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H,dcc,;.xxxi* 


XKXX*XX>*XXXXXXXX 

rut 
T    I    T    U    T    I    d    N 

O    F       THE 

States  of  America*, 


*     E     A    M    B    L    E. 

eople  of  the  United  States,  in  order  t# 

:\  n  ore  per  fe£r,  union,  eftablifh  juftice,  in* 

nquility,  provide  for  the  common  defence, 

eral  welfare,  and  fecure  the  hleffings  of 

its  and  our  pofterity,  do  ordain  and  eita- 

Li  ,         tution  for  the  United  States  of  America* 

Article    I, 

4  ft  fj  S  E     of    REPRESENTATIVES. 
:  I.     4    LL  legiflative  powers  herein  granted  fhall, 
be  veiled  in  a  Congrefs  of  the  United  States, 
nfift  of  a  Senate  and  Houfe  of  Reprefenta- 

lie  Hou&Vf  Rcpicf-p stives  ftiall  be  comp 
rs  chofen  every  fecond  yeW  by  the  f 

ites,  and.  the  electors  in  each  fta( 
ions  reqinTite  for  ele&orspf  tjle 

of  the  ft  ate  Legiuature.     "  xs 
i  (ha*!  fee  a  Reprefentative  wJ 
the  age  of  twenty-five  years, 
zen  of  the  United  States,  ac 
ed,  he  an  inhabitant  of  that 
chofen. 
;ntatives  and  dire&  taxes  fl 
e  feveral  ftates  which  may  be 
i,     cording  to  their  refpecliven^ 
4?;te;"sr  ied  by  adding  to  the  w^oK 


fdns,  including  thofe  bound  to  fervice  for  a  term  f  year  j, 
and  excluding  Indians  not  taxed,  three-fifths  of  \[\  other 
perfons.  The  a&ual  enumeration  (hall  be  mad<  withii 
three  years  after  the  firft  meeting  of  the  Congtei  of  the 
United  States,  and  within  every  fubfequent  term  of  ten 
years,  in  fuch  manner  as  they  {hall  by  law  dire£\  The 
number  of  Reipreferitatives  mall  not  exceed  one  fo  ever/ 
thirty  thoufand/  but  each  ftate  (hall  have  at  leaft  ofc  Re- 
presentative $  and  until  fuch  enumeration  (hall  be  nade, 
the  ftate  of  New-Hampfhire  fhall  be  entitled  to  Qoofe 
three,  Maflachufetts  eight,  Rhode-Ifland  and  Provi<ence 
Plantations  one,  Connecticut  five,  New- York  fix,  I^w- 
Jerfey  four,  Pennfylvania  eight,  Delaware  one,  Marjjand 
lix,  Virginia  ten,  North-Carolina  five,  South-Carolinaf.lve, 
and  Georgia  three. 

When  vacancies  happen  in  the  reprefentation  fro  it  jmy 
l\ate,  the  executive  authority  thereof  fhall  iffue  wiitJof 
election  to  fill  fuch  vacancies. 

The  Houfe  of  Reprefentatives  (hall  choofe  their  Speaks 
and  other  officers  5  and  fhall  have  the  fote  power  of  inr 
peach  ment. 

SENATE. 
Seft.  III.  The  Senate  of  the  United  States  fhall  be  com- 
posed of  two  Senators  from  each  ftate,  chofen  by  the  Le- 
gislature thereof,  for  fix  years ;  and  each  Senator  fhall  have 
*ie  vote. 
Immediately  after  they  fhall  be  aflembled  in  confequenc* 
v  che  firft  eleclion,  they  fhall  be  divided  as  equally  as  ma) 
*hto  three  clafles.     The  feats  of  |he  Senators  of  the 
^A  fhall  be  vac»*rJ  *"•  lhe  expirarion  of  the  feconj 
fecomi  c  afs  at  the  expiration  of  the  fourth 
he  thrd  clafs  at  the  expiration  of  the  fixth 
Xfrd  may  be  chofen  every  fecond  year  5 
xpprn  by  refignation,  or  otherwife,  du- 
he  Legiflature  of  any  ftate,  the  Exe- 
Imake  temporary  appointments  until 
^he  Legiflature,  which  fhall  then  fill 

Senator  who  fhall  not  have  attained 

ars;  and  been  nine  years  a  citizen 

xnd  who  fhall  not,  when  eMed, 

\m  for  which  he  fliall  be  chofen. 


o.iie  Vice-Prefident  of  the  United  States  {hall  be  Prefi- 
aent  of  the  Senate,  but  (hall  have  no  vote,  unlefs  they  be* 
equally  divided. 

The  Senate  (hall  choofe  their  other  officers,  and  alfo  & 
Prefident  pro  tempore,  in  the  abfence  of  the  Vice-Prefi- 
dent, or  when  he  {hall  exercife  the  office  of  Prefident  of' 
the  United  States. 

The  Senate  (hall  have  the  fole  power  to  try  all  impeach* 
ments.     When  fitting  for  that  purpofe,  they  fhall  be  on,r 
oath  or  affirmation.     When  the  Prefident  of  the  United' 
Sta,  ~s  is  tried,  the  Chief-Juftice  fhall  prefide :  And  no 
perfon  (hall  be  convicted  without  the  concurrence  of  two- 
thirds  of  the  members  prefent. 

Judgment  in  cafes  of  impeachment,  (hall  not  extend 
further  than  to  removal  from  office,  and  disqualification, 
to  hold  and  enjoy  any  office  of  honour,  tcuft  or  profit  un- 
der the  United  States;  but  the  party  convicted  (hall  ne- 
verthelefs  be  liable  and  fubjeel:  to  indictment,  trial,  judg-. 
ment  and  punifliment,  according  to  law. 

Seft.  IV.  The  times,  places   and  manner  of  holding - 
elections  for  Senators  and  Reprefentatives,  (hall  be  pre* 
fcribed  in  each  (late  by  the  Legiflature  thereof;  but  the* 
the  Congrefs  may  at  any  time  by  law  make  or  alter  fuch 
^regulations,  except  as  to  the  places  of  choofing  Senators. 
GENERAL    CONGRESS. 

The  Congrefs  (hall  aflemble  at  lead  once  in  every  year  j/o 
and  fuch  meeting  fhall  be  on  the  firft  Monday  in  Decem-es 
ber,  unlefs  ttaey  (nail  by  law  appoint  a  different  day.         ft- 

Seff.  V.  Each  Houfe  (hall  be  the  judge  of  the  elections iCC 
returns  and  qualifications  of  its  own  membe  --»,  and  a  r  -nors 
jority  of  each  (hall  conftitute  a  quorum  to  doibuGne  writ- 
but  a  fmaller  number  mav  adjourn  from  day  to  day,  aridto 
may  be  authorifed  to  compel  the  attendance  of  abfent 
members,  in  fuch  manner,  and  under  fuch  penalties  as 
each  Houfe  may  provide. 

Each  Houfe  may  determine  the  rules  of  its  proceedings, 
puni(h  its  members  for  disorderly  behaviour,  and,  with  the 
concurrence  of  two-thirds,  expel  a  member. 

Each  R:>ufe  (hall  keep  a  journal  of  its  proceedings,  and  I 
from  time  to  time  publiffi  the  fame,  excepting  fuch  parts 
as  may  in*  their  judgment  require  fecrecy — And  the  yeas  . 
a&d  nap  of  the  members  of  cither  tioufe,  on  any  quefr ; 

tion. 


fion,  thall,  at.  the  cjefire  of  brte-fifth  of  thofe  prefen**  te 
entered  en  the  journal. 

Neither  Houfe,  during  the  feffion  of  Congrefs,  (hdll, 
without  the  confent  of  the  other,  adjourn  for  more  than 
three  days,  nor  to  any  Other  place  than  that  in  which  the 
two  Houfes  {hall  be  iltting. 

SeB.  VI.  The  Senators  and  fteprefentatives  (hall  x& 
ceive  a  compenfation  for  their  fervices,  to  be  afcertained 
by  law,  and  paid  out  of  the  treafury  Of  the  United  States* 
They  (hall,  in  all  cafes,  except  treafon,  felony  and  breach 
of  the  peace,  be  privileged  from  arreft  during  the'.,  at- 
tendance at  the  feffion  of  their  refpe&ive  Houfef,  and  in 
going  to  and  returning  from  the  fame  ;  and  for  any  fpeech 
or  debate  in  either  houfe,  the*  (hall  Rot  be  iqueih'oned  in 
any  other  place. 

No  Senator  or  fee'pretent&ive  than*,  during  the  time 
for  which  he  was  elected,  be  appointed  to  any  civil  office 
tinder  the  authority  of  the  United  States,  which  (hall  have 
been  created,  or  the  emoluments  whereof  (hall  have  been 
encreafed  during  fuch  time  ;  and  no  perfon  holding  any 
office  under  the  United  States,  {hall  be  a  member  of  el* 
ther  Houfe,  during  his  continuance  in  office. 
P  O  W  E  R  S  of  CONGRESS. 
SeB.  VII,  All  bHls  for  raifing  revenue  (hall  originate  in 
the  Houfe  of  Representatives  ;  but  the  Senate  may  pro- 

ofe  or  concur  with  amendments  as  on  other  bills. 
Every  bill  which  (hall  have  paifed  the  Houfe  of  Repre* 

mtatives  and  the  Senate,  (hall,  before  it  become  a  law, 

«!  prefented  to  the  Prefident  of  "the  United  States  :  If  he 
irove  he  (V  II  fign  it,  but  if  not,  he  (hall  returii  it,  with 
_..  .Qions,  to  that  Houfe  in  which  it  (hall  have  origi- 
nated,* who  (hall  enter  the  objections  at  large  on  their 
journal,  and  proceed  to  reconfidcr  it.  If  after  fuch  re- 
confideration,  two-thirds  of  that  Houfe  fhall  agree  to  pafs 
the  bill,  it  (hall  be  fent,  together  with  the  obje&ions,  to 
the  other  Houfe,  by  which  it  (hall  likewife  be  reconfidered, 
and  if  approved  by  two-thirds  of  that  Houfe,  it  (hall  be- 
come a  law.  But  in  all  fuch  cafes,  the  votes  of  both 
Houfes  (hall  be  determined  by  yeas  and  nays,  and  the 
names  of  the  perfons  voting  for  and  againft  the  bill,  (hall 
be  entered  on  the  journal  of  each  Houfe  refpeCtively.  tf 
#ay  bill  (hall  not  be  returned  by  the  Prefident  within  \&% 


(    7     > 

«tay§  (Sundays  excepted)  after  it  (hall  have  been  preferred 
%o  him,  the  fame  (hall  be  a  law  in  like  manner  as  if  he 
had  figned  it,  unlefs  the  Congrefs,  by  their  adjournment, 
prevent  its  return — in  which  cafe  it  (hall  not  be  a  law. 

Every  order,  refolution,  or  vote,  to  which  the  concur* 
rence  of  the  Senate  and  Houfe  of  Reprefentatives  may  be 
neceflary,  (except  on  a  queftion  of  adjournment)  iliall  be 
prefented  to  the  Prefident  of  the  United  States  j  and  be- 
fore the  fame  iliall  take  effect,  fhall  be  approved  by  him, 
or,  being  difapproved  by  him,  iliall  be  rcpaffed  by  two- 
thirds  of  the  Senate  and  Houfe  of  Reprefentatives,  ac* 
Cording  to  the  rules  and  limitations  prescribed  in  the  cafe 
Of  a  bill. 

Seft.  VIII.  The  Congrefs  (hall  have  power  to  lay  and 
solledi  taxes,  duties,  impofts  and  excifes,  to  pay  the  debts 
and  provide  for,  the  common  defence  and  general  welfare 
of  the  United  S.tatea  :  But  all  duties,  impofts  and  excifes 
iliall  be  uniform  throughout  the  United  States— To  bor- 
row money  on  the  credit  of  the  United  States — To  regu- 
late commerce  with  foreign  nations,  and  among  the  feve- 
jal   flates,  and  with  the  Indian  tribes — To  eftabliih  an  u- 
niform  rule  of  naturalization,  and  uniform  laws  on  the 
,  fubjecl:  of  bankruptcies  throughout  the  United  States — 
To  coin  money,  regulate  the  value  thereof,  and  of  foreign 
coin,  and  fix  the  flandard  of  weights  and  meafures — To) 
provide  for  the  punifhment  of  counterfeiting  the  fecurities 
and  current  coin  of  the  United  States — To  eftablifti  poft- 
©ffices  and  poft-roads  —To  promote  the  progrefs  of  fcience 
and  ufeful  arts,  by  fecuring  for  limited  times  to  author* 
and  inventors,  the  exclufive  right  to  their  refpe£Hve  writ- 
ings and  difcovcries — To  conftitute  tribunals  inferior  to 
the  Supreme  Court — To  define  and  punifh  piracies  and  fe- 
lonies committed  on  the  high  feas,and  offences  againft  the 
law  of  nations — To  declare  war,  grant  letters  of  marque  and 
xeprifal,  and  make  rules  concerning  captures  on  land  and 
water — To  raife  and  fupport  armies  j  but  no  appropriation 
of  money  to  that  ufe  fhall  be  for  a  longer  term  than  two 
years — To  provide  and  maintain  a  navy — >To  make  rules 
for  the  government  and  regulation  of  the  land  and  naval 
forces — To  provide  for  calling  forth  the  militia  to  exe- 
cute the  laws  of  the   union,  fupprefs  infiirre&ions   and 
fepel  iavafioa^To  provide  foy  organizing,  arming  and 

disciplining 


i  •  •) 

tfifciptming  the  militia,  and  for  governing  fuch  part  cf 
tnem  as  may  be  employed  in  the  fer vice  of  the  United^ 
States,  referving  to  the  ftates  refpeclively,  the  appoint- 
mentof  the  officers,  and  the  authority  of  training  the  militia, 
"according  to  the  discipline  prefcribed  by  Gongrefs — To. 
exercife  exclufive  legitimation  in  all  cafes  whatsoever,  over 
fetch  diftri£V,  (not  exceeding  ten  miles  fquare)  as  may  by 
ceflion  of  particular  ftates,  and  the  acceptance  of  Con- 
grefs,  become  the  feat  of  the  government  of  the  United 
States  ;  ami  to  exercife  like  authority  over  all  places  pur* 
chafed  by  the  confent  of  the  Legiilature  of  the  ftate  in 
which  the  fame  mall  be,  for  the  erection  of  forts,  maga- 
zines, arfenals,  dock-yards.,  and  other  needful  buildings  % 
ancj  to  make  all  laws  which  (hall  be  necefTary  and  proper 
fo^  carrying  into  execution  the  foregoing  powers,  and  all 
other  powers  vefted  by  this  Confutation  in  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States^  or  in  any  department  or  of* 
ficer  thereof. 

RESTRICTIONS     upon     CONGRESS. 

Seel.  IX.  The  migration  or  importation  of  fuch  perfona 
as  any  of  the  ftates  now  exifting  ihall  think  proper  to  ad- 
mit, (hall  not  be  prohibited  by  the  Congrefs  prior  to  the 
year  one  thoufand  eight  hundred  and  eight,  but  a  tax  or 
duty  may  be  impofed  on  fuch  importation,  not  exceeding 
ten  dollars  for  each  perfon. 

The  privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  fhall  not  be 
fufpended,  unlefs  when  in  cafe?  of  rebellion  or  invafion 
the  public  fafety  may  require  it. 

No  bill  of  attainder*  or  expoftfaclo  law  {hall  be  pafledf. 

No  capitation  or  other  diredt  tax  fhall  be  laid,  unlefa 
in  proportion  to  the  cenfus  or  enumeration  herein  before; 
<lire£ted  to  be  taken. 

No  tax  or  duty  fhall  be  laid  on  articles  exported  from 
any  ftate.  No  preference  {hall  be  given  by  any  regulation 
of  commerce  or  revenue  to  the  ports  of  one  ftate  over 
thofe  of  another ;  nor  fhall  veflels  bound  to  or  from  one 
ifcate,  be  obliged  to  enter,  clear,  or  pay  duties  in  another.. 
•  No  money  fhall  be  drawn  from  the  treafury,  but  in  con- 
lequenee  of  appropriations  made  by  law ;  and  a  regular 
itatement  and  account  of  the  receipts  and  expenditures  o£ 
ill  public  money  fhall  be  publifhed  from  time  to  time. 
J   ???  ^e  ?*  ^^ty  ftaU  &c  granted by  the  United  States;, 


(    9') 

^nd  no  perfon  holclin^ny  ofRce  of  profit  or  truft  under 
them,  (hall,  without  the  confent  of  Congrefs,  accept  of 
any  prefent,  emolument,  office,  or  title,  of  any  kind  what-* 
ever,  from  any  King,  Prince,  or  foreign  (late. 
RESTRIC.TlONs'u^ON  RESPECTIVE  STATES. 
Sect.  X.  No  ftate  ihall  enter  into  any  treaty,  alliance  or 
confederation  ;  grant  letters  of  marque  and  reprifal ;  coin 
money  ;  emit  bills  qf  credit;  make  any  thing  but  gold  and 
filler  coin  a  tender  in  payment  of  debts;  pafs  a  ay  bill  of* 
attainder,  ex  pojl  fat'h  law,  or  law  impairing  the  obligati- 
on of  contracts*  or  grant  any  title  of  nobility. 

No  (late  (hall,  without  the  confent  of  the  Congrefs,  lay  any 
impofis  or  duties  on  imports  and  ej^ports,  except  what  may- 
be abfolutely  neceffary  for  executing  its  infpe£tion  laws; 
and  the  net  produce  of  all  duties  and  imports  laid  by  any 
ftate  on  imports  or  exports,  (hall  be  for  the  ufe  of  the 
treafury  of  the  United  States  ;  and  all  fuch  laws  (hall  be 
fubje£fc  to  the  revifionand  controul  of  the  Congrefs,  No. 
ftate  (hall,  without  the  confent  of  Congrefs,  lay  any  duty 
of  tonnage,  keep  troops  or  fhips  of  war  in  time  of  peace, 
enter  into  any  agreement  or  compact  with  another  date, 
or  with  a  foreign  power,  or  engage  in  war,  unlefs  actu- 
ally invaded,  or  in  fuch  imminent  danger  as  will  not  ad- 
mit of  delay. 

Article    II. 
PRESIDENT. 

Sett  I.  The  executive  power  Ihall  be  vefted  m  a  P**e{f- 
dent  of  the  United  States  of  America.  He  (hall  hol<j 
his  dfftee'dujfirigj  the  ter.nof»four  years,  and,  together 
with  the  Viee-Frefident,  chofen  for  the  fame  term,  be 
elected  as  follows: 

Each  ftate  flaajl  appoint,  in  fuch  manner  as  the  Legisla- 
ture thereof  may  diredt,  a  number  of  Electors,  equal  to 
the  whole  number  of  Senators  and  Reprefentativrs  to  whidj 
the  ftate  may  be  entitled  in  the  Congrefs  :  But  no  Senator  off 
Representative,  or  ptrfon  holding  an  office  of  trud  or  profit 
under  the  United  States,  f!  all  be  appointed  an  Elector. 

The  Electors  Ihall  meet  in  their  refpe£rive  ftat<  ss  anc( 
Vote  by  ballot  for  two  perfons,  ot  whom  one  at  le  ft  (haj^ 
not  be  an  inhabitant  of  the  fame  (late  with  then fe "vcs. 
iVn«1  they  (hall  make  a  lift  of  all  the  perfons  voted  for,  and 
ft  &e  number  of  votes  for  each;  wiiich  lilt" $hey  (hall  %oj 

ft  m* 


{       IO      ) 


■and  cert.fy,  and  tranfmit,  fealed,  to  the  feat  of  the  mmn- 
went  of  the  United  States,  directed  to  the  Prefident  of 
the  Senate.      1  he  Prefident  of  the  Senate  fhall,  in  the  pre- 
fence  of  the  Senate  and  Houfe  of  Reprefentatives,  open  all 
the  certificates,  and  the  votes  fhall  then  he  counted.    The 
perfon  having  the  greateft  number  of  votes  (hall  be  the  'Pre- 
f.dent    if  fuch  number  be  a  majority  of  the  whole  num- 
ber of  Electors  appointed ;  and  if  there  be  more  than  one 
who  have  fuch   majority,  and  have  an   equal   number  of 
votes,  then  the   Houfe  of  Reprefentatives  (hall  immedi- 
ately choof,  by  ballot  one  of  them  for  Prefident;  and  if 
no  perfon  have  a   majority,  then  from  the  five  h.gheft  ,n 
the  lift,  the  faid  Houfe   (hall  in    like   manner  choofe  the 
Prefaknt.     But  m  choofing  the  Prefident,  the  votes  fhall 
be  taken  by  dates,  the  reprefentation  from  each  date  hav- 
ing one  vote  :  a  quorum  for  this  purpofe  (hall  confift  of  a 
member  or  memDers  from  twothirdsof  the  dates,  and  a 
majority  of  all  the  dates  fhall  be  neceffary  to  a  choice.     In 
every  cafe,  after  the  choice  of  the  Prefident,  the  perfon 
having  the  greateft  number  of  votes  of  the  EMors,  fhall 
be  the  \  ,ce  Prefident      But  if  there  fhould  remain  two  or 
more  who  have  equal  votes,  the  Senate  fhall  choofe  from 
them  by  ballot  the  Vice-Prefident. 
_  The  Congrefs  may  determine  the  time  of  choofing  the 

which  day  fhall  be  the  fame  throughout  the  United  States! 

No  perfon,  except  a  natural  born  citizen,  or  a  ci- 
tizen of  the  U.nted  States,  at  the  time  of  the  adoption 
of  this  conftitunon,  fhall  be  eligible  to  the  office  of  Pre- 
fident;  neither  fhall  any  perfon  be  eligible  to  that  office 
•who  (hall  not  have  attained  to  the  age  of  thirty-five  years, 
and  been  fourteen  years  a  refident  within  the  United  States! 

In  cafe  of  the  removal  of  the  Prefident  from  office,  or 
t>t  his  death,  refignation  or  inability  to  difcharge  the  pow- 
ers and  dut.es  af  the  foid  office,  the  fame  fhall  devolve  om 
the  Vice-Prefident ;  and  the  Congrefs  may  by  law  provide 
for  the  cafe  of  removal,  death,  refignation  or  inability, 
ffi  fl^f  tKMeitt  and  Vice-Prefident,  declaring  what 
officer  (hall  then  al  as  Prefident,  and  fuch  officer  fhall  aft 

Sta£&2& difabilitybe  — d>  - p- 


The 


(  »  ) 

The  Prefident  fhall,  at  Rated  times,  receive  for  hi*  fcr- 
vices,  a  compenfation,  which  fhali  neither  be  encreafed 
nor  diminiffied  during  the  period  for  which  he  ftiall  have 
been  elected,  and  he  ihail  not  receive  within  that  period 
any  other  emolument  from  the  United  States,  or  any  of 
them. 

Before  he  enters  on  the  execution  of  his  office,  he  (hall 
fcake  the  following  oath  or  affirmation  : 

**  I  do  folemnly  fw.  ar  (or  affirm)  that  I  will  faithfully 
"  execute  the  office  of  Prefident  of  the  United  States,  and 
s<  will  to  the  belt  of  my  ability,  preferve,  protect  and  de- 
u  fend  the  gonflitution  of  the  United  States." 

Sea.  II.  The  Prefident  mall  be  Commander  in  Chief 
of  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the 
militia  of  the  feveral  Hates,  when  called  into  the  actual 
fervice  of  the  United  States  ;  he  may  require  the  opini- 
on, in  writing,  of  the  principal  officer  in  each  of  the 
Executive  departments,  upon  any  fubjecTt  relating  to  the 
duties  of  their  refpe£live  offices,  and  he  (hall  have  powec 
to  grant  reprieves  and  pardons  for  offences  againft  the 
United  States,  except  in  cafes  of  impeachment. 

He  (hall  have  power,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  con- 
fent  of  the  Senate,  to  make  treaties,  provided  t«ro-third$ 
of  tlae  Senators  prefent  concur  :  And  he  (hall  nominate* 
and  by  and  with  the  advice  and  content  of  the  S;  nate? 
fhall  appoint  AmbalTadors,  other  public  Minilters  and 
Confute,  Judges  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  all  other  of- 
ficers of  the  United  States,  whofe  appointments  are  not 
herein  otherwife  provided  for,  and  which  (hall  be  elta- 
bliffied  bylaw.  But  the  Congrefs  may  by  law  veil  the 
appointment  of  fuch  inferior  officers,  as  they  think  pro- 
per, in  the  Prefident  alone,  in  the  courts  of  law,  01  in 
the  heads  of  departments. 

The  Prefident  thall  have  power  to  fill  up  alt  vacancies 
that  may  happen  during  the  recefs  of  the  Senate,  by 
granting  commiffions,  which  (hall  expire  at  the  end  of  their 
next  fefiipn. 

Se3  III.  He  (hall  from  time  to  time  give  to  the  Con- 
grefs information  of  the  date  of  the  union,  and  recom- 
mend to  their  confideratipn  fuch  meafures  as  he  (hall  judge 
nectflarv  and  expedient ;  he  may,  on  extraordinary  occa- 
fcoas,  CQavene  both  Houfos,  ox  tuber  of  them,  and  i« 

mfo 


(      *2      ) 

fcafe  of  disagreement  between  them,  with  refpecl  fo  the 
tnre  of  adjournment,  he  mav  adjourn  them  to  fuch  time 
Ss  he  (hall  think  proper  *,  he  ihall  receive  Ambaffadors  and 
other  public  Minifters;  he  ftiaii  take  care  that  the  laws 
be  faithfully  executed,  and  fhali  commifFion  all  the  of- 
ficers of  the  United  States. 

Sect.  IV.  The  Prefident,  Vice-FrelMent  and  all  civil 
officers  of  the  United  States,  ihall  be  removed  from  of- 
fice on  impeachment  for^  and  conviction  of,  treafon,  bri- 
bery, or  other  high  crimes  and  mifdemeanors. 

A  r   t  i  c  L  fe     III. 

JUDICI  A  R  y. 

Seel,  I.  The  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  (hall 
be  veiled  in  one  Supreme  Court,  and  in  fuch  Inferior 
Courts  as  the  Congrefs  may  from  time  to  time  ordain  and 
eftnblith.  The  judges,  both  of  the  Supreme  and  Inferior 
Courts,  (hall  hold  their  offices  during  good  behaviour,  and 
fhail,  at  dated  times,  receive  for  their  fervices,  a  com- 
j>enfa'tion,  which  (halt  not  be  diminifhed  during  their  con- 
tinuance in  office. 

,  Seel.  II.  The  Judicial  power  mall  extend  to  all  cafes,  in 
law  and  equity,  arillng  under  this  Conltituticn,  the  laws 
of  the  United  States,  and  treaties  made,  or  which  ill  all 
be  made,  under  their  authority — To  all  cafes  affecling 
Amhaffadors>»  other  public  Ministers  and  Confuls — To  all 
cafes  of  admiralty  and  maritime  jurifdiclion — To  contro- 
verfies  to  which  the  United  States  mall  be  a  £arty — To 
comroverfies  between  two  or  more  ftates — between  a  ftate 
and  citizens  of  another  ftate  —between  citizens  of  differ- 
ent ftates — between  citizens  of  the  fame  ftate  claiming 
lands  under  crams  of  different  ftates- — and  between  a  ftate, 
'or  the  citizens  thereof,  and  foreign  ftates,  citizens  or 
fubjecls. 

In  all  cafes  affe&ing  Ambafladors,  other  public  Mini- 
fters and  Confuls,  and  thofe  in  which  a  ftate  lhall  be  a 
rrtv,  the  Supreme  Court  fhall  have  original  jurifdi£tion. 
*n  all  the  other  cafes  before  mentioned,  the  Supreme  Court 
ifhall  have  apnellate  jurifdiclion,  both  as  to  law  and  fatl^ 
xvhh  fu ch  exceptions,  and  under  fuch  regulations,  as  the 
Gopgrefs  nhall  make. 

The  trial  of  all  crimes,  except  in  cafes  of  impeach- 
feent, '-fhail  be  by  jury,  arj4  fuch  trial  ihall  be  held  in  the 

fete 


(     *3     ) 

fjUte  where  the  fsjid  crime  {hall  have  beeii  committed  ;^* 
but  when  not  committed  within  any  ftate,  the  trial  (hall 
be  at  fuch  place  or  places  as  the  Congrefs  may  by  lavf 
have  directed. 

Serf.  III.  Treafon  ag?inft  the  United  States  (hall  confifl 
only  in  levying  war  agaiwft  them,  or  in  adhering  to  thejr 
enemies,  giving  them  aid  and  comfort.  No  perfon  fhall 
be  convicted  of  treafon  unlefs  on  the  teftimony  of  two 
•witneiTes  to  the  fame  overt  act,  or  on  confeflion  in  opea 
Court.  > 

The  Congrefs  fhall  have.|>Ower  to  declare  the  punifh- 
ment  of  treafon  ;  but  no  attainder  of  treafon  (hall  work 
corruption  of  blood,  or  forfeiture,  except  during  the  life 
©f  the  perfon  attainted. 

Article     IV. 

Seel.1.  Full  faith  and  credit  (hall  be  given  in  each  (rate 
lathe  public  acls,  records  and  judicial  proceedings  of  e- 
very  other  ftate  :  And  the  Congrefs  may,  by  general  laws, 
prefcribe  the  manner  in  which  fuch  acls,-  records  and  pro- 
ceedings fhall  be  proved,  and  the  p.ffe&  thereof. 

Seel.  II.  The  citizens  of  each  ftate  '-'{hall  be  entitled  to 
all  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  in  the  feveral 
ftates. 

A  perfon  charged  in  an'y  ftate  with  treafon,  felony,  or 
other  crime,  who  mail  flee  from  juftke,  and  be  found  m 
another  ftate,  fhall,  on  dlmand  of  the  Executive  authori- 
ty of  the  ftate  from  which  he  fled,  be  delivered  up,- to  be' 
removed  to  the  ftate  having  jurifdicXion  of  the  crime. 

No  perfon  held  to  fervice  or  labour  in  one  ftate,  under 
the  laws  thereof,  efcaping  into  another,  dial!,  in  conf  - 
quence  of  any  law  or  regulation  therein,  be  difcharged 
from  fuch  fervice  or  labour,  but  fhall  be  delivered  up,  oa 
claim  of  the  party  to  whom  fuch  fervice. or  labour  may  be 
dug. 

GENERAL    REGULATIONS.. 

Seel.  III.  New  ftates  may  be  admitted  by  the  Conpref# 
into  this  union ;  but  no  new  ftate  fhall  be  formed  cr  erect, 
ed, within  the  jurifdiclion  of  anvother  ftate;  .n.-.-r  any  flits 
be  formed  by  the  junction  of  two  or  more  (lad  s  or  pprtj 
of  ftates,  without  the  confent  of  the  Le?'flature*  of  the- 
Hates  concerned  as  well  as  of  the  Congrefs, 


(     M     ) 

The  Congrefs  mail  have  power  to  difpofe  of  and  make  a$ 
lieedtul  rulesand  regulations  refpettmgche  territory  or  other 
property  belonging  to  the  United  States;  and  nothing  in 
this' Conftitution  ihail  be  fo  conftrued  as  to  prejudice  any 
•iaims  of  the  United  States,  or  or  any  particular  ftate. 

Serf.  TV.  The  United  otates  lhall  guarantee  to  every 
ftate  in  this  union  a  republican  form  or  government,  and 
ihail  protect  each  of  them  againft  invaiion-,  ana  on  appli- 
cation of  the  l>egiflature,  or  of  the  Executive  (wncn  the- 
Legiflature  cannot  be  convened)  again  it  domeftie  violence^ 

ARTICLE  V. 
AMENDMENT*  PROVIDED  FOR. 
The  Congrefs,  whenever  two- thirds  of  both  Houfe& 
{hall  deem  ic  necellary,  (hall  propoie  amendments  to  this 
Conftitution,  or,  on  the  application  of  the  Legiflatures 
of  two-thirds  of  the  ieverai  itates,  lhall  call  a  Conventi- 
on for  propoiing  amendments*,  which,'  in  either  cafe,  ihall 
b:-  valid  to  all  intents  ana1  purpofes,  as  part  of  this  Con- 
ftitution, when  ratified  by  the  .Leg  ill  a  cures  of  three -rourths 
of  the  feveral  ftates,  or  by  Conventions  in  three-fourths 
thereof,  as  the  one  or  the  other  mode  of  ratification  may- 
be propofed  by  the  Congrefs  $  Provided  that  no  amend- 
ment which  may  be  made  prior  to  the  year  one  thouiand 
eight  hundred  and  Bight,  ihaii  in  any  manner  affeU  tire 
firft  and  fourth  claufes  in  the  ninth  fpttion  of  the  firit  ar- 
ticle ;  and  that  no  itate,  withoutvfts  confent,  ihail  be  de- 
prived of  jts  equal   fuffrage  in  the  Senate, 

Article    VI. 

♦        GENERAL     REGULATIONS. 

All  debts  contracted,  and  engagements  entered  into^ 
before  the  adoption  of  this  Conftitution,  (hall  be  as  valid 
againft  the  United  States  under  this  Conftitution,  as  un-» 
dtr  the  Confederation. 

This  Conftitution,  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
which  lhall  be  made  in  purfuance  thereof;  and  all  treaties 
made,  or  which  (hall  be  made,  under  the  authority  of  the 
United  States,  (hall  be  the  fupreme  law  of  the  land  ;  and 
the  Judges  in  every  ftate  (hall  be  bound  thereby ;  any 
thing  in  the  Conftitution  or  laws  of  any  ftate  to  the  con* 
trary  notwithftanding. 

The  Senators  and  Representatives  before  mentioned, 
and  the  ^embers  of  the  ieverai  itate  L^ulatures,  and  all 

Executive 


(    *s   ) 

©xecutTve  and  Judicial  officers,  both  of  the  TTnited  State* 
and  of  the  feveral  iiates,  fhaii  be  bound  by  oath  or  \ffirw 
mation,  to  fupport  this  Conftitution  ;  but  no  religious  tcfl 
(hall  ever  be  required  as  a  qualification  to  any  oiBcc  09 
public  truft  under  the  United  States, 

Article     VH. 

The  ratification  of  the  Conventions  of  nine  dates,  (halt 
be  fufficient  for  the  efbblifhment  of  this  Conititution  be* 
tween  the  dates  fo  ratifying  the  fame. 

DONE  in  Convention*  by  the  unanimout  confent  of  the 
Jlates  prefent,  the  Seventeenth  day  of  September,  in  the 
year  of  our  Lord  one  thoufand /even  hundred  and  eighty- 
feven,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the  United  States  of 
America  the  twelfth.  In  witnefs  whereof  we  have  her+> 
>$nto  fubfcribed  our  names. 

GEORGE    WASHINGTON, 

Prefident,  and  Deputy  from  Vhgime^ 

New-Hampshire, 
^fih^J.angdon,   Nicholas  Gilman. 

Massachusetts, 

Nathaniel  Gorham>    Rufus  King. 

Connecticut, 

William  Samuel  John/on ,   Roger  Shermaak 

New-York, 

Alexander  Hamilton. 

New -Jersey, 

William  Livtngfon,  David  Brearley,  William  Patter/fo$ 

Jonathan  Daytsn. 

Pennsylvania, 

Benjamin  Franklin,  Thomas  Mifflin,  Robert  Morris,  George 

Ctymer,  Thomas  Fitzftmons,  Jared  Ingerfoll,  James 

Wilfon,  Gouverneur  Morris. 

Delaware, 

George   Ready    Gunning    Bedford,  jun.    John    Dickenfoni 

Richard  Baffett,    Jacob  Broom. 

Maryland, 

Jama  M< Henry,  Daniel  of  St   Thomas  Jennifer,  Danitf 

Carrol. 

Virginia, 

John  Blair,  Jamu  Madifotty  jw 

No&Tsr- 


(  I*  ) 

North-Carolina, 
William  Blount,  Richard  Dobbs  Spmgkt,  Hugh  WilliamJou. 

South-Carolina, 

'John  Rutledge,  Chales  C.  Pinckney,  Charles  Pincbieyy  Pierce 

■  J  Butler. 

Georgia, 

William  Few,  Abraham  Baldwin, 

'    tfttejf.    WILLIAM  JACKSON,  Secret AR¥i 


In      CONVENTION, 

Monday,  September  17,  1787. 

P     R     E    S     E    N    T, 

The  States  of  New-Hampfhire,  MaflTachufetts,  Connecti- 
cut, Mr.  Hamilton  from  New- York,  New-Jerfey,  Penn-? 
fylvania,  Delaware,  Maryland,  Virginia,  North- Caro- 
lina, South -Carolina,  and  Georgia. 

Refofved} 

THAT  the  preceding  Conftitution  be  laid  before  the 
United  States  in  Congrefs  afTemhled,  and  that  it  is 
the  opinion  of  this  Convention,  that  it  ihould  afterwards 
be  fubmitted  to  a  Convention  of  Delegates,  chofen  in  each 
ftate  by  the  people  thereof,  under  the  recommendation  of 
its  Legiflature,  for  their  affent  and  ratification;  and  that: 
each  Convention  Renting  to,  and  ratifying  the  fame, 
fhould  give  notice  thereof  to  the  United  States  in  Congrefs 
aflembled. 

Refolvedy  That  it  is  the  opinion  of  this  Convention,  that 
as  loon  as  the  Conventions  of  nine  ftates  (hall  have  rati- 
fied this  Conftitution,  the  United  States  in  Congrefs  af- 
fembled  fhould  fix  a  day  on  which  Electors  ihould  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  ftates  which  (hall  have  ratified  the  fame, 
and  a  day  on  which  the  Electors  fhould  affemble  to  vote 
for  the  Prefident,  and  the  time  and  place  for  commencing 
proceedings  under  this  Conftitution.  That  after  fuch 
publication  the  Electors  fhould  be  appointed,  and  the  Se- 
nators and  Reprefentatives  elected  :  That  {ne  Electors 
fi^U  ronton  the  day  fixed  for  the  eleftioa  of  the  Pre? 


C    37    ; 

Gdent,  and  fhould  tranfmit  their  votes  certified,  figned, 
fealed  and  dire£ted,  as  the  Conftitution  requires,  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  United  States  in  Congrefs  affembled : 
That  the  Senators  and  Reprefentatives  fhould  convene  at 
the  time  and  place  affigned  :  That  the  Senators  and  Re- 
prefentatives fhould  appoint  a  Prefidentof  the  Senate,  foy 
the  iqle  purpofe  of  receiving,  opening  and  counting  the 
votes  for  Preiident:  And,  that  after  he  fhall  be  chofen,  the 
Congrefs,  together  with  the  Prefident,  (hould  without  de* 
3ay,  proceed  to  execute  this  Conftitution. 

By  the  unanimous  order  of  the  Convention, 

GEORGE  WASHINGTON,  President, 

William  Jackson,  Secretary. 


In  CONVENTION,  September  17,  1787, 
SIR, 

WE  have  now  the  honour  to  fubmit  to  the  confederation  of  th$ 
United  States  in  Congrefs  affembled,  that  conftitution  which] 
has  appeared  to  us  the  moil  advifeable. 

The  friends  of  our  country  have  long  feen  and  defired,  that  the  pow- 
er of  making  war,  peace  and  treaties,  that  of  levying  money  and  re- 
gulating commerce,  and  the  correfpondent  executive  and  judicial 
authorities  fhould  be  fully  and  effectually  vefted  in  the  general  govern- 
ment of  the  union  :  but  the  impropriety  of  delegating  fuch  extenfiv« 
tin  it  to  one  body  of  men  is  evident — hence  refults  the  neceflity  of  4 
different  organization. 

It  is  obvionily  impracticable  in  the  federal  government  of  the  ftates, 
to  fecure  all  right  of  independent  fovereignty  to  each,  and  yet  provide 
for  the  interelt  and  fafety  of  all — Individuals  entering  into  fociety, 
muft  give  up  a  mare  of  liberty  to  preferve  the  reft.  The  magnitude  o£ 
the  facrifice  muft  depend  as  well  on  fituation  and  circumftance,  as  or* 
theobjett  to  be  obtained.  It  is  at  all  times  difficult  to  draw  with  pre- 
cifion  the  line  between  thofe  rights  which  muft  be  furrendered,  and 
thofe  which  may  be  referved  j  and  on  the  prefent  occafion  this  difficul- 
ty was  encreafed  by  a  difference  among  the  feveral  ftates  as  to  their  fitu- 
ation, extent,  habits,  and  particular  interefts. 

In  all  our  deliberations  on  this  fubjeft,  we  kept  fteadily  in  our  view, 
that  which  appears  to  us  the  greateft  intereft  of  every  true  American, 
the  confolidation  of  our  union,  in  which  is  involved  our  profperity» 
felicity,  fafety,  perhaps  our  national  exiftence^.  This  important  con- 
fideration, ferioufly  and  4cePty  impreffed  on  our  minds,  led  each  flats 

C  in 


{   »  ) 

in  the  Convention  to  be  lefs  rigid  on  points  of  inferior  mao-mtud* 
than  might  have  been  otherwife  expe&ed  ;  and  thus  the  Conititution 
which  we  now  prefent,  is  the  refult  of  a  fpirit  of  amity,  and  of  that 
mutual  deference  and  conceflion  which  the  peculiarity  of  our  politi- 
cal fituatron  rendered  indifpenfible. 

That  it  will  meet  the  full  and  entire  approbation  of  every  ftate  is 
not,  perhaps,  to  be  expeaed  ;  but  each  will  doubtlefs  coniider,  that 
had  her  interefts  been  alone  ccnfulted,  the  confequences  might  have 
been  paiticularly  difagreeable  or  injurious  to  others  :  That  it  is  liable 
to  as  few  exceptions  as  could  reafonably  have  been  expected,  we  hope 
and  believe  :  That  it  may  promote  the  lafting  welfare  of  that  country 
fo  dear  to  us  all,  and  fecure  her  freedom  and  happinefs,  is  our  moil 
ardent  wifh. 

With  great  refpeft, 

We  have  the  honour  to  be, 

Sir,  your  Excellency's  raoft  obedient, 

And  humble  fervants, 

GEORGE   WASHINGTON,  Pre/idem. 

By  the  unanimous  order  of  the  Convention. 

fils  Excellency  the  Prejident  of  Congrefs. 


AwA 


«*■*  **•  •*-*•  •*+•  •*-*■  «*■*•  -t-5-  *  4-t*  ■*-*»  •*-*•  <**  4->  *+•  4-J- 
•4-*-  **->  **->  «•*•■*•  «*~5r  H->  «f~**  *  *l-i*  «*--**  <*-**  -*-*•  «*•*  **-^*  «*-*• 


PROCEEDINGS 

A    N    Di 

DEBATE  S 

OF       THE 

CONVENTION' 

O    F 

NORTH-CAROLINA. 


AT  a  Convention,  begun  and  heM  at  Hillfborough* 
the  2 1 ft  day  of  July,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one 
thoufand  feven  hundred  and  eighty-eight,  and  of  the  in- 
dependence of  America  the  thirteenth,  in  purfuance  of 
a  refolution  of  the  laft  General  Affembly,  tor  the  purpofe 
of  deliberating  and  determining  on  the  propofed  plan  of 
Federal  Government — 

A  majority  of  thofe  who  were  duly elected  as  Members 
for  this.  Convention,  being  met  at  the  Church,,  they  pro- 
ceeded to  the  election  of  a  Prefident,  when  bis  Excellency 
Samuel  Johnston,  Efquire,  was  unanimoufiy  chofen, 
and  conduced  to  the  chair  accordingly. 

The  Houfe  then  elected  Mr,  John  Hunt  and  Mr.  James 
Tavlor,  Clerks  to  the  Convention  ;  and  alfo  appointed 
•Door-Keepers,  &c. 

The  Houfe  then  appointed  a  felect  committee  to  pre- 
pare and  propofe  certain  rules  and  regulations  for  the  go- 
vernment of  the  Convention  in  the  difcuffion  of  the  Con* 
ftitution. 

The 


{      26     ) 

The  committee  confided  of  Meflrs.  Davie,  Perfon,  Ire- 
dell, I.  M'Donald,  Battle,  Spaight,  and  the  Honourable 
Samuel  Spencer,  Efquire. 

The  Convention  then  appointed  a  committee  of  three 
Members  from  each  diftricl;,  as  a  committee  of  privileges 
Snd  elections,  confifting  of  Meflrs.  Spencer,  Irwin,  Cald- 
well, Perfon,  A.  Mebane,  Jofeph  Taylor,  M'Dowall,  J. 
Brown,  J.  Johnfton,  Davie,  Peebles,  E.  Gray,  Gregory, 
Iredell,  Cabarrus,  I.  G.  Blount,  Keais,  B.  Williams,  T. 
iBrowrtj  Machine,  Forfter,  Clinton,  J.  Willis,  Grove* 
J.  Stewart,  Martin  and  Tipton. 

The  Convention  then  adjourned  till  to-morrow  morn- 
ing. 

TUESDAY,  July  22,  1788. 
The  Convention  met  according  to  adjournment. 
The  committee  appointed  for  that  purpofe,  reported 
certain  rules  and  regulations  for  the  government  of  the 
Convention ;  which  were  twice  read,  and,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  one  article,  were  agreed  to,  and  are  as  follow, 
viz. 

r.  When  the  Prefident  aflumes  the  chair,  the  Mem- 
bers mall  take  their  feats, 

2.  At  the  opening  of  the  Convention  each  day,  the 
minutes  of  the  preceding  day  {hall  be  read,  and  be  in  the 
power  of  the  Convention  to  be  corrected,  after  which  any 
tmfinefs  addrefled  to  the  chair  may  be  proceeded  upon. 

3.  No  Member  fhall  be  allowed  to  fpeak  but  in  his 
place,  and  after  rifing  and  addreffing  htmfelf  to  the  Pre- 
fident, fhall  not  proceed  until  permitted  by  the  Prefident. 

4.  No  Member  fpeaking  fhall  be  interrupted  but  by  a 
rail  to  order  by  the  Prefident,  or  by  a  Member  through 
the  Prefident. 

5.  No  perfon  fhall  pafs  between  the  Prefident  and  the 
perfon  fpeaking. 

6.  No  perfon  fhall  be  called  upon  for  any  words  of 
lieat  but  on  the  day  on  which  they  were  fpoken. 

7.  No  Member  to  be  referred  to  in  debate  by  name. 

8.  The  Prefident  fhall  be  heard  without  interruption^ 
«nd  when  he  rifes,  the  member  up  fhall  fit  down. 

$>.    The  Prefident  hixofelf;  or  by  requeft,  may  call  t* 

order 


(   ai   ) 

atder  any  Member  who  fhall  tnnfgrcfs  the  rules  5  If  & 
fecond  time,  the  Prefident  may  refer  to  him  by  name  -, 
the  Convention  may. then  examine  and  cenfure  the  Mem- 
ber's conduct,  he  being  allowed  to  extenuate  or  juftify. 

10.  When  two  or  more  Members  are  up  together,  the 
Prefident  mail  determine  who  rofe  firft. 

11.  A  motion  made  and  feconded,  fhall  be  repeated 
by  the  Prefident.  A  motion  fhall  be  reduced  to  writing 
if  the  Prefident  requires  it.  A  motion  may  be  withdrawn 
by  the  Member  making  itj  before  any  decifion  is  had 
upon  £t. 

12.  The  name  of  him  who  makes,  and  the  name  of 
,him  who  feconds,  a  motion,  fhall  be  entered  upon  the 
minutes. 

13.  No  Member  mall  depart  the  fervice  of  the  Houfc 
without  leave. 

14.  Whenever  the  Houfe  fhall  be  divided  upon  any 
iqueflion,  two  or  more  Tellers  fhall  be  appointed  by  the 
Prefident,  to  number  the  Members  on  each  fide. 

15.  No  Member  fhall  come  into  the  Houfe,  or  remove 
from  one  place  to  another,  with  his  hat  on,  except  thofc 
of  the  Quaker  profeflion. 

*6\  Every  Member  of  a  committee  fhall  attend  at  the 
call  of  his  Chairman. 

17.  The  yeas  and  nays  may  be  called  and  entered  on 
the  minutes,  when  any  two  members  require  it. 

18.  Every  Member  actually  attending  the  Convention, 
{hall  be  in  his  place  at  the  time  to  which  the  Convention 
flands  adjourned,  or  within  half  an  hour  thereof. 

Mr.  Lenoir  moved,  and  was  feconded  by  Mr.  Perfon, 
that  the  return  for  t)obbs  county  fhould  be  read  ;  which 
was  accordingly  read  :  Whereupon  Mr.  Lenoir  prefented. 
the  petition  of  fundry  of  the  inhabitants  of  Dobbs  county, 
complaining  of  an  illegaVeleQjpn  in  the  faid  county,  and 
praying  relief  ;  which  he  ig  alfo  read,  on  motion  of  Mr. 
Lenoir  >  feconded  by  Mr  Davie,  Refolved,  That  the  faid 
petition  be  referred  to  the  committee  of  elections. 

Mr.  Spaight  prefented  the  depofition  of  Benjamin  Caf- 
well,  Sheriff  of  Dobbs  county,  and  a  copy  of  the  poll  of 
^n  election  held  in  the  faid  county  for  members  to  this 
Convection  j  and  the  depofitions  of  William  Croom,  Neil 

Hopkins, 


(      22      ) 

Hopkins,  Robert  White,  John  Hartsfield,  Job  Smith  an<i 
Frederick  Baker  ;  which  being  feverally  read,  were  refer- 
red  to  the  committee  of  elections. 

Mr.  Cabarrus  prefented  the  depositions  of  Charles  Mark- 
land,  jun.  and  Luther  Spalding,  relative  to  the  eleaion  of 
!Dobbs  county  ;  which  -being  read,  were  referred  to  the 
committee  of  elections. 

The  Convention  then  adjourned  to  te  n  o'clock  to-mor- 
row morning. 


WEDNESDAY,    July  23,1788. 
The  Houfe  met  according  to  adjournment. 

Mr.  Gregory,  from  the  committee  of  ele&ions,  to 
whom  were  referred  the  return  from  Dobbs  county,  and 
fundry  other  papers,  and  the  petition  of  fundry  of  the 
inhabitants  of  Dobbs  county  relative  to  the  ele&ion  of 
the  faid  county,  delivered  in  a  report ;  which  being  read* 
was  agreed  to  in  the  following  words,  viz. 

Refofoed,  That  it  is  the  opinion  of  this  committee,  that 
the  fitting  members  returned  from  the  county  of  Dobbs, 
vacate  their  feats,  as  it  does  not  appear  that  a  majority  of 
the  county  approved  of  a  new  eleaion  under  the  recom- 
mendation of  his  Excellency  the  Governor,  but  the  con- 
trary is  more  probable. 

That  it  appears  to  this  committee,  that  there  was  a  dif« 
turbance  and  riot  at  the  firft  eleaion  (which  was  held 
on  the  days  appointed  by  the  refolve  of  the  General  Af- 
fembly)  before  all  the  tickets  could  be  taken  out  of  the 
box,  and  the  box  was  then  taken  away  by  violence,  at 
which  time  it  appears  there  were  a  fufficient  number  of 
tickets  remaining  in  the  box  to  have  given  a  majority  of 
the  whole  poll  to  five  others  of  the  candidates,  befides. 
thofe  who  had  a  majority  of  the  votes  at  the  time  when 
the  difturbance  and  riot  happened.  It  is  therefore  the 
opinion  of  this  committee,  th"v  the  Sheriff  could  have 
made  no  return  of  any  five  Members  eleaed  ;  nor  was 
there  any  evidence  before  the  committee  by  which  they 
could  determine  with  certainty,. which  candidates  had  a 
majority  of  votes  of  the  other  eleaors. 

The  committee  are  therefore  of  opinion  that  the  firft 
eleaion  is  void,  as  well  as  the  latter. 

On 


(      23      ) 

On  a  motion  made  by  Mr.  Gallotvay,  feconded  by  Mr. 
Macon, 

Refolved,  That  theBill  of  Rights  and  Conftitution  of  this 
ftate,  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  the  refolve  of  Congrefs 
of  the  2 1 ft  of  February,  1787,  recommending  a  Conven- 
tion of  Delegates  to  meet  at  Philadelphia  the  2d  Monday 
in  May,  1787,  for  the  purpofe  of  revifing  the  faid  articles 
of  confederation,  together  with  the  adr.  of  Aflfembly  of 
this  ftate,  paffed  at  Fayetteville  the  6th  day  of  January, 
1787,  entitled  "  An  at~r.  for  appointing  Deputies  from 
this  ftate  to  a  Convention  propofed  to  be  held  in  the  city 
of  Philadelphia  in  May  next,  for  the  purpofe  of  revifing 
the  federal  Conftitution:"  As  alfothe  refolve  of  Congrefs 
of  the  28th  September  laft  accompanying  the  report  of 
the  federal  Convention,  together  with  the  faid  report,  and 
the  refolution  of  the  laft  General  AfTembly,  be  now  read. 

TheBill  of  Rights  and  Conftitution  of  this  ftate,  the  Ar- 
ticles of  Confederation,  the  act  of  Affembly  of  this  ftate 
above  referred  to,  and  the  refolution  of  Congrefs  of  the 
28th  September  laft,  were  accordingly  read. 

The  Honourable  the  Prefident  then  laid  before  the  Con- 
vention official  accounts  of  the  ratification  of  the  propofed 
federal  Conftitution  by  the  ,ftates  of  Maffachufetts  and 
South-Carolina;  which  were  ordered  to  be  filed  with  the 
Secretary,  fubje£fc  to  the  perufai  of  the  members. 

Mr.  James  Galloway  moved  that  the  Conftitution  fhould 
be  difcufled  claufe  by  claufe. 

Mr.  Willie  Jones  moved  that  the  queftion  upon  the  Con- 
ftitution fhould  be  immediately  put.  He  faid  that  the  Con- 
ftitution had  fo  long  been  the  fubjet"r,  of  the  deliberation 
of  every  man  in  this  country,  and  that  the  members  of  the 
Convention  had  had  fuch  ample  opportunity  to  confider 
it,  that  he  believed  every  one  of .  them  was  prepared  to 
give  his  vote  then  upon  the  queftion :  That  the  fituation 
of  the  public  funds  would  not  admit  of  lavifhing  the  pub- 
lic money,  but  required  the  utmoft  economy  and  frugali- 
ty :  That  as  there  was  a  large  reprefentation  from  this 
ftate,  an  immediate  decifion  would  fave  the  country  a  con- 
fiderable  fum  of  money.  He  thought  it  therefore  pru- 
dent to  put  the  queftion  immediately. 

He  was  feconded  by  Mr.  Per/on,  who  added  to  the  rea- 
soning of  Mr.  JoneS)  that  he  (hould  be  forry  if  any  man  had 

com* 


<     14     >   . 

come  hither  without  having  determined  in  his  mind  a  qwef- 
tion  Nvhich  mull  have  been  fo  long  the  object  of  his  confl* 
deration. 

Mr.  Iredell  then  arofe  and  addrefTed  the  Hjrfident  thus  : 
Mr.  Prefident,  I  am  very  much  furprifeo^t  the  motion 
which  has  been  made  by  the  gentleman  from  Halifax.  I 
am  greatly  aftonifhed  at  a  propofal  to  decide  immediately, 
without  the  leaft  deliberation,  a  quejtiojri  which  is  perhaps 
thejrreateft  that  ever  wasjubmitted  to  ^££jojT^pj_iQe»« 
There  is  no  fnftance  of  anv  Convention  upon  the  conti- 
nent, in  which  the  fubje<5t  has  not  been  fully'debated,  ex- 
cept in  thofe  dates  which  adopted  the  Conftitution  una- 
nimoufly.  If  it  be  thought  proper  to  debate  at  large  an 
act  of  Afiembly,  trivial  in  its  nature,  and  the  operation 
of  which  may  continue  but  a  few  months,  are  we  to  de- 
cide on  this  great  and  important  queftion  without  a  mo-> 
ment's  confideration  ?  Are  we  to  give  a  dead  vote  upon  it  ? 
If  fo,  I  would  wifh  to  know  why  we  are  met  together  1 
If  it  is  to  be  refolved  now  by  dead  votes,  it  would  have 
been  better  that  every  elector,  inftead  of  voting  for  per-* 
fons  to  come  here,  fhould  in  their  refpeclive  counties  have 
voted  or  balloted  for  or  againft  the  Conftitution.  A  deci-? 
fion  by  that  mode  would  have  been  as  rational  and  juft  a& 
by  this,  and  would  have  been  better  on  economical  prin- 
ciples, as  it  would  have  faved  the  public  the  expence  of 
our  meeting  here.  This  is  a  fubjecl  of  great  confiderati- 
on. It  is  a  Conftitution  which  has  been  formed  after  much 
deliberation.  It  has  had  the  fanttion  of  men  of  the  firft 
characters  for  their  probity  and  underltanding.  It  has  aU 
fo  had  the  folemn  ratification  of  ten  dates  in  ihe  union. 
A  Conftitution  like  this,  Sir,  ought  not  to  be  adopted  or  re-* 
jecled  in  a  moment.  If  in  confequence  of  either  we  fhould 
involve  our  country  in  mifery  and  diitrefs,  what  excufc 
could  we  make  for  our  conduct  ?  Is  it  reconcileable  with  our 
duty  to  our  conftituents?  Would  it  be  a  confcientious  dif- 
charge  of  that  truft  which  they  have  fo  implicitly  repofed 
in  us  ?  Shall  it  be  faid,  Sir,  of  the  Reprefentatiyes  of 
North-Carolina,  that  near  three  hundred  of  them,  afiem-» 
bled  for  the  exprefs  purpofe  of  deliberating  upon  the  mod 
important  queftion  that  ever  came  before  a  people,  refufec$ 
to  difcufs  it,  and  difcarded  all  reafoning  as  ufelefs  ?  It  is 
wujqubtedly  to  be  lamented  that  any  addition,  fhould  fyq 

*n&# 


( *s > 

made  to  the  public  expence,  cfpecially  at  this  period  when 
the  public  funds  are  fo  low  ;  but  if  it  be  ever  neceiTary  on 
any  occafion,  it  is  neceffary  on  this,  when  the  queftion  p<  r- 
haps  involves  the  fafety  or  ruin  of  our  country.     For  my 
own  part  I  fhould  not  choofe  to  determine  on  any  queftion, 
without  mature  reflection,  and  on  this  occafion  my  repug-* 
nance  to  a  hafty  decifion  is  equal  to  the  magnitude  of  the 
fubje&.     A  gentleman  has  faid,  he  fhould  be  forry  if  any 
Member  had  come  here  without  having  determined  in  hisj 
mind  on  a  fubjecT:  he  had  fo  long  confuiered.     I  (hou^d  be 
forry,  Sir,  that  I  could  be  capable  of  corning  to  this  Houfe 
predetermined  for  or  againft  the  Conftitution,     I  readily 
confefs  my  prefent  opinion  is  ftrongly  in  its  favour    I  have 
liftened  to  every  objection  that  I  had  an  opportunity  of 
hearing  with  attention  ;  but  have  not  yet  heard   any  that 
I  thought  would  juftify  its  rejection,  even  if  it  hid  not 
beep  adopted  by  fo  many  ftates.    But  notwithftanding  this 
favourable  opinion  I  entertain  of  it,  I  have  not  come  here 
refolved  at  all  events  fo  vote  for  its  adoption.     I  have  come 
here  for  information,  and  to  ]udge,after  all  that  can  be  faid 
upon  it,  whether  it  really  merits  my  attachment  or  not, 
My  conftituents  did  me  the  honour  to  eleel:  me  unanimous- 
ly, without  the  leaft  folicitation  on  my  part.     They  pro- 
bably chofe  me   becaufe  my   fentiments  were  the  fame 
with  their  own.     But  highly  as  I  value  thi    honour,  and 
much  as  I  confefs  my  ambition  prompted      e  to  afpire  to 
it,  had  I  been  told  that  I  mould  not  be  elected  unlefs  I 
promifed  to  obey  their  directions,  I  fhould  have  difdained 
to  ferve  on  fuch  difhonourable  terms.     Sir,  I  mall  vote 
perfectly  independent,  and  (hall  certainly  avow  a  change 
of  my  prefent  opinion,  if  I  can  be  convinced  it  is  a  wrong 
one.     I  (hall  not,  in   fuch  a  cafe,  be   reft  rained  by  the 
univerfal  opinion  of  the  part  of  the  country  from  whicf* 
I  came ;  I  fhall  not  be  afraid  to  go  back  and  tell  my  con- 
ftituents, «  Gentlemen,  I  have  been  convinced  I  was  ir* 
«  an  error.    I  found,  on  confideration,  that  the  opinion 
«  which  I  had  taken  up,  was  ill  founded,  and  have  voted 
a  according  to  my  fmcere  fentiments  at  the  time,  though 
*c  contrary  to  your  withes."     I  know  that  the  honour  and 
integrity  of  my  conftituents  are  fuch,  that   they   woulc$ 
approve  of  my  acting  on  fuch  principles,  rather  than  any 


v    *w    ; 


other.    They  are  the  principles,  however,  I  think  if  m. 

I. h»  <Cottft.tut.on  ought  to  be  difcufled  in  fuel,  a  man 
Mr  that  every  poffible  light  may  be  thrown  upon  it      tf 

kl 111*™"  Wh°  3re  fo  fan«uine  h  ^  S  that 

hat  any  gentlemen  here  are  fo  obftinate  and  tenfis  of 
the.r  op.mon,  that  they  will  not  recede  from  it  when  ther 

•hear  ftrong  reafons  offered  ?  Has  not  every  gentleman  her! 
Shoftothr:r:raHufeful  knowu^ {™  •  ££S£& 
Honfr  k  Have  not  many  of  the  Members  of  this 
Houfe,  when  Members  of  Aflembly,  frequently  changed 
their  opm.ons  on  fubjea*  of  Iegiflldon  ?  If  {1  trlfvi 
M  of  fo  complicated  a  nature,  and  which  involves 

di?umrn0U:hCa?fe<1UenCej  3S  this>  "«»»!"«  the  «>oft  mp  e 
,'?,'°n'  *at  we  may  «"'ve  every  information  that  can 
enable  us  to  form  a  proper  judgment.  I  hope,  therefore 
that  we  (hall  imitate  the  laudable  examph/of  the other' 
ftates,  and  go  into  a  committee  of  the  whole  Houfe,  hat 
the  Conft.mt.on  may  be  difouffed  elaufe  by  claufe     ' 

Mr.  Willi*  Jones-Mr.  Prefic'ent,    My  reafons  for  pro. 
pof.nga*   immediate  decifion    were,  that  I  was  prepaid 
tog,vemv  vote    and  believed   that  others  were  equally 
prepared  as  myfelf.     If  Kenth-men  differ  from  me  ?„  , hi 
pronnety  of  this  motion,  I  will  fubmit.     I  agTee  with   he 
pntieman,  that^nomica-  confutation,  ainot  o f  e<£ 
importance  with  the  magnitude  of  the  fubjea.     Heto 
that  ,t  would  hnv,  been  better  at  once  foAh    ekaors  to* 
vote  ,n  tber  refpeflive  coumiee  than  to   decide    t  he  e 
wuhout  .bfcuffon.     Does  he  forget  that  the  acTof  && 
DI-  points  out  Tinothcf  niode  ? 

the  Affcmbly  mi&ht  as  weU  have  rcquired  ^  ^  ^ 

tors 


4§  (  n  ) 

tors  mould  vote  or  ballot  for  or  againfl.  the  Confutation 
in  their  refpettive  counties,  as  for  the  Convention  to  de- 
cide it  in  this  precipitate  manner. 

Mr.  James  Galloivay — Mr.  President,  I  had  no  fuppo- 
fition  that  the  gentleman  on  my  right  [Mr.  Jones]  was 
nfraid  of  a  difcuflion  :  It  is  not  fo  with  me,  nor  do  I  be- 
lieve that  it  is  fp  with  any  gentleman  here.  I  do  not  like 
fuch  reflections,  and  am  furprifed  that  gentlemen  mould 
make  them. 

Mr.  Iredell  declared,  that  he  meant  not  to  reflect  on  any 
gentleman  \  but,  for  his  part,  he  would  by  no  mea.15 
choofe  to  go  home  and  tell  his  conftitucnts  that  he  had 
Voted  without  any  previous  consideration. 

After  feme  defultory  conversation  the  Convention  ad- 
journed till  to-morrow,  ten  o'clock. 


THURSDAY,   July    24,    1788. 
The  Convention  met  according  to  adjournment. 

On  a  motion  made  by  Mr.  Bloodworth,  and  feconded  by 
Mr.  Madeline^ 

Rrfolved,  That  the  fpecia!  return  made  by  the  Sheriff 
of  New-Hanover  county^  of  the  election  for  Members  of 
this  Convention,  be  referred  to  the  committee  of  elecli-p 
ons. 

On  a  motion  made  by  Mr.  Perfon,  and  feconded  by  Mr. 
Iredell^ 

Refolvcdy  That  the  return  for  a  Member  for  the  town 
of  Fayetteville,  be  referred1  to  the  committee  of  elections. 

Reverend  Mr.  Caldwell— Mr.  Prefideat,  The  fubj-a 
before  us  is  of  a  complicated  nature.  In  order  to  obviate 
the  difficulty  attending  its  difcuffion,  I  conceive  that  it 
will  be  neceffary  to  lay  down  fuch  rules  or  maxims  as 
ought  to  be  the  fundamental  principles  of  every  free  go- 
vernment;  and  after  laying  down  fuch  rules,  to  compare 
the  Conftitution  with  them,  and  fee  whether  it  has  at- 
tended to  them :  For  if  it  be  not  founded  on  fuch  princi- 
ples, it  cannot  be  proper  for  our  adoption.  [Here  he 
r^d  thofe  rules  which  he  faid  appeared  to  him  mod  pro- 
per.] 

Mr.  James  Galloivay — Mr.  Prefulent,  I  hid  the  honour 
yeii$rday  of  propofing  the  mode  which  I  thought  mod 

eligibly 


(     *8     } 

eligible  for  out  proceeding.    I  wilh  the  fubjea  tote  fairlr 
cooby,  a„d  candidly  difcuffed  ,  that  we  may  not  go  Sv' 
Without  knowmg  why  we  came  hither.     My  tLmloni! 
that  we  mould  enter  into  a  committee  of  the  whole  Houfc 
where  we  mall  be  at  liberty  to  difcufs  it.     Though  I  Jo 
rot  objea  to  the  proportion  of  the  Honourable  Member! 
as  the  ground-work  of  our  proceeding,  I  hope  he   wil 
™hdraw  his  motion,  and  I  Ln  feconu'him  in  the  corn- 
Mr.  CaidueU  had  no  objeaion  to  that  propofition. 

mini:  t  °PP°fed  jhe  m0tion  bf  ente"«S  into  a  com- 
taittee.  He  conceived  it  would  be  an  ufelefs  wafte  of 
fame a,  they  would  be  obliged  to  reconfide ZllSz 
Coi.ftitutionin  Convention  again. 

Mr.  Davie  largely  expatiated  on  the  neceffity  of  enter* 

nf  Itirmm?'  ?£  f3id  that  the  Wifl»t««  in  vol 
wg  fj  large  a  reprefentat.on,  did  not  mean  that  they  fllould 
go  away  without  inveftigating  the  fubjea,  but  that  their 
cohea.ve  information  mould  be  more  'competent  to  a  juft 

ardour  nf  P '"J-"!  h°'5cft  ™en  He  «»««  not  know  how  the 
Zf  Z ., 0f  °5POufi,10nIm!Sbt  °Pe»*  upon>„,  gentlemen, 
yet  he  trolled  that  others  bad  temper  and  moderation.    He 

would  b  C  TT"  °!  lhe  mSmber  frora  Rockingham 

won  d  be  agreed  to,  and  that  the  Conftitution  would  be 

lafd  /  VhUe'     He  then  obferved>  **  if  they 

laid  down  a  number  of  original  principles,  they  muft  go 

toTl^w'6  ,nv<ftiSation'  That  it  would  be  necelWy 
JS  thefe  °"$»ai  P"««ples  and  compare  them  with 
the  Conft.tution  That  it  was  highly  improbable  that  they 
fhould  agree  on  theft  principle,.  That  he  had  a  refped  for 
the  undemanding  of  the  Honourable  Member,  and  truft! 
ed  he  would  reflea,  that  difference  in  opinion  We  f'om 
the  nature  of  things ,  and  that  a  great  deal  of  time  might 
be  taken  up  to  no  purpoft,  if  th*ey  ftou.d   neither  agree 

Zl,MnC'P!  n°ruhe.,r  aPP'ication-  He  faid  he  hoped 
they  would  not  treat  this  important  bufinefs  like  a  milita" 

7veZlV*.\  1  r°CeCd  UP°n  il  like  a  ^Hberative  bo- 
dy,  and  that  the  debates  would  be  conduaed  with  decen- 
cy  and  moderation.  oecen- 

„f  TkC  C"n,veniion/hen  refolved  itfelf  into  a  committee1 
of  the  whole  Houfe,  Mr.  Elijha  Haul,  in  the  chair. 

Mr. 


4  »  (    29    > 

Mr.  Caldwell — Mr.  Chairman,  Thofe  maxims  which  I 
conceive  to  be  the  fundamental  principles  of  every  fafe  and 
free  government,  are,  ift.  A  government  is  a  compact  be- 
tween the  rulers  and  the  people.  2d.  Such  a  compact 
ought  to  be  lawful  in  itfelf.  3d.  It  ought  to  be  lawfully 
executed.  4th.  Unalienable  rights  ought  not  to  be  given 
up  if  not  neceffary.  5th.  The  compact  ought  to  be 
mutual.  And,  6th.  It  ought  to  be  plain,  obvious,  and 
eafily  underftood.  Now,  Sir,  if  thefe  principles  be  juft, 
by  comparing  the  Conftitution  with  them,  we  (hall  be  able 
to  judge  whether  it  is  fit  for  our  adoption. 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  I  concur  entirety  in  the  fen- 
timents  lately  urged  by  the  gentleman  from  Halifax,  and 
am  convinced  we  (hall  be  involved  in  very  great  difficul- 
ties if  we  adopt  the  principles  offered  by  the  gentleman 
from  Guilford.  .To  (hew  the  danger  and  impolicy  of  this 
proceeding,  I  think  I  can  convince  the  committee  in  a  mo- 
ment, that  his  very  nrft  principle  is  erroneous.  Tn  other 
countries,  where  the  origin  of  government  is  obfeure,  and 
its  formation  different  from  ours,  government  may  be  decod- 
ed a  contract  between  the  rulers  and  the  people.  What 
is  the  confequence  ?  A  compact:  cannot  be  annulled  but 
by  the  confent  of  both  parties  ;  therefore,  unlefs  the  rulers 
are  guilty  of  oppreffion,  the  people,  on  the  principle  of 
a  compart,  have  no  right  to  new  mode*  their  government* 
This  is  held  to  be  the  principle  of  fome  monarchical  go- 
vernments in  Europe.  Our  government  is  founded  on 
much  nobler  principles*  The  people  are  known  with  cer- 
tainty to  have  originated  it  themfelves.  Thofe  in  power 
are  their  fervants  and  agents,  and  the  people  without  their 
confent  may  new  model  their  government  whenever  they 
think  proper,  not  merely  becaufe  it  it  oppreffively  exer- 
cifed,  but  becaufe  they  think  another  form  will  be 
more  conducive  to  their  welfare.  It  is  upon  the  foot- 
ing of  this  very  principle  that  we  are  now  met  to  con- 
fider  of  the  Conftitution  before  us.  If  we  attempt  to  lay 
down  any  rules  here,  it  will  take  us  as  much  time  to  efta- 
blifh  their  validity  as  to  confider  the  fyftem  itfeK. 

Mr.  Caldwell  obferve.d,that  though  this  government  did 
not  refemble  the  European  governments,  it  ftill  partook 
of  the  nature  of  a  compact.  That  he  conceived  thofe 
principles  which  he  propofed  to  be  juft,  but  was  willing. 

that 


(    3°    ) 

iliaf  any  others  which  fhould  be  thought  better,  mould  be 
fubltituted  in  their  place. 

Mr.MacIaine-^-Mr.  Chairman,  The  gentleman  has  taken 
his  principles  from  fources  which  cannot  hold  here.  In 
England  the  government  is  a  compact  between  the  King 
a,d  the  people.  I  hope  it  is  not  fo  here.  We  (hall  have 
no  officers  in  the  fltuation  of  a  King.  The  pcopie  here 
are  the  origin  of  all  power.  Our  governors  are  elected 
temporarily.  We  can  remove  them  occafionaiiy,  and  put 
others  in  their  (lead.  We  do  not  bind  ourfelves.  We  are 
to  confider  whether  this  fyftem  will  promote  our  hap  pi- 
ne fs. 

Mr.  Goudv — Mr.  Chairman,  I  wonder  that  thefe  gentle- 
men learned  in  the  law  mould  quibble  upon  words.  I 
care  not  whether  it  be  called  a  compact,  agreement,  cove- 
nant, bargain  or  what  :  Its  intent  is  a  conceflion  of  power 
on  the  part  of  the  people  to  their  rulers.  We  know  that 
private  intereft  governs  mankind  generally.  Power  be- 
longs originally  to  the  people,  but  if  rulers  be  not  well 
guarded,  that  power  may  be  ufurped  from  them.  People 
ought  to  be  cautious  in  giving  away  power.  Thefe  gen- 
tlemen fay  there  is  no  occafion  for  general  rules.  Every 
one  has  one  for  himfclf.  Every  one  has  an  unalienable 
right  of  thinking  for  himfeJf.  There  can  be  no  inconve- 
nience from  laying  down  general  rules  If  we  give  away 
more  power  than  we  ought,  we  put  ourfelves  in  the  fltuati- 
on of  a  man  who  puts  on  an  iron  glove, which  he  can  never 
take  off  till  he  breaks  his  arm.  Let  us  beware  of  the  iron 
glove  of  tyranny.  Power  is  generally  taken  from  the  peo- 
ple by  impofmg  on  their  underftanding  or  by  fetters.  Let 
us  lay  down  certain  rules  to  govern  our  proceedings.  It 
will  be  highly  proper  in  my  opinion,  and  I  very  much 
wonder  that  gentlemen  mould  objecl  to  it. 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  The  gentleman  who  fpoke 
laft  miftook  what  tht  gentleman  from  Wilmington  and 
myfelf  have  faid.  In  my  opinion  there  ought  to  be  a  line 
drawn,  as  accurately  as  poflible,  between  the  power  which 
is  given  and  that  which  is  retained.  In  this  fyftem  the 
line  is  mofl  accurately  drawn  by  the  pofitive  grant  of  the 
powers  of  the  general  government.  But  a  compact  be- 
tween the  rulers  and  the  ruled,  which  gentlemen  compare 
$iis  government  withj  is  certainly  not  the  principle  of  our 

government 


(     3'     ) 

government.  Will  any  man  fayv  that  if  there  be  a  com* 
pa&,  it  can  be  altered  without  th  content  of  both  parries? 
Thofe  who  govern,  unlefs  they  grofsly  abufe  their  truft 
(which  is  held  an  implied  violation  of  the  corr.pa£t,  and 
therefore  a  diflblution  of  it)  have  a  ri^ht  to  fay  they  do  not 
choofe  the  government  fliould  be  changed.  But  have  an) 
of  the  officers  of  our  government  a  right  to  fay  fo  if  the  peo- 
ple choofe  to  change  it  ?  Surely  they  have  not.  Therefore, 
as  a  general  principle,  it  can  never  ''pply  to  a  government 
where  the  people  are  avowedly  the  fountain  of  all  power. 
I  have  no  manner  of  objection  to  the  mod  explicit  decla- 
ration that  all  power  depends  upon  the  people,  becaufe, 
though  it  will  not  ftrengthen  their  rights,  it  may  be  a 
means  of  fixing  them  on  a  plainer  foundation.  One  gen- 
tleman has  faid  that  we  were  quibbling  upon  words.  If 
1  know  my  own  heart,  I  am  incapable  of  quibbling  on 
words.  I  act  on  as  independent  principles  as  any  gentle- 
man upon  the  floor.  If  I  make  ufe  of  quibbles,  there  are 
gentlemen  here  who  can  correct  me.  If  my  premifes  are 
wrong,  let  them  be  attacked  If  my  conclufions  be  wrong, 
let  me  be  put  right.  I  am  forry  that  in  debating  on  fo 
important  a  fubjec~r,  it  could  be  thought  that  we  were 
difputing  about  words,  I  amtwilling  to  apply  as  much 
time  as  is  neceffary  for  our  deliberations.  I  have  no  ob- 
jection to  any  regular  way  of  difcufiing  the  fubjec"t ;  but 
this  way  of  proceeding  will  wafte  time,  and  not  anfwer 
any  purpofe.  Will  it  not  be  in  the  power  of  any  gentle- 
man in  the  courfe  of  the  debates,  to  fay  that  this  plan 
militates  againft  thofe  principles  which  the  reverend  gen- 
tleman recommends  ?  Will  it  not  be  more  proper  to  urge 
its  incompatibilitv  with  thofe  principles  during  that  dif- 
cuflion,  than  to  attempt  to  eftablifh  their  exclufive  validity 
previous  to  our  entering  upon  the  new  plan  of  govern- 
ment? By  the  former  mode,thofe  rules  and  the  Conftitu- 
tion  may  be  considered  together.  By  the  latter,  much 
time  may  be  wafted  to  n<-»  t>urnofe.  T  rruft  therefore  that 
the  reverend  gentleman  will  withdraw  his  motion. 

Mr.  Rutherford — Mr.  Chairman,  I  conceive  thofe  max-* 
ims  will  be  of  urili+v.  J  wifh  as  much  as  any  one,  to 
have  a  full  and  free  difcuffion  of  the  fubjec"r.  To  faci- 
litate this  deferable  <""%  it  feems  highly  e^nedient  that 
(om.e  ground-work  (hould  be  laid,  feme  line  drawn  to 

guide 


(    3*    ) 

guide  our  proceedings :    I  truft  then,  that  the  reverend 
Jrentleman's  propofal  will  be  agreed  to. 

Mr.  Sptticer-r-l  conceive  that  it  will  retard  the  bufinefs 
to  accede  to  the  propofal  of  the  learned  gentleman.  The 
obfervation  which  has  been  made  in  its  behalf  does  not 
apply  to  the  prefect  circumftances.  When  there  is  a  King 
or  other  Governor,  there  is  a  compact  between  him  and 
the  people.  It  is  then  a  covenant  ;  but  in  this  cafe,  in  re- 
gard to  the  government  which  it  is  propofed  we  fhould 
adopt,  there  are  no  governors  or  rulers,  we  being  the 
people  who  poflefs  all  power..  It  ftrikes  me,  that  when 
a  fociety  of  free  people  agree  on  a  plan  of  government* 
there  are  no  governors  in  exiftenee,  but  thofe  who  ad* 
minifter  the  government  are  their  fervants.  Although  fe- 
veral  of  thefe  principles  are  proper,  I  hope  they  will  not 
be  part  of  our  difcuffion ;  but  that  every  gentleman  will 
confider  and  difcufs  the  fubje£t  with  all  the  candour,  mo- 
deration, and  deliberation  which  the  magnitude  and  im- 
portance of  the  fubje£t  requires. 

Mr.  Caldwell  obferved,  that  he  would  agree  that  any 
other  word  mould  be  fubftituted  to  the  word  compact  m% 
but  after  all  that  had  been  faid,  the  Conflitution  appeared 
to  him  to  be  of  the  nature  of  a  compact.  It  could  not  be 
fully  (o  called  till  adopted  and  put  in  execution  ;  when 
fo  put  in  execution,  there  were  aclual  Governors  in  ex* 
iftence. 

Mr. Davie — Mr.  Prefident,  What  we  have  already  faid, 
may  convince  the  reverend  gentleman  what  a  long  time  it 
will  take  us  to  difcufs  the  fubje£t  in  the  mode  which  he 
has  propofed.  Thofe  few  folitary  propofitions  which  he 
has  put  on  paper,  will  make  but  a  fmall  part  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  this  Conflitution.  I  wifh  the  gentleman  to  re- 
flet! how  dangerous  it  is  to  confine  us  to  any  particular 
rules.  This  fyftem  is  moft  extenfive  in  its  nature,  in- 
volving not  only  the  principles  of  governments  in  general, 
but  the  complicated  principles  of  federal  governments. 
We  ihould  not  perhaps  in  a  week  lay  down  all  the  princi- 
ples eflential  to  fuch  a  Conflitution.  Any  gentleman  may, 
in  the  courfe  of  the  inveftigation,  mention  any  maxims 
Jic  thinks  proper,  and  compare  them  with  the  Conflituti- 
on. It  would  take  us  more  time  to  eftablifh  thefe  prin- 
ciples 


(     33     ) 

ciples,thantoconfidertheConftitution  itfelf.  Itwillbewrong 
to  tie  any  man's  hands.     I  hope  the  queftion  will  be  put. 

Mr.  Per/on  infilled  on  the  propriety  of  the  principles, 
and  that  they  ought  to  be  laid  on  the  table  with  the  De- 
claration of  Rights,  Conftitution  of  the  flate,  and  the 
Confederation. 

Mr.  Lenoir  approved  of  the  principles,  but  difapproved 
of  being  bound  by  any  rules. 

Mr.  Machine  was  of  the  fame  opinion  as  to  the  impro* 
priety  of  being  bound. 

Mr.  James  Galloway  wifhed  to  leave  the  hands  of  the 
Members  free,  but  he  thought  thefe  principles  were  unex- 
ceptionable. He  faw  no  inconvenience  in  adopting  them, 
and  wifhed  they  would  be  agreed  to. 

Mr.  Lenoir  anfwered,  that  the  matter  had  been  largely 
debated.  He  faid,  that  he  thought  the  previous  queftion 
ought  to  be  put,  whether  they  fhould  lay  down  certain 
principles  to  be  governed  by,  or  leave  every  man  to  judge* 
as  his  own  breaff  fuggefted. 

After  fome  little  altercation  the  previous  queftion  was 
put — For  the  principles  90.  Againft  them  163.  Majo- 
rity againfl  them  73. 

His  Excellency  Governor  Johnjlon  then  moved  to  dif-r 
cufs  it  by  fettions. — This  was  oppofed  becaufe  it  would 
take  up  too  much  time. 

After  fome  altercation  about  the  mode  of  confidering 
the  Conftitution,  Mr.  Iredell  arofe,  and  fpoke  as  follows: 

Mr.  Prefident,  Whatever  delay  may  attend  it,  a  difcuf-* 
fion  is  indifpenfable.  We  have  been  fent  hither  by  the 
people  to  confider  and  decide  this  important  bufinefs  for 
them.  This  is  a  facred  truft,  the  honour  and  importance 
of  which  I  hope  are  deeply  imprefled  on  every  member 
here.  We  ought  to  difcufs  this  Conftitution  thoroughly 
in  all  its  parts.  It  was  ufelefs  to  come  hither,  and  dilho-? 
nourable  unlefs  we  difcharge  that  truft  faithfully.  God 
forbid  that  any  one  of  us  fhould  be  determined  one  way  or 
the  other.  I  prefume  that  every  man  thinks  it  his  duty  to 
hold  his  mind  open  to  conviction,  that  whatfoever  he  may 
have  heard,  whether  againft  or  for  the  Conftitution,  he 
will  recede  from  his  prefent  opinion,  if  reafons  of  fuffici- 
ent  validity  are  offered.  The  gentleman  from  Granvilla 
$ia§  told  us,  that  we  had*  fince  March  tg  confider  it,  anc| 
~T  * "    I  tbtf 


(     34     > 

that  he  hoped  every  member  was  ready  to  give  his  vote, 
upon  it.  'Tis  true,  we  have  had  fince  that  time  to  confi*. 
der  it,  and  I  hope  every  Member  has  taken  pains  to  in- 
form himfelf.  I  truft  they  have  confcientioufly  confi- 
dered  it,  that  ihey  have  read  on  both  fides  of  the  quefti- 
on,  and  are  refolved  to  vote  according  to  the  dictates  of 
their  confciences.  I  can  truly  fay,  that  I  believe  there  are 
few  members  in  this  Houfe  who  have  taken  more  pains  to 
confider  it  than  myfelf.  But  I  am  ftiil  by  no  means  confi- 
dent that  I  am  right.  I  have  fcarcely  ever  converfed  on 
the  fubjecT:  with  any  man  of  underftanding,  who  has  not 
thrown  fome  new  light  upon  the  fubjecl:  which  efcaped  me 
before.  Thofe  gentlemen  who  are  fo  felf  futficient,  that 
they  believe  they  are  never  in  the  wrong,  may  arrogate  in- 
fallibility to  themselves,  and  conclude  deliberation  to  be 
ufelefs.  For  my  part,  I  have  often  known  myfelf  to  be  in 
the  wrong,  and  have  ever  wifhed  to  be  corrected.  There 
is  nothing  dimonourable  in  changing  an  opinion.  Nothing 
is  more  fallible  than  human  judgment.  No  gentleman 
will  fay  that  his  is  not  fallible  :  Mine  I  am  fure  has  often 
proved  fo.  The  ferious  importance  of  the  fubjecl:  merits 
the  utmoft  attention.  An  erroneous  decifion  may  involve 
truly  awful  and  calamitous  confequences.  It  is  incum- 
bent on  us  therefore  to  decide  it  with  the  greateft  delibe- 
ration. The  Conftitution  is  at  leaft  entitled  to  a  regular 
difcuflion.  It  has  had  the  fan£tion  of  many  of  the  beft 
and  greateft  men  upon  the  continent ;  of  thofe  very  men 
to  whom  perhaps  we  owe  the  privilege  of  debating  now. 
It  has  alfo  been  adopted  by  ten  dates  fince.  Is  it  probable 
that  we  are  lefs  fallible  than  they  are  ?  Do  we  fuppofe  our 
knowledge  and  wifdom  to  be  fupcrior  to  their  aggregate  wif- 
dom  and  information  ?  I  agree  that  this  queftion  ought  to 
be  determined  on  the  footing  of  reafon,  and  not  on  that 
of  authority ;  and  if  it  be  found  defective  and  unwife,  I 
{hall  be  for  rejecting  it  •,  but  it  is  neither  decent  nor  right  to 
refufe  it  a  fair  trial.  A  fyftem  fupported  by  fuch  characters 
merits  at  leaft  a  ferious  confideration.  I  hope  therefore, 
that  the  Conftitution  will  be  taken  up  paragraph  by  para- 
graph. It  will  then  be  in  the  power  of  any  gentleman  to 
offer  his  opinion  on  everypart,  and  by  comparing  it  with 
other  opinions  he  may  obtain  ufeful  information.     If  the 

JpoaftitutiQU  be  fo  defeftive  as  it  is  reprefented,  then  the 
___-  _    _  enquiry 


(    3S    ) 

enquiry  will  terminate  in  favour  of  thofe  who  oppofe  it  i 
But  if,  as  I  believe  and  hope,  it  be  difcovered  to  be  fo 
formed  as  to  be  likely  to  promote  the  happinefs  of  our 
country,  then  I  hope  the  decifion  will  be  accordingly  in  its 
favour.  Is  there  any  gentleman  fo  indifferent  to  an  union 
with  our  fifter  itates,  as  to  hazard  difunion  rafhly  without 
confidering  the  confequences  ?  Had  my  opinion  been  dif- 
ferent from  what  it  is,  I  am  fure  I  fhoukl  have  hefitated 
and  reflected  a  long  time  before  I  had  offered  it  againft 
fuch  refpeclable  authorities.  I  am  forry  for  the  expence 
which  may  be  incurred,  when  the  community  is  fo  dif- 
treffedj  but  this  is  a  trivial  confideration  compared  to  the 
confequences  of  a  rafh  proceeding  upon  this  important 
queftion.  Were  any  member  to  determine  againft  it  with- 
out proper  confideration,  and  afterwards  upon  his  return 
home,  on  an  impartial  consideration,  to  be  convinced  it 
was  a  good  fyftem,  his  reflections  on  the  temerity  and  pre- 
cipitation of  his  conduct  might  deflroy  his  peace  of  mind 
forever.  I  doubt  not  the  members  in  general  who  con- 
demn it,  do  fo  from  a  fincere  believe  that  the  fyftem  is  a 
bad  one :  But  at  the  fame  time,  I  believe  there  are  many 
who  are  ready  to  relinquifh  that  opinion,  if  they  can  be 
convinced  it  is  erroneous,  and  that  the'y  fincerely  wifh  for 
a  fair  and  full  difcufhon  of  the  fubje£t..  For  thefe  reafons 
I  am  of  opinion  that  the  motion  made  by  the  Honourable 
Member  is  proper  to  be  adopted* 

Mr.  Rutherford  was  furprifed  at  the  arguments  ufed  by 
gentlemen,  and  wifhed  to  know  how  they  mould  vote  5 
whether  on  the  paragraphs,  and  how  the  report  fhould  be 
made  when  the  committee  rofe. 

His  Excellency  Governor  Johnfton — If  we  reject  any 
t>ne  part  we  rejecl:  the  whole.  We  are  not  to  form  a  con- 
ftitution,  but  to  fay  whether  we  flaall  adopt  a  conftitution 
to  which  ten  ftates  have  already  acceded.  If  we  think  it 
a  bad  government,  it  is  not  binding  on  us;  we  can  reject 
it.  If  it  be  proper  for  our  adoption,  we  may  adopt  it. 
But  a  rejection  of  a  fingle  article,  will  amount  to  a  rejec- 
tion of  the  whole. 

Mr.  Rutherford  —The  honourable  gentleman  has  mifta- 
ken  me.  Sorry  I  am  that  it  is  fo  late  taken  up  by  North- 
Carolina,  if  we  are  to  be  influenced  and  perfuaded  in  this 
«aanncr.    I  am  unhappy  to  hear  geutierhea  of  learning  and 

integrity 


I  35  ) 

Integrity  preach  up  the  docTxine  of  adoption  by  ten  ftates* 
Sir9  it  is  my  opinion  that  we  ought  to  decide  it  as  if  no 
{tate  had  adopted  it.  Are  we  to  be  thus  intimidated  into 
a  meafure,  of  which  we  may  difapprove  ? 

The  queftion  way  then  put,  and  carried  by  a  great  majo- 
rity, to  difcui's  the  Conftitution  claufe  by  claufe. 

The  preamble  of  the  Conftitution  was  then  read. 

Mr.  Caldwell — Mr.  Chairman,  If  they  mean  by  Wey  thi 
people — the  people  at  large,  I  conceive  the  expreflion  is 
Improper.  Were  not  they  who  framed  this  Conftitution, 
the  Reprefentatives  of  the  Legiflatures  of  the  different 
ftates  ?  In  my  opinion  they  had  no  power  from  the  people 
st  large  to  ufe  their  name,  or  to  a£t  for  them.  They  were 
riot  delegated  for  that  purpofe. 

Mr.  Maclairte-^-The  reverend  gentleman  has  told  us> 
that  the  expreffions,  We,  the  People,  are  wrong,  becaufe  the 
gentlemen  who  framed  it,  were  not  the  Reprefentatives  of 
the  people.  I  readily  grant  that  they  were  delegated  by 
ftates.  But  they  did  not  think  that  they  were  the  people, 
but  intended  it  for  the  people  at  a  future  day.  The  fane* 
tion  of  the  {late  Legiflature  was  in  fome  degree  neceflary. 
It  was  to  be  fubmitted  by  the  Legiflatures  to  the  people^ 
So  that  when  it  is  adopted,  it  is  the  ael:  of  the  people. 
When  it  is  the  acl:  of  the  people*  their  name  is  certainly- 
proper.     This  is  very  obvious  and  plain  to  any  capacity. 

Mr  Davie — -Mr.  Chairman,  The  obfervation  of  the  reve- 
rend gentleman  is  grounded,  I  fuppofe,  on  a  fuppofition  that 
the  federal  Convention  exceeded  their  powers.  This  objec- 
tion has  been  induftrioufly  circulated ;  but  I  believe,  on  a 
candid  examination,  the  prejudice  on  which  thi?  error  is 
founded,  will  be  done  away.  As  I  had  the  honour,  Sir,  to  be 
a  member  of  the  Convention,  it  may  be  expected  I  would 
anfwer  an  objection  perfonal  in  its  nature,  and  wjhich  con- 
tains rather  a  reflection  on  our  condudt,  than  an  objection 
to  the  merits  of  the  Conftitution.  After  repeated  and  de- 
cifive  proofs  of  the  total  inefficiency  of  our  general  govern- 
ment, the  ftates  deputed  the  Members  of  the  Convention 
to  revife  and  Jlrengthen  it:  And  permit  me  to  call  to  your 
confideration,  that  whatever  form  of  confederate  govern- 
ment they  might  devife,  or  whatever  powers  they  might 
juopofe  to  give  this  new  government,  no  part  of  it  was 
binding  until  the  whole  Conftitution  had  received  the  fo* 


(  »  ) 

lemn  aflfent  of  the  people.  What  was  the  object  of  out 
million  ?  "  To  decide  upon  the  moft  effectual  means  of  re- 
moving the  defe£ts  of  our  federal  union."  This  is  a 
general,  difcretional  authority  to  propofe  any  alteration 
they  thought  proper  or  neceflary.  Were  not  the  ftate  Le- 
giflatures  afterwards  to  review  our  proceedings  ?  Is  it  not 
immediately  through  their  recommendation  that  the  plan 
of  the  Convention  is  fubmitted  to  the  people  ?  And  this 
plan  muft  ftill  remain  a  dead  letter,  or  receive  its  operation 
from  the  fiat  of  this  Convention.  Although  the  federal 
Convention  might  recommend  the  concelTion  of  the  moft 
extenfive  powers,  yet  they  could  not  put  one  of  them  in 
execution.  WJiat  have  the  Convention  done  that  can  me- 
rit this  fpecies  of  cenfure  ?  They  have  only  recommended 
a  plan  of  government  containing  feme  additional  powers 
to  thofe  enjoyed  under  the  prefent  feeble  fyftem,  amend- 
ments not  only  neceffary,  but  which  were  the  exprefs  ob- 
ject of  the  deputation.  When  we  inveftigate  this  fyftem 
candidly  and  accurately,  and  compare  all  its  parts  with  one 
another,  we  mail  find  it  abfolutely  necefiary  to  confirm 
thefe  powers,  in  order  to  fecure  the  tranquility  of  the  ftates 
and  the  liberty  of  the  people.  Perhaps  it  may  be  necefTa- 
ry  to  form  a  true  judgment  of  this  important  queftion,  to 
ftate  lome  events,  and  develope  fome  of  thofe  defects 
which  gave  birth  to  the  late  Convention,  and  which  have 
produced  this  revolution  in  our  federal  government.  With 
the  indulgence  of  the  committee  I  wiil  attempt  this  detail 
with  as  much  precifion  as  I  am  capable  of.  The  general 
objects  of  the  union,  are,  i  ft.  To  protect  us  againft  foreign 
invafion.  2d.  To  defend  us  againft  internal  commotions 
and  infurrections.  3d.  To  promote  the  commerce,  agri- 
culture and  manufactures  of  America.  Thefe  objects  are 
requifite  to  make  us  a  fafe  and  happy  people,  and  they  can- 
not be  attained  without  a  firm  and  efficient  fyftem  of  union. 
As  to  the  firft,  we  cannot  obtain  any  effectual  protec- 
tion from  the  prefent  Confederation.  It  is  indeed  univer- 
fally  acknowledged  that  its  inadequacy  in  this  cafe,  is  one 
of  its  greateft  defects.  Examine  its  ability  to  repel 
invafion.  In  the  late  glorious  war  its  weaknefs  was  une- 
quivocally experienced:  It  is  well  known  that  Congrefe 
had  a  dijeretionary  right  to  raife  men  and  money,  but  they 
liad  no  power  to  do  either.  In  order  to  preclude  the  ne- 
ceffity  of  examining  the  whole  progrefs  of  its  imbe- 
cility, 


C    3*    ) 

ciHty,  permit  me  to  Call  to  your  recollection  one  Tingle  in- 
fiance.  When  the  laft  great  ftroke  was  made  which  hum- 
bled the  pride  of  Britain,  and  put  us  in  pofieflion  of  peace 
and  independence,  fo  low  were  the  finances  and  credit  of 
the  United  States,  that  our  army  could  not  move  from 
Philadelphia,  until  the  Minifter  of  his  molt  Chriftian  Ma- 
jefty  was  prevailed  upon  to  draw  bills  to  defray  the  expence 
of  the  expedition :  Thefe  were  net  obtained  on  the  credit 
or  intereit  of  Gongrefs,  but  by  the  perfonal  influence  of 
the  Commander  in  Chief.  Had  this  great  project  mifcar- 
Tied,  what  fatal  events  might  have  enfued  ?  It  is  a  Very  mo- 
derate prefumption,  that  what  has  once  happened  may 
happen  again.  The  next  important  confideration  which 
is  involved  in  the  external  powers  of  the  union,  are  treaties. 
Without  a  power  in  the  federal  government  to  compel  the 
performance  of  our  engagements  with  foreign  nations,  we 
{hall  be  perpetually  involved  in  deftructive  wars.  The  Con- 
federation is  extremely  defective  in  this  point  alfo.  I  mall 
only  mention  the  Britifh  treaty,  as  a  fatisfactory  proof  of 
this  melancholy  fa£h  It  is  well  known,  that  although  this 
treaty  was  ratified  in  1 784,  it  required  the  fanction  of  a 
law  of  North-Carolina  in  1787  :  And  that  our  enemies* 
prefuming  on  the  weaknefs  of  our  federal  government,  have 
refufed  to  deliver  up  feverai  important  pods  within  the 
territories  of  the  United  Stites>  and  ftill  hold  them,  to  our 
fhame  and  difgrace.  It  is  unneceffary  to  reafon  on  facts, 
the  perilous  confequences  of  which  muft  in  a  moment 
ftrike  every  mind  capable  of  reflection. 

The  next  head  under  which  the  general  government  may 
be  confidered,  is  the  regulation  of  commerce.  The  Uni- 
ted States  (hould  be  empowered  to  compel  foreign  nations 
into  commercial  regulations,  that  were  either  founded  on 
the  principles  of  juftice  or  reciprocal  advantages.  Has  the. 
prefent  Confederation  effected  any  of  thefe  things  ?  Is 
not  our  commerce  equally  unprotected  abroad  by  arms  and 
negociation  ?  Nations  have  refufed  to  enter  into  treaties 
with  us.  What  was  the  language  of  the  Britifh  Court  on 
a  proportion  of  this  kind  ?  Such  as  wtould  infult  the  pride 
of  any  man  of  feeling  and  independence — "  You  can  make 
4€  engagements,  but  you  cannot  compel  your  citizens  to 
«  comply  with  them  ;  we  derive  greater  profits  from  tjie 
*  prefent  fituatioa  of  yoyr  comjnerge,  than  we  could  expe<5fc 

«  undec 


(    39    ) 

«*  under'a  treaty ;  and  you  have  no  kmd  of  power  that  caa 
"  compel  us  to  Surrender  any  advantage  to  you."  This  was 
the  language  of  our  enemies  *,  and  while  our  government 
remains  as  feeble  as  it  has  been,  no  nation  will  form  any 
connexion  with  us,  that  will  involve  the  relinquishment 
of  the  lead  advantage.  What  has  been  the  confequence  ? 
a  general  decay  of  trade,  the  rife  of  imported  merchan- 
dife,  the  fall  of  produce,  and  an  uncommon  decreafe  of 
the  value  of  lands.  Foreigners  have  been  reaping  the  be- 
nefits and  emoluments  which  our  citizens  ought  to  enjoy. 
An  unjuftifiable  perverfion  of  juftice  has  pervaded  almoft 
all  the  dates,  and  every  thing  prefenting  to  our  view  a 
fpe&acle  of  public  poverty  and  private  wretchednefs. 

While  this  is  a  true  reprefentation  of  our  fituation,  caa 
our  general  government  recur  to  the  ordinary  expedient  o£ 
loans  f  During  the  late  war,  large  fums  were  advanced  to> 
us  by  foreign  dates  and  individuals.  Congrefs  have  not 
been  enabled  to^r  pay  even  the  intereft  of  thcfe  debts  with, 
honour  and  punctuality.  The  requifitions  made  on  the 
dates  have  been  every  where  unproductive,  and  fome  of 
them  have  not  paid  a  diver.  Thefe  debts  are  a  part  of  the 
price  of  our  liberty  and  independence ;  debts  which  ought 
to  be  regarded  with  gratitude  and  difcharged  with  ho- 
nour. Yet  many  of  the  individuals  who  lent  us  money  in 
the  hour  of  our  didrefs,  are  now  reduced  to  indigence  in 
confequence  of  ou|  delinquency.  So  low  and  hopelefs  are 
the  finances  of  the  United  States,  that  the  year  before  lafl: 
Congrefs  were  obliged  to  borrow  money  even  to  pay  the 
intercd  of  the  principal  which  we  had  borrowed  before. 
This  wrethed  refource  of  turning  intered  into  principal,  is 
the  mod  humiliating  and  difgraceful  meafure  that  a  nation 
could  take,  and  approximates  with  rapidity  to  abfolute 
ruin  :  Yet  it  is  the  inevitable  and  certain  confequence  of 
fuch  a  fydem  as  the  exiding  Confederation. 

There  are  feveral  other  inftances  of  imbecility  in  that 
fydem.  It  cannot  fecure  to  us  the  enjoyment  of  our  own 
territories,  nor  even  the  navigation  of  our  own  rivers. 
The  want  of  power  to  edablifh  an  uniform  rule  of  natura- 
lization through  the  United  States  is  alfo  no  fmall  defect, 
as  it  mud  unavoidably  be  productive  of  difagreeable  con- 
troverfies  with  foreign  nations.  The  general  government 
§*J£ht  io  this,  as  in  every  other  inftance,  to  poflefs  the 

meana 


(    40     ) 

means  of  preferving  the  peace  and  tranquility  of  the  union, 
Aftriking  proof  of  the  neceffity  of  this  power  lately  happen- 
ed in  Rhode-Iiland :  A  man  who  had  run  off  with  a  veflet 
and  cargo,  the  property  of  fome  merchants  in  Holland, 
took  fanftuary  in  that  place ;  application  was  made  for  him 
as  a  citizen  of  the  United  Netherlands  by  the  Minifter* 
but  as  he  had  taken  the  oath  of  allegiance,  the  ftate  refufed 
to  deliver  him  up,  and  protected  him  in  his  villainy.  Had 
it  not  been  for  the  peculiar  fituation  of  the  dates  at  that 
time,  fatal  confequences  might  have  refulted  from  fuch  a, 
conduct,  and  the  contemptible  Hate  of  Rhode-Iiland  might 
have  involved  the  whole  union  in  a  war. 

The  encroachments  of  fome  ftates  on  the  rights  of  others, 
and  of  all  on  thofe  of  the  confederacy,  are  inconteftible 
proofs  of  the  weaknefs  and  imperfection  of  that  fyftem. 
Maryland  lately  pafled  a  law  granting  exclufive  privileges 
to  her  own  veifels,  contrary  to  the  articles  of  the  Confe- 
deration :  Congrefs  had  neither  power  nor  influence  to  al- 
!  ter  it,  all  they  could  do,  was  to  fend  a, contrary  recom* 
mendation.  It  is  provided  by  the  6th  article  of  the  Con-, 
federation,  that  no  compact  fhall  be  made  between  two  or 
more  ftates  without  the  confent  of  Congrefs  ;  yet  this  has 
been  recently  violated  by  Virginia  and  Maryland,  and  alfa 
by  Pennfylvania  and  New-Jerfey.  North-Carolina  and 
MafTachufetts  have  had  a  considerable  body  of  forces  on 
foot,  and  thofe  in  this  ftate  raifed  for  iwo  years,  notwith- 
standing the  exprefs  provifion  in  the  Confederation  that 
no  forces  fliould  be  kept  up  by  any  ftate  in  time  of  peace. 

As  to  internal  tranquility,  without  dwelling  on  the  un- 
happy commotions  in  our  own  back  counties,  I  will  only 
add,  that  if  the  rebellion  in  Maflaehufttts  had  been  plan- 
ned and  executed  with  any  kind  of  ability,  that  ftate  mull 
have  been  ruined,  for  Congrefs  were  not  in  a  fituation  to 
render  them  any  affiftance. 

Another  object  of  the  federal  union  is,  to  promote  the 
agriculture  and  manufactures  of  the  ftates;  objecls  in 
which  we  are  fo  nearly  concerned.  Commerce,  Sir,  is 
the  nurfe  of  both.  The  merchant  furnifties  the  planter 
with  fuch  articles  as  he  cannot  manufacture  himfelf,  and 
finds  Jiim  a  market  for  his  produce.  Agriculture  cannot 
flourifh  if  commerce  languishes  \  they  are  mutually  de-* 
pendant  on  each  other.    Our  cornmerce|  as.  I  have  befoas 

QbftrY<sd» 


(     4«     ) 

©bfervcd,  is  unproteaed  abroad,  and  without  regulation 
at  home,  and  in  this  and  many  of  the  ftates  ruined,  by  par- 
tial and  iniquitous  laws— laws  which,  inftead  of  having  a 
tendency  to  protcft  property  and  encourage  induftry,  led 
to  the  depreciation  of  the  one,  and  deftroyed  every  incite- 
ment  to  the  other— laws  which  bafely  warranted  and  lega- 
lifed  the  payment  of  juft  debts  by  paper,  which  reprefenta 
nothing,  or  property  of  very  trivial  value. 

Thefe  are  fome  of  the  leading  caufes  which  brought 
forward  this  new  Conftitution.  It  was  evidently  necefTa* 
ry  to  infufe  a  greater  portion  of  ftrength  into  the  na- 
tional government  :  But  Congrefs  were  but  a  fingle  body, 
with  whom  it  was  dangerous  to  lodge  additional  powers. 
Hence  arofe  the  ncceffity  of  a  different  organization.  In 
order  to  form  fome  balance,  the  departments  of  govern- 
ment were  feparatcd,  and  as  a  necerTary  check  the  legifla- 
tive  body  was  compofed  of  two  branches.  Steadinefs  and 
wifdom  are  better  enfured  when  there  is  a  feeond  branch  to 
balance  and  check  the  firft.  The  (lability  of  the  laws 
will  be  greater,  when  the  popular  branch,  which  might 
be  influenced  by  local  views,  or  the  violence  of  party,  is 
checked  by  another,  whofe  longer  continuance  in  office 
will  render  them  more  experienced,  more  temperate  and 
more  competent  to  decide  rightly. 

The  Confederation  derived  its  fole  fupport  from  the  ftate 
Legiflatures  \  this  rendered  it  weak  and  ineiT  aual :  It  was 
therefore  necefTary  that  the  foundations  of  this  govern- 
ment mould  be  laid  on  the  broad  bafis  of  the  peo- 
ple. Yet  the  ftate  governments  are  the  pillars  upon 
which  this  government  is  extended  over  fuch  an  im- 
menfe  territory,  and  are  efTential  to  its  exiftence.  The 
Houfe  of  Reprefentatives  are  immediately  ele&cd  by  the 
people.  The  Senators  reprefent  the  fovereignty  of  the 
ftates  •,  they  are  direaiy  ehofen  by  the  ftate  Legiflatures* 
vnd  no  legiflative  aa  can  be  done  without  their  concurrence. 
The  eleaioit  of  the  Executive  is  in  fome  meafure  under 
the  controul  of  the  Legiflatures  of  the  ftates,  the  Eleaorg 
being  appointed  under  their  direaion. 

The  difference  in  point  of  magnitude  and  importance 
in  the  members  of  the  confederacy,  was  an  additional  rea- 
fon  for  the  divifion  of  the  Legiflature  into  two  branches, 
and  for  eftablifhing  an  equality  of  fuffrage  in  the  Senate. 
The  protection  of  the  fmall  ftates  againft  the  ambirion  *n$ 
v  influenza 


(       42       ) 

influence  of  the  larger  members,  could  only  be  effected  by 
arming  them  with  an  equal  power  in  one  branch  of  the 
Legiflature.  On  a  contemplation  of  this  matter,  we  fhali 
find,  that  the  jealoufics  of  the  flates  could  not  be  recon- 
ciled any  other  way.  The  lefier  dates  would  never  have 
concurred  unlefs  this  check  had  been  given  them,  as  a  Se- 
curity for  their  political  cxidence  againd  the  power  and  en- 
croachments of  the  great  dates.  It  may  be  alfo  proper  to 
ohferve,  that  the  Executive  is  feparated  in  its  functions  from 
the  Legiflature  as  well  as  rhe  nature  of  the  cafe  would  ad- 
mit, and  the  Judiciary  from  both. 

Another  radical  vice  in  the  old  fyftem,  which  was  necef- 
fary  to  be  corrected,  and  which  will  be  underdood  with- 
out a  long  deduction  of  reafoning,  was,  that  it  legiflated  on 
dates  indead  of  individuals  }  and  that  its  powers  could  not 
be  executed  but  by  fire  ob  by  the  fword  ;  by  military  Force, 
and  not  by  the  intervention  of  the  civil  magidrate.  Every 
one  who  is  acquainted  with  the  relative  fituation  of  the 
dates,  and  the  genius  of  our  citizens,  mud  acknowledge, 
that  if  the  government  was  to  be  carried  into  effect  by  mi- 
litary force,  the  mod  dreadful  confequences  would  enfue. 
It  would  render  the  citizens  of  America,  the  mod  implaca- 
ble enemies  to  one  another.  If  it  could  be  carried  into  ef- 
fect againd  the  fmall  dates,  yet  it  could  not  be  put  in  force 
again  ft  the  larger  and  more  powerful  dates.  It  was  there- 
fore absolutely  neceflary  that  the  influence  of  the  magidrate 
fhould  be  introduced,  and  that  the  laws  fhould  be  carried 
home  to  individuals  themfelves. 

In  the  formation  of  this  fydem,  many  difficulties  present- 
ed themfelves  to  the  Convention.  Every  member  law  that 
the  exiding  fyftcm  would  ever  be  ineffectual,  unlefs  its  laws 
operated  on  individuals,  as  military  coercion  was  neither 
eligible  nor  practicable.  Their  own  experience  was  forti- 
fied by  their  knowledge  of  the  inherent  weaknefs  of  all 
confederate  governments  :  They  knew  that  all  governments 
merely  federal,  had  been  fhort-lived;  or  had  exided  from 
principles  extraneous  from  their  conditutions ;  or  from  ex- 
ternal caufes  which  had  no  dependence  on  the  nature  of 
their  governments.  Thefe  confiderations  determined  the 
Convention  to  depart  from  that  folecifm  in  politicks,  the 
principle  of  Jegiflation,  for  ftates,  ia  their  political  capaci- 
ties. 

1U 


X    43     .) 

The  great  extent  of  country  appeared  to  fome  a  formi- 
dable difficulty  ;  but  a  confederate  government  appears  at 
lead  in  theory,  capable  of  embracing  the  various  inierefts  of 
the  mod  extenfive  territory  :  Founded  on  the  (late  govern- 
ments folely,  as  I  have  faidt>efore,  it  would  be  tottering  and 
inefficient.  It  became  therefore  necefisry  to  bottom  it  on 
the  people  themfelves,  by  giving;  them  an  immediate  inte- 
relt  and  agency  in  the  government.  There  was  however, 
fome  real  difficulty  in  conciliating  a  number  of  jarring  in- 
ierefts, arifing  from  the  incidental,  but  unalterable,  diffe- 
rence in  the  ftates  in  point  of  territory,  fituation,  climate, 
and  rivalfhip  in  commerce.  Some  of  the  ftates  are  very 
extenfive,  others  very  limited  :  Some  are  manufacturing 
ftates,  others  merely  agricultural :  Some  of  thefe  are  ex- 
porting ftates,  while  the  carrying  and  navigation  bufinefs 
are  in  the  pofteflion  of  others.  It  was  not  eafy  to  recon- 
cile fuch  a  multiplicity  of  difcordant  and  clalhing  interefts. 
Mutual  concedions  were  necefiary  to  come  to  any  concur- 
rence, A  plan  that  would  promote  the  exclufive  interefts 
of  a  few  ftates,  would  be  injurious  to  others.  Had  each 
Hate  obftinately  infifted  on  the  fecurity  of  its  particular  lo- 
cal advantages,  we  fhould  never  have  come  to  a  conclufion  ; 
each  therefore  amicably  and  wifely  relinquished  its  particu- 
lar views.  The  federal  Convention  have  told  you,  that  the 
Conftitution  which  they  formed,  "  was  the  refult  of  a  fpirit 
*f  of  amity,  and  of  that  mutual  deference  and  concefiion, 
li  which  the  peculiarity  of  their  political  fituation  rendered 
«<  indifpenfable."  I  hope  the  fame  laudable  fpirit  will  go- 
vern this  Convention  in  their  decifion  on  this  important 
queftion. 

The  bufinefs  of  the  Convention  was  to  amend  the  Con- 
federation by  giving  it  additional  powers.  The  prefent  form 
of  Congrefs  being  a  finglc  body,  it  was  thought  unfafe  to 
augment  its  powers,  without  altering  its  organization. 
The  act  of  the  Convention  is  but  a  mere  propofal,  fimilar 
to  the  production  of  a  private  pen.  I  think  it  a  govern- 
ment which,  if  adopted,  will  cherifii  and  protect:  the  hap- 
pinefs  and  liberty  of  America;  but  I  hold  my  mind  open 
to  conviction  \  I  am  ready  to  recede  from  my  opinion  if  it 
be  proved  to  be  ill-founded.  I  truft  that  every  man  here 
is  equally  ready  to  change  an  opinion  he  may  have  impro- 
perly formed.     The  weaknefs  and  inefficiency  of  the  old 

Confederation 


(     44     ) 

Confederation  produced  the  neceffity  of  calling  the  Federal 
Convention:  Their  plan  is  nuw  before  you,  and  I  hope  on 
a  deliberate  consideration  every  man  will  fee  the  neceflity 
of  fach  afyftem.  It  has  been  the  fubje£t  of  much  jea- 
loufy  and  cenfure  out  of  doors.  I  hope  gentlemen  will  now 
come  forward  with  their  objections,  and  that  they  will  be 
thrown  out  and  anfwered  with  candour  and  moderation. 

Mr.  Caldwell  wifhed  to  know  why  the  gentlemen  who 
were  delegated  by  the  ftates,  filled  themfelves  We,  the  Peo- 
ple.    He  faid  that  he  only  wifhed  for  information. 

Mr.  Iredell  anfwered,  that  it  would  be  eafy  to  fatisfy  the 
gentleman.  That  the  ftile  We,  the  People,  was  not  to  be 
applied  to  the  Members  themfelves,  but  was  to  be  the  Itile 
of  the  Conftitution  when  it  {hould  be  ratified  in*their  re- 
fpeflive  dates. 

Mr.  Jofeph  Taylor — Mr.  Chairman,  The  very  wording 
of  this  Conftitution  feems  to  carry  with  it.an  aflunied  pow- 
er. We,  the  People,  is  furely  an  afmmed  power.  Have 
ihey  faid,  We,  the  Delegates  of  the  people  ?  It  feems 
to  me,  that  when  they  met  in  Convention  they  aiTumed 
more  power  than  was  given  them.  Did  the  people  give 
them  the  power  of  ufmg  their  name?  This  power  was  in 
the  people :  They  did  not  give  it  up  to  the  Members  of  the 
Convention.  If  therefore  they  had  not  this  power,  they 
affumed  it.  It  is  the  intereft  of  every  man  who  is  a  friend 
to  liberty,  to  oppofe  the  alTumption  of  power  as  foon  as 
poflible.  I  fee  no  reafon  why  they  affumed  this  power. 
Matters  may  be  carried  ft  ill  farther.  This  is  a  confolida- 
tion  of  all  the  ftates.  Had  it  faid,  We,  the  States,  there 
would  have  been  a  federal  intention  in  it.  But,  Sir,  it  is 
clear  that  a  confolidationis  intended.  Will  any  gentleman 
fay  that  a  confolidated  government  will  anfwer  this  coun- 
try ?  It  is  too  large.  The  man  who  has  a  large  eftate  can- 
not manage  it  with  convenience.  I  conceive,  that  in  the 
prefent  cafe,  a  confolidated  government  can  by  no  means 
fuit  the  genius  of  the  people.  The  gentleman  from  Ha- 
lifax [Mr.  Davie]  mentioned  reafons  for  fuch  a  government. 
They  have  their  weight  no  doubt,  but  at  a  more  conveni- 
ent time  we  can  fhew  their  futility.  We  fee  plainly  that 
tnen  who  come  from  New- England,  are  different  from  us: 
^hey  are  ignorant  of  our  fituation  :  They  do  not  know  the 
Hate  of  our  country ;  They  cannot  with  fafety  legiflate  for 

us. 


(     45     ) 


xls.  I  am  aftonifhcd  that  the  fervants  of  the  Legislature  of 
North-Carolina  ihould  go  to  Philadelphia,  and  inftead  of 
fpeaking  of  the  i'tate  of  North- Carolina,  (hould  fpeak  of 
the  people.  I  wifh  to  (top  power  as  foon  as  poiTible,  f6r 
they  may  carry  their  affumption  of  power  to  a  more  dan- 
gerous lengtl).  I  wifh  to  know  where  they  found  the  pow- 
er of  faying,  Wey  the  People,  and  of  confolidating  the  ftates. 

Mr.  Machine — Mr.  Chairman,  I  cor.fefs  myfelf  aito- 
nifhed  to  hear  objections  to  the  preamble  They  fay  that 
the  Delegates  to  the  federal  Convention  affumed  powers 
which  were  not  granted"  them  :  That  they  ought  not  to  have 
ufed  the  words,  W>,  the  People.  That  they  were  not  the 
Delegates  of  the  people  is  ur,iv,erfally  acknowledged.  The 
Conttitution  is  only  a  mere  propofaL  Had  it  been  binding 
on  us,  there  might  be  a  reafon  for  objedling.  After  they 
had  finifhed  the  plan,  they  propofed  that  it  mould  be  re- 
commended to  the  people  by  the  feveral  ftate  Legiflatures. 
If  the  people  a'pprove  of  ir>  it  becomes  their  act.  Is  not 
this  merely  a  difpute  about  words,  without  any  meaning 
whatever  ?  Suppofe  any  gentleman  of  this  Convention  had 
drawn  up  this  government,  and  we  thought  it  a  good  one  ; 
we  might  refpe6l  his  intelligence  and  integrity,  but  it  would 
not  be  binding  upon  us.  We  might  adopt  it,  if  we  thought 
It  a  proper  fyftem,and  then  it  would  be  our  acl.  Suppofe 
it  had  been  made  by  our  enemies,  or  had  dfopt  from  the 
clouds,  we  might  adopt  it  if  we  iound  it  proper  for  our 
adoption.  By  whatever  means  we  found  it,  it  would  be 
our  aCt  as  foon  as  we  adopted  it.  It  is  no  more  than  a 
blank  till  it  be  adopted  by  the  people.  When  that  is 
done  here,  is  it  not  the  people  of  the  (late  of  North-Ca- 
rolina that  dp  it,  joined  with  the  people  of  the  other  ftates 
who  have  adopted  it?  The  exprefiion  is  then  right.  But 
the  gentleman  has  gone  further,  and  fays,  that  the  people 
of  New-England  are  different  from  us.  This  goes  againft 
the  union  altogether.  They  are  not  to  legiflate  for  us  ; 
we  are  to  be  reprefented  as  well  as  they.  Such  a  futile  ob- 
jection ftrikes  at  all  union.  We  know  that  without  union, 
we  mould  not  have  been  debating  now.  I  hope  to  hear  no 
more  objections  of  this  trifling  nature,  but  that  we  fhall 
enter  into  the  fpirit  of  the  fubject  at  once. 

Mr.  Caldwell  obferved,  that  he  only  wifhed  to  knoW  why 
they  had  aflumed  the  name  of  the  people. 

Mr, 


(     4<5    ) 

Mr.  yames  Galloway  —Mr.  Chairman,  I  truft  we  mall 
siot  take  up  more  time  on  this  point.  I  fhall  juft  make  a 
few  remarks  on  what  has  been  faid  by  the  gentleman  from 
Halifax.  He  has  gone  through  our  diftrefTes,  and  thofe  of 
the  other  dates.  As  to  the  weaknefs  of  the  Confederation, 
we  all  know  it.  A  fenfe  of  this  induced  the  different  ftates 
to  fend  Delegates  to  Philadelphia.  They  had  given  them 
certain  powers ;  we  have  feen  them,  they  are  now  upon  the 
table.  The  refult  of  their  deliberations  is  now  upon  the 
table  alfo.  As  they  have  gone  out  of  the  line  which  the 
ftates  pointed  out  to  them,  we,  the  people  are  to  take  it 
up  and  confider  it.  The  gentlemen  who  framed  it,  have 
exceeded  their  powers,  and  very  far.  They"  will  be  able 
perhaps  to  give  reafons  for  fo  doing.  If  they  can  (hew  us 
any  reafons,  we  will  no  doubt  take  notice  of  them.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  if  our  civil  and  religious  liberties  are 
not  fecured,  and  proper  checks  provided,  we  have  the  pow- 
er in  our  own  hand  to  do  with  it  as  we  think  proper.  I 
hope  gentlemen  will  permit  us  to  proceed. 

The  Clerk  then  read  the  fir  ft  feci  ion  of  the  fir  ft  article. 

Mr.  Caldwell — Mr.  Chairman,  I  am  forry  to  be  object- 
ing ;  but  I  apprehend,  that  all  the  legiflative  powers 
granted  by  this  Conflitution,  are  not  vefted  in  a  Congrefs 
confiding  of  the  Senate  and  the  Houfe  of  Reprefentatives, 
becaufe  the  Vice-Prefident  has  a  right  to  put  a  check  on 
It.  This  is  known  to  every  gentleman  in  the  Convention. 
How  can  all  the  legiflative  powers,  granted  in  that  Con- 
flitution, be  vefted  in  the  Congrefs,  if  the  Vice-Prefident 
is  to  have  a  vote  in  cafe  the  Senate  is  equally  divided  ?  I 
aflc  for  information,  how  it  came  to  be  exprefled  in  this 
manner,  when  this  power  is  given  to  the  Vice-Prefident  ? 

Mr.  Madame  declared,  that  he  did  not  know  what  the 
gentleman  meant. 

Mr.  Caldwell  faid,  that  the  Vice-Prefident  is  made  a 
part  of  the  legiflative  body,  although  there  was  an  exprefs 
declaration,  that  all  the  legiflative  powers  were  vefted  in 
the  Senate  and  Houfe  of  Reprefentatives,  and  that  he 
would  be  glad  to  know  how  thefe  things  confifted  together. 

Mr.  Maclaine  exprefled  great  aftonifhment  at  the  gen- 
tleman's criticifm.  He  obferved,  that  the  Vice-Prefident 
had  only  a  calling  vote,  in  cafe  of  an  equal  divifion  in  the 
Senate.    That  a  provifioa  pf  this  kind  was  tg  be  found  in 

^:  -  r-         ~ "- -         «u 


I  47  y 

all  deliberative  bodies.  That  it  was  highly  ufeful  and  ex- 
pedient. That  it  was  by  no  means  of  the  nature  of  a 
check  which  impedes  or  arrefts,  but  calculated  to  prevent 
the  operation  of  the  government  from  being  impeded. 
That  if  the  gentleman  could  (hew  any  legiflative  power  to 
be  given  to  any  but  the  two  Houfes  of  Congrefs,  his  objec- 
tion would  be  worthy  of  notice. 

Some  other  gentlemen  faid  they  were  dhTatisfied  with  Mr. 
Machine's  explanation.  That  the  Vice-Prefi dent  was  not 
a  Member  of  the  Senate,  but  an  officer  of  the  United 
States,  and  yet  had  a  legiflative  power  ;  and  that  it  ap-' 
peared  to.  them  inconfiftcnt.  That  it  would  have  been 
more  proper  to  have  given  the  calling  vote  to  the  Preli- 
dent. 

His  Excellency  Governor  Johnfton  added  to  Mr.  Mac- 
Iaine's  reafoning,  that  it  appeared  to  him  a  very  good  and 
proper  regulation.  That  if  one  of  the  Senate  was  to  be 
appointed  Vice-Prefident,  the  flate  which  he  reprefented 
would  either  lofe  a  vote  if  he  was  not  permitted  to  vote 
on  every  occafion,  or  if  he  was  he  might  in  fome  inftances 
have  two  votes.  That  the  Prefldent  was  already  pofTeffed  of 
the  power  of  preventing  the  paflage  of  a  law  by  a  bare  ma- 
jority :  Yet  laws  were  not  faid  to  be  made  by  the  Prefi- 
dent,  but  by  the  two  Houfes  of  Congrefs  exclufively. 

Mr.  Lenoir — Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  a  greater  objection 
on  this  ground,  than  that  which  has  juft  been  mentioned. 
I  mean,  Sir,  the  legiflative  power  given  to  the  Prefldent 
himfelf.  It  may  be  admired  by  fome,  but  not  by  me. — 
He,  Sir,  with  the  Senate,  is  to  make  treaties,  which  are 
to  be  the  fupreme  law  of  the  land.  This  is  a  legiflative 
power  given  to  the  Prefldent,  and  implies  a  contradiction 
to  that  part  which  fays,  that  all  legiflative  power  is  veiled 
in  the  two  Houfes.  f 

Mr.  Spaight  anfwered,  that  it  was  thought  better  to 
put  that  power  into  the  hands  of  the  Senators  as  Reprefen- 
tatives  of  the  flates  ;  that  thereby  the  interell  of  every 
ftate  was  equally  attended  to  in  the  formation  of  treaties  j 
but  that  it  was  not  confidered  as  a  legiflative  a£l  at  all. 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  This  is  an  objection  againll 
the  inaccuracy  of  the  fentence.  I  humblv  conceive  it  will 
appear  accurate  on  a  due  attention.  After  a  bill  is  pafled 
by  both  Houfes,  it  if  to  fee  &ewn  to  the  Prefldent.   With* 


(     48     ) 


in  a  certain  time  he  is  to  return  it.  If  he  difapproves  of 
it,  he  is  to  date  his  objections  in  writing  ;  and  it  depends 
on  Congrefs  afterwards  to  fay,  whether  it  (hall  be  a  law  or 
not.  Now,  Sir,  I  humbly  apprehend,  that,  whether  a 
law  paffes  by  a  bare  majority,  or  by  two-thirds,  which 
are  required  to  concurafter  he  fhall  have  flared  objections, 
what  gives  active  operation  to  it  is,  the  will  of  the  Sena- 
tors and  Reprefentatives,  The  Prefident  has  no  power  of 
legiflation.  If  he  does  not  object,  the  law  panes  by  a  bare 
majority  ;  and  if  he  objects,  it  paries  by  two-thirds.  His 
power  extends  only  to  caufe  it  to  be  reconfidered,  which 
fecures  a  greater  probability  of  its  being  good.  As  to  his 
power  with  refpetl  to  treaties,  I  fhall  offer  my  fentimenta 
on  it  when  we  come  properly  to  it. 

Mr.  Maclaine  intimated,  that  if  any  gentleman  was  out 
of  order*,  it  was  the  gentleman  from  Wilkes.  [Mr.  Le- 
noir.] That  treaties  were  the  fupreme  law  of  the  land  in 
all  countries,  for  the  mo-ft  obvious  xeafons.  That  laws,  or 
legiflative  acls,  operated  upon  individuals  ;  but  that  trea- 
ties a£ted  upon  ftates.  That  unlefs  they  were  the  fupreme. 
law  of  the  la^nd,  they  could  have  no  validity  at  all.  That 
the  Prefident  did  not  a£r,  in  this  cafe  as  a  iegiflator,  but  ra- 
ther in  his  executive  capacity. 

Mr.  Lenoir  replied,  that  he  wifhed  to  be  conformable  tc* 
the  rules  of  the  Houfe  ;  but  he  ftill  thought  the  Prefident 
was  poiTeffed  of  legiflative  powers,  while  he  could  make- 
.  treaties  joined  with  the  Senate. 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  the  gentleman  is  in- 
order.  When  treaties  are  made,  they  become  as  valid  as. 
legiflative  at~ts  I  apprehend,  that  every  a£t,  of  the  go- 
vernment, legiflative,  executive,  or  judicial,  if  in  purfu^ 
ance  of  a  conflitutional  power,  is  the  law  of  the  land.- — 
Thefe  different  atls  become  the  a£ts  of  the  flate  by  the 
inftrumentality  of  its  officers.  When,  for  inflance,  the 
Governor  of  this  ftate  grants  a  pardon,  it  becomes  the 
law  of  the  land,  and  is  valid.  Every  thing  is  the  law  of 
land,  let  it  come  from  what  power  it  will,  provided  it  be 
confident  with  the  Conftitution. 

Mr.  Lenoir  anfwered,  that  that  comparison  did  not  hold, 

M 

*  Something  had  been  faid  about  order,  which  was  net  di&ii&l 
iteird. 


»y 


(    49    ) 

.  Mr.  Iredell  continued — If  the  Governor  grants  a  pardon; 
it  becomes  a  law  of  the  land.  "Why  ?  Becaufe  he  has 
power  to  grant  pardons  by  the  Conftitution.  Suppofe  this 
Conftitution  is  adopted,  and  a  treaty  is  made — that  treaty 
is  the  law  of  the  land.  Why  ?  Becaufe  the  Conftitution 
grants  the  power  of  making  treaties. 

Several  Members  expreffed  difTatisf action  at  the  incon- 
fiftency  (as  they  conceived  it)   of  the  expreffions  ;  when 

Mr.  James  Galloway  obferved,  that  their  obfervations 
would  be  made  more  properly  when  they  come  to  that 
claufe  which  gave  the  calling  vote  to  the  Vice-Prefident, 
and  the  qualified  negative  to  the  Prefident. 

The  firft  three  claufes  of  the  fecorid  fection  read, 

Mr.  Machine — Mr.  Chairman,  As  many  objections  have 
been  made  to  biennial  elections,  it  will  be  neceflary  to  ob- 
viate them.  I  beg  leave  to  ftate  their  fuperiority  to  annual 
elections.  Our  elections  have  been  annual  for  fome  years- 
People  are  apt  to  be  attached  to  old  cuftoms.  Annual 
elections  may  be  proper  in  our  ftate  governments,  but  not 
in  the  general  government.  The  feat  of  government  is  at 
a  confiderable  diftance  ;  and  in  cafe  of  a  difputed  election, 
it  would  be  fo  long  before  it  could  be  fettled,  that  the  ftate 
would  be  totally  without  reprefentation.  There  is  ano- 
ther  reafon,  ftill  more  cogent,  to  induce  us  to  prefer  bien- 
nial to  annual  elections  ;  the  objects  of  flate  legiflation  are- 
narrow  and  confined,  and  a  fliort  time  will  render  a  mart 
fufficiently  acquainted  with  them;  but  thofe  of  the  gene- 
ral government  are  infinitely  more  extenfive,  and  require? 
a  much  longer  time  to  comprehend  them.  The  Reprc- 
fentatives  to  the  general  government,  muft  be  acquainted 
not  only  with  the  internal  fituation  and  circumftances  of  the 
United  States,  but  alio  with  the  ftate  of  our  commerce 
with  foreign  nations,  and  our  relative  fituation  to  thofe  na- 
tions. They  muft  know  the  relative  fituation  of  thofe  na- 
tions to  one  another,  and  be  able  to  judge  with  which  o£ 
them,  and  in  what  manner  our  commerce  mould  be  regu- 
lated. Thefe  are  good  reafons  to  extend  the  time  of  elec- 
tions to  two  years.  I  believe  you  remember,  and  perhaps 
every  Member  here  remembers,  that  this  country  was  very 
happy  under  biennial  elections.  In  North-Carolina  the 
Reprefentatives  were  formerly  chofen  by  ballot  biennially. 
Jt  was  changed  under  the  royal  government,  and  the  mods 


(    5°    ) 

pointed  out  by  the  King,  Notwithstanding  the  conteft  for 
annual  elections,  perhaps  biennial  elections  would  (till  be 
better  for  this  country.  Our  laws  would  certainly  be  lefs 
fluctuating. 

Mr.  Shepperd  obferved,  that  he  could  fee  no  propriety 
iii  the  friends  of  the  new  fyftern  making  objections,  when 
hone  were  urged  by  its  oppofers.  That  it  was  very  un- 
common for  a  man  to  make  objections  and  anfwer  them 
himfelf :  And  that  it  would  take  an  immenfe  time  to  men- 
tion every  objection  which  had  been  mentioned  in  the 
country. 

Mr.  Madame— -It  is  determined  |Jready  by  the  Conven- 
tion, to  debate  the  Conftitution  fection  by  left  ion.  Are 
we  then  to  read  it  only  ?  Suppofe  the  whole  of  it  is  to  be 
paHed  over  without  faying  any  thing,  will  not  that  amount 
to  a  dead  vote  ?  Sir,  I  am  a  Member  of  this  Convention, 
and  if  objections  are  made  here  I  will  anfwer  them  to  the 
belt  of  my  ability.  If  I  fee  gentlemen  pafs  by  in  filence  fuch 
parts  as  they  vehemently  decry  out  of  doors,  or  fuch  parts 
as  have  been  loudly  complained  of  in  the  country,  I  (hall 
anfwer  them  alfo. 

After  fome  defultory  converfation,  Mr.  Willie  Jones  ob- 
ferved, that  he  would  eafily  put  the  friends  of  the  Con- 
ftitution in  a  way  of  difcuffing  it.  Let  one  of  them  (faid 
he)  make  objections  and  another  anfwer  them. 

Mr.  Davie — Mr.  Chairman,  I  hope  that  reflections  of 
a  perfohal  nature  will  be  avoided  as  much  as  poflible.  What 
is  there  in  this  bufinefs  fhould  make  us  jealous  of  each 
other  ?  We  are  all  come  hither  to  ferve  one  common  caufc 
of  one  country.  Let  us  go  about  it  openly  and  amicably  : 
There  is  no  neceflity  for  the  employment  of  underhanded 
means.  Let  every  objection  be  made*  Let  us  examine 
the  plan  of  government  fubmitted  to  us  thoroughly.  Let 
us  deal  with  each  other  with  candour.  I  am  forry  to  fee 
fo  much  impatience  fo  early  in  the  bufinefs. 

Mr.  Shepperd  anfwered,  that  he  fpoke  only  becaufe  he 
was  averfe  to  unnece&ary  delays,  and  that  he  had  no  fineffe. 
or  dvrfign  at  all. 

Mr.  Rutherford  wifhed  the  fyftern  to  be  thoroughly  dif- 
cuffed.  He  hoped  that  he  fhould  be  excufed  in  making  a 
few  obfervations  in  the  Convention  after  the  committee 
rofe,  and  that  he  trufted  gentlemen  wquU  make  no  re  flee- 
panu       "~  ~"  """  Mr.' 


(    5«     ) 

Mr.  Bloodworth  declared,  that  every  gentleman  had  a 
right  to  make  obje&ions  in  both  cafes,  and  that  he  was  for- 
ry  to  hear  reflections  made. 

Mr.  Goudy — Mr.  Chairman,  This  claufe  of  taxation  will 
give  an  advantage  to  fome  dates  over  the  others.  It  will 
be  oppreftive  to  the  fouthern  ftates.  Taxes  are  equal  to 
our  reprefentation.  To  augment  our  taxes  and  encreafe 
our  burthens,  our  negroes  are  to  be  represented.  If  a 
date  has  fifty  thoufand  negroes,  (he  is  to  fend  one  Repre-  * 
Tentative  for  them.  I  wifh  not  to  be  reprefented  with  ner 
groes,  efpecially  if  it  encreafes  my  burthens. 

Mr.  Davie — Mr.  Chairman,  I  will  endeavour  to  obvi- 
ate what  the  gentleman  laft  up  has  faid.  I  wonder  to  fee 
gentlemen  fo  precipitate  and  hafty  on  a  vubjeCt  of  fuch  aw- 
ful importance.  It  ought  to  be  confidered,  that  fome  of  m 
are  flow  of  apprehenfion,  not  having  thofe  quick  concep- 
tions, and  luminous  understandings,  of  which  other  gentle- 
men may  be  pofleffed.  The  gentleman  c(  does  not  wrifh  to 
be  reprefented  wkh  negroes."  This,  Sir,  is  an  unhappy 
fpecies  of  population,  but  we  cannot  at  prefent  alter  their 
fituation.  The  eaftern  ftates  had  great  jealoufies  on  this 
fubjecl:  :  They  infilled  that  their  cows  and  horfes  were 
equally  entitled  to  reprefentation ;  that  the  one  was  pro- 
perty as  well  as  the  other.  It  became  our  duty  on  the  other 
hand,  to  acquire  as  much  weight  as  pofliblein  the  icgiflati- 
on  of  the  union;  and  as  the  northern  ftates  were  more  po* 
pulous  in  whites,  this  only  could  be  done  by  infilling  that 
a  certain  proportion  of  our  Haves  mould  make  a  part  of 
the  computed  population.  It  was  attempted  to  form  a  rule 
of  reprefentation  from  a  compound  ratio  of  wealth  and 
population;  but  on  confederation  it  was  found  impractica- 
ble to  determine  the  comparative  value  of  lands,  and  other 
property,  in  fo  extenfive  a  territory,  with  any  degree  of 
accuracy;  and  population  alone  was  adopted  as  the  onhg 
practicable  rule  or  criterion  of  reprefentation.  It  was  urg- 
ed by  the  Deputies  of  the  eaftern  ftates,  that  a  reprefenta- 
tion of  two-fifths  would  be  of  little  utility,  and  that  their 
entire  reprefentation  would  be  unequal  and  burthenfome  ; 
That  in  a  time  of  war  flaves  rendered  a  country  more  vul? 
nerable,  while  its  defence  devolved  uponjts/w  inhabitants. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  infilled  that  in  time  of  peace,  they 
contributed  by  their  labour  to  the  general  wealth  as  well  as 

other 


(     5*     ) 

ftthef  members  of  the  community :  That  as  rational  beihgg 
they  had  a  right  of  reprefentation,  and  in  fome  inftances 
inight  be  highly  ufeful  in  war.  On  thefe  principles  the 
eaftern  dates  gave  the  matter  up,  and  confented  to  the  re- 
gulation as  it  has  been  read.  I  hope  thefe  reafons  will  ap- 
pear fatisfactory.  It  is  the  fame  rule  or  principle  which 
•was  propofed  fome  years  ago  by  Congrefs,  and  afiented  to 
by  twelve  of  the  ftates.  It  may  wound  the  delicacy  of  the 
gentleman  from  Guilford  [Mr.  Goudy]  but  I  hope  he  wilt 
endeavour  to  accommodate  his  feelings  to  the  ihtereft  and 
circumftances  of  his  country. 

Mr.  James  Galloway  faid,  that  he  did  hot  object  to  the  re- 
prefentation of  negroes,  fo  much  as  he  did  to  the  fewnefs 
of  the  number  of  Reprefentatnres.  He  was  furprifed  how 
we  came  to  have  but  five,  including  thofe  intended  to  re- 
present negroes  :  That  in  his  humble  opinion  North-Caro- 
lina was  entitled  to  that  number  independent  of  the  negroes. 

Mr.  Spaight  endeavoured  to  fatisfy  him,  that  the  Con- 
tention had  no  rule  to  go  by  in  this  Cafe  :  That  they  could 
2iot  proceed  upon  the  ratio  mentioned  in  the  Conftitution, 
till  the  enumeration  of  the  people  was  made:  That  fome 
ftates  had  made  a  return  to  Congrefs  of  their  numbers,  and 
others  had  not :  That  it  was  mentioned  that  we  had  had 
time,  but  made  no  return  :  That  the  prefent  number  was 
only  temporary  :  That  in  three  years  the  actual  cenfus 
would  be  taken,  and  our  number  oi  Representatives  regu- 
lated accordingly. 

His  Excellency  Governor  John/Ion  was  perfectly  fatis- 
fied  with  the  temporary  number.  He  faid  that  it  could 
not  militate  againft  the  people  of  North-Carolina,  becaufe 
they  paid  in  proportion  :  That  no  great  inconvenience  could 
happen  in  three  years  from  their  paying  lefs  than  their  full 
proportion:  That  they  were  not  very  flufh  of  money  ;  and 
that  he  hoped  for  better  times  in  the  courfe  of  three  years. 

The  reft  of  the  fecond  fection  read. 

Mr.  Jofeph  Taylor  objected  to  the  provifion  made  for 
impeaching.  He  urged  that  there  could  be  no  fecurity 
from  it,  as  the  perfons  accufed  were  triable  by  the  Senate, 
who  were  a  part  of  the  Legiflature  rhemfelves  :  That  while* 
irten  were  fallible,  the  Senators  were  liable  to  errors,  efpe- 
^jaPy  in  a  cafe  *vhere  they  were  concerned  themfelves. 

Mr.  Iredtll—hlx^  Chairman^  I  was  going  to  obferve  that 

this 


(    S'i    ) 

this  claufe,  vetting  the  power  of  impeachment  in  the  Houfe 
of  Representatives,  is  one  of  the  greateft  fecurities  for  a 
due  execucion  of  all  public  offices.  Every  government 
requires  it.  Every  man  ought  to  be  amenable  for  his  con- 
duct, and  there  are  no  perfons  fo  proper  to  complain  of 
the  public  officers  as  the  Representatives  of  the  people  at 
large.  The  Representatives  of  the  people  know  the  feel- 
ings of  the  people  at  large,  and  will  be  ready  enough  to 
make  complaints.  If  this  power  were  not  provided  the 
confequences  might  be  fatal.  It  will  be  not  only  the  meant 
of  punifhing  miSconduct,  but  it  will  prevent  miSconduct. 
A  man  in  public  office  who  knows  that  there  is  no  tribunal 
to  punim  him,  may  be  ready  to  deviate  from  his  duty ; 
but  if  he  knows  that  there  is  a  tribunal  for  that  purpoSe, 
although  he  may  be  a  man  of. no  principle,  the  verv  terror 
of  .punifhment  will  perhaps  deter  him.  I  beg  leave  to 
mention  that  every  man  has  a  right  toexprefs  his  opinion, 
and  point  out  any  part  of  the  Conftitution  which  he  either 
thinks  defective,  or  has  heard  reprefented  to  be  fo.  What 
Will  be  the  confequence  if  they  who  have  objections  do  not 
think  proper  to  communicate  them,  and  they  are  not  to  be 
mentioned  by  others  ?  Many  gentlemen  have  read  many 
objections,  which  perhaps  have  made  impreffions  on  their 
minds,  though  they  are  not  communicated  to  us.  I  there- 
fore apprehend  that  the  Member  was  perfectly  regular  in 
mentioning  the  objections  made  out  of  doors.  Such  ob- 
jections may  operate  upon  the  minds  of  gentlemen,  who, 
not  being  uSed  to  convey  their  ideas  in  public,  conceal  them 
out  of  diffidence. 

Mr.  Bloodivorth  wifhed  to  be  informed,  whether  this  Sols 
power  of  impeachment  given  to  the  Houfe  of  Representa- 
tives, deprived  the  ftate  of  the  power  of  impeaching  any 
of  its  Members. 

Mr.  Spaight  anfwered,  that  this  impeachment  extended 
only  to  the  officers  of  the  United  States.  That  it  would 
be  improper  if  the  fame  body  that  impeached,  had  the  pow- 
er of  trying  :  That  therefore  the  Conftitution  had  wifely 
given  the  power  of  impeachment  to  the  Houfe  of  Repre- 
sentatives, and  that  of  trying  impeachments  to  the  Senate* 

Mr.  Jtfeph  Taylor — Mr.  Chairman,  The  objection  is  ve- 
ry ftrong.  If  there  be  but  one  body  to  try,  where  are  we  ? 
If  any  tyranny  or  oppreffion  fhouid  ariSe,  how  are  thoS« 

who 


(    54    ) 

%t?\\o  perpetrated  fuch  oppreffion,  to  be  tried  and  punifhed? 
By  a  tribunal  confiiling  of  the  very  men  who  affiit  in  fuch 
tyranny.  Can  any  tribunal  be  found  in  any  community, 
who  will  give  judgment  aga^nft  their  own  aclipns  ?  Is  it 
the  nature  of  man  to  decide  againft  himfelf  ?  I  am  obliged  to 
the  worthy  member  from  New-Hanover  for  affifting  me 
with  objections.  None  can  impeach  but  the  Representa- 
tives, and  the  impeachments  are  to  be  determined  by  the 
Senators,  who  are  one  of  the  branches  x>f  power  which  we 
dread  under  this  corrftitution- 

His  Excellency  Governor  Johnflon — Mr.  Chairman,  The 
•worthy  Member  from  Granville  furprifes  me  by  his  objec- 
tion. It  has  been  explained  by  another  Member,  that  on- 
ly officers  of  the  United  States  were  impeachable.  J  ne- 
ver knew  any  inftance  of  a  man  being  impeached  for  a  le- 
giflative  a£t ;  nay,  I  never  heard  it  fuggefted  before*  $o 
Member  of  the  Houfe  of  Commons  in  England  has  ever 
been  impeached  before  the  Lords,  nor  any  Lord  for  a  le- 
giflative  mifdemeanor.  A  Reprefentative  is  anfwerable  to 
no  power  but  his  conftituents — He  is  accountable  to  no  ber 
ing  under  heaven,  but  the  people  who  appointed  him. 

Mr.  Taylor  replied,  that  it  now  appeared  to  fiim  in  a 
(till  worfe  light  than  before. 

Mr.  Bloodivorth  obferved,  that  as  this  was  a  Conftitution 
for  the  United  States,  he  fhould  not  have  made  the  ob- 
servation' he  did,  had  the  fubject  not  been  particularly 
mentioned.  That  the  words,  "  fole  power  of  impeach- 
ment," were  fo  general,  and  might  admit  of  fuch  a  latitude 
of  conftruclion,  as  to  extend  to  every  legiflative  Member 
upon  the  continent,  fo  as  to  preclude  the  Representatives 
of  the  different  ftates  from  impeaching. 

Mr.  Maclmne — Mr.  Chairman,  If  I  underrland  the  genr 
tleman  rightly,  he  means,  that  Congrefs  may  impeach  alj 
the  people  or  officers  of  the  United  States.  If  the  gen- 
tleman will  attend  he  will  fee,  that  this  is  a  government 
for  confederated  ftates  ;  that  consequently  it  can  never  inr 
termeddle  where  no  power  is  given-  I  confefs  I  can  fee 
sio  more  reafon  to  fear  in  this  cafe  than  from  our  own  Ge- 
neral Affembly.  A  power  is  given  to  our  own  ftate  Senate 
to  try  impeachments.  Is  it  not  neceflary  to  point  out 
fome  tribunal  to  try  great  offences  ?  Should  there  not  be 
iome  mode  of  punifhmeat  for  the  offences  of  the  officers 

of 


(    55    ) 

of  the  general  government  ?  Is  it  not  neceflary  that  fuch 
officers  fhould  be  kept  within  proper  bounds  ?  The  offi- 
cers of  the  United  States  are  excluded  from  offices  of  ho- 
nour, truft  or  profit  under  the  United  States,  on  impeach- 
ment for,  and  conviction  of,  high  crimes  and  mifdemea- 
nors.  This  is  certainly  neceffary.  This  exclufion  from 
offices  is  harmlefs  in  comparifon  with  the  regulation  made 
in  fimilar  cafes  in  our  own  government.  Here  it  is  ex- 
prefsly  provided  how  far  the  punifhment  {hall  extend,  and 
that  it  fhall  extend  no  farther.  On  the  contrary,  the  limits 
are  not  marked  in  our  own  Conftitution,  and  the  punifh- 
ment  may  be  extended  too  far.  I  believe  it  is  a  certain  and 
known  fact:,  that  Members  of  the  legiflative  body  are  ne- 
ver, as  fuch,  liable  to  impeachment,  but  are  punifhabte 
by  law  for  crimes  and  mifdemeanors  in  their  perfonal  ca- 
pacity. For  inftance,  the  Members  of  Aflembly  are  not 
liable  to  impeachment,  but,  like  other  people,  are  amena- 
ble to  the  law  for  crimes  and  mifdemeanors  committed  as 
individuals.  But  in  Congrefs,  a  Member  of  either  Houfe 
can  be  no  officer. 

Governor  Johnjlon — Mr.  Chairman,  I  find  that  making 
objections  is  ufeful.  I  never  thought  of  the  objection 
made  by  the  Member  from  New-Hanover.  I  never  thought 
that  impeachments  extended  to  any  but  officers  of  theUni- 
ted  States.  When  you  look  at  the  judgment  to  be  given, 
on  impeachments,  you  will  fee,  that  the  punifhment  goes 
no  farther  than  to  remove  and  difqualify  civil  officers  o£ 
the  United  States,  who  (hall,  on  impeachment,  be  con- 
victed of  high  mifdemeanors.  Removal  from  office  is  the 
punifhment — to  which  is  added,  future  difqualification. 
How  could  a  man  be  removed  from  office  who  had  no  of- 
fice ?  An  officer  of  this  flare  is  not  liable  to  the  United 
States.  Congrefs  could  not  difqualify  an  officer  of  this 
ftate.  No  body  can  difqualify  but  that  body  which  creates. 
We  have  nothing  to  apprehend  from  that  article.  We  are 
perfectly  fecure  as  to  this  point.  I  fhould  laugh  at  any 
judgment  they  fhould  give  againfl  any  officer  ^)f  our  own. 

Mr.  Bloodivortb — From  the  completion  of  the  para- 
graph, it  appeared  to  me  to  be  applicable  only  to  officers 
of  the  United  States  5  but  the  gentleman's  own  reafoning 
convinces  me  that  he  is  wrong.  He  fays  he  would  laugh 
it  them.    Will  the  gentleman,  laugh  when  the  extentioa 

of 


(     $6     ) 

•f  their  powers  takes  place  ?  It  is  only  by  our  adoption 
they  can  have  any  power. 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  The  argument  of  the  gen- 
tleman laft  up,  is  founded  upon  mifapprehenfion.  Every 
article  refers  to  its  particular  object.  We  mufl  judge  of 
expreffions  from  the  fubjecl-matter  concerning  which  they 
are  ufed.  The.fole  power  of  impeachment  extends  only  to 
objects  of  the  Conftitution,  The  Senate  (hall  only  try  im- 
peachments ariGng  under  the  Conft itu  tron.  I  n  order  to  con- 
firm and  illuftrate  that  pofition,  the  gentleman  who  fpoke 
before,  explained  it  in  a  manner  perfectly  fatisfactory  to 
my  apprehenfion.  "  Under  this  Conftitution." — What  is 
the  meaning  of  thefe  words  ?  They  fignify,  thofe  arifing 
tinder  the  government  of  the  United  States.  When  this 
government  is  adopted,  there  will  be  two  governments  to 
which  we  {hall  owe  obedience.— LTo  the  government  of  the 
union,  in  certain  defined  cafes— To  our  own  ftate  govern- 
ment, in  every  other  cafe.  If  the  general  government 
were  to  difqualify  me  from  any  office  which  I  held  in  North- 
Carolina  under  its  Jaws,  I  would  refer  to  the  Conftitution, 
arid  fay,  that  they  violated  it,  as  it  only  extended  to  offi-* 
cers  of  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Bloodivorth -r-The  penalty  is  only  removal  from  of- 
fice. It  does  not  mention  from  what  office.  I  do  not  fee 
any  thing  in  the  expreffion  that  convinces  me  that  I  was 
mifhken.     I  ftill  confider  it  in  the  fame  light. 

Mr.  Porter  wifhed  to  be  informed  if  every  officer,  who 
was  a  creature  of  that  Conftitution,  was  to  be  tried  by  the 
Senate  ?  Whether  fuch  officers,  and  thofe  who  had  com- 
plaints againft  them,  were  to  go  from  the  extreme  parts  of 
the  continent  to  the  feat  of  government  to  adjuft  difputes  ? 

Mr.  Davie  anfwered,  that  impeachments  were  confined 
to  cafes  under  the  Conftitution,  but  did  not  defcend  to 
petty  offices.  That  if  the  gentleman  meant,  that  it  would 
be  troublefome  and  inconvenient  to  recur  to  the  federal 
courts  in  cafe  of  oppreffions  by  officers,  and  to  carry  wit- 
.neiTes  fuch  great  diftances,  that  he  would  fatisfy  the  gen- 
tleman, that  Congrefs  would  remove  fuch  inconveniences, 
as  they  had  the  power  of  appointing  inferior  tribunals, 
where  fuch  difputes  would  be  tried. 

Mr.  J.  Taylor — Mr.  Chairman,  I  conceive  that  if  this 
ponftitution  be  adopted,  we  {hall  have  a  large  number  of 

•©cert 


(    57    > 

officers  in  North-Carolina  under  the  appointment  of  Con- 
grefs.  We  ihall  undoubtedly,  for  inftance,  have  a  great 
number  of  tax-gatherers.  If  any  of  thefe  officers  fhall  do 
wrong,  when  we  come  to  fundamental  principles,  we  find 
that  we  have  no  way  to  punifh  them,  but  by  going  to  Con- 
grefsatanimmenfe  diilance,  whither  we  muft  carry  our 
witnefles.  Every  gentleman  muft  fee  in  thefe  cafes 
that  oppreffions  will  arife.  I  conceive  that  they  cannot  be 
tried  elfewhere.  I  confider  that  the  Conltitution  will  be 
explained  by  the  word  "  fole."  If  they  did  not  mean  to 
retain  a  general  power  of  impeaching,  there  was  no  occa- 
fion  for  faying  the  "  fole  power."  I  confider  therefore  that 
oppreffions  will  arife.  If  I  am  opprefled  I  muft  go  to  the 
Houfe  of  Reprefentatives  to  complain.  I  confider  that 
when  mankind  are  about  to  part  with  rights,  they  ought 
only  to  part  with  thofe  rights  which  they  can  with  conve- 
nience relinquish,  and  not  fuch  as  muft  involve  them  in 
diftreifes. 

1  In  anfwer  to  Mr.  Taylor,  Mr.  Spaight  obferved,  that  tho* 
the  power  of  impeachment,  was  given,  yet  it  did  not  fay 
that  there  was  no  other  manner  of  giving  redrefs.  That 
it  was  very  certain  and  clear,  that  if  any  man  was  injured 
by  an  officer  of  the  United  States  he  could  get  redrefs  by 
a  fuit  at  law. 

Mr.  Madame — Mr.  Chairman,  I  confefs  I  never  heard 
before  that  a  tax-gatherer  was  worthy  of  impeachment.  It 
is  one  of  the  meaneft  and  leaft  offices :  Impeachments  are 
only  for  high  crimes  and  mifdemeanors.  If  any  one  is  in- 
jured in  his  perfon  or  property,  he  can  get  redrefs  by  a  fuit 
at  law.  Why  does  the  gentleman  talk  in  this  manner  i 
It  (hews  what  wretched  fhifts  gentlemen  are  driven  to.  I 
never  heard  in  my  life  of  fuch  a  filly  objection.  A  poor, 
infignificant,  petty  officer  amenable  to  impeachment ! 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  The  objection  would  be 
jight  if,  there  was  no  other  mode  of  punifhing.  But  it  is? 
evident  that  an  officer  may  be  tried  by  a  Court  of  common* 
law.  He  may  be  tried  in  fuch  a  court  for  common  law  of- 
fences, whether  impeached  or  not.  As  it  is  to  be  prefumed 
that  inferior  tribunals  will  be  conftituted,  there  will  be  ncr 
occafion  for  going  always  to  the  fupreme  court,  even  ia 
cafe  where  the  federal  courts  have  exclufive  jurifdidtion, 
Wljeje  this  exclufive  cognisance  is  not  given  them,  redrefs 


may  be  Lad  in  the  common  law  courts  in.the  ftate  ami  t 
have  no  doubt  fuch  regulations  will  be  made  as  will  put  k 
out  of  the  power  of  officers  to  diftrefs  the  people  with  im- 
punity.  r     r    .      . 

Governor  Johifton  obferved,  that  men  who  were  in  very 
high  offices  could  not  be  come  at  by  the  ordinary  courfe  of 
juftice,  but  when  called  before  this  high  tribunal  and  con- 
triacd,  they  would  be  topped  of  their  dignity,  and  reduced 
to  the  rank  of  their  fellow-citizens,  and  then  the  courts  of 
common  iaw  might  proceed  againft  them. 

The  committee  now  rofe-Mr.  Prefident  refumed  the 
chair,  and  Mr  Battle  reported,  that  the  committee  had,  ac- 
cording to  order,  had  the  propofed  conftitution  under  their 
confidera^ion,  but  not  having  time  to  go  through  the  fame, 
had  directed  him  to  move  the  Convention  for  leave  to  fit 
again.  , 

■  Refolved,  That  this  Convention  will  to-morrow  again  re- 
io4yc  itfelf  into  a  committee  of  the_  whole  Convention,  on 
the  laid  propofed  plan  of  government. 

The  Convention  then  adjourned  to  ten  o'clock  to-mor- 
row morning. 

F  R  I  D  AY,   July  25,  1788. 
The  Convention  met  according  to  adjournment. 
.    Mr.  Gregory   from  the  committee  of  eledions,  delivered 
ma  report;  which  being  read,  was  agreed  to  as  follows  t 

^  -ff  C?I?.mi"ee  Proceeded  t0  have  read  the  return  of  the 
Sheriff  of  Cumoerland  county,  for  the  town  of  Favetteville 
m  faid  county,  wherein  John  Ingram-  was  returned  to  re- 
prefent  faid  town  in  the  Convention.      ' 

It  is  the  opinion  of  this  committee,  that  the  faid  town 
poflcflcs  not  the  right  of  reprefentation  in  this  Convention, 
and  that  therefore  the  faid  John  Ingram  hath  no  right  to  a 
feat  in  the  fame.  6 

^  It  appearing  to  this  committee,  that  the  votes  given  for 
Thomas  Devane,  fen.  Efq.  and  Thomas  Devane,  were  in- 
tended and  meant  for  the  fame  perfon  : 

Refolved  therefore,  ^hat  the  faid  Thomas  Devane,  fen. 
W3.  is  duly  ele&ed  to  reprefent  the  county  of  New-Hano- 

ISS?! preient  Co~-e?tiQn>  *nd  that  he  take  his  feat  ac- 

lit 


(    59    ) 

The  order  of  tire  day,  for  taking  into  further  confidcra- 
tion  the  propofed  Conftitution  for  the  future  government 
of  the  United  States,  the  Convenrion  agreeable  thereto,  re» 
folved  itfelf  jnto  a  committee  of  the  whole  Houfe.  Mr, 
Battle  in  the  chair. 

Firft  article  of  the  third  fection  read. 

Mr.  Cabarrus  wifhed  to  be  informed  of  the  reafon  why 
the  Senators  were  to  be  elected  forfcriong  a  time. 

Mr.  Iredell—* Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  waited  for  fome  time 
in  hopes  that  a  gentleman  better  qualified  than  myfelf,  would 
explain  this  part.  Every  objection  to  every  part  of  this 
Conftitution  ought  to  be  anfwered  as  fully  as  pofiible. " 

I  believe,  Sir,  it  was  the  general  fenfe  of  all  America, 
with  the  exception  only  of  one  ftate,  in  forming  their  own 
{late  Con{titutions,that  the  legiflative  body  fhould  be  divided 
into  two  branches.in  order  that  the  people  might  have  a  dou- 
ble fecurity.  It  will  often  happen  that  in  a  fingle  body  a  bare 
majority  will  carry  exceptionable^and  pernicious  meafures. 
The  violent  faction  of  a  party  may  often  form  fuch  a  ma- 
jority in  a  fingle  body,   and  by  that  means  the  particular 
views  or  interests  of  a  part  of  the  community  may  be  con^ 
fulted,  and  thofe  of  the  reft  neglected  or  injured.     Is  there 
a  fingle  gentleman  in  this  Convention,  who  has  been  a  mem- 
ber of  the  kegiflaturc,  who  has  not  found  the  minority  in 
the  mod  important  queftions  to  he  often  right  f  Is  there  a 
man  here,  who  has  been  in  either  Houfe,  who  has  not  at 
fometimes  found  the  molt  folid  advantages  from  the  co-ope- 
ration or  oppofition  of  the  other  ?  If  a  meafure  be  righly 
which  has  been  approved  of  by  one  branch,  the  other  will 
probably  confirm  it  :  If  it  be  wrong,  it   is  fortunate   that 
there  is  another  branch  to  oppofe  or  amend  it.  Thefe  prin- 
ciples probably  formed  one  reafon  for  the  inftitution  of  a 
Senate  in  the  form  of  government  before  us.     Another 
arofe  from  the  peculiar  nature  of  that  government,  as  con- 
nected with  the  governments  of  the  particular  dates. 

The  general  government  will 'have  the  protection  and 
management  of  the  general  interefts  of  the  United  States. 
The  local  and  particularMnterefts  of  the  different  ftates  are 
left  to  their  respective  Legiflatures.  All  affairs  which  con- 
cern this  ftate  only  are  to  be  determined  by  our  Reprefen- 
tatives  coming  from  all  parts  of  the  ftate:  All  affairs  which 
concern  the  union  at  large,  are  ta  be  determined  by  Repre- 
sentatives 


(    6o    ) 

.fentatives  coming  from  all  parts  of  the  union.  Thus  then 
the  general  government  is  to  be  taken  care  of,  and  the  ftate 
governments  to  be  preferved.  The  former  is  done  by  a  nu- 
merous reprefentation  of  the  people  of  each- ftate,  in  pro- 
portion to  its  importance  :  The  latter  is  effected  by  giving 
each  ftate  an  equal  reprefentation  in  the  Senate.  The  peo- 
ple will  be  reprefented  in  one  Houfe :  The  ftate  Legifia- 
iures  in  the  other. 

Many  are  of  opinion  that  the  power  of  the  Senate  is  too 
great,  but  I  cannot  think  fo,  confidering  the  great  weight 
which  the  Houfe  of  Reprefentatives  will  have."  Several 
reafons  may  be  affigned  for  this.  The  Houfe 6?  Reprefen- 
iatives  will  be  more  numerous  than  the  Senate  :  They  will 
reprefent  the  immediate  interefts  of  the'people  :  They  will 
originate  all  money  bills,  which  is  one  of  the  greateft  fe- 
curities  in  any  republican  government.  The  refpecl  ability 
of  their  conftituents,  who  are  the  free  citizens  of  America, 
'will  add  great  weight  to  the  Reprefentatives.  For  a  power 
derived  from  the  people  is  the  fource  of  all  real  honour, 
and  a  demonftration  of  confidence  which  a  man  of  any  feel- 
ing would  be  more  ambitious  to  pofTefs,  than  any  other  ho- 
nour or  any  emolument  whatever.  There  is  therefore  al- 
ways a  danger  of  fuch  a  Houfe  becoming  too  powerful,  and 
It  is  neceflary  to  counteracl:  its  influence  by  giving  great 
•weight  and  authority  to  the  other.  I  am  warranted  by  well 
known  fa&s,  in  my  opinion,  that  the  Reprefentatives  of 
the  people  at  large  will  have  more  weight,  than  we  (hould 
be  induced  to  believe  from  a  flight  coniideration.  The  Bri- 
tish government  furnifhes  a  very  remarkable  inftance  to  my 
prefent  purpofe.  In  that  country,  Sir,  is  a  King,  who  is 
hereditary;  a  man,  who  is  not  chofen  for  his  abilities,  but 
who,  though  he  may  be  without  principle  or  abilities,  is  by 
birth  their  Sovereign,  and  may  impart  the  vices  of  his  cha- 
racter to  the  government.  His  influence  and  power  are  fo 
great,  that  the  people  would  bear:a  great  deal  before  they 
would  attempt  to  refill  his  authority.  He  is  one  complete 
branch  of  the  Legiflature,  may  make  as  many  Peers  as  he 
pleaies,  who  are  immediately  members  of  another  branch; 
he  has  the  difpofal  of  almoft  all  offices  in  the  kingdom, 
commands  the  army  and  navy,  is  head  of  the  church,  and 
has  means  of  corrupting  a  large  proportion  of  the  Repre- 
fentatives of  the  people,  who  form  the  third  branch  of  th$ 

Legiflature1, 


<  If  ) 

Legislature.  The  Houfe  of  Peers,  which  forms  the  focohd 
branch,  is  compofed  of  Members  who  are  here.dit.iry,  and 
except  as  to  money  bills  (which  they  are  not  allowed  either 
to  originate  or  alter)  hath  equal  authority  with  the  other 
Houfe.  The  Members  of  the  Huufe  of  Commons,  who 
are  confiderea  to  reprefent  the  people,  are  elected  for  feven 
years,  and  they  are  chofen  by  a  fmall  proportion  of  the 
peop!e,varu»  I  believe  I  may  fay,  a  large  majority  of  them  by 
actual  corruption.  Under  thefe  circumrtances,  one  would 
fuppofe  their 'influence,  compared  to  that  of  the  King  and 
Lords,  was  very  inconfiderable.  But  the  fact  is,  that  they 
"have  by  degrees  increafed  their  power  to  an  aitoniiliing  de- 
gree, and  when  they  think  proper  to  exert  it  can  command 
almoft  any  thing  they  pleafe.  This  great  power  they  en- 
joy, by  having  the  name  of  Reprefentatives  of  the  people, 
a'nd  the  exclufive  right  of  originating  money  bills.  What 
authority  then  will  our  Reprefentatives  not  pofTefs,  who  will 
really  reprefent  the  people,  and  equally  have  the  right  of 
originating  money  bills  ? 

The  manner  in  which  our  Senate  is*  to  be  chofen,  gives 
us  an  additional  fecurity.  Our  Senators  will  not  be  chofen 
by  a  King,  nor  tainted  by  his  influence.  They  are  to  be 
chofen  by  the  different  Legiflatures  in  the  union.  Each  is 
to  choofe  two.  It  is  to  be  fuppofed  that  in  the  cxercife  of 
this  power  the  utm'oft  prudence  and  circumfpection  will  be 
obferved  We  may  prefume  that  they  will  felecl  two  of  the 
moil  refpectable  men  in  the  flate,  two  men  who  had  given, 
the  ftrongeft  proofs  of  attachment  to  the  interefts  of  their 
country.  The  Senators  are  not  to  hold  eftates  for  life  in 
the  Legiflature,  nor  to  tranfmit  them  to  their  children. 
Their  families,  friends  and  eflates,  will  be  pledges  for  their 
fidelity  to  their  country.  Holding  no  office  under  the 
United  States,  they  will  be*  under  no  temptation  of  that 
kind  to  forget  the  interefts  of  their  confliituents.  There  is 
every  probability  that  men  elected  in  this  manner,  will  in 
general  do  their  duty  faithfully.  It  may  be  expected  there-  ' 
fore,  that  they  will  co-operate  in  every  laudable  acl,but  fire- 
nuoufly  refift  thofe  of  a  contrary  nature.  To  do  this  to  ef- 
fect, their  ftation  muft  have  fome  permanency  annexed  to  it. 

As  the  Reprefentatives  of  the  people  may  probably  be 
more  popular,  and  it  may  be  fometimes  necefiary  for  the 
-Senate  to  prevent  factious  meafures  taking  place,  whick 

may 


(62      ) 

may  be  highly  injurious  to  the  real  infereft  of  the  pub- 
lic, the  Senate  fhould  not  be  at  the  mercy  of  every  popu- 
lar clamour.  Men  engaged  in  arduous 'affairs,  are  often 
obliged  to  do  things  which  may  for  the  prefent  be  difap- 
proved  of,  for  want  of  full  information  of  the  cafe,  which 
it  is  not  in  every  man's  power  immediately  to  obtain.  In 
the  mean  time  every  one  is  eager,  to  judge,  and  many  to  con- 
demn ;  and  thus  many  an  action  is  for  a  time  unpopular, 
the  true  policy  and  juftice  of  which  afterwards  very  plain- 
ly  appears.  Thefe  obfervatjVis  apply  even  to  ads  of  legif- 
lation  concerning  domeftic  policy ;  They  apply  much  more 
forcibly  to  thecafe  of  foreign  negociarions,  which  will  form 
one  part  of  the  bufinefs  of  the  Senate.  I  hope  we  fhatt 
not  be  involved  in  the  labyrinths  of  foreign  politicks.  But 
n  is  neceffary  for  us  to  watch  the  condud  of  European  pow- 
ers, that  we  may  be  on  our  defence,  and  ready  in  cafe  of 
an  attack.  All  thefe  things  will  require  a  continued  atten- 
tion :.  And  in  order  to  know  whether  they  were  tranfacted 
rightly  or  not,  it  muft  take  up  a  confiderable  time. 

A  certain  permanency  in  office' is  in  my  opinion  ufefu! 
for  another  reafon.  Nothing  is  more  unfortunate  for  a  na- 
tion, than  to  have  its  affairs  condufted  in  an  irregular  man- 
ner. Confiftency  and  {lability  are  neceffary  to  render  the 
laws  of  any  fociety  convenient  for  the  people.  If  they  were 
to  be  entirely  conduced  by  men  liable  to  be  called  away 
loon,  we  might  be  deprived  in  a  great  meafure  of  their 
utility :  Their  meafures  might  be  abandoned  before  they 
were  fully  executed,  and  others  of  a  lefs  beneficial  tenden- 
cy fubitituted  in  their  ftead.  The  public  alfo  would  be  de- 
prived of  that  experience  which  adds  fo  much  weight  to 
the  greateft  abilities. 

The  bufinefs  of  a  Senator  will  require  a  great  deal  of 
knowledge,  and  more  extenfive  information  than  can  be 
acquired  in  a  ftiort  time.  This  can  be  made  evident  by 
ia£ts  well  known.  I  doubt  not  the  gentlemen  of  this  Houfe 
who  have  been  Members  of  Congrefs,  will  acknowledge 
that  they  have  known  feveral  inftances  of  men  who  were 
Members  of  Congrefs,  and  were  there  many  months  before 
they  knew  how  to  aft,  for  want  of  information  of  the  real 
State  of  the  union.  The  acquifition  of  full  information  of 
this  kind,  muft  employ  a  great  deal  of  time;  fince  a  gene, 
wl  knowledge  of  the  affairs  of  gli  the  ftates,  and  of  the  re. 

lative 


('  «3    ) 

lative  fituation  of  foreign  nations,  would  be  indifp  en  fable. 
Refponfibility  alfo  would  be  leffened  by  a  fhort  duration ; 
for  many  ufeful  meafures  require  a  good  deal  of  time,  and 
continued  operations,  and  no  man  mould  be  anfwerable 
for  the  ill  fuccefs  of  a  fcheme  which  was  taken  out  of  his 
hands  by  others. 

For  thefe  reafons  I  hope  it  will  appear,  that  fix  years  are 
not  too  long  a  duration  for  the  Senate:  I  hope  alfo  it  will  be 
thought,  that  fo  far  from  being  injurious  to  the  liberties  and 
intereft  of  the  public,  it  will  form  an  additional,  fecurity  to 
both,  efpecially  when  the  next  claufe  is  taken  up,  by  which 
we  (hall  fee  that  one  third  of  the  Senate  is  to  go  out  every 
fecond  year,  and  two-thirds  mull  concur  in  the  mod  im- 
portant cafes  ;  fo  that  if  there  be  only  one  honefl  man 
among  the  two-thirds  that  remain,  added  to  the  one-third  v 
which  has  recently  come  in,  this  will  be  fufficient  to  pre- 
vent the  rights  of  the  people  being  facrificed  to  any  unjufl 
ambition  of  that  body. 

I  was  in  hopes  fome  other  gentleman  would  have  ex- 
plained this  paragraph,  becaufe  it  introduces  an  entire 
change  in  our  fyflem,  and  every  change  ought  to  be  found- 
ed on  good  reafons,  and  thofe  reafons  made  plain  to  the 
people.  Had  my  abilities  been  greater  I  mould  have  an- 
fwered  the  objection  better  :  I  have  however  done  it  in  the 
beft  manner  in  my  power,  and  I  hope  the  reafons  I  have 
afligned  will  be  fatisfactory  to  the  committee. 

Mr.  Machine — Mr.  Chairman,  A  gentleman  yefterday 
made  fome  objections  to  the  power  of  the  Vice-Prefident, 
and  infifted  that  he  was  pofleffed  of  legiflative  powers. 
That  in  cafe  of  equality  of  voice  in  the  Senate,  he  had  the 
deciding  vote,  and  that  of  courfe  he,  and  not  the  Senate, 
legiflated.  I  confefs  I  was  (truck  with  aftoniihment  at  fuch 
an  objection,  efpeqally  as  it  came  from  a  gentleman  o£ 
character.  As  far  as  my  underftanding  goes,  the  Vice- 
Prefident  is  to  have  no  acting  part  in  the  Senate,  but  a  mere 
calling  vote.  In  every  other  inftance  he  is  merely  to  pre- 
side in  the  Senate  in  order  to  regulate  their  deliberations. 
I  think  there  is  no  danger  to  be' apprehended  from  him  in 
particular,  as  he  is  to  be  chofen  in  the  fame  manner  with 
the  PreGdent,  and  therefore  may  be  prefumed  to  pofTefs  a 
great  (hare  of  the  confidence  of  all  the  dates.  He  has  been 
flailed  an  ufelefS  officer;  I  think  him  very  ufeful,  and  I  think 

the 


(     64     ) 

the  oVjetVion  very  trifling.  It  (hews  the  uniform  oppefttion 
gentlemen  are  determined  to  make.  It  is  very  eafy  to  ca- 
vil at  the  fineft  government  that  ever  exifted. 

Mr.  Davie — Mr.  Chairman,  I  will  ftate  to  the  committee 
the  reafons  upon  which  this  officer  was  introduced.  I  had 
the  honour  to  obferve  to  the  committee  before,  the  caufes 
of  the  particular  formation  of  the  Senate  ;  that  it  was  owing 
with  other  reafons,  to  the  jealoujy  of  the  ftates,  and  parti- 
cularly'to  the  extreme  jealoufy  of  the  leiTer  itates,  of  the 
power  and  influence  of  the  larger  members  of  the  confe- 
deracy. It  was  in  the  Senate  that  the  feveral  political  in- 
terefts  of  the  ftates  were  to  be  preferved,  and  where  all 
their  powers  were  to  be  perfectly  balanced.  The  commer- 
cial jealoufy  between  the  eaftern  and  fouthern  ftates  had  a 
principal  fhare  in  this  bufinefs.  It  might  happen  in  im- 
portant cafes,  that  the  voices  would  be  equally  divided.  In- 
decificn  might  be  dangerous  or  inconvenient  to  the  public. 
It  would  then  be  neceiTary  to  have  fome  perfon  who  mould 
determine  the  queltion  as  impartially  aspoilible.  Had  the 
Vice-Prefident  been  taken  from  the  reprefer|tation  of  any 
of  the  dates,  the  vote  of  that  ftate. would  have  been  dimi- 
nished in  the  firft  inftance,  and  he  would  have  been  under 
local  influence  in  the  fecond  :  It  is  true  he  mult  be  chofea 
from  fome  ftate  ;  but  from  the  nature  of  his  election  and 
office,  he  reprefents  no  one  ftate  in  particular,  but  all  the 
ftates.  It  is  impoilible  that  any  officer  could  be  chofen 
more  impartially  :  He  is  in  confequence  of  his  election,  the 
creature  of  no  particular  diftrict  or  ftate,  but  the  officer  and 
reprefentative  of  the  union.  He  mutt  poffefs  the  confi- 
dence of  the  ftates  in  a  very  great  degree,  and  confequent- 
ly  be  the  mo(t  proper  perfon  to  decide  in  cafes  of  this  kind. 
Thefe  I  believe  are  the  principles  upon  which  the  Conven- 
tion formed  this  officer. 

Sixth  claufe  of  the  third  fection  read. 

Mr.  James  Galloway  wifhed  gentlemen  to  offer  their  ob- 
jections. That  they  muft  have  made  objections  to  it,  and 
that  they  ought  to  mention  them  here. 

Mr.  Jthn  Blount  faid,  that  the  fole  power  of  impeach- 
ment had  been  objected  to  yefterday,  and  that  it  was  urged, 
officers  were  to  be  carried  from  the  furtheft  parts  of  the 
ftates  to  the  feat  of  government ;  $?  wifhed  to  know  if 
gentfemen  were'fatUSed, 


t    $    ) 

Mr.  Maclmne — Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  no  inclination  W 
get  up  a  fecond  time,  but  fome  gentlemen  think  this  fub- 
jeet  ought  to  be  taken  notice  of.  I  recollect  it  was  men- 
tioned by  one  gentleman,  that  petty  officers  might  be  im- 
peached. It  appears  to  me,  Sir,  to  be  the  mod  horrid  igno- 
rance to  fuppofe,  that  every  officer,  however  trifling  his  of- 
fice, is  to  be  impeached  for  every  petty  offence;  and  that  every 
man  who  fliou'ld  be  injured  by  fuch  petty  officer?,  could  get 
no  redrefsbut  by  this  mode  of  impeachment,  at  the  feat  of 
governments  at  the  diftarice  of  feveral  hundred  miles,  whi- 
ther he  would  be  obliged  to  fummort  a  great  number  of 
witnefTes.  I  hope  every  gentleman  in  this  committee  muft 
fee  plainly,  that  impeachments  cannot  extend  to  inferior  of- 
ficers of  the  United  States.  Such  a  conftruction  cannot 
be  fupported  without  a  departure  from  the  ufual  and  well- 
known  practice  both  in  England  and  America;  But  this 
elaufe  empowers  the  Houfe  of  Reprefentatives,  which  is 
the  grand  inqueft  of  the  Union  at  large,  to  bring  great  of- 
fenders to  juftice.  It  will  be  a  kind  of  ftate  trial  for  high 
crimes  and  mifdertieanors.  I  remember  it  was  objected 
yeflerday,  that  the  Houfe  of  Reprefentatives  had  the  fole 
power  of  impeachment:  The  word  **  fole,"  was  fuppofed 
to  be  fo  extenilve  as  to  include  impeachable  offences  again  ft 
particular  ftates.  Now  for  my  part,  I  cart  fee  no  impro- 
priety in  the  expreilion.  The  word  relates  to  the  gene- 
ral objects  of  the  union.  It  can  only  refer  to  offences 
a'gainffc  the  United -States,  nor  can  it  be  tortured  fo  as  to  havd 
any  other  meaning,  without  a  perverfion  of  the  ufual  mean- 
ing of  language.  The  Houfe  of  Reprefentatives  is  to  have 
the  fole  power  of  impeachment,  and  the  Senate  the  fole 
power  of  trying.  And  here  is  a  valuable  provifion,  not  ta 
be  found  in  other  governments.  In  England,  the  Lords, 
who  try  impeachments,  declare  folemnly  upon  honour,  whe- 
ther the  perfons  impeached  be  guilty  or  not.  But  here  the 
Senators  are  on  oath.  This  is  a  very  happy  frcurity.  It 
is  further  provided,  that  when  the  President  is  tried  (for  he 
is  alfo  liable  to  be  impeached)  the  Chief-Juftice  (hall  pre- 
fide  in  the  Senate  :  Becaufe  it  might  be  fuppofed,  that  the 
Vice-PreuMent  might  be  connected,  together  with  the  Pre- 
fident,  in  the  fanie  crime,  and  would  therefore  be  an  im- 
proper perfon  to  judge  him.  It  would  be  improper  for 
another  reafoa.    On  the  removal  of  the  Prefident  from  of- 


I    6-6    ) 

lice,  it  devolves  on  the  Vice-Prefiderit.  This  being  the 
cafe,  if  the  Vice-Prefident  fhould  be  Judge,  might  he  not 
look  at  the  office  of  President,  and  endeavour  to  influence 
the  Senate  unjuftly  againft  him.  This  is  a  moft  excellent 
caution.  It  has  been  objected  by  fome,  that  the  Prefident 
is  in  no  danger  from  a  trial  by  the  Senate,  becaufe  he  does 
nothing  without  its  concurrence.  It  is  true,  he  is  exprefT- 
ly  reftricled  not  to  make  treaties  without  the  concurrence 
of  two-thirds  of  the  Senators  prefent,  nor  appoint  officers 
without  the  concurrence  of  the  Senate  (not  requiring  two- 
thirds).  The  concurrence  of  all  the  Senators  however, 
is  not  required  in  either  of  thofe  cafes.  They  may  be  all 
prefent  when  he  is  impeached,  and  other  Senators  in  the 
meantime  introduced.  The  Chief*Juftice  we  ought  to 
prefume,  would  not  countenance  a  collufion.  One  diflent- 
ing  perfon  might  divulge  their  mifbehaviour.  Befides  he 
is  impeachable  for  his  own  mifdemeanors,  and  as  to 
their  concurrence  with  him,  it  might  be  effected  by  mifre- 
prefentations  of  his  own,  in  which  cafe  they  would  be  in- 
nocent, though  he  guilty.  I  think  therefore  the  Senate  a 
very  proper  body  to  try  him.  Notwithfianding  the  mode 
pointed  out  for  impeaching  and  trying,  there  is  not  a  fingle 
officer  but  may  be  tried  and  indicted  at  common  law.  For 
it  is  provided,  that  a  judgment  in  cafes  of  impeachment, 
fhall  not  extend  further  than  to  removal  from  office,  and 
difqualification  to  hold  and  enjoy  any  office  of  honour,  truft 
or  profit  under  the  United  States  ;  but  the  party  convicled 
fhall  neverthelefs  be  liable  and  fubje£t  to  indictment,  trial, 
judgment,  and  puniffiment,  according  to  law.  Thus  you 
find  that  no  offender  can  efcape  the  danger  of  puniffiment. 
Officers  however  cannot  be  oppreffed  by  an  unjuft  decifion 
of  a  bare  majority.  For  it  farther  provides,  that  no  per- 
fon fhall  be  convicted  without  the  concurrence  of  two- 
thirds  of  the  members  prefent.  So  that  thofe  gentlemen 
*vho  formed  this  government,  have  been  particularly  care- 
ful to  diftribute  every  part  of  it  as  equally  as  poffible.  As 
the  government  is  folely  inftituted  for  the  United  States, 
fo  the  power  of  impeachment  only  extends  to  officers  of 
the  United  States.  The  gentleman  who  is  fo  much  afraid 
of  impeachment  by  the  federal  Legiflature,  is  totally  mif- 
faken  in  his  principles. 

Mr.  J*  Tajhr— Mr«  Chairman,  My  apprehe&fion  is,  that 

v.:         "  "  r1*"  ~  ""  '  this 


(•  61     ) 

this  claufe  is  connected  with  the  other  which  gives  the  fole 
power  of  impeachment,  and  is  very  dangerous.  "When  I 
was  offering  an  objection  to  this  part,  I  obferved  that  it  was 
fuppofed  by  fome,  that  no  impeachments  could  be  prefer- 
red but  by  the  Houfe  of  Representatives.  I  concluded  that 
perhaps  the  collectors  of  the  United  States,  or  gatherers 
of  taxes,  might  impofe  on  individuals  in  this  country,  and 
that  thefe  individuals  might  think  it  too  great  a  diftance  to 
go  to  the  feat  of  federal  government  to  get  redrefs,  and 
would  therefore  be  injured  with  impunity.  I  obferved  that 
there  were  fome  gentlemen  whofe  abilities  are  great,  who 
conitrue  it  in  a  different  manner.  They  ought  to  be  kind 
enough  to  carry  their  conftru£tion  not  to  the  mere  letter, 
but  to  the  meaning.  I  obferve  that  when  thefe  great  men  are 
met  in  Congrefs,  in  confequ.ence  of  this  power,  they  will 
have  the  power  of  appointing  all  the  officers  of  the  United 
States.  My  experience  in  life  {hews  me,  that  the  friends 
of  the  Members  of  the  Legiflature  will  get  the  offices- 
Thefe  Senators  and  Members  of  the  Houfe-  of  Regrefen- 
tatives,  will  appoint  their  friend?  to  all  offices.  Thefe  of- 
ficers will  be  great  men,  and  they  will  have  numerous  de- 
puties under  them.  The  Receiver-General  of  the  taxes  of 
North-Carolina,  mult  be  one  of  the  greateil  men  in  the 
country.  Will  he  come  to  me  for  my  taxes  ?  No.  He  will 
fend  his  deputy,  who  will  have  fpecial  inftructions  to  op- 
prefs  me.  How  am  I  to  be  redreffed  ?  I  {hall  be  told  that 
I  muft  go  to  Congrefs  to  get  him  impeached.  This  being 
the  cafe,  who  am  I  to  impeach  ?  A  friend  of  the  Repre- 
fsntatives  of  North-Carolina.  For  unhappily  for  us,tthefe 
men  will  have  too  much  weight  for  us;  they  will  have  friends 
in  the  government  who  will  be  inclined  againft  us,  and  thus 
we  may  be  oppreffed  with  impunity.  I  was  forry  yefter- 
day  to  hear  perfonal  obfervations  drop  from  a  gentleman  in 
this  Houfe.  If  we  are  not  of  equal  ability  with  the  gen- 
tleman, he  ought  to  poffefs  charity  towards  us,  and  not  la- 
vifli  fuch  fevere  refledtions  upon  us  in  fuch  a  declamatory- 
manner.  Thefe  are  considerations  I  offer  to  the  Houfe. 
Thefe  oppreffions  may  be  committed  by  thefe  officers.  I 
can  fee  no  mode  of  redrefs.  If  there  be  any,  let  it  be  point- 
ed out.  As  to  perfonal  afperfions  with  refpecl;  to  me,  I 
defpife  them.  Let  him  convince  me  by  realbnjng,  but  not 
fall  on  detraction  or  declamation. 

Mr, 


(    6«     ) 

Mr.  Madame — Mr.  Chairman,  If  I  made  ufe  of  any 
$fperity  to  that  gentleman  yefterday,  I  conieis  I  am  forry 
ior  it.  It  was  becauie  fuch  an  observation  came  from  a 
gentleman  of  his  profeffion.  Had  it  come  from  any  other 
gentleman  in  this  Convention  who  is  not  of  his  profeflion, 
I  (hould  not  be  furprifed.  But  I  was  furprifed  that  it 
(hould  come  from  a  gentleman  of  the  law,  who  muft  know 
the  contrary  perfectly  well.  If  his  memory  had  failed  him, 
he  might  have  known  by  confuting  his  library.  HL  books 
would  have  told  him,  that  no  petty  officer  was  ever  im- 
peachable. When  fuch  trivial,  ill-founded  objections  were 
advanced,  by  perfons  who  ought  to  know  better,  was  it 
not  fufficient  to  irritate  thofe  who  were  determined  to  decide 
the  queftion  by  a  regular  and  candid  difcuffion  ?  Whether 
or  not  there  will  be  a  Receiver-General  in  North-Carolina, 
jf  we  adopt  the  Gonftitution,  I  cannot  take  upon  myfelf  to 
fay.  I  cannot  fay  how  Congrefs  will  collect  their  money. 
It  will  depend  upon  laws  hereafter  to  be  made.  Thefe  laws 
■will  extend  to  other  flares  as  well  as  us.  Should  there  be 
a  Receiver-General  in  North-Carolina,  he  certainly  will 
3iot  be  authorifed  to  opprefs  the  people,  His  deputies  can 
have  no  power  that  he  could  not  have  himfelf.  As  all  col- 
lectors and  other  officers  will  be  bound  to  act  according  to 
law,  and  will  in  all  probability  be  obliged  to  give  fecurity 
for  their  conduct,  we  may  expect  they  will  not  dare  to  op- 
prefs. The  gentleman  has  thought  proper  to  lay  it  down 
ns  a  principle,  that  thefe  fame  Receivers-General  will  give 
fpecial  orders  to  their  deputies  to  opprefs  the  people.  The 
Prefident  is  the  fuperior  officer,  who  is  to  fee  the  laws  put 
In  execution.  He  is  amenable  for  any  mal-adminiftration 
an  his  office.  Were  it  poffible  to  fuppofe,  that  the*  Prefi- 
ident  fhould  give  wrong  inft ructions  to  his  deputies,  where- 
by the  citizens  would  be  diftrefled,  they  would  have  redrefs, 
in  the  ordinary  courts  of  common  law.  But  fays  he,  parties 
injured  muft  go  to  the  feat  of  government  of  the  United 
States,  and  get  redrefs  there.  I  do  not  think  it  will  be  necef- 
izxv  to  go  to  the  feat  of  the  general  government  for  that 
purpofe.  No  perfons  will  be  obliged  to  attend  there,  but 
on  extraordinary  oecafions  ;  for  Congrefs  will  form  re- 
gulations fo  as  to  render  it  unneceflary  for  the  inhabitants 
to  go  thither,  but  on  fuch  oecafions.  My  reafons  for  this* 
coaslufion  are  thefe,  I  lopfc  upon  it  as  the  intereft  of  all 

the 


(     «9     ) 

the  people  of  America,  except  thofe  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
feat  of  government,  to  make  laws  as  eafy  as  poffible  for  the 
people,  with  reipecr.  to  local  attendance.  They  will  not 
agree  to  drag  their  citizens  unneorflTarily  fix  or  feven  hun-» 
dred  miles  from  their  homes.  This  would  be  equally  in*, 
convenient  to  all  except  thofe  in  the  vicinity  of  the  feat  of 
government,  and  therefore  will  be  prevented.  But  fays 
the  gentleman  from  Granville,  what  redrefs  have  we  when 
we  go  to  that  pi  tee  ?  Thefe  great  officers  will  be  the  friends 
of  the  Representatives  of  North-Carolina.  It  is  poffible  they 
may  or  they  may  not.  They  have  the  power  to  appoint 
officers  for  each  ftate  from  what  place  they  pleafe.  It  is 
probable  they  will  appoint  them  out  of  the  ftate  in  which 
they  are  to  act.  I  will  however  admit,  for  the  fake  of  ar- 
gument, that  thofe  federal  officers  who  will  be  guilty  of 
mifdemeanors  in  this  ftate,  will  be  near  relations  of  the 
Reprefentatives  and  Senators  of  North -Carolina.  What 
then?  Are  they  to  be  tried  by  t.hem  only  i  Will  they  be  the 
near  friends  of  the  Senators  and  Reprefentatives  of  the 
other  ftates  ?  If  not,  his  objection  goes  for  nothing,  I  do 
not  understand  what  he  fays  about  detraction  and  declama- 
tion. My  character  is  well  known.  I  am  no  declaimer,  but 
when  I  fee  a  gentleman  ever  fo  refpe&able,  betraying  his 
truft  to  the  public,  I  will  publifh  it  loudly  ;  and  I  fay  this 
is  not  detraction  or  declamation. 

Governor  Johnfton — Mr.  Chairman,  Impeachment  is  ve- 
ry different  in  its  nature  from  what  the  learned  gentleman 
from  Granville  fuppofes  it  to  be.  If  an  officer  commits  an 
offence  againft  an  individual,  he  is  amenable  to  the  courts 
or  law.  If  he  commitst  crimes  againft  the  ftate,  he  may 
be  indicted  and  punifhed.  Impeachment  only  extends  to 
high  crimes  and  mifdemeanors  in  a  public  office.  It  is  a 
mode  of  trial  pointed  out  for  great  mifdemeanors  againft' 
the  public;  But  I  think  neither  that  gentleman  or  any 
other  perfon  need  be  afraid  that  officers  who  commit  op- 
preffions,  will  pafs  with  impunity.  It  is  not  to  be  appre- 
hended, that  fuch  officers  will  be  tried  by  their  coufins  and 
friends.  Such  cannot  be  on  the  jury  at  the  trial  of  the 
caufe;  it  being  a  principle  of  law,  that  no  perfon  intereft- 
ed  in  a  caufe,  or  who  is  a  relation  of  the  party,  can  be  a 
juror  in  it.  This  is  the  light  in  which  it  ftrikes  me. 
Therefore  the  objection  of  the  gentleman  from  GranviHr, 
|r*nft  neceflarily  fall  to  the  ground  on  that  principle.     Mr, 


(     7°     ) 

Mr.  Machine — Mr.  Chairman,  I  muft  obviate  fome  ob- 
jections which  have  been  made.  It  was  faid  by  way  of  ar- 
gument, that  they  could  impeach  and  remove  any  officer, 
whether  of  the  United  States,  or  any  particular  ftate.  This 
was  fuggefted  by  the  gentleman  from  New  Hanover.  No- 
thing appears  to  me  more  unnatural  than  fuch  a  conftruc- 
tion.  The  Conftitution  fays  in  one  place,  that  the  Houfe 
of  Reprefentatives  (hall  have  the  fole  power  of  impeach- 
ment. In  the  claufes  under  debate  ifprovides,  that  the  Se- 
nate (hali  have  the  fole  power  to  try  all  impeachments,  and 
then  fuhjoins,  that  judgment  in  cafes  of  impeachment,  mall 
not  extend  further  than  to  removal  from  office,  and  dif- 
-qualification  to  hold  and  enjoy  any  office  of  honour,  truft 
or  profit  under  the  United  States.  And  in  the  fourth  fee- 
tion  of  the  fecond  article,  it  fays,  that  the  President,  Vice- 
Prefident  and  all  civil  officers  of  the  United  States,  fhali 
be  removed  from  office  on  impeachment  for,  and  convic- 
tion of,  treafon,  bribery,  or  other  high  crimes  and  rwifde- 
meanors.  Now,  Sir,  what  can  be  more  clear  and  obvious 
than  this  ?  The  fe  eral  claufes  relate  to  the  fame  fubjecl:,  and 
ought  to  be  confidered  together.  If  confidered  feparately 
and  unconneeledly,  the  meaning  is  dill  clear.  They  relate  to 
the  government  of  the  union  altogether*  Judgment  on  im- 
peachment only  extends  to  removal  from  office,  and  future 
difqualification  to  hold  offices  wider  the  United  States.  Can 
thole  be  removed  from  offices,  and  difqualified  to  hold  of- 
fices under  the  United  States,  who  actually  held  no  of- 
fice under  the  United  States  ?  The  fourth  fe£Hon  of  the 
fecond  article  provides  exprefsly  for  the  removal  of  the  Pre- 
sident, Vice-Prefident  and  all  civil  officers  of  the  United 
States,  on  impeachment  and  conviction.  Does  not  this 
clearly  prove,  that  none  but  officers  of  the  United  States 
are  impeachable.  Had  any  other  been  impeachable,  why 
was  not  provifion  made  for  the  cafe  of  their  conviction  ? 
Why  not  point  out  the  punifhment  in  one  cafe  as  well 
as  in  others  ?  I  beg  leave  to  obfervc,  that  this  is  a  Con- 
stitution which  is  not  made  with  any  reference  to  the  go- 
vernment of  any  particular  ftate,  or  to  officers  of  particu- 
lar ftates,  but  to  the  government  of  the  United  States  at 
large.  We  muft  fuppofe,  that  every  officer  here  fpoken  of, 
muft  be  an  officer  of  the  United  States.  The  words  dis- 
cover the  meaning  as  plainly  as  poflible.     The  fentence 

which 


(    7' .  ) 

which  provides,  that  "judgment  in  cafes  of  impeachment, 
fliall  not  extend  further  than  to  removal  from  otfice,"  is 
joined  by  a  conjunction  copulative  to  the  other  fentcnce, 
f*  and  dlfqualification  to  hold  and  enjoy  any  office  of  ho- 
nour, trull  or  profit  under  the  United  States"  which  incon- 
trovertibly  proves,  that  officers  of  the  United  States  are 
only  referred  to.  No  other  grammatical  conftruction  can 
I  be  put  upon  it.  But  there  is  no  neceflity  to  refer  to  gram- 
matical conitruclions,  fince  the  whole  plainly  refers  to  the 
government  of  the  United  States  at  large.  The  general 
government  cannot  intermeddle  with  the  internal  affairs  of 
the  ftate  governments.  They  are  in  no  danger  from  it.  It 
has  been  urged,  that  it  has  a  tendency  to  a  confolidation. 
On  the  contrary  it  appears,  that  the  ftate  Legiflatures  mufl 
exift  in  full  force,  otherwife  the  general  government  can- 
not exift  itfelf.  A  confolidated  government  would  never 
fecure  the  happinefs  of  the  people  of  this  country.  It 
would  be  the  intereft  of  the  people  of  the  United  States, 
to  keep  the  general  and  individual  governments  as  feparate 
and  diftincl:  as  poffible. 

Mr.  Bloodworih  —Mr.  Chairman,  I  confefs  I  am  obliged 
to  the  honourable  gentleman  for  his  conftruclion.  Were 
he  to  go  to  Congrefs  he  might  put  that  conftru&ion  on 
the  Conftitution.  But  no  one  can  fay  what  conftru£tion 
Congrefs  will  put  upon  it.  I  do  not  diftruft  him,  but  I 
diftruft  them.  I  wifh  to  leave  no  dangerous  latitude  of 
conllruction. 

The  firft  claufe  of  the  fourth  fe£lion  read. 

Mr.  Spencer — Mr.  Chairman,  It  appears  to  me  that  this 
claufe,  giving  this  controul  over  the  time,  place  and  man- 
ner of  holding  elections,  to  Congrefs,  does  away  the  right 
of  the  people  to  choofe  the  Reprefentatives  every  fecond 
year,  and  impairs  the  right  of  the  ftate  Legiflatures  to  choofe 
the  Senators.     I  wifh  this  matter  to  be  explained. 

Governor  Johnfton — Mr. Chairman,  I  confefs  that  I  am  a 
very  great  admirer  of  the  new  Conftitution, but  Icannot  com- 
prehend the  reafon  of  this  part.  The  reafon  urged  is,  that 
every  government  ought  to  have  the  power  of  continuing 
itfelf,  and  that  if  the  general  government  had  not  this  pow- 
er, the  ftate  Legiflatures  might  neglect  to  regulate  elections, 
^whereby  the  government  might  be  difcontinued.  As  long 
#s  tbe  ftate  Legiflatures  have  it  in  &eir  pQwer  uot  to  choofe 

th© 


v     72     ; 

the  Senators,  this  power  in  Congrefs  appears  to  me  altoge- 
ther ufdefs  ;  becaufe  they  can  put  an  end  to  the  general  go- 
vernment by  refufmg  to  choofe  Senators,  But  I  do  not  con- 
fi'<er  this  fuch  a  biemifh  in  the  Conftitution,  as  that  it  ought 
for  that  reafon,  to  be  rejected.  I  obferve  that  every  ftate 
which  has  adopted  the  Conftitution  and  recommended 
amendments,  has  given  directions  to  remove  this  objec- 
tion, and  I  hope  if  this  ftate  adopts  it,  (he  will  do  the  fame. 
•  Mr.  Spencer — Mr.  Chairman,  It  is  with  great  reluctance: 
that  I  rife  upon  this  important  occafion.  I  have  confidered 
with  fome  attention  the  fubjecl:  before  lis.  I  have  paid  at^ 
tention  to  the  Conftitution  i  tie  If,  and  to  the  writings  on  both 
fides.  I  confidered  it  on  one  fide  as  well  as  on  the  other, 
in  order  to  know  whether  it  would  be  beft  to  adopt  it  of 
not.  I  would  not  wifh  to  infinuate  any  reflections  on  thofe 
gentlemen  who  formed  it,  I  look  upon  it  as  a  great  per-* 
formance.  It  has  a  great  deal  of  merit  in  it,  and  it  is  per- 
haps as  much  as  any  fet  of  men  could  have  done.  Even  if 
it  be  true  what  gentlemen  have  obferved,  that  the  gentle- 
men who  were  Delegates  to  the  federal  Convention,  were 
not  inftrufted  to  form  a  new  Conftitution,  but  to  amend  the 
Confederation.  This  will  be  immaterial,  if  it  be  proper  to 
be  adopted.  It  will  be  of  equal  benefit  to  us,  if  proper  to 
be  adopted  in  the  whole,  or  in  fuch  parts  as  will  be  necef- 
fary,  whether  they  were  exprefsly  delegated  for  that  purpofe 
or  not.  This  appears  to  me  to  be  a  reprehenfible  claufej 
becaufe  it  feems  to  ftrike  at  the  ftate  Legiflatuies,  and  feema 
to  take  away  that  power  of  elections,  which  reafon  dictates 
they  ought  to  have  among  themfelves.  It  apparently  looks 
forward  to  a  consolidation  of  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  when  the  ftate  Legiflatares  may  entirely  decay  away," 
This  is  one  of  the  grounds  which  have  induced  me  to  make 
objections  to  the  new  form  of  government.  It  appears  to 
me  that  the  ftate  governments  are  not  fufficiently  fecwred, 
and  that  they  may  be  fwallowed  up  by  the  great  mafs  of 
powers  given  to  Congrefs.  If  that  be  the  cafe,  fuch  power 
fhould  not  be  given  •,  for  from*  all  the  notions  which  we 
Iiave  concerning  our  happinefs  and  well-being,  the  ftate  go- 
vernments are  the  bafis  of  our  happinefs,  fecuritv  and  pros- 
perity- A  large  extent  of  country  ought  to  be  divided  in- 
to fuch  a  number  of  ftates,  as  that  the  people  may  conve- 
niently carry  on  their  own  government.    This  will  render 

the 


(     73     ) 

the  government  perfectly  agreeable  to  the  geniusand  wifh- 
es  of  the  people.  If  the  United  States  were  to  confift  of 
ten  times  as  many  dates,  they  might  all  have  a  degree  of 
harmony.  Nothing  would  be  wanting  but  fome  cement 
for  their  connection.  On  the  contrary,  if  all  the  United 
States  were  to  be  fwallowed  up  by  the  great  mafs  of  powers 
given  to  Congrefs,  the  parts  that  are  more  diftant  in  this 
great  empire  would  be  governed  with  lefs  and  lefs  energy. 
It  would  not  fuit  the  genius  of  the  people  to  aflift  in  the 
government.     Nothing  would  fupport  government  in  fuch, 

ft.  cafe  as  that  but  military  coercion.  Armies  would  be  ne- 
cefTary in  different  parts  of  the  United  States.  The  ex- 
pence  which  they  would  coft,  and  the  burdens  which  they 
would  make  necefTary  to  be  laid  upon  the  people,  would 
be  ruinous.  I  know  of  no  Way  that  is  likely  to  produce 
the  happinefs  of  the  people,  but  to  preferve,  as  far  as  pof- 
fible,  the  exiftence  of  the  feveral  dates,  fo  that  they  mall 
not  be  fwallowed  up.  It  has  been  faid,  that  the  exiftence 
of  the  Hate  governments  is  efTential  to  that  of  the  general 
government,  becaufe  they  choofe  the^  Senators.  By  this 
claufe  it  is  evident,  that  it  is  in  the  power  of  Congrefs  to 
make  any  alterations,  except  as  to  the  place  of  choofing 
Senators.  They  may  alter  the  time  from  fix  to  twenty 
years,  or  to  any  time  ;  for  they  have  an  unlimited  con- 
troul  over  the  time  of  elections.  They  have  alfo  an  abfo- 
lute  controul  over  the  election  of  the  Representatives.  It 
deprives  the  people  of  the  very  mode  of  choofing  them. 
It  feems  nearly  to  throw  the  whole  power  of  election  in- 
to the   hands   of  Congrefs.     It  ftrikes  at  the  mode,  .time 

« and  place  of  choofing  Reprefentatives.  It  puts  all  but  the 
place  of  electing  Senators,  into  the  hands  of  Congrefs. 
This  fupercedes  the  neceflity  of  continuing  the  ftate  Legis- 
latures. This  is  fuch  an  article  as  I  can  give  no  fanction 
to,  becaufe  it  ftrikes  at  the  foundation' of  the  government 
on  which  depends  the  happinefs  of  the  ftates,  and  the  ge- 
neral government.  It  is  with  reluctance  I  make  the  ob- 
jection. I  have  the  higheft  veneration  for  the  characters 
of  the  framers  of  this  Conftitution.  I  mean  to  make  ob- 
jections only  which  are  necefTary  to  be  made.  I  would 
not  take  up  time  unneceflarily.  As  to  this  matter,  it 
grikes  at  the  foundation  of  every  thing.  I  may  fay  more 
K  '      wherj 


v    74    ; 

trhen  we  come  to  that  part  which  points  out  the  mode  of 
doing  without  the  agency  of  the  (late  Legiflatures. 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  I  am  glad  to  fee  fo   much 
candour  ana  moderation.     The  liberal  fentiments  exprefT- 
ed  by  the  honourable  gentleman  who  fpoke  laft,  command 
riiy  refpe£h     No  time  can  be  better  employed  than  in  en- 
deavouring to  remove,  by  fair  and  juft  reafoning,  every 
objection  which  can  be  made  to  this  Conftitution.     I   ap- 
prehend,  that  the  honourable  gentleman  is  miftaken  as  to 
the  extent   of  the  operation  of  this  claufe.     He  fuppofes, 
that  the  controul  of  the  general  government  over  elections 
looks  forward  to  a  confolidation   of  the    ftates  *,  and  that 
the  general  word,  time,  may  extend  to  twenty,  or  any  num- 
ber of  years.     In  my  humble  opinion,  this  claufe  does  by  no 
ineans  warrant  fuch  a  conftru&ion.   We  ought  to  compare 
other  parts  with  it.     Does   not  the  Conftitution  fay,  that 
Reprefentatives  (hall  be   chofen  every  fecond  year  i     The 
rigitt  of  choofing  them,  therefore,  reverts  to  the  people 
every  fecond  year.     No  inftrument  of  writing  ought  to  be 
conitrued  abfurdly*  When  a  rational   conftru&ion   Can    be 
put  upon  it.     If  Congrefs  can  prolong  the  ele£liori  to  anyv 
time  they  pleafe,  why  is  it  faid,   that  Reprefentatives  fhall 
be  chofen  every  fecorid  year  ?  'They  mujl  be  chofen  every  fe- 
cond year  ;    but  whether  in  the  month  of  March  or  Janu-  ' 
ary,  or  any  other  month,  may  be  afcertained    at   a  future 
time,  by  regulations  of  Congrefs.     The  word  time,  refers 
only  to  the  particular  month  and  day  within  the  two  years. 
I  heartily  agree  with  the  gentleman,  that   if  any   thing  in 
this  Conftitution  tended  to  the   annihilation    of  the  ftate 
governments,  inftead  of  exciting  the   admiration   of-  any 
man,  it   ought  to   excite  his  refentment    and  execration. 
No  fuch  wicked   intention   ought  to  be  fuffered.     But  the 
gentlemen  who    formed  the   Conftitution  had  no  fuch  ob- 
ject ',  nor  do  1  think  there  is  the  leaft  ground  for  that  jea- 
loufy.     The  very  exiftehce  of  the  general  government  de- 
pends on  that  of  the  ftate  governments.     The  ftate  Legif- 
latures are   to  choofe   the   Senators.      Without  a  Senate 
there  can  be  no  Congrefs.     The  ftate  Legiflatures  are  alfo 
to  direcl:  the   manner  of  choofing  the  Prefident.     Unlefs, 
therefore,  there  are   ftate  Legiflatures  to  direcl:  that  man- 
ner, no  Prefident   can  be  chofen.     The  fame  <  obfervatioa 
may  be  made  as  to  the  Houfe  pi  Reprefentatives,  fmce, 

as 


(is) 

as  they  are  to  be  chofen  by  the  electors  of  the  mod  nu- 
merous branch  of  each  date  Legiflature.  It  there  are  no 
ftate  Legiflatures,  there  are  no  perfons  to  choofe  the  Houfe 
of  Reprefentatives.  Thus  it  is  evident,  that  the  very  ex;- 
iftence  of  the  general  government  depends  on  that  of  the 
ftate  Legiflatures,  and  of  courfe,  that  their  continuance 
cannot  be  endangered  by  it. 

An  bccafion  may  arife  when  the  exercife  of  this  ulti- 
mate power  in  Congrefs  may  be  neceflary  :  As  for  in  fiance, 
if  a  ftate  fhould  be  involved  in  war,  and  its  Legiflature 
could  not  affemble,  as  was  the  cafe  of  South-Carolina,  and  . 
occasionally  of  fome  other  ftates,  during  the  late  war.  It 
might  alfo  be  ufeful  for  this  reafon — left  a  few  powerful 
itates  fhoqld  combine,  and  make  regulations  concerning 
elections,  which  might  deprive  many  of  the  eleclors  of  a 
fair  exercife  of  their  rights,  and  thus  injure  the  commu- 
nity, and  occafion  great  difTatisfaclion  :  And  it  feems  na- 
tural and  proper  that  every  government  fhould  have  in  it- 
felf  the  means  of  its  own  prefervation,  A  few  of  the 
great  ftates  might  combine  to,  prevent  any  election  of  Re- 
prefentatives at  all,  and  thus  a  majority  might  be  wanting 
to  do  bufinefs  ;  but  it  would  nor  be  fo  eafy  to  deftroy  the 
government  by  the  non-election  of  Senators,  becaufe  one- 
third  only  are  to  go  out  at  a  time,  and  all  the  ftates  will 
be  equally  reprefenfced  in  the  Senate.  It  is  not  probable 
this  power  would-be  abufed  ;  for  if  it  fhould  be,  the  ftate 
Legiflatures  would  immediately  refent  it ;  and  their  autho- 
rity over  the  people  will  always  be  extremely  great.  Thefe 
reafons  induce  me  to  think,  that  the  power  is  both  necef- 
fary  and  ufeful.  But  I  am  fenfihle  great  jealoufy  has 
been  entertained  concerning  it  :  And  as,  perhaps,  the  dan- 
ger of  a  combination,  in  the  manner  I  have  mentioned, 
to  deftroy  or  diftrefs  the  general  government,  is  not  very 
probable,  it  nuy  be  better  to  incur  this  rifly,  than  occafion 
any  difcontent,  by  fufFering  the  clause  to  continue  as  it  now 
Hands.  I  fhould,  therefore,  not  object  to  the  recommen- 
dation of  an  amendment  fimilar  to  that  of  other  ftates, 
that  this  power  in  Congrefs  fhould  only  be  exercifed  when 
a  ftate  Legiflature  neglected,  or  was  difabied  from  making 
the  regulations  required. 

Mr.  Spencer — Mr.  Chairman,    I  did  not  mean  to  infinu- 
ate,  that  defigns  were  made  by  the  b^-'iMble  gentlemen 

who 


(    7«    ) 

who  compofed  the  federal  Conftitution,  againft  our  liber- 
ties. I  only  meant  to  fay,  that  the  words  in  this  place 
were  exceeding  vague.  It  may  admit  of  the  gentleman's 
conftru&ion  ;  but  it  may  admit  of  a  contrary  conftru&ion. 
In  a  matter  of  fo  great  moment,  words  ought  not  to  be  fo 
vague  and  indeterminate.  I  have  faid,  that  the  dates  are 
the  bafts  on  which  the  government  of  the  United  States 
ought  to  reft,  and  which  muft  render  us  fecure.  No  man 
wifhes  mere  for  a  federal  government  than  I  do.  I  think 
it  necefTary  for  our  happinefs  :  But  at  the  fame  time,  when 
we  form  a  government  which  muft  entail  happinefs  or  mi- 
fery  on  posterity,  nothing  is  of  more  .  confequence  than 
fettling  it  fo  as  to  exclude  animofity  and  a  conteft  between 
the  general  and  individual  governments.  With  refpecT:  to 
the  mode  here  mentioned,  they  are  words  of  very  great 
extent.  This  claufe  provides,  that  a  Congrefs  may  at  any 
time  alter  fuch  regulations,  except  as  to  the^  places  of  choof- 
ing  Senators.  Thefe  words  are  fo  vague,  and  uncertain, 
that  it  muft  ultimately  deftroy  the  whole  liberty  of  the 
United  States.  It  ftrikes  at  the  very  exiftence  of  the  ftates, 
and  fupercedes  the  neceftity  of  having  them  at  all.  ,  I 
would  therefore  wifh  to  have  it  amended  in  fuch  a  manner, 
as  that  the  Congrefs  fhould  not  interfere  but  when  the 
ftates  refufed  or  neglected  to  regulate  elections. 

Mr.  Bloodworth  —Mr.  Chairman,  I  truft  that  fuch  learn- 
ed arguments  as  are  offered  to  reconcile  to  our  minds  fuch 
dangerous  powers  will  not  have  the  intended  weight.  The 
Houfe  of  Reprefentatives  is  the  only  democratical  branch. 
This  claufe  may  deftroy  reprefentation  entirely.  What 
does  it  fay  ?  The  times,  places  and  manner  of  holding 
elections  for  Senators  and  Reprefentatives,  fhali  be  pre- 
scribed in  each  ftate  by  the  Legislature  thereof  •,  but  the 
Congrefs  may  at  any  time,  by  law,  make  or  alter  fuch  re- 
gulations, except  as  to  the  places  of  choofing  Senators. 
Now,  Sir,  does  not  this  claufe  give  an  unlimited  and  un- 
bounded power  to  Congrefs  over  the  times,  places  and 
manner  of  choofing  Reprefentatives  ?  They  may  make 
the  time  of  election  fo  long,  the  place  fo  inconvenient, 
and  the  manner  fo  oppreffive,  that  it  will  entirely  deftroy 
reprefentation.  I  hope  gentlemen  will  exercife  their  own 
underftan  ling  on  this  occafion,  and  not  let  their  judgment 
be  led  away  by  thefe  fhining  characters,  for  whom,  how- 
ever, 


(    77    ) 

ever,  I  have  the  higheft  refpect.  This  Conftitution,  if 
adopted  in  its  prefent  mode,  muft  end  in  the  fubverfion  of 
our  liberties.  Suppofe  it  takes  place  in  North-Carolina, 
can  farmers  elect  then  ?  No,  Sir.  The  elections  may  be 
in  fuch  a  manner  that  men  may  be  appointed  who  are  not 
Representatives  of  the  people.  This  may  exift,  and  it 
ought  to  be  guarded  againft.  As  to  the  place,  fuppofe 
Congrefs  mould  order  the  elections  to  be  held  in  the  mod 
inconvenient  place,  in  the  mod  inconvenient  diftrict: ;  could 
every  perfon  entitled  to  vote  attend  at  fuch  a  place  ?  Sup- 
pofe they  mould  order  it  to  be  laid  off  into  fo  many  diftri&s, 
and  order  the  election  to  be  held  within  each  diftrict:  ;  yet 
may  not  their  power  over  the  manner  of  election  ena- 
ble them  to  exclude  from  voting  every  defcription  of  men 
they  pleafe  ?  The  democratic  branch  is  fo  much  endanger- 
ed, that  no  arguments  can  be  made  ufe  of  to  fatisfy  my 
mind  to  it.  The  honourable  gentleman  has  amufed  us 
with  learned  difcuflions,  and  told  us  he  will  condefcend  to 
propofe  amendments.  I  hope  the  Reprefentatives  of  North- 
Carolina  will  never  f wallow  the  Conftitution  till  it  is 
amended. 

Mr.  Goudy — Mr.  Chairman,  The  invafion  of  the  flates  is 
urged  as  a  reafon  for  this  claufe.  But  why  did  they  not 
mention  that  it  mould  be  only  in  cafes  of  invafion  ?  But 
that  was  not  the  reafon  in  my  humble  opinion.  I  fear  it 
was  a  combination  againft  our  liberties.  I  aflc,  when  we 
give  them  the  purfe  in  one  hand,  and  the  fword  in  another, 
what  power  have  we  left  ?  It  will  lead  to  an  ariftocratical 
government,  and  eftablifh  tyrranny  over  us.  We  are  free- 
men, and  we  ought  to  have  the  privileges  of  fuch. 

Governor  Johnjlon — Mr.  Chairman,  I  do  not  impute 
any  impure  intentions  to  the  gentlemen  who  formed  this 
Conftitution.  I  think  it  unwarrantable  in  any  one  to  do 
it.  I  believe,  that  were  there  twenty  Conventions  ap- 
pointed, and  as  many  Conftitutions  formed,we  never  could 
get  men  more  able  and  difinterefted  than  thofe  who  formed 
this,  nor  a  Conftitution  lefs  exceptionable  than  that  which 
is  now  before  you.  I  am  not  apprehenfive  that  this  article 
will  be  attended  with  all  the  fatal  confequences,  which  the 
gentleman  conceives.  I  conceive  that  Congrefs  can  have 
no  other  power  than  the  ftates  had.  The  ftates, .  with  re- 
gard to  elections,  muft  be  governed  by  the  articles  of  the 

Conftitution*, 


(     78     ) 

Conftitution  ;  fo  mud  Congrefs.  But,  I  believe,  the  pow- 
er, as  it  now  ftands,  is  unneceffary.  I  fliould  be  perfectly 
fatisfied  with  it  in  the  mode  recommended  by  the  worthy 
Member  on  my  right  hand  :  Although  I  mould  be  extreme- 
ly cautious  to  adopt  any  Conftitution  that  would  endanger 
the  rights  and  privileges  of  the  people.  I  have  no  tear  in 
adopting  this  Conftitution,  and  then  propofing  amend- 
ments. I  feel  as  much  attachment  to  the  rights  and  pri- 
vileges of  my  country  as  any  man  in  it  ;  and  if  I  thought 
any  thing  in  this  Conftitution  tended  to  abridge  thefe 
rights,  I  would  not  agree  to  it.  I  cannot  conceive  that 
this  is  the  cafe,  I  have  not  the  lead  doubt  but  it  will  be 
adopted  by  a  very  great  majority  of  the  fiates  :  For  dates 
who  have  been  as  jealous  of  their  liberties  as  any  in  the 
world,  have  adopted  it  ;  and  they  are  fome  of  the  moft 
powerful  dates.  We  mall  have  the  afTent  of  all  the  dates 
In  getting  amendments.  Some  gentlemen  have  apprehen- 
fions,  that  Congrefs  will  immediately  confpire  to  deftroy  the 
liberties  of  their  country.  The  men,  of  whom  Congrefs 
will  confid,  are  to  be  chofen  from  among  ourfelves.  They 
will  be  in  the  fame  fituation  with  us.  They  are  to  be  bone 
of  our  bone,  and  flefh  of  our  flefh.  They  cannot  injure 
us  without  injuring  themfelves.  I  have  no  doubt  but  we 
{hall  choofe  the  bed  men  in  the  community.  Should  dif- 
ferent men  be  appointed,  they  are  fufficiently  refponiible.  $ 
therefore  think,  that  no  danger  is  to  be  apprehended. 

Mr.  M'Dowall — Mr. Chairman,  I  have  the  highed  efteem, 
for  the  gentleman  who  fpoke  lad.  He  hasamufed  us  with 
the  fine  characters  of  thofe  who  formed  that  government, 
Some  were  good  ;  but  fome  were  very  imperious,  arido- 
cratical,  defpotic  and  monarchical.  If  parts  of  it  are  ex- 
tremely good,  other  parts  are  very  bad.  The  freedom  of 
election  is  one  of  the  greated  fecurities  we  have  for  our 
liberty  and  privileges.  It  was  fuppofed  by  the  Member 
from  IJdenton,  that  the  controul  over  elections  was  only 
given  to  Congrefs  to  be  ufed  in  cafe  oT  invafion.  I  differ 
from  him.  That  could  not  have  been  their  intention,  other- 
wife  they  could  have  exprefled  it.  But,  Sir,  it  points  for- 
ward to  the  time  when  there  will  be  no  date  Legiflatures 
— to  the  confolidation  of  all  the  dates.  The  dates  will 
be  kept  up  as  boards  of  elections.  I  think  the  fame  men 
could  make  a  better  Conftitution  i  for  good  government  is 

vat 


I     79    7 

riBTtne  work  of  a  fhort  time.  They  only*  bad  their  own 
wiSdom.,  Were  they  to  go  now,  they  would  have  the  wif- 
dom  of  the  United  States.  Every  gentleman  who  muft 
reflect  on  this,  muft  fee  it.  The  adoption  of  feveral  other 
dates  is  urged.  I  hope  every  gentleman  (lands  for  himfelf 
— will  act  according  to  his  own  judgment — and  will  pay 
no  refpett  to  the  adoption  by  the  other  ftates.  It  may  em- 
barrafs  us  in  fome  political  difficulties  5  but  let  us  attend  to 
the  intereft  of  our  conftituents. 

Mr.  Iredell  anfwered,  that  he  dated  the  cafe  of  invafion 
as  only  one  reafon  out  of  many,  for  giving  the  ultimate. 
controul  ever  elections  to  Congrefs. 

Mr.  Davie — -Mr.  Chairman,  A  consolidation  of  the 
ftates,  is  faid  by  fome  gentlemen  to  have  been  intended. 
They  infinuate  that  this  was  the  caufe  of  their  giving  this 
power  over  elections.  If  there  were  any  feeds  in  this  Con- 
ftitution  which  might  one  day  produce  a  consolidation*  it 
would,  Sir,  with  me,  be  an  infuperable  objection;  lamfo 
perfectly  convinced  that  fo  extenfive  a  country  as  this,  cati 
never  be  managed  by  one  consolidated  government.  The 
federal  Convention  were  as  well  convinced  as  the  Members 
of  this  Houfe,  that  the  ftate  governments  were  absolutely 
neceflary  to  the  exiftenceof  the  federal  government :  They 
confidered  them  as  the  great  majfy  pillars  on  which  this  po- 
litical fabric  was  to  be  extended  and  fupported,  and  were 
fully  perfuaded,  that  when  they  were  removed  or  fhould 
moulder  down  by  time,  the  general  government  muft  tum- 
ble into  ruins.  A  very  little  reflection  will  fhew,  that  no 
department  of  it  can  exift  without  the  ftate  governments. 

Let  us  begin  with  the  Houfe  of  Representatives.  -Who 
are  to  vote  for  the  federal  Representatives  ?  Thofe  wh<> 
vote  for  the  ftate  Representatives.  If  the  ftate  government 
vanifhes,  the  general  government  muft  vanifti  alSo.  This 
is  the  foundation  on  which  this  government  was  raifed,  and 
without  which  it  cannot  poflibly  exift. 

The  nextdepartment  is  the  Senate.  How  is  it  formed  ? 
By  the  ftateV  themfelves.  Do  they  not  choofe  them  ?  Are 
they  not  created  by  them  ?  And  will  they  not  have  the  in- 
tereft of  the  ftates  particularly  at  heart?  The  ftates,  Sir, 
can  put  a  final  period  to  the  government,  as  was  obferyed 
by  a  gentleman  who  thought  this  power  over  elections  un- 
fteceiTary.    If  the  ftate  Legiflatures  think  proper,  they  may 

refufe 


(     8°     ) 

refufe  to  choofc  Senators,  and  the  government  muft  be  de- 
ftroyed.  Is  not  this  government  a  ncrvelefs  mafs,  a  dead 
carcafs,  without  the  Executive  power  ?  Let  your  Repre- 
fentatives  be  the  moft  vicious  demons  that  ever  exifted,  let 
them  plot  againft  the  liberties  of  America,  let  them  con- 
fpire  againft  its  happinefs — all  their  machinations  will  not 
avail  if  not  put  in  execution.  By  whom  are  their  laws  and 
projects  to  be  executed  ?  By  the  Prefident.  How  is  hecre- 
ated  ?  By  Electors  appointed  by  the  people  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Legiflatures— -by  an  union  of  the  intereft  of  the 
people  and  the  ftate  governments.  The  ftate  governments 
can  put  a  veto,  at  any  time,  on  the  general  government,  by 
ceafing  to  continue  the  Executive  power.  Admitting  the 
Reprefentatives  or  Senators  could  make  corrupt  laws ;  they 
can  neither  execute  them  themfelves,  nor  appoint  the  Exe- 
cutive. Now,  Sir,  I  think  it  muft  be  clear  to  every  candid 
mind,  that  no  part  of  this  government  can  be  continued 
after  the-  ftate  governments  lofe  their  exiftence,  or  even 
their  prefent  forms.  It  may  alfo  be  eafily  proved,  that  all 
federal  governments  poffefs  an  inherent  weaknefs  which 
continually  tends  to  their  deftru&ion.  It  is  to  be  lamented 
that  all  governments  of  a  federal  nature  have  been  fhort- 
lived.  Such  was  the  fate  of  the  Achaean  league,  the  Am- 
phytliomc  council,  and  other  ancient  confederacies  ;  and 
this  opinion  is  confirmed  by  the  uniform  teftimony  of  all 
hiftory.  There  are  initances  in  Europe  of  confederacies 
fubfifting  a  conGderable  time,  but  their  duration  muft  be 
attributed  to  circumftances  exterior  to.  their,  government. 
The  Germanic  confederacy  would  not  exift  a  moment,  were 
it  not  for  the  fear  of  the  furrounding  powers,  and  the  in- 
tereft of  the  Emperor.  The"  hiftory  of  this  confederacy- 
is  but  a  feries  of  factions,  diflention:,  bloodihed  and  civil 
war.  The  confederacies  of  the  Swifs  and  United  Nether- 
lands, would  long  ago  have  been  deftroyed  from  their  im- 
becility, had  it  not  been  for  the  fear,  and  even  the  policy* 
of  the  bordering  nations.  It  is  impoflible  to  conftru£t  fuch 
a  government  in  fuch  a  manner  as  to  give  it  any  probable 
longevity.  But,  Sir,  there  is  an  excellent  principle  in  this 
jDropofed  plan  of  federal  government,  which  none  of  thefe 
confederacies  had,  and  to  the  want  of  which  in  a  great, 
meafure  their  imperfections  may  be  juftly  attributed.  J. 
mean  the  principle  of  reprefentatipjj.    I  hope  that  by  the 

agency 


I  91  > 

Agency  of  this  principle,  if  it  be  not  immortal,  it  will  at 
leait  be  Jong-lived.  I  thought  it  necefTary  to  fay  this  much 
to  detect  the  futility  of  that  unwarrantable  fuggeftion,  that 
we  are  to  be  fwallowed  up  by  a  great  confolidated  govern- 
ment. Every  part  of  this  federal  government  is  dependent 
On  the  continuation  of  the  ftate  Lcgillatures  for  its  evidence. 
The  whole,  Sir,  can  never  fwallow  up  its  parts.  The  gen- 
tleman from  Edenton  [Mr.  Iredell]  has  pointed  out  tha 
rcafo'ns  of  giving  this  controul  over  elections  to  Congrefs, 
the  principal  of  which  was,  to  prevent  a  dhTolution  of  the 
government  by  defigning  ftates.  If  all  the  (tares  were  equal- 
ly poffeffed  of  abfolute  power  over  their  elections,  without 
any  controul  of  Congrefs,  danger  might  be  juftly  appre- 
hended where  one  ftate  pofierTes  as  much  territory  as  four 
or  five  others;,  and  fome  of  them  being  thinly  peopled  nowj 
will  daily  become  more  numerous  and  formidable.  .  With- 
out this  controul  in  Congrefs,  thofe  large  ftates  might  fuc- 
cefsfully  combine  to  deftroy  the  general  government.  It 
was  therefore  necefiary  to  controul  any  combination  of  this' 
kind.  Another  principal  reafon  was, that  it  would  operate  in 
favour  of  the  people  againft  the  ambitious  defignsof  the  fede- 
ral Senate.  I  will  illuftrate  this  by  matter  of  fact.  The  hiftory 
of  the  little  ftate  of  Rhode-Iftand  is  well  known.  An  aban- 
doned faction  have  felzed  on  the  reins  of  government,  and 
frequently  refufed  to  have  any  reprefentation  in  Congrefs. 
Jf  Congrefs  had  the  power  of  making  the  law  of  elections 
operate  throughout  the  United  States,  no  ftate  could  with- 
draw itfelf  from  the  national  councils,  without  the  confenfc 
of  a  majority  of  the  Members  of  Congrefs.  Had  this  been 
the  cafe,  that  trifling  ftate  would  not  have  with-held  its  re- 
prefentation, _  What  once  happened  may  happen  again,  and 
it  was  neceffary  to  give  Congrefs  this  power  to  keep  the  go- 
vernment in  full  operation.  This  being  a  federal  govern- 
ment,- and  involving  the  interefts  of  feveral  ftates  ;  and  fome 
acts  requiring  the  afientof  more  than  a  majority,  they 
Qught  to  be  able  to  keep  their  reprefentation  full.  It  would 
have  been  a  folecifm,  tor  have  a  government  without  any 
means  of  felf-prefervation*.  The  Confederation  is  the  only 
inftance  of  a  government  without  fuch  means,  and  is  a 
nervelefs  fyftem,  as  inadequate  to  every  purpofe  of  go^ 
ternment  as  it  is  to  the  fecurity  of  the  liberties  of  the  peo- 


(     82     ) 

pie  of  America.  When  the  councils  of  America  have  this 
power  over  elections,  they  can,  in  fpite  of  any  faction  in 
any  particular  ftate,  give  the  people  a  reprefentation.  Uni- 
formity in  matters  of  election  is  alfo  of  the  greateft  con- 
fequence.  They  ought  all  to  be  judged  by  the  fame  law 
and  the  fame  principles,  and  not  be  different  in  one  ftate 
from  what  they  are  in  another.  At  prefent  the  manner  of 
electing  is  different  in  different  dates.  Some  elect  by  bal- 
lot and  others  viva  voce.  It  will  be  more  convenient  to  have 
the  manner  uniform  in  all  the  ftate3.  I  fhall  now  anfwer 
fome  obfervations  made  by  the  gentlemanfromMecklinburg. 
He  has  ftated,  that  this  power  over  elections,  gave  to  Con- 
grefs  power  to  lengthen  the  time  for  which  they  were  elect- 
ed. Let  us  read  this  claufe  coolly,  all  prejudice  afide,  and 
determine  whether  this  conftruction  be  warrantable.  The 
claufe  runs  thus  :  (<  The  times,  places  and  manner  of  hold- 
ing elections  for  Senators  and  Reprefentatives,  fhall  be  pre- 
fcribed  in  each  ftate  by  the  Legiflature  thereof;  but  the 
Congrcfs  may,  at  any  time,  by  law,  make  or  alter  fuch  re- 
gulations, except  as  to  the  place  of  choofing  Senators.1* 
I  take  it  as  a  fundamental  principle,  which  is  beyond  the 
reach  of  the  general  or  individual  governments  to  alter,  that 
the  Reprefentatives  (hall  be  chofen  every  fecond  year,  and 
that  the  tenure  of  their  offices  fhall  be  for  two  years — that 
Senators  fhall  be  chofen  every  fixth  year,  and  that  the  te- 
nure of  their  offices  fhall  be  for  fix  years.  I  take  it  alfo  as 
a  principle,  that  the  electors  of^the  molt  numerous  branch 
of  the  ftate  Legiflatures,  are  to  elect  the  federal  Reprefen- 
tatives. Congrefs  has  ultimately  no  power  over  elections, 
but  what  is  primarily  given  to  the  ftate  Legiflatures.  If 
Congrefs  have  the  power  of  prolonging  the  time,  &c.  as 
gentlemen  obferve,  the  fame  powers  muft  be  completely 
vefted  in  the  ftate  Legiflatures.  I  call  upon  every  gentle- 
man candidly  to  declare,  whether  the  ftate  Legiflatures  have 
the  power  of  altering  the  time  of  elections  for  Reprefen- 
fentatives  from  two  to  four  years,  or  Senators  from  fix  to 
twelve ;  and  whether  they  have  the  power  to  require  any 
ether  qualifications  than  thofe  of  the  moft  numerous  branch 
of  the  ftate  Legiflatures,  and  alfo  whether  they  have  any 
other  power  over  the  manner  of  elections  any  more  than 
the  mere  mode  of  the  act  of  choofing,  or  whether  they  fhall 
be  held  by  Sheriffs  as  sontradiftinguifhed  to  any  other  of* 


(     83     ) 

ficer,  or  whether  they  fhall  be  by  votes  as  contradiflin- 
guiihed  from  ballots  or  any  other  way.  If  gentlemenwill  pay 
attention  they  will  find,  that  in  the  latter  part  of  this  claufe, 
Congrefs  has  no  power  but  what  was  given  to  the  dates  in 
the  firfl  part  of  the  fame  claufe.  They  may  alter  the  manner 
pf  holding  the  election,  but  cannot  alter  the  tenure  of  their 
oiHce.      They  cannot  alter  the  nature  of  the  elections,  for 
it  is  eftablifhed  as  fundamental  principles,  that  the  electors 
of  the  moft  numerous  branch  of  the  ftate  Legiflature  (hall 
elect  the  federal  Reprefentatives,  and  that  the   tenure  of 
their  office  (hall  be  for  two  years  •,  and  likewife,  that  the 
Senators  (hall  be  elected  by  the  Legislatures,   and  that  the 
tenure   of    their   office    (hall   be   for   fix   years.       When 
gentlemen  view  the  claufe  accurately,  and  fee  that  Congrefs 
have  only  the  fame  power  which  was  in  the  ftate  Legifla- 
ture, they  will  not  be  alarmed.     The   learned  Doctor   on 
my  right  [Mr.  Spencer]  has  alfo  faid,  that  Congrefs  might 
lengthen  the  time  of  elections.     I  am  willing  to  appeal  to 
grammatical  conttruction  and  punctuation.     Let  me  read 
this  as  it  ftands  on  paper.     {Here  he  reads  the  clauje  different 
%uayst  exprejjtng  the  fame  fenfe.]     Here  in  the  firft  part  of  the 
claufe,  this  power  over  elections  is  given  to  the  ftates,  and 
in  the  latter  part  the   fame  power  is  given  to  Congrefs, 
and  extending  only  to   the  time  of  holding,  the  place  of 
holding,  and  the  manner  of  holding  the  elections.     Is  this  not 
the    plain,   literal   and   grammatical    conftruction  of  the 
claufe  ?  Is  it  poflible  to  put  any  other  conftruction  on  it, 
without  departing  from  the  natural  order,  and  without  de^ 
viaHng  from  the  general  meaning  of  the  words  and  every 
rule  of  grammatical  conftruction?    Twift  it,  torture  it  as 
you  may,  Sir,  it  is  irnpoffible  to  fix  a  different  fenfe  up- 
on it.     The  worthy  gentleman  from  New-Hanover,  whofe 
ardour   for   the   liberty   of    his  country  I  wifli  never  to 
be  damped,  has  infmuated,  that  high  characters  might  in- 
fluence the  Members  on  this  occafion.     I  declare  for  my 
own  part,  I  wifh  every  man  to  be  guided  by  their  own  con- 
science and  underftanding,  and  by  nothing  elfe.    Every  man 
has  not  been  bred  a  politician  nor  ftudied  the  fcience  of  go- 
vernment; yet  when  a  Subject  is  explained,  if  the  mind 
js  unwarped  by  prejudice  and  not  in  the  leading- firings  of 
other  people,  gentlemen  will  do  what  is  right.     Were  this 
the  cafe  I  would  riik  my  Salvation  on  a  right  decifion. 

Mr, 


(     «4     5 

Mr.  Caldwell — Mr.  Chairman,  Thofc  things  which  cam 
be,  may  be.  We  know  that  in  the  Britifh  government, 
the  Members  of  Parliament  were  eligible  only  for  three 
years.  They  determined  they  might  be  chofen  for  feven 
years.  If  Congrefs  can  alter  the  time,  manner  and  place, 
I  think  it  will  enable  them  to  do  what  the  Britifh  Parlia- 
ment once  did.  They  have  declared,  that  the  elections  of 
Senators  are  for  fix  years,  and  of  Reprcfentatives  for  two 
years.  But  they  have  faid  there  was 'an  exception  to  this 
general  declaration,  viz*  that  Congrefs  can  alter  them.  If 
the  Convention  only  meant  that  they  mould  alter  them  in 
fuch  a  manner  as  to  prevent  a  difcontinuation  of  the  go- 
vernment, why  have  they  not  faid  fo  ?  It  mufl  appear  to 
every  gentleman  in  this  Convention^  that  they  can  alter  the 
elections  to  what  time  they  pleafe  :  And  if  the  Britifh 
Parliament  did  once  give  themfelves  the  power  of  fitting 
four  years  longer  than  they  had  a  right  to  do,  Congrefs^ 
having  a  (landing  army,  and  the  command  of  the  militia, 
may,  with  the  fame  propriety,  make  an  aft  to  continue 
the  Members  for  twenty  years,  or  even  for  their  natural 
lives.  This  conftruttion  appears  perfectly  rational  to  me. 
I  fhall  therefore  think  that  this  Convention  will  never  fwal- 
}ow  fuch  a  government,  without  fecuring  us  againft  danger. 

Mr.  Machine — Mr.  Chairman,  The  reverend  gentleman 
from  Guilford,  has  made  an  objection  which  aftonifhes 
me  more  than  any  thing  I  have  heard.  He  feems  to  be 
acquainted  with  the  hiftory  of  England,  but  he  ought  to 
confider  whether  his  hiftorical  references  apply  to  this  coun- 
try. He  tells  us  of  triennial  elections  being  changed  to 
ieptennial  elections.  This  is  a  hiftorical  fact  we  well 
know,  and  the  occafion  on  which  it  happened,  is  equally 
well  known.  They  talk  as  loudly  of  conftitutional  rights 
and  privileges  in  England,  as  we  do  here,  but  they  have 
no  written  conftitution.  They  have  a  common  law,  which 
has  been  altered  from  year  to  year,  for  a  very  long  period- — 
Magna  Charta,  and  Bill  of  Rights.  Thefe  they  lpok  upon 
as  their  conftitution.  Yet  this  is  fuch  a  conftitution  as  it 
as  univerfally  confidered  Parliament  can  change.  Black- 
Hone,  in  his  admirable  Commentaries,  tells  us,  that  the 
power  of  the  Parliament  is  tranfeendent  and  abfolute,  and 
tan  do  and  undo  every  thing  that  is  not  naturally  impofli- 
fcle.    The  a&,  therefore^  to  which  the  reverend  gentlemau 

alludes, 


(  «s   ) 

ft-Hudes,  was  not  unconstitutional.  Has  any  man  faid  that 
the  Legiflature  can  deviate  from  this  Conftitution  ?  The 
Legiflature  is  to  be  guided  by  the  Conftitution.  They  can- 
riot  travel  beyond  its  bounds.  The  reverend  gentleman 
fays,  that  though  the  Reprefentatives  are  to  be  elected  for 
two  years,  they  may  pafs  an  act  prolonging  their  appoint- 
ment for  twenty  years,  or  for  natural  life,  without  any  vi- 
olation of  the  Conftitution.  Is  it  poffrble  for  any  com- 
mon understanding  or  fenfe,  to  put  this  conftru&ion  upon 
it  ?  Such  an  acl,  Sir,  would  be  a  palpable  violation  of  the 
Conftitution.  Were  they  to  attempt  it,  Sir,  the  country 
would  rife  againil  them.  After  fuch  an  unwarrantable 
fuggeftion  as  this,  any  objection  may  be  made  to  this  Con- 
ftitution. It  is  neceffary  to  give  power  to  the  government. 
I  would  afk  that  gentleman  who  is  fo  afraid  it  will  deftroy 
our  liberties,  why  he  is  not  as  much  afraid  of  our  ftate 
Legiflature  ?  For  they  have  much  more  power  than  we 
are  now  propoling  to  give  this  general  government.  They 
have  an  unlimited  controul  over  the  p&rfe  and  fword — 
yet  no  complaints  are  made.  Why  is  he  net  afraid  that 
our  Legiflature  will  call  out  the  militia  to  deftroy  our  li- 
berties ?  Will  the  militia  be  called  out  by  the  general  go- 
vernment to  enflave  the  people — to  enflave  their  friends, 
their  families,  themfelves  ?  The  idea  of  the  militia  being 
made  ufe  of  as  an  inftrument  to  deftroy  our  liberties,  is 
?lmoft  too  abfurd  to  merit  a  refutation.  It  cannot  be  fup- 
pofed  that  the  Reprefentatives  of  our  general  government 
will  be  worfe  men  than  the  Members  of  our  ftate  govern- 
ment. Will  we  be  fuch  fools  as  to  fend  our  greateft  rafcala 
to  the  general  government  ?  Wc  mu'ft  be  both  fools  as  well 
as  villains  to  do  fo. 

Governor  Johnjtoti — Mr.  Chairman,  I  (hall  offer  fome 
observations  on  what  the  gentleman  faid.  A  parallel  has 
been  drawn  between  the  Britifh  Parliament  and  Congrefs. 
The  powers  of  Congrefs  are  all  circumfcribed,  defined, 
and  clearly  laid  down.  So  far  they  may  go,  but  no  farther. 
But,  Sir,  what  are  the  powers  of  the  Britifh  Parliament  ? 
They  have  no  written  Conftitution  in  Britain.  They  have 
certain  fundamental  principles  and  legiflative  acts,  fecuring 
the  liberty  of  the  people  :  But  thefe  may  be  altered  by 
ti\eir  Reprefentatives,  without  violating  their  Conftitution, 
jii  fuch  manner  as  they  may  think  proper.  Their  Legif- 
lature 


(     86    ) 

lature  exifted  long  before  the  fcience  of  government  wat 
well  underftood.  From  very  early  periods  you  find  their 
Parliament  in  full  force.  What  is  their  Magna  Charta  ? 
It  is  only  an  a£r,  of  Parliament,.  Their  Parliament  can  at 
any  time,  alter  the  whole,  or  any  part  of  it.  In  fhort,  it 
is  no  more  binding  on  the  people  than  any  orher  act  which 
has  pafled.  The  power  of  the  Parliament  is,  therefore* 
unbounded.  But,  Sir,  can  Congrefs  alter  the  Conftituti- 
on ?  They  have  no  fuch  power.  '  They  are  bound  to  a£fc 
by  the  Conftitution.  They  dare  not  recede  from  it.  At 
the  moment  that  the  time  for  which  they  are  elected  ex<- 
pires,  they  may  be  removed.  If  they  make  bad  laws,  they 
mntt  be  removed,  for  they  will  be  no  longer  worthy  of  con^ 
fidcncc.  The  Britifli  Parliament  can  do  every  thing  they 
pleafe.  Their  Bill  of  Rights  is  only  an  acl:  of  Parliament, 
which  may  be  at  my  time  altered  or  modified,  without  a 
violation  of  the  Conftitution.  The  people  of  Great-Bri- 
tain have  no  Conftitution  to  controul  their  Legislature. — - 
The  King,  Lords  and  Commons  can  do  what  they,  pleafet 
Mr.  Caldiutll  obferved,  that  whatever  nominal  powers 
the  Britiih  Parliament  might  poflefs,  yet  they  had  infring- 
ed the  liberty  of  the  people  in  the  molt  flagrant  manner, 
by  giving  themfelves  power  to  continue  four  years  in  Parl- 
iament longer  than  they  had  been  elected  for  .  That 
though  they  were  only  chofen  for  three  years  by  their  con- 
ftituents,  yet  they  pafled  an  a£l,'that  Reprefentatives  fhould, 
for  the  future,  be  chofen  for  feven  years — That  this  Con* 
Citation  would  have  a  dangerous  tendency— That  this 
claufe  would  enable  them  to  prolong  their  continuance  in 
©See  as  long  as  they  pleafed — And  that  if  a  Conftitution 
was  not  agreeable  to  the  people,  its  operation  could  not  be 

iiappy- 

Governor  JohnJIon  replied,  that  the  a£r.  to  which  allufi- 
on  was  made  by  the  gentleman,  was  not  unconstitutional  : 
But  that  if  Congrefs  were  to  pafs  an  acl,  prolonging  the 
terms  of  elections  of  Senators  or  Reprefentatives,  it  would 
he  clearly  unconstitutional. 

Mr.  Maclaine  obferved,  that  the  a£fc  of  Parliament  re- 
ferred to  was  pafled  on  urge  it  neceflity,  when  George  I. 
afcended  the  throne,  to  prevent  the  Papifts  from  getting  in- 
to Parliament ;  for  parties  ran  fo  high  at  that  time,  that 
FapifU  enough  might  have  got  in  to  deftroy  the  a£t  of  fet- 

tlement§ 


(    «7    ) 

dement,  which  excluded  the  Roman  Catholics  from  the 
fucceffion  to  the  throne. 

Mr.  Spencer — The  gentleman  from  Halifax  faid,  that  the 
-'reafon  of  this  claufe  was,  that  fome  ftates  might  be  re- 
fractory. I  profefs,  that,  in  my  opinion,  the  circumftances 
of  Rhode-Ifland  do  not  appear  to  apply.  I  cannot  con- 
ceive the  particular  caufe  why  Rhode-Ifland  fhould  not 
fend  Reprefentatives  to  Congrefs.  If  they  were  united 
in  one  government,  is  it  prefumed  that  they  would  wave 
the  right  of  reprefentation  ?  I  have  not  the  leaft  reafon  to 
doubt  they  would  make  ufe  of  the  privilege.  With  re- 
fpe£l  to  the  conftru&ion  that  the  worthy  Member  put  up- 
on the  claufe,  were  that  conftruclion  eftablifhed,  I  would 
be  fatisfied  ;  but  it  is  fufceptible  of  a  different  explanation. 
They  may  alter  the  mode  of  election  fo  as  to  deprive  the 
people  of  the  right  of  choofing.  I  wifh  to  have  it  exprefled 
in  a  more  explicit  manner. 

Mr.  Davie— Mr.  Chairman,  The  gentleman  has  cer- 
tainly mifconeeived  the  matter,  when  he  fays,  "  that  the 
circumftances  of  Rhode-Ifland  do  not  apply."  It  is  a  fa£fc 
well  known,  of  which  perhaps  he  may  not  be  poflefled, 
that  the  ftate  of  Rhode-Ifland  has  not  been  regularly  re- 
prefented  for  feveral  years,  owing  to  the  character  and  par- 
ticular views  of  the  prevailing  party.  By  the  influence  o£ 
this  faction,  who  are  in  pofTeffion  of  the  ftate  government, 
the  people  have  been  frequently  deprived  of  the  benefit  of 
a  reprefentation  in  the  union,  and  Congrefs  often  embaraf- 
fed  by  their  abfence.  The  fame  evil  may  again  refult  from, 
the  fame  caufe  ;  and  Congrefs  ought  therefore  to  poffefs 
conftitutional  power  to  give  the  people  an  opportunity  of 
elecling  Reprefentatives,  if  the  ftates  neglect  or  refufe  to 
do  it.  The  gentleman  from  Anfon  has  faid,  «  that  this 
claufe  is  fufceptible  of  an  explanation  different  from  the 
conftru£Hon  I  put  upon  it."  I  have  a  high  refpecl:  for  his 
opinion  %  but  that  alone,  on  this  important  occafion,  is  not 
fatisfactory  :  We  muft  have  fome  reafons  from  him  to  fup- 
port  and  fan£tion  this  opinion.  He  is  a  profeffional  man, 
and  has  held  an  office  many  years — the  nature  and  duties 
of  which  would  enable  him  to  put  a  different  conftru&ion 
on  this  claufe,  if  it  is  capable  of  it. 

This  claufe,  Sir,  has  been  the  occafion  of  much  ground- 
lefs  alarm,  and  has  fceea  the  favourite  theme  of  declama- 
tion 


(    «»    J 

tidn  out  of  doors.  I  now  call  upon  the  gentlemen  of  thfc 
oppofition  to  fhew  that  it  contains  the  mifchiefs  with  which' 
they  have  alarmed  and  agitated  the  public  mind,  and  I  de- 
fy them  to  fupport  the  conftruction  they  have  put  upon  it 
by  one  fingle  plaufible  reafon.  The  gentleman  from  New- 
Hanover  has  faid  in  objection  to  this  claufe,  "  That  Con- 
grefs  may  appoint  the  mod  inconvenient  place  in  the  mod 
inconvenient  diftrict,  and  make  the  manner  of  election  fa 
oppreffive,  as  entirely  to  deftroy  reprefentation."  IS  this  is' 
confidered  as  poflible,  he  fhould  alfo  reflect  that  the  ftate 
Legiflatures  may  do  the  fame  thing.  But  this  can  never 
happen,  Sir,  until  the  whole  mafs  of  the  people  become 
corrupt,  when  all  parchment  fecurities  will  be  of  little  fer- 
vice.  Does  that  gentleman,  or  any  other  gentleman  whoJ 
has  the  fmalleft  acquaintance  with  human  nature  or  the  fpi- 
rit  of  America,  fuppofe  that  the  people  will  pafiively  re- 
linquifh  privileges,  or  fufFer  the  ufurpation  of  powers  un* 
warranted  by  the  Conftitution  ?  Does  not  the  right  of  elect- 
ing Reprefentatives  revert  to  the  people  every  fecond  year  ? 
There  is  nothing  in  this  clause  that  can  impede  or  deftroy 
this  reverfion ;  and  although  the  particular  time  of  year,- 
the  particular  place  in  a  county  or  a  diftrict,  or  the  parti- 
cular mode  in  which  elections  are  to  be  held,  as  whether 
by  vote  or  ballot,  be  left  to  Congrefs  to  direct  ;  yet  this* 
can  never  deprive  the  people  of  the  right  or  privilege  of 
election.  He  has  alfo  added,  that  the  "  democratical  branch; 
was  in  danger  from  this  claufe  •,"  and  with  fome  other  gen- 
tlemen took  it  for  granted,  that  an  ariftocracy  mull  arife 
out  of  the  general  government.  This,  I  take  it,  from  thie- 
very nature  of  the  thing,  can  never  happen.  Ariftocracies 
grow  out  of  the  combination  of  a  few  powerful  families,' 
where  the  country  or  people  upon  which  they  are  to  operate 
are  immediately  under  their  influence ;  whereas  the  intereft 
and  influence  of  this  government  are  too  weak,  and  too 
much  diffufed  ever  to  bring  about  fuch  an  event.  The  con- 
fidence of  the  people,  acquired  by  a  wife  and  virtuous  con- 
duct, is  the  only  influence  the  members  of  the  federal  go- 
vernment can  ever  have.  When  ariftocracies  are  formed, 
they  will  arife  within  the  individual  ftates ;  it  is  therefore 
absolutely  neceffary  that  Congrefs  fhould  have  a  conftituti- 
onal  power  to  give  the  people  at  large  a  reprefentation  in 
tfis  government,  in  order  to  break  and  controul  fuch  dan- 
gerous 


(     *9    ) 

gerous  combinations.  Let  gentlemen  (hew  when  and  how 
this  ariftocracy  they  talk  of,  is  to  arife  out  of  this  Confti- 
tution.  Are  the  firft  members  to  perpetuate  themfelves  2 
Is  the  Conftitution  to  be  attacked  by  fuch  abfurd  aflertions 
as  thefe,  and  charged  with  defects  with  which  it  has  no 
poflible  connection  i 

Mr.  Bloodworth  —Mr.  Chairman,  The  gentleman  has 
miftaken  me.  When  we  examine  the  gentleman's  argu- 
ments, they  have  no  weight.  He  tells  us,  that  it  is  not  pro- 
bable "  that  an  ariftocracy  can  arife."  I  did  not  fay  that  it 
would.  Various  arguments  are  brought  forward  in  fup- 
port  of  this  article,  They  are  vague  and  trifling.  There 
is  nothing  that  can  be  offered  to  my  mind,  which  will  re- 
concile me  to  it,  while  this  evil  exifts — while  Congrefs 
have  this  controul  over  elections.  It  was  eafy  for  them  to 
mention,  that  this  controul  fhould  be  only  exerted  when 
the  ftate  would  neglect  or  refufe,  or  be  unable  in  cafe  o£ 
invafion,  to  regulate  elections— If  fo,  why  did  they  not 
mention  it  exprefsly  ? 

It  appears  to  me,  that  fome  of  their  general  obfervations 
imply  a  contradiction.  Do  they  not  tell  us,  that  there  is 
no  danger  of  a  confolidation  ?  That  Congrefs  can  exift 
no  longer  than  the  ftates — the  mafly  pillars  on  which  it 
is  faid  to  be  raifed  ?  Do  they  not  alfo  tell  us,  that  the  ftate 
governments  are  to  fecute  us  againft  Congrefs  ?  At  another 
time  they  tell  us,  that  it  was  neceffary  to  fecure  our  liber- 
ty by  giving  them  power  to  prevent  the  ftate  governments 
from  opprefling  us.  We  know  that  there  is  a  corruptioa 
in  human  nature.  Without  circumfpection  and  careful- 
nefs  we  (hall  throw  away  our  liberties.  Why  is  this  gene- 
ral expreflion  ufed  on  this  great  occafion  ?  Why  not  ufe* 
expreffions  that  were  clear  and  unequivocal  ?  If  I  truft  my 
property  with  a  man  I  take  fecurity,  (hall  I  then  barter  awa^ 
my  rights  ? 

Mr.  Spencer- — Mr.  Chairman,  This  claufe  may  operate 
in  fuch  a  manner  as  will  abridge  the  liberty  of  the  people 
It  is  well  known  that  men  in  power  are  apt  to  abufe  it,  andt 
extend  it  if  poflible.  From  the  ambiguity  of  this  expreflion* 
they  may  put  fuch  conftruction  on  it  as  may  fuit  them.  5 
would  not  have  it  in  fuch  a  manner  as  to  endanger  the  rights 
q£  the  people.  But  it  has  been  faid,  that  this  power  is  ne- 
fejTary  to  preferve  their  exiftence.    Jtee  i§  not  the  leaft 


(    9*    ) 

<!oubt  but  the  people  will  keep  them  from  loofing  their  ex- 
istence, if  they  fhall  behave  in  fuch  a  manner  as  will  me- 
rit it. 

Mr.  Madame — Mr.  Chairman,  I  thought  it  very  extra- 
ordinary, that  the  gentleman  who  was  laft  on  the  floor, 
fhould  fay  that  Congrefs  could  do  what  they  pleafe  with  re- 
fpect  to  elections,  and  be  warranted  by  this  claufe.  The 
gentleman  from  Halifax  £Mr.  Davie]  has  put  that  conftruc- 
tion  upon  it  which  reajon  and  common  fenfe  will  put  upon  it. 
Lawyers  will  often  differ  on  a  point  of  law,  but  people  will 
fe.'dom  differ  about  fo*  very  plain  a  thing  as  this.  The 
claufe  enables  Congrefs  to  alter  fuch  regulations  as  the  Hates 
{hall  have  made  with  refpect  to  elections.  What  would  he 
infer  from  this  ?  What  is  it  to  alter  ?  It  is  to  alter  the  time, 
place  and  manner  eftablifhed  by  the  Legiflatures,  if  they 
do  not  anfwer  the  purpofe.  Congrefs  ought  to  have  pow- 
er to  perpetuate  the  government,  and  not  the  ftates,  who 
might  be  otherwife  inclined.  I  will  afk  the  gentleman,  and 
I  wifh  he  may  give  me  a  fatisfactory  anfwer,  if  the  whole 
is  not  in  the  power  of  the  people,  as  well  when  the  elec- 
tions are  regulated  by  Congrefs^  as  when  by  the  dates  ?  Are 
not  both  the  agents  of  the  people  amenable  to  them  ?  Is 
there  any  thing  in  this  Conftitutipn  which  gives  them  the 
power  to  perpetuate  the  fitting  Members-?  Is  there  any  fuch 
firange  abfurdity  ?  If  the  Legiflature  of  this  ftate  has  the 
power  to  fix  the  time,  place  and  manner  of  holding  elec- 
tions, why  not  place  the  fame  confidence  in  the  general 
government  ?  The  members  of  the  general  government,  and 
tbofe  of  the  ftate  Legiflature,  are  both  chofen  by  the  peo- 
p-  e.  Thev  are  both  from  among  the  people,  and  are  ia 
the  fame  fituation.  Thofe  who  ferved  in  the  ftate  Legifla- 
ture are  eligible,  and  may  be  fent  to  Congrefs.  If  the  elec- 
tions be  regulated  in  the  beft  manner  in  the  ftate  govern- 
ment, can  it  be  fuppofed  that  the  fame  man  will  lofe  all 
his  virtue,  his  character  and  principles,  when  he  goel  into 
the  general  government,  in  order  to  deprive  us  of  our  li- 
berty ? 

The  gentleman  from  New- Hanover  feems  to  think  it 
poflible,  Congrefs  will  fo  far  forget  themfelves,  as  to  point: 
out  fuch  improper  feafons  of  the  year,  and  fuch  inconve- 
nient places  for  elections,  as  to  defeat  the  privilege  of  the 
democratic  branch  altogether.    He  fpeaks  of  meonfiftency 


(  ft  ) 

in  the  arguments  of  the  gentlemen,  I  wifh  he  would  be  con- 
fident himfelf.  If  I  do  not  miftake  the  politicks  of  that 
gentleman,  it  is  his  opinion  that  Congrefs  had  fulEcient 
power  under  the  Confederation.  He  has  faid  without  con- 
tradiction, that  we  ihould  be  better  without  the  union  than 
with  it :  That  it  would  be  better  for  us  to  be  by  ourfelves 
than  be  in  the  union.  His  antipathy  to  a  general  govern- 
ment, and  to  the  union,  is  evidently  inconfident  with  his 
predilection  for  a  federal  democratic  branch.  We  fhouid 
have  no  democratic  part  of  government  at  all,  under  fuch  a 
government  as  he  would  recommend.  There  is  no  fuch 
part  in  the  old  Confederation.  The  body  of  the  people 
had  no  agency  in  that  fydem.  The  Members  of  the  pre- 
fent  general  government  are  felected  by  the  (late  Legifla- 
tures,  and  have  the  power  of  the  purfe  and  other  powers,, 
and  are  not  amenable  to  the  people  at  large*  Although  the 
gentleman  may  deny  my  alTertions,  yet  this  argument  of 
his,  is  inconfiftent  with  his  other  afTertions  and  doctrines- 
It  is  impoflible  for  any  man  in  his  fenfes  to  think  that  we 
can  exiil  by  ourfelves,  feparated  from  our  fifter  dates. 
Whatever  gentlemen  may  pretend  to  fay  on  tbis  point,  it 
mud  be  a  matter  of  ferious  alarm  to  every  reflecting  mind* 
to  be  difunited  from  the  other  dates. 

Mr.  Bloodworth  begged  leave  to  wipe  of  the  afperfion  of 
the  gentleman.  That  he  could  not  account  for  any  expref- 
£on  which  he  might  drop  among  a  laughing,  jocote  people,, 
but  that  it  was  well  known  he  was  for  giving  power  to  Con- 
grefs to  regulate  the  trade  of  the  United  States :  That  he 
had  faid,  that  Congrefs  had  exercifed  power  not  given  them 
by  the  Confederation  ;  and  that  he  was  accurate  in  the  af- 
fertion  :  that  he  was  a  freeman-  and  was  under  the  controuJ 
of  no  man* 

Mr.  Madame  replied,  that  he  meawtn-o  afperfions  :  That 
he  only  meant  to  point  out  a  fact:  That  he  had  committed 
midakes  himfelf  in  argument,  and  that  he  fuppofed  the 
gentleman  not  more  infallible  than  other  people. 

Mr.  J.  Taylor  wifhed  to  know  why  the  dates  hal  con- 
troul  over  the  place  of  electing  Senators,  but  not  over  that 
of  choofing  the  Reprefentatives. 

Mr.  Spaight  anfwered,  that  the  reafon  of  that  refervatfon 
was,  to  prevent  Congrefs  from  altering  'he  pi  ices  for  hold- 
ing the  leeiflative  AlTembiies  in  tzie  uiSwioni  dates. 

Mi. 


(     92      ) 

Mr .  Jaities  Galloway— Mr.  Chairman,  In  the  beginning  t 
found  great  candour  in  the  advocates  of  this  government, 
but  it  is  not  fo  towards  the  laft.  I  hope  the  gentleman 
from  Halifax  will  not  take  it  amifs,  if  I  mention  how  he 
brought  the  motion  forward.  They  began  with  dangers. 
As  to  Rhode-Ifland  being  governed  by  a  faction,  what  has 
that  to  do  with  the  queftion  before  us  ?  I  afk  what  has  the 
ftate  governments  left  for  them,  if.the  general  government 
is  to  be  poflefled  of  fuch  extenfive  powers,  without  controul 
or  limitation,  without  any  refponfibility  to  the  ftates  ?  He 
afks,  how  is  it  poftible  for  the  members  to  perpetuate  them-* 
felves^  I  think  I  can  mew  how  they  can  do  it.  For  in- 
ftance,  were  they  to  take  the  government  as  it  now  (lands 
organized.  We  fend  five  Members  to  the  Houfe  of  Re- 
prefentatives  in  the  general  government.  They  will  go 
no  doubt  from  or  near  the  fea-ports.  In  other  ftates  alio, 
thofe  near  the  fea  will  have  more  intereft,  and  will  go  for- 
ward to  Congfefs-,  and  they  can,  without  violating  the  Con- 
ftitution,  make  a  law  continuing  themfelves,  as  they  have 
controul  over  the  place,  time  and  manner  of  elections. 
This  may  happen,  and  where  the  great  principles  of  liber- 
ty are  endangered,  no  general,  indeterminate,  vague  ex- 
preffion  ought  to  be  fuffered.  Shall  we  pafs  over  this  ar- 
ticle as  it  is  now  ?  They  will  be  able  to  perpetuate  them* 
ielves  as  well  as  if  it  had  exprefsly  faid  fo. 

Mr.  Steele — Mr.  Chairman,  The  gentleman  has  faid, 
that  the  five  Reprefentatives  which  this  Hate  will  be  enti- 
tled to  fend  to  the  general  government,  will  go  from  the 
fea-ftiore.  What  reafon  has  he  to  fay  they  will  go  from 
the  fea-fhore  ?  The  time,  place  and  manner  of  holding 
the  elections  are  to  be  prescribed  by  the  Legiflatures.  Our 
Legiflature  is  to  regulate  the  firft  election  at  any  event. — 
They  will  regulate  it  as  they  think  proper.  They  may,  and 
moft  probably  will,  lay  the  ftate  off  into  diftricls.  Who 
are  to  vote  for  them  ?  Every  man  who  has  a  right  to  vote 
for  a  Reprefentative  to  our  Legiflature,  will  ever  have  a 
right  to  vote  for  a  Reprefentative  to  the  general  govern- 
ment. Does  it  not  exprefsly  provide,  that  the  electors  in 
each  ftate  fhall  have  the  qualifications  requifite  for  the  moft 
numerous  branch  of  the  ftate  Legiflature  ?  Can  they, 
without  a  moft  manifeft  violation  of  the  Conftitution,  al- 
ter tfce  qualifications  of  Jfe  ele&ors  ?  Jht  power  over  the 

manner 


(    93    ) 

Manner  of  elections,  docs  not  include  that  of  faying  wh# 
mall  vote.     The  Conftitution  exprefsly  fays,  that  the  qua- 
lifications which  entitle  a'  man  to  vote  for  a  itate  Rrpre- 
fentative,  will  enable  him  to  vote  for  a  federal  Rdprelen- 
tative.     It  is,  then,  clearly  and    indubitably  fixed  and  de- 
termined who  (hall  be  the  electors  ;  and  the  power  over  the 
manner  only  enables  them  to  determine  honv  theie  electors 
{hall  eleft — whether  by  ballot  or  by  vote,  or  by  any  other 
Way.     Is  it  not  a  maxim  of  univerfal  jurifprudence,  of  rea- 
fon  and  common  fenfe,  that  an  inftrument  or  deed  of  writing 
(hall  be  fo  conftrued  as  to  give  validity  to  all  parts  of  it,  if 
it  can  be  done  without  involving  any  abfurdity  ?    By  con- 
ftruing   it  in  the  plain  obvious  way  I  have  mentioned,   all 
parts  will  be  valid.     By  the  way  gentlemen   fugged,  the 
moft  palpable  contradiction  and  abfurdity  will  foliow.   To 
fay  that  they  lhali  go  from  the  fea-fhore,  and  be  able  to  per- 
petuate themfelves,  is  a  moft  extravagant  idea.     Will  the 
Members  of  Congrefs  deviate  from  their  duty  without  any* 
profpecT:  of  advantage  to  themfelves  ?  What  intereft  can 
they  have  to  make  the   place  of  elections  inconvenient  ? 
The  judicial  power  of  that  government  is  fo  well  conftrudr.- 
ed  as  to  be  a  check      There  was  no  check  in  the  old  Con- 
federation.    Their  power  was  in  principle  and  theory  tran- 
fcendent.     If  the  Congrefs  make  laws  inconfiftent  with  the 
Conftitution,  independent  Judges   will  not  uphold  them, 
nor  will  the  people  obey  them.    An  univerfal  refiftance  will 
enfue.     In  fome  Countries  the  arbitrary  difpofition  of  rul*rs 
may  enable  them  to  overturn  the  liberties  of  the  people  ; 
but  in  a  country  like  this,  where  every  man  is  his  own  maf- 
ter,  and  where  almoft  every  man  is  a  freeholder,  and  has 
right  of  election,  the  violations  of  a  Conftitution  will  not 
be  paffively  permitted.     Can  it  be  fuppofed,  that  in  fuch  a 
country  the  rights  of  fufFrage  will  be  tamely  furrendered  ? 
Is  it  to  be  fuppofed,  that  30,000  free  perfons  will  fend  the 
moft  abandoned  wretch  in  the  diftricl:  to  legiflate  for  them 
in  the  general  Legiflature  ?  I  fhould   rather   think  they 
Uirould  choofe  men  of  the  moft  refpe&able  chara&ers. 

Mr.  Prefident  now  refumed  the  chair,  and  Mr.  Battle 
reported,  that  the  committee  had,  according  to  order,  again 
liad  the  faid  propofed  Conftitution  under  theirconfideration, 
but  p.ot  having  time  to  go  through  the  fame,  had  directed 
%un  to  mdve  the  Convention  for  leave  to  fit  again. 

RefolvtJk 


(  m  )  : 

RefotveJ,  That  this  Convention  will  again  to-morrow 
refolve  itfelf  into  a  committee  of  the  whole  Convention, 
on  the  faid  propofed  plan  of  government. 

The  Convention  then  adjourned  to  ten  o'clock  to-mor- 
row morning: 

wmm*        — 


SATURDAY,    July  26,  178&. 

The  Convention  met  according  to  adjournment,  and  then 
refolved  itfelf  into  a  committee  of  the  whole  Convention, 
to  take  into  farther  confideration  the  faid  propofed  Condi- 
tution  of  government — Mr.  Kenman  in  the  chair. 

The  fifth  fetlion  of  the  fiift  article  read, 

Mr.  Steele  obferved,  that  he  had  heard  objections  to  the 
third  claufe  of  this  fe&ion,  with  refpe£t  to  the  periodical 
publication  of  the  journals,  the  entering  the  yeas  and  naye 
on  them,  and  the  fuppreflion  of  fuch  parts  as  required  fe- 
crecy.  That  he  had  no  objection  himfelf,  for  that  he 
thought  the  necefllty  of  publiming  their  trail  factions  was 
an  excellent  check,  and  that  every  principle  of  prudence 
and  good  policy,  pointed  out  the  neceffity  of  not  publifh- 
ing  fuch  tranfactions  as  related  to  military  arrangements- 
and  war.  That  this  provifion  was  exaclly  fimilar  to  that 
which  was  in  the  old  Confederation. 

Mr.  Graham  wifhed  to  hear  an  explanation  cf  the  words 
w  from  time  to  time,*'  whether  it  was  a  fhort  or  a  long 
time,  or  how  often  they  fliould  be  obliged  to  publifli  their 
proceedings. 

Mr-  Davie  anfwered,  that  they  would  be  probably  pub- 
lished after  the  rifing  of  Congrefs,  every  year.  That  if 
they  fat  two  or  three  times,  or  often  er,  in  the  year,  they 
might  bepublifhed  every  time  they  rofe.  That  there  could 
fee  no  doubt  of  their  publifhing  them  as  often  as  it  would 
be  convenient  and  proper,  and  that  they  would  conceal  no- 
thing but  what  it  would  be  unfafe  to  publifh.  He  further 
obferved,  that  fome  dates  had  propofed  an  amendment, 
that  they  mould  be  published  annually  ;  but  he  thought  it 
very  fafe  and  proper  as  it  dood.  That  it  was  the  fenfe  of 
the  Convention  that  they  fhould  be  publifbed  at  the  end  of 
every  feflion.  The  gentleman  from  Salifbury  had  faid, 
that  in  this  particular  it  rciembled  the  old  Confederation, 

Other 


.     (     9J    ) 

Other  gentlemen  have  faid  that  there  was  no  fimilarity  at 
all.     He  therefore  wiftied  the  difference  to  be  Hated. 

Mr.  Iredell  remarked,  that  the  provifion  in  the  claufe  un- 
der confideration,  was  fimilar  in  meaning  and  fubftance  to 
that  in  the  Confederation.  That  in  time  of  war  it  was  ab- 
folutely  necefTary  to  conceal  the  operations  of  government, 
otherwife  no  attack  on  an  enemy  could  be  premeditated  with 
fuccefs,  for  the  enemy  could  difcover  our  plans  foon  enough 
to  defeat  them.  That  it  was  no  Jefs  imprudent  to  divulge 
our  negociations  with  foreign  powers,  and  the  mod  falu- 
tary  fchemes  might  be  prevented,  by  imprudently  promul- 
gating all  the  tranfa&ions  of  the  government  indifcrimi- 
nately. 

Mr.  J.  Galloway  wifhed  to  obviate  what  gentlemen  had 
faid  with  regard  to  the  fimilarity  of  the  old  Confederation 
to  the  new  fyftem,  with  refpeft  to  the  publication  of  their 
proceedings.  He  remarked,  that  at  the  defire  of  one  Mem- 
ber from  any  date  the  yeas  and  nays  were  to  be  put  on  the 
journals  and  publifhed  by  the  Confederation*  whereas  by 
this  fyftem  the  concurrence  of  one-fifth  was  necefTary. 

To  this  it  was  anfwered,  that  the  alteration  was  made 
becaufe  experience  had  (hewed,  when  any  two  Members 
sould  require  the  yeas  and  nays,  they  were  taken  on  many 
trifling  occafions  :  And  there  was  no  doabt  one-fiith  would 
require  them  on  every  occafion  of  importance. 

The  fix th  fection  read  without  any  obfervations. 

Firft  claufe  of  the  feventh  fedion  likewife  read  without 
any  obfervations. 

Second  claufe  read. 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  This  is  a  novelty  in  the 
Conftitution,  and  is  a  regulation  of  confider^ble  import- 
ance. Permit  me  to  ftate  the  reafons  for  which  I  imagine 
this  regulation  was  made.  They  are  luch  as  in  my  opi- 
nion, fully  juftify  it. 

One  great  alteration  propofed  by  the  conftitution,  and 
which  is  a  capital  improvement  en  the  Articles  of  Con- 
federation is,  that  the  executive,  legiflative,  and  judicial 
powers  fhould  be  feparate  and  diftinct.  The  beft  writers, 
and  all  the  moll  enlightened  part  of  mankind,  agree  that 
it  is  effential  to  the  prefervation  of  liberty,  that  fuch  dif- 
tin£Hon  and  fepaiation  of  powers  fhould  be  made.  But 
Ifeia  diftin&ifb  would  bays  very  iittfe  efeacvj  if  each 

power 


(•  m  > 

power  had  not  means  to  defend  itfelf  againft  the  encroach- 
ment of  the  others. 

The  Britifh  Conftitution,  the  theory  of  which  is  much 
admired,  but  which,  however,  is  in  fact  liable  to  many 
objections,  has  divided  the  government  into  three  branches. 
The  King,  who  is  hereditary,  forms  one  branch,  the  Lords 
and  Commons  the  two  others  ;  and  no  bill  paffes  into  a 
law  without  the  King's  confent.  This  a  great  conftitu- 
tional  fupport  of  his  authority.  By  the  propofed  Condi- 
tution>  the  Prefident  is  of  a  very  different  nature  from  a 
Monarch.  He  is  to  be  chofen  by  Electors  appointed  by  the, 
people — to  be  taken  from  among  the  people— to  hold  his 
office  only  for  the  (hort  period  of  four  years — and  to  be 
perfonally  refponfible  for  any  abufe  of  the  great  truft  re- 
pofed  in  him. 

-  In  a  republican  government  it  would  be  extremely  dan* 
gerous  to  place  it  in  the  power  of  one  man  to  put  an  abfo- 
lute  negative  on  a  bill  propofed  by  two  houfes,  one  of 
which  reprefented  the  people,  the  other  the  dates  of  Ame- 
rica. It  therefore  became  an  object  of  confideration,  how 
the  Executive  could  defend  itfelf  without  being  a  compo- 
nent part  of  the  Legiflature.  This  difficulty  was  happily 
remedied  by  the  claufe  now  under  our  confideration.  The 
Executive  is  net  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  the  Legiflature  mt 
nor  is  it  put  in  the  power  of  the  Executive  entirely  to  defeat 
the  acts  of  thofe  two  important  branches.  As  it  is  pro- 
vided in  this  claufe,  if  a  bare  majority  of  both  Houfes 
fliould  pafs  a  bill  which  the  Prefident  thought  injurious  to 
his  country,  it  is  in  his  power — to  do  what  ?  Not  to  fay 
in  an  arbitrary,  haughty  manner,  that  he  does  not  approve 
of  it ;  but,  if  he  thinks  it  a  bad  bill,  refpectfully  to  offer 
his  reafons  to  both  Houfes ;  by  whom,  in  that  cafe,  it  is  to 
be  reconfidered,  and  not  to  become  a  law  unlefs  two-thirds 
of  both  Houfes  (hall  concur \  which  they  ftill  may,  not- 
withftanding  the  Prefident's  objection.  It  cannot  be  pre- 
fumed  that  he  would  venture  to  oppofe  a  bill  under  fuch 
circumftances,  without  very  ftrong  reafons.  Unlefs  he 
was  fure  of  a  powerful  fupport  in  the  Legiflature,  his  op- 
pofition  would  be  of  no  effect ;  and  as  his  reafons  are  to 
be  put  on  record,  his  fame  is  committed  both  to  the  pre- 
fent  times  and  to  pofterity.  The  exercife  of  this  power 
in  a  time  of  violent  faction^  might  be  pffiWy  hazardous 

9 


(     91     ) 

to  hlmfelf,  but  he  can  have  no  ill  motive  to  exert  it  in  the 
face  of  a  violent  opposition.  Regard  to  his  duty  alone 
could  induce  him  to  oppofe  when,  it  was  probable  two- 
thirds  would  at  all  events  over-rule  him.  This  power  may 
be  ufefully  exercifed,  even  when  no  ill  intention  prevails 
in  the  Legiftature.  It  might  frequently  happen,  that  where 
a  bare  majority  had  carried  a  pernicious  bill,  if  there  was 
an  authority  to  fufpend  it,  upon  a  cool  ftatement  of  rea- 
fons  many  of  that  majority,  on  a  reconsideration,  might 
be  convinced,  and  voce  differently.  I  therefore  think  the 
method  propofed,  is  a  happy  medium  between  the  pofTefTioni 
^of  an  abfolute  negative,  and  the  Executive  having  no  con- 
troul  whatever,  on  a£fcs  of  legiflation  :  And  at  the  fame 
time  that  it  ferves  to  protect  the  Executive  from  ill  defigns 
in  the  Legiftature,  it  may  alfo  anfwer  the  purpofe  of  pre- 
venting many  laws  paffing  which  w<7uld  be  immediately 
injurious  to  the  people  at  large.  It  is  a  ftrong  guard  againft 
abufes  in  all,  that  the  President's  reafons  are  to  be  entered 
at  large  on  the  journals,  and  if  the  bill  paffes  notwithstand- 
ing, that  the  yeas  and  nays  are  alfo  to  be  entered.  The 
public  therefore  can  judge  fairly  between  them. 
#The  firfl:  claufe  of  the  eighth  fe£tion  read. 
Mr.  Spencer — Mr.  Chairman,  I  conceive  this  power  to  be 
too  extenfive,  as  it  embraces  all  poffible  powers  of  taxation, 
and  gives  up  to  Congrefs  every  poffible  article  of  taxation 
that  can  ever  happen.  By  means  of  this,  there  will  be  no 
way  for  the  ftates  of  receiving  or  collecting  taxes  at  all, 
but  what  may  interfere  with  the  collections  of  Congrefs. 
Every  power  is  given  over  our  money,  to  thofe  over  whom 
we  have  no  immediate  controul.  I  would  give  them  pow-. 
ers  to  fupport  the  government,  but  would  not  agree  to  an- 
nihilate the  ftate  governments  in  an  article  which  is  raoft 
efiential  to  their  exiftence.  I  would  give  them  power  of 
laying  impofls;  and  I  would  give  them  power  to  lay  and 
collect  excifes.  I  confefs  that  this  is  a  kind  of  tax  fo  odi- 
ous to  a  free  people,  that  I  would  with  great  reluctance 
agree  to  its  exercife.  But  it  is  obvious,  that  unlefs  fuch 
excifes  were  admitted,  the  public  burthen  will  be  all  borne 
by  thofe  parts  of  the  community  which  do  not  manufacture 
for  themfelves.  So  manifeft  an  inequality  would  juftify  a, 
{esurrerjce  to  this  fpecies  of  taxe§, 

-     N  How 


(     9«     ) 

How  are  direct  taxes  to  be"  laid  ?  By  a  poll-tax,  autf& 
ments  on  land  or  other  property  ?  Inconvenience  and  op- 
prelfton  will  arife  from  any  of  them.  I  would  not  be  un- 
deritood  that  I  would  not  wifti  to  have  an  efficient  govern- 
ment for  the  United  States.  I  am  fcnfible  that  laws  ope- 
rating on  individuals,  cannot  be  carried  on  againft  ftates  ; 
becaufe  if  they  do  not  comply  with  the  general  laws  of  the 
union,  there  is  noway  to  compel  a. compliance  but  force. 
There  mull  be  an  army  to  compel  them.  Some  ftates  may 
have  fome  excufe  for  non-compliance.  Others  will  feign 
excufes.  Several  ftates  may  perhaps  be  in  the  fame  predi- 
cament. If  force  be  ufed  to  compel  them,  they  will  pro- 
bably call  for  foreign  aid,  and  the  very  means  of  defence  • 
will  operate  to  the  difTolution  of  the  fyftem,  and  to  the 
destruction  of  the  ftates.  I  would  not  therefore  deny  that 
Congrefs  ought  to  have  the  power  of  taking  out  of  the 
pockets  of  the  individuals  at  large,  if  the  ftates  fail  to  pay 
thofe  taxes  in  convenient  time.  If  requifitions  were  to  be 
made  on  the  feveral  ftates,  proportionate  to  their  abilities, 
the  feveral  ftate  Legifiatures,  knowing  the  circumftances 
of  their  conftituents,  and  that  they  would  ultimately  be 
compelled  to  pay,  would  lay  the  tax  in  a  convenient  man- 
ner, and  would  be  able  to  pay  their  quotas  at  the  end  of  the 
year.  They  are  better  acquainted  with  the  mode  in  which 
taxes  can  be  raifed,  than  the  general  government  can  pof- 
fibiy  be. 

It  may  happen,  for  inftance,  that  if  ready  money  can- 
not be  immediately  received  from  the  pockets  of  individu- 
als for  their  taxes,  their  eftates,  confiding  of  lands,  negroes, 
flock,  and  furniture,  muft  be  fet  up  and  fold  at  vendue. 
We  can  eafily  fee,  from  the  great  fcarcity  of  money  at 
this  day,  that  great  diftrefles  muft  happen.  There  is  no 
hard  money  in  the  country.  It  muft  come  from  fome  other 
parts  of  the  wSrld.  Such  property  would  fell  for  one 
tenth  part  of  its  value.  Such  a  mode  as  this  would,  in  a 
few  years,  deprive  the  people  of  their  eftates.  But  on  the 
contrary,  if  fuch  articles  as  are  proper  for  exportation,  were 
either  fpecifically  taken  for  their  taxes  immediately  by  the 
ftate  Legiflaturej  or  if  the  collection  fhould  be  deferred 
till  they  had  difpofed  of  fuch  articles,  no  oppreflion  or  in- 
convenience would  happen.  There  is  no  perfon  fo  poor 
fcut  who  can  raife  {omsxhwz  to  dtfpofe  of.    For  a  great 

"*     " "' ""      -~**         K«t 


(  pp  ) 

part  of  the  United  Suites,  thofe  articles  whicli  are  proper 
for  exportation  would  anfwer  the  purpofe.  I  would  have 
a  tax  laid  on  eftates  where  fitch  articles  could  not  be  had, 
and  fuch  a  tax  to  be  by'inftallments  for  two  or  more  years, 
I  would  admit  that  if  the  quotas  were  not  punctually 
paid  at  the  end  of  the  time,  that  Congrefs  might  collect 
taxes,  becaufe  this  power  is  abfolutely  neceifary  for  the 
fupport  of  the  general  government.  But  I  would  not  give 
It  in  the  firft  inftance,  for  nothing  would  be  more  oppref- 
five,  as  in  a  fhort  time  people  would  be  compelled  to  part 
with  their  property.  In  the  other  cafe  they  would  part 
with  none  but  in  fuch  a  manner  as  to  encourage  their  in- 
duftry.  On  the  other  hand  if  requifitions,  in  cafes  of  emer- 
gency, were  propofed  to  the  ftate  AfTemblies,  it  would  be 
a  meafure  of  convenience  to  the  people,  and  would  be  a 
means  of  keeping  up  the  importance  of  the  ftate  Legisla- 
tures, and  would  conciliate  their  affections;  and  their 
knowledge  of  the  ultimate  right  of  Congrefs  to  colled: 
taxes,  would  ftimulate  their  exertions  to  raife  money.  But 
if  the  power  of  taxation  be  given  in  the  firft  inftance^  to 
Congrefs,  the  itate  Legillatures  will  be  liable  to  be  coun- 
teracted by  the  general  government,  in  all  their  operations, 
Thefe  are  my  reafons  for  objecting  to  this  article, 

Governor  Johnjion — Mr.  Chairman,  This  claufe  is  ob» 
jedted  to,  and  it  is  propofed  to  alter  it  in  fuch  a  manner 
that  the  general  government  fhall  not  have  power  to  lay- 
taxes  in  the  firft  inftance,  but  fhall  apply  to,  the  Mates,  and 
in  cafe  of  refufal,  that  direCl  taxation  fhall  take  place.  That 
is  to  fay,  that  the  general  government  fhould  pafs  an  ac~fc  ta 
levy  money  on  the  United  States,  and  if  the  dates  did  not 
within  a  limited  time  pay  their  refpeclive  proportions,  the 
officers  of  the  United  States  fhould  proceed  to  levy  money 
on  the  inhabitants  of  the  different  flates.  This  queftion  has 
been  agitated  by  the  Conventions  of  different  ft ates,  and 
fome  very  refpeeTable  ftates  have  propofed  that  there  fhould 
be  an  amendment  in  the  manner  which  the  worthy  Mem- 
ber laft  up  has  propofed.  But,  Sir,  although  I  pay  very 
great  refpecl:  to  the  opinions  and  decifions  of  the  gentle- 
men who  compofed  thofe  Conventions,  and  although  they 
were  wife  in  many  inftances,  I  cannot  concur  with  them  in. 
this  particular.  It  appears  to  me  that  it  will  be  attended 
with  many  inconveniences^.    It  feems  to  me  probable,  that 

the 


(       100      ) 

(he  money  arifjng  from  duties  and  excifes,  will  be  in  gene- 
ral fufficient  to  anfwer  all  the  ordinary  purpofes  of  govern- 
ment ;  but  in  cafes  of  emergency  it  will  be  neceffary  to  lay 
direct  taxes.     In  cafes  of  emergency  it  will  be  neceffary 
that  thefe  taxes  fhould  be  a  refponfible  and  eftablifhed  fund 
to  fupport  the  credit  of  the  United  States  :  For  it  cannot 
be  fuppofed  that  from  the  ordinary  fources  of  revenue,  mo- 
ney can  be  brought  into  our  treafufy  in  fuch  a  manner  as 
to  anfwer  preffing  dangers  ;   nor  can  it  be  fuppofed  that  our 
(credit  will  enable  us  to  procure  any  loans,   if  our  govern- 
ment is  limited  in  the  means  of  procuring  money.     But  if 
the  government  have  it  in  their  power  to  lay  thofe  taxes,  it 
will  give  them  credit  to  borrow  money  on  that  fecurity, 
and  for  that  reafon  it  will  not  be  neceffary  to  lay  fo  heavy 
a  tax;  for  if  the  tax   is   fufficiently  productive  to  pay  the 
intereft,  money  may  always  be  had  in  confequence  of  that 
fecurity.     If  the  date  Legiflatures  mufi:  be  applied  to9  they 
mud  lay  a  tax   fufficient  for   the  full  fum  wanting.     This 
wi]l  be  much  more  oppreffive  than  a  tax  laid  by  Congrefs; 
for  I  prefume  that  no  ftate  Legiilature  will  have  as  much 
credit  individually,  as  the  United  States  conjointly  ;  there- 
fore viewing  it  in  this  light,  a  tax  laid  by  Congrefs  will  be 
much  eafier  than  a  tax  laid  by  the  ftates.     Another  incon- 
venience which  will  attend  this  propofed  amendment  is, 
that  thefe  emergencies  may  happen  a  confiderable  time  be- 
fore the  meeting  of  fome  ftate  Legiflatures,  and  previous 
to  their  meeting  the  fchemes  of  the  government  may  be  de- 
feated by  this  delay.     A  confiderable  time  will  elapfe  be- 
fore the  ftate  can  lay  the  tax,  and  a  confiderable  time  before 
it  be  collected,  and  perhaps  it  cannot  be  collected  at  all. — 
One  reafon  which  the  worthy  Member  has  offered  in  favour 
of  the  amendment  was,  that  the  general  Legiilature  can- 
not lay  a  tax  without  interfering  with  the  taxation  of  the 
ftate  Legiilature.     It  may  happen,  that  the  taxes  of  both 
may  be  laid  on  the  fame  article  ;  but  I  hope  and  believe  that 
the  taxes  to  be  laid  on  by  the  general  Legiilature,  will  be 
fo  very  light,  that  it  will  be  no  inconvenience  to  the  people 
to  pay  them  ;  and  if  you  attend  to  the  probable  amount  of 
the  impoft,  you  mufl  conclude  that  the  fmall  addition  to 
the  taxes  will  not  make  them  fo  high  as  they  are   at  this 
time.     Another  reafon  offered  by  the  worthy  Member  in 
fupport  of  the  amendment,  is,  that  the  ftate  Legiilature 

may 


(       "I       ) 

j&ay  direct  taxes  to  be  paid  in  fpecinc  articles.  We  had  full 
experience  of  this  in  the  late  war.  I  call  on  the  Houfe  t& 
fay,  whether  it  was  not  the  moft  oppreffive,  and  lead  pro- 
ductive tax  ever  known  in  the  ftate.  Many  articles  were 
loft,  and  many  could  not  be  difpofed  of  fo  as  to  be  of  any 
fervice  to  the  people.  Moft  articles  are  perifhable,  and 
cannot  therefore  anfwer.  Others  are  difficult  to  tranfport, 
expenfive  to  keep,  and  very  difficult  to  difpofe  of.  A  tar 
payable  in  tobacco  would  anfwer  very  well  in  fome  parts 
of  the  country,  and  perhaps  would  be  more  productive  than 
any  other  ;  yet  we  fee  that  great  loffes  have  been  fuftained 
)by  the  public  on  this  article.  A  tax  payable  in  any  kind  of 
grain  would  anfwer  very  little  purpofe — grain  being  perifh- 
able. A  tax  payable  in  pitch  and  tar  would  not  anlwer. 
A  mode  of  this  kind  would  not  be  at  all  eligible  in  this  Mate: 
The  great  lofs  on  the  fpecific  articles,  and  inconvenience  in 
difpofi.ng  of  them,  would  render- them  productive  of  very 
Jittle. 

He  fays,  that  this  would  be  a  means  of  keeping  up  the 
importance  of  the  (late  Legiflatures.  I  am  afraid  it  would 
have  a  different  effect:.  If  requifitions  mould  not  be  com- 
plied with  at  the  time  fixed,  the  officers  of  Congrefs  would 
then  immediately  proceed  to  make  their  collections.  We 
know  that  feveral  caufes  would  inevitably  produce  a  failure. 
The  dates  would  not,  or  could  not  comply.  In  that  cafe, 
the  ftate  Legiilature  would  be  difgraced*  After  having 
done  every  thing  for  the  fupport  of  their  credit  and  import- 
ance without  fuccefs,  would  they  not  be  degraded  in  the 
eyes  of  the  United  States  ?  Would  it  not  caufe  heart-burn- 
ings between  particular  ftates  and  the  United  States  ?  The 
inhabitants  would  oppofe  the  tax-gatherers.  They  would 
fay,  "  We  are  taxed  by  our  own  ftate  Legiilature  for  the 
proportionate  quota  of  our  ftate,  we  will  not  pay  you  alfo." 
This  would  produce  infurrections  and  confufion  in  the 
country.  Thefe  are  the  reafons  which  induce  me  to  fup- 
port this  claufe.  It  is  perhaps  particularly  favourable  to 
this  ftate.  We  are  not  an  importing  country — very  little 
is  here  raifed  by  impofts.  Other  ftates  who  have  adopted 
fche  Conftitution  import  for  us.  Maffachufetts>South-Caro- 
lina,  Maryland  and  Virginia,  are  great  importing  ftates. 
From  them  we  procure  foreign  goods,  and  by  that  means^ 
fhey  are  generally  benefitec},     For  it  is  agreed  upon  by  all 

writers,  > 


(      K»     ) 

Witers,  that  the  confumer  pays  the  impoft.  Do  we  net 
then  pay  a  tax  in  fupport  of  their  revenue  in  proportion  to 
our  confumption  of  foreign  articles  ?  Do  we  not  know  that 
this,  in  our  prefent  fituation,  is  without  any  benefit  to  us  ? 
Do  we  not  pay  a  fecond  duty  when  thefe  goods  are  import- 
ed into  this  ftate  ?  We  now  pay  double  duties.  It  is  not  to 
be  fuppofed  that  the  merchant  will  pay  the  duty  without 
wifhing  to  get  intereft  and  profit  on  the  money  he  lays  out. 
It  is  not  to  be  prefumed  that  he  will  not  add  to  the  price  a 
fum  fufficient  to  indemnify  himfelf  for  the  inconvenience 
of  parting  with  the  money  he  pays  as  a  duty.  We  there- 
fore now  pay  a  much  higher  price  for  European  manufac- 
tures than  the  people  do  in  the  great  importing  dates.  Is 
it  not  laying  heavy  burthens  on  the  people  of  this  country, 
not  only  to  compel  them  to  pay  duties  for  the  fupport  of 
the  importing  ftates,  but  to  pay  a  fecond  duty  on  the  im- 
portation into  this  ftate  by  our  own  merchants  ?  By  adop- 
tion we  fhall  participate  in  the  amounts  of  the  impofts. — 
Upon  the  whole,  I  hope  this  article  will  meet  with  the  ap- 
probation of  this  committee,  when  they  confider  the  ne- 
cefhty  of  fupporting  the  general  government,  and  the  ma- 
ny inconveniences,  and  probable  if  not  certain  inefficacy, 
of  requisitions. 

Mr.  Spencer — Mr.  Chairman,  I  cannot,  notwithftanding 
what  the  gentleman  has  advanced,  agree  to  this  claufe  un- 
conditionally. The  moft  certain  criterion  of  happinefs  that 
any  people  can  have,  is,  to  be  taxed  by  their  own  immedi- 
ate Representatives — By  thofe  Reprefentatives  who  inter- 
mix with  them,  and  know  their  circumftances — not  by 
thofe  who  cannot  know  their  fituation.  Our  federal  Re- 
prefentatives cannot  fufficiently  know  our  fituation  and 
circumftances.  The  worthy  gentleman  faid,  that  it  would 
be.  necefTary  for  the  general  government  to  have  the  power 
of  laying  taxes,  in  order  to  have  credit  to  borrow  money. 
But  I  cannot  think,  however  plaufible  it  may  appear,  that 
his  argument  is  conclufive.  If  fuch  emergency  happens 
as  will  render  it  necefTary  for  them  to  borrow  money,  it  will 
be  necefTary  for  them  to  borrow  before  they  proceed  to  lay 
the  tax.  I  conceive  the  government  will  have  credit  fuffi- 
cient to  borrow  money  in  the  one  cafe  as  well  as  the  other. 
If  requifitionsbe  pun&uality  complied  with,  no  doubt  they 
can  borrow,  and  if  not  punctually  complied  with,  Congrefs 
•can  ultimately  lay  the  tax.  I 


(    I03    ) 

I  wilh  to  have  the  mod  eafy  way  for  the  people  to  pa/ 
their  taxes.     The  itate  Legiflature  will  know  every  method 
and  expedient  by  which  the  people  can  pay,  and  they  will 
recur  to  the  moft   convenient.     This  will  be  agreeable  to 
the  people,  and  will  not  create  infurredtions  or  diflentiona 
in  the  country.     The  taxes  might  be  laid  on  the  moil  pro- 
ductive articles  :  I  wifh  not,  for  my  part,  to  lay  them  or* 
perishable  articles.     There  are  a  number  of  other  articles 
befides  thofe  which  the  worthy  gentleman   enumerated. 
There  are  befides  tobacco,  hemp,  indigo,  and  cotton.    la 
the  northern  dates,  where  they  have  manufactures,  a  con- 
trary fyftem  from   ours   would  be  necefTary.     There  the* 
principal  attention  is  paid  to  the  giving  their  children  trades. 
They  have   few  articles   for  exportation.     By  railing  the 
tax  in  this  manner,  it  will   introduce  fuch  a  fpirit  of  in- 
duftry  as  cannot  fail  of  producing  happy  confequences  to 
pofterity.     He  objects  to.  the  mode  of  paying  taxes  infpe- 
cific  articles  :    May  it  not  be  fuppofed  that  we  mail  gain 
fomething  by  experience,  and  avoid  thofe  fchemes  and  me- 
thods which  ihall  be  found  inconvenient  and  difadvantage- 
ous  ?    If  expences  mould  be  incurred  in  keeping  and  dif- 
pofing  of  fuch  articles,  could  not  thofe  expences  be  reim- 
burfed  by  a  judicious  fale  ?  Cannot  the  Legiflature  be  cir- 
cumfpe£t  as  to  the  choice  and  qualities  of  the  objects  to  be 
feledted  for  raifmg  the  taxes  due  to  the  continental   trea- 
fury  ?  The  worthy  gentleman   has  mentioned,  that  if  the 
people  fhould  not  comply  to  raife  the  taxes  in  this  wayB 
that  then  if  they  were  fubje£t  to  the  law  of  Congrcfs,  it 
would  throw  them  into  confufion*     I  would  afk  every  one 
here,  if  there  be  not  more  reafon  to  induce  us  to  believe 
that  they  would  be  thrown  into  confufion  in  cafe  the  power 
of  Congrefs  was  exercifed  by  Congrefs  in  the  firft  initance, 
than  in  the  other  cafe.    After  having  fo  long  a  time  to  raife- 
the  taxes,  it  appears  to  me  that  there  could  be  no  kind  o£ 
doubt  of  a  punctual  compliance.     The  right  of  Congrefs 
to  lay  taxes  ultimately,  in  cafe  of  non-compliance  with  re- 
quifitions,  would  operate  as  a  penalty,  and  would  ftimulate  ■ 
the  dates  to  difcharge  their  quotas   faithfully.     Between 
thefe  two  modes  there  is  animmenfe  difference.     The  one 
will   produce  the   happinefs,  eafe,  and  profperity  of  the 
people  j  the  other  will  deftroy  them,  and  produce  infur- 
p&ion. 


(  *ft  > 

-  Mr.  Spaig£t~—Mr.  Chairman,  It  was  thought  abfolutely 
necefTary  for  the  fupport  of  the  general  government,  to 
give  it  power  to  raife  taxes.  Government  cannot  exift 
without  certain  and  adequate  funds.  R.equifitions  cannot 
be  depended  upon.  For  my  part,  I  think  it  indifferent 
whether  I  pay  the  tax  to  the  officers  of  the  continent,  or  to 
thofe  of  the  ftate.  I  would  prefer  paying  to  the  conti- 
nental officers,  becaufe  it  will  be  lefs  expenfive. 

The  gentleman  laft  up,  has  objected  to  the  propriety  of 
the  tax  being  laid  by  Congrefs,  becaufe  they  could  not  know 
the  circumftances  of  the  people.  The  ftate  Legiflature 
will  have  no  fource  or  opportunity  of  information  which 
the  Members  of  the  general  government  may  not  have* 
They  can  avail  themfelves  of  the  experience  of  the  ftate 
Legiflatures.  The  gentleman  acknowledges  the  inefficacy 
of  requifitions,  and  yet  recommends  them.  He  has  allow- 
ed that  laws  cannot  operate  upon  political  bodies  without 
the  agency  of  force.  His  expedient  of  applying  to  the 
ftates  in  the  firft  inftance,  will  be  productive  of  delay,  and 
w*ll  certainly  terminate  in  a  disappointment  to  Congrefs- 
But  the  gentleman  has  faid  that  we  had  no  hard  money, 
and  that  the  taxes  might  be  paid  in  ipecific  articles.  It  is 
well  known  that  if  taxes  are  not  raifed  in  medium,  the  ftate 
lofes  by  it.  If  the  government  wifhes  to  raife  orte  thou- 
fa-nd  pounds,  they  mult  calculate  on  a  difappointment  by 
fpecific  articles,  and  will  therefore  impofe  taxes  more  in 
proportion  to  the  expected  difappointment.  An  individual 
can  fell  his  commodities  much  better  than  the  public  at 
large.  A  tax  payable  in  any  produce  would  be  lefs  pro- 
ductive, and  more  oppreffive  to  the  people,  as  it  would  en- 
hance the  public  burthens  by  its  inefficiency.  As  to  abufes 
by  the  continental  officers,  I  apprehend  the  ftate  officers 
will  more  probably  commit  abufes  than  they.  Their  con- 
duct will  be  more  narrowly  watched,  and  mifconducl:  more 
feverely  punifl  ed.  They  will  be  therefore  more  cautious. 
Mr.  Spencer,  in  anfwer  to  Mr.  Spaight,  obferved,  that 
in  cafe  of  war,  he  was  not  oppofed  to  this  article,  becaufe 
if  the  ftates  refufed  to  comply  with  requifitions,  there  was 
no  way  to  compel  them  but  military  coercion,  which  would 
induce  refractory  ftates  to  call  for  foreign  aid,  which  might 
terminate  in  a  difmemberment  of  the  empire.  But  he  faid 
that  he  would  not  give  the  power  of  4i?e&  taxation  ttf 

Congrefs 


(   *°s   ) 

Congrefs  in  the  firft  inftance,  as  he  thought  the  ftatcs 
would  lay  the  taxes  in  a  lefs  oppreflive  manner. 

Mr.  Whitmill  Hill— Mr.  Chairman,  The  fubjeft  now 
before  us  is  of  the  higheft  importance.  The  object  of  all 
government  is  the  protection,  fecurity,  and  happinefs  of 
the  people.  To  produce  this  end,  government  mud  be 
poflefled  of  the  neceflary  means. 

Every  government  muft  be  empowered  to  raife  a  fuf- 
flcient  revenue;  but  I  believe  it  will  be  allowed  on  all 
hands,  that  Congrefs  has  been  hitherto  altogether  deftitute 
of  that  power  fo  eiTential  to  every  government.  I  believe 
alfo  that  it  is  generally  wiflied  that  Congrefs  mould  be 
pcflefTed  of  power  to  raife  fuch  fums  as  are  requifite  for 
the  fupport  of  the  union,  though  gentlemen  may  differ 
with  regard  to  the  mode  of  railing  them. 

Our  paft  experience  (hews  us,  that  it  is  in  vain  to  expect 
any  poffible  efficacy  from  requisitions  Gentlemen  recom* 
mend  thefe  as  if  their  inutility  had  not  been  experienced. 
But  do  we  not  all  know  what  effecTs  they  have  produced  ? 
Is  it  not  to  them  that  we  muft  impute  the  lofs  of  our  cre- 
dit and  refpedt-abiiity  ?  It  is  neceflary,  therefore,  that  go- 
vernment have  recourfe  to  fome  other  mode  of  raifing  a 
revenue.  Had,  indeed,  every  ftate  complied  with  requi- 
fitions,  the  old  Confederation  would  not  have  been  com- 
plained of;  but  as  the  feveral  flates  have  already  discovered 
fuch  a  repugnancy  to  comply  with  federal  engagements, 
it  muft  appear  absolutely  neceflary  to  free  the  general  go- 
vernment from  fuch  a  ftate  of  dependence. 

The  debility  of  the  old  fyftem,  and  the  neceffity  of  fub- 
ftituting  another  in  its  room,  are  the  caufes  of  calling  this 
Convention. 

I  conceive,  Sir,  that  the  power  given  by  that  claufe,  is 
abfolutely  neceflary  to  the,exiftence  of  the  government* 
Gentlemen  fay  that  we  are  in  fuch  a  Situation  that  we  can- 
not pay  taxes.  This,  Sir,  is  not  a  fair  reprefentation  in 
my  opinion.  The  honefl:  people  of  this  country  acknow- 
ledge themfelves  fufficiently  able  and  willing  to  pay  them. 
Were  it  a  private  contract  they  would  find  means  to  pay 
them.  The  honeft  part  of  the  community  complain  of 
the  a£ts  of  the  Legislature.  They  complain  that  thesLe- 
giflature  makes  laws,  not  to  fuit  their  conftituents,  but 
them/elves.  The  Legislature,  Sir,  never  means  to  pay  a 
O  juft 


(     i<rf    ) 

jaH:  deKt,  as  their  conftituents  wifh  to  do.     Witnefs,  the 

Jaws    made  in  this  country. 1   will,  however,  be  bold 

enough  to  fay,  that  it  is  the  wifh  of  the  honeft  people,  to 
pay  thofe  taxes  which  are  neceflary  for  the  fupport  of  the 
government.  We  have  for  a  long  time  waited,  in  hope 
that  our  Legiflature  would  point  out  the  manner  of  fup-' 
porting  the  general  government,  and  relieving  us  from  our 
prefent  ineligible  fituation.  Every  body  was  convinced 
of  the  neceffity  of  this,  but  how  is  it  to  be  done  ?  The 
Legiflature  have  pointed  out  a  mode — their  old  favourite 
mode — they  have  made  paper  money — purchafed  tobacco 
at  an  extravagant  price,  and  fold  it  at  a  confiderable  lofs  — 
they  have  received  about  a  dollar  in  the  pound.  Have  we 
any  ground  to  hope  that  we  fhall  be  in  a  better  fituation  ? 

Shall  we  be  bettered  by  the  alternative  propofed  by 
gentlemen — by  levying  taxes  in  fpecific  articles  ?  How 
will  you  difpofe  of  them  ?  Where  is  the  merchant  to  buy 
them  ?  Your  bufinefs  will  be  put  into  the  hands  of  a 
Commiffioner,  who,  having  no  bufinefs  of  his  own,  grafps 
at  it  eagerly  ,  and  he  no  doubt  will  manage  it.  But  if  the 
payment  of  the  tax  be  left  to  the  people — if  individuals 
are  told  that  they  muft  pay  fuch  a  certain  proportion  of 
their  income  to  fupport  the  general  government,  then  each 
will  confider  it  as  a  debt— he  will  exert  his  ingenuity  and 
induftry  to  raife  it — He  will  ufe  no  agent,  but  depend  up- 
on himfelf.  By  thefe  means  the  money  will  certainly  be 
collected.  I  will  pledge  myfelf  for  its  certainty.  As  the 
Legiflature  has  never  heretofore  called  upon  the  people,  let 
the  general  government  apply  to  individuals — It  cannot 
depend  upon  ftates.  If  the  people  have  articles,  they  can 
receive  money  for  them.  Money  is  faid  to  be  fcarce — But, 
Sir,  it  is  the  want  of  induftry  which  is  the  fource  of  our 
indigence  and  difficulties.  If  people  would  be  but  a£Hve, 
and  exert  every  power,  they  might  certainly  pay,  and  be  in 
eafy  cir cum  fiances—  And  the  people  are  difpoied  to  do  fo 
— I  mean  the  good  part  of  the  community,  which,  I  truft, 
is  the  greater  part  of  it. 

Were  the  money  to  be  paid  into  our  treafury  firft,  inftead 
of  remitting  it  to  the  continental  treafury,  we  fhould  apply 
it  to  difchar^e  our  own  prefling  demands  •,  by  which  means, 
a  very  fmall  proportion  of  it  would  be  paid  to  Congrefs. 
^od  if  the  tax  were  to  be  laid  and  collected  by  the  feveral 

ftatef, 


(     ™7    ) 

'  ftates,  what  would  be  the  confequence  ?  Congrefs  mull 
depend  upon  twelve  funds  for  its  'fupport.  The  general 
government  mud  depend  on  the  contingency  of  fuccced- 
ing  in  twelve  different  applications, to  twelve  different  bo- 
dies !  What  a  (lender  and  precarious  dependence  would 
this  be  !  The  Hates,  when  called  upon  to  pay  thefe  de- 
mands of  Congrefs,  would  fail  :  They  would  pay  every 
other  demand  before  thofe  of  Congrefs.  They  ha,ve  hi- 
therto done  it.  Is  not  this  a  true  {lavement  of  fa£ts  I 
How  is  it  with  the  continental  treafury  ?  The  true  an- 
fwer  to  this  queftion  mud  hurt  every  friend  to  his  country. 
I  came  in  late  ;  but  I  believe  that  a  gentleman  [Governor 
Johndon]  faid,  that  if  the  dates  mould  refufe  to  pay  re- 
quifitions,  and  the  continental  officers  were  fent  to  collect, 
the  dates  would  be  degraded,  and  tn>  people  difcontented. 
I  believe  this  would  be  the  cafe.  The  dates,  by  acting 
dimonedly,  would  appear  in  the  mod  odious  light  •,  and 
the  people  would  be  irritated  at  fuch  an  application,  after 
a  rejection  by  their  own  Legiflaf  ure.  But  if  the  taxes  were 
to  be  raifed  of  individuals,  I  believe  they  could,  without 
any  difficulty,  be  paid  in  due  time. 

But,Sir,theUnitedStates  wifii  to  be  eftablifhed  and  known 
among  other  nations.  This  will  be  a  matter  of  great  util* 
ity  to  them.  We  might  then  form  advantageous,  connec- 
tions. When  it  is  once  known  among  foreign  nations, 
that  our  general  government  and  our  finances  are  upon  a 
refpe&able  footing,  fhould  emergencies  happen,  we  can 
borrow  money  of  them  without  any  difadvantage.  The 
lender  would  be  fure  of  being  reimbursed  in  time.  This 
matter  is  of  the  highed  confequence  to  the  United  States. 
Loans  mud  be  recurred  to  fometim.es.  In  cafe  of  war  they 
would  be  neceffary.  All  'nations  borrow  money  on  pref- 
fmg  occasions. 

The  gentleman  who  was  lad  up,,  mentioned  many  fpe- 
cific  articles  which  could  be  paid  by  the  people  in  difcharge 
of  their  taxes.  He  has,  I  think,  been  fully  anfwered. 
He  mud  fee  the  futility  of  fuch  a  mode.  When  our  wants 
would  be  greated,  thefe  articles  would  be  lead  pro*- 
du£Uve — I  mean  in  time  of  war.  But  we  dill  Jiave 
means — fuch  means  as  honed  and  affiduous  men  will  find. 
He  fays,  that  Congrefs  cannot  lay  the  tax  to  fuit  us.  He 
has  forgot  that  Congrefs  are  acquainted  with  us — go  from 

us — 


(     io8     ) 

tig— are  (ituated  like  ourfelves.  I  will  be  bold  to  fay,  that 
it  will  be  moil  their  own  intereft  to  behave  with  propriety 
and  moderation.  Their  own  intereft  will  prompt  them  to 
lay  taxes  moderately  ;  and  nothing  but  the  laft  neceflity 
will  urge  them  to  recur  to  that  expedient. 

This  is  a  moft  effential  claufe.  Without  money  govern- 
ment will  anfwer  no  purpofe.  Gentlemen  compare  this 
to  a  foreign  tax.  It  is  by  no  means  the  cafe.  It  is  laid 
by  ourfelves.  Our  own  Representatives  will  lay  it,  and 
•will,  no  doubt,  ufe  the  mcft  eafy  means  of  raifing  it  pofli- 
ble.  Why  not  truft  our  own  Reprefentatives  ?  We  might 
no  doubt  have  confidence  in  them  on  this  occafion,  as  well 
as  every  other.  If  the  continental  treafury  is  to  depend 
on  the  ftates  as  ufual,  it  will  be  always  poor.  But  gen- 
tlemen are  jealous,  and  unwilling  to  truft  government, 
though  they  are  their  own  Reprefentatives.  Their  max- 
im is,  truft  them  with  no  power.  This  holds  againft  all 
government.  Anarchy  will  enfue,  if  government  be  not 
trufted.  I  think  that  I  know  the  fentiments  of  the  honeft, 
induftrious  part  of  the  community,  as  well  as  any  gentle- 
man in  this  houfe.  They  wifh  to  difcharge  thefe  debts, 
and  are  able.  If  they  can  raife  the  intereft  of  the  public 
debt,  it  is  fuflicient.  They  will  not  be  called  upon  for 
more  than  the  intereft,  till  fuch  time  as  the  country  be 
rich  and  populous.  The  principal  can  then  be  paid  with 
eafe.     The  intereft  can  now  be  paid  with  great  facility. 

We  can  borrow  money  with  eafe,  and  on  advantageous 
terms,  when  it  (hall  be  known,  that  Congrefs  will  have 
that  power  which  all  governments  ought  to  have.  Con- 
grefs will  not  pay  their  debts  in  paper  money.  I  am  will- 
ing to  truft  this  article  to  Congrefs,  becaufe  I  have  :io  rea- 
fon  to  think  that  our  government  will  be  better  than  it  has 
been.  Perhaps  I  have  fpoken  too  liberally  of  the  Legisla- 
ture before  ;  but  I  do  not  expect  that  they  will  ever, 
•without  a  radical  change  of  men  and  meafures,  wifh  to  put 
the  general  government  on  a  better  footing.  It  is  not  the 
poor  man  who  oppofes  the  payment  of  thofe  juft  debts  to 
which  we  owe  our  independence  and  political  exiftence — 
but  the  rich  mifer.  Not  the  poor,  but  the  rich,  fhudder 
at  the  idea  of  taxes.  I  have  no  dread  that  Congrefs  will 
diftrefs  us  ;  nor  have  I  any  fear  that  the  tax  will  be  em- 
bezzled by  officers.  Induftry  and  economy  will  be  pro- 
moted, 


(  m  ) 

moted,  and  money  will  be  eafier  got  than  ever  it  has  been 
yet.  The  taxes  will  be  paid  by  the  people  when  called 
upon.  I  truft,  that  all  honeft,  induttrious  people  will 
think  with  me,  that  Congrefs  owght  to  be  poiTefled  of  the 
power  of  applying  immediately  to  the  people  for  its  fup- 
port,  without  the  interpofition  of  the  ftate  Legiflatures. 
I  have  no  confidence  in  the  Legiflature — The  people  do  not 
fuppofe  them  to  be  honeft  men. 

Mr.  Steele  was  decidedly  in  favour  of  the  claufe.  A 
government  without  revenue,  he  compared  to  a  poor,  for* 
lorn,  dependent  individual,  and  faid,  that  the  one  would 
be  as  helpiefs  and  contemptible  as  the  other.  He  wifhed 
the  government  of  the  union  to  be  on  a  refpe£iable  foot- 
ing. Congrefs,  he  faid,  (hewed  no  difpofition  to  tax  us; 
That  it  was  well  known,  that  a  poll-tax  of  eighteen  pence 
per  poll,  and  fix  pence  per  hundred  acres  of  land,  were 
appropriated  and  offered  by  the  Legiflature  to  Congrefs  : 
That  Congrefs  was  folicited  to  fend  the  officers  to  collect 
thofe  taxes,  but  they  refufed  :  That  if  this  power  was  not 
given  to  Congrefs,  the  people  mud:  be  oppreffed,  efpecial- 
lyin  time  of  war  :  That  during  the  I  a  ft  war.  provifions, 
horfes,  &c.  had  been  taken  from  the  people  by  force,  to 
fupply  the  wants  of  government :  That  a  refpedtable  go- 
vernment would  not  be  under  the  neceflity  of  recurring  to 
fuch  unwarrantable  means  :  That  fuch  a  method  was  un- 
equal and  oppreffive  to  the  laft  degree.  The  citizens, 
whofe  property  was  prefied  from  them,  paid  all  the  taxes 
— the  reft  efcaped.  The  prefs-m  afters  went  often  to  the 
pooreft,  and  not  to  the  richeft  citizens,  and  took  their 
horfes,  &c.  This  difabled  them  from  making  a  crop  next 
year.  ,  It  would  be  better,  he  faid,  to  lay  the  public  bur- 
thens equally  upon  the  people.  Without  this  power,  the 
other  powers  of  Congrefs  would  be  nugatory.  He  added, 
that  it  would,  in  his  opinion,  give  ftrength  and  refpecta- 
bility  to  the  United  States  in  time  of  war — would  promote 
induftry  and  frugality — and  would  enable  the  government 
to  protect  and  extend  commerce,  and  confequently  increafe 
the  riches  and  population  of  the  country. 

Mr.  Jofeph  M'Dowall— Mr.  Chairman,  This  is  a  pow- 
er I  will  never  agree  to  give  up  from  the  hands  of  the  peo- 
ple of  this  country.  We  know  that  the  amount  of  the 
impofts  will  be  trifling,  and  that  the  expences  of  this  go- 
vernment 


(     «o     ) 

vernment  will  be  very  great  *,  confequently  the  taxes  will 
be  very  high.  The  tax-gatherers  will  be  fent,  and  our  pro- 
perty will  be  wrefted  out  of  our  hands  The  Senate  is 
moil  dangeroufly  constructed.  Our  only  fecurity  is  the 
Houfe  or  Reprefentatives.  They  may  be  continued  at 
Congrefs  eight  or  ten  years.  At  fuch  a  diftance  from  their 
homes,  and  for  fo  long  a  lime,  they  will  have  no  feeling 
for,  nor  any  knowledge  of,  the  fituation  of  the  people.  If 
elected  from  the  fea-ports,  they  will  not  know  the  weftern 
part  of  the  country,  and  vice  verfa.  Two  co  operative 
powers  cannot  exilt  together.  One  mud  fumbit.  The  in- 
ferior muft  give  up  to  the  fuperior.  While  I  am  up,  I 
will  fay  lomething  to  what  has  been  foid  by  the  gentleman 
to  ridicule  the  General  AlTembly.  He  reprelents  the  Le- 
gislature in  a  very  approbious  light.  It  is  ,very  aftonifhing 
that  the  people  mould  choofe  men  of  fuch  characters  to 
reprefent  them.  If  the  people  be  virtuous,  why  fhould 
they  put  confidence  in  men  of  a  contrary  difpofition.  As 
to  paper  money,  it  was  the  refult  of  neceffity.  We  were 
involved  in  a  great  war.  What  money  had  been  in  the 
country,  was  fent  to  other  parts  of  the  world.  What 
would  have  been  the  confequence  if  paper  money  had  not 
been  made  ?  We  muft  have  been  undone.  Our  political 
cxiftence  muft  have  been  deftroyed.  The  extreme  fcarcity 
of  fpecie,  with  other  good  caufes,  'particularly  the  fe- 
licitation of  the  officers  to  receive  it  at  its  nominal  va- 
lue, for  their   pay,  produced    fubfequent    emiflions. 

HI  tells  us  that  all  the  people  wifh  this  power  to  be  giv- 
en—that the  mode  of  payment  need  Only  be  pointed  out, 
and  that  they  will  willingly  pay.  How  are  they  to  raife 
the  money  ?  Have  they  it  in  their  chefts  ?  Suppofe,  for 
inftance,  there  be  a  tax  of  two  (hilling  per  hundred  laid 
.on  land— where  is  the  money  to  pay  it  ?  We  have  it  not. 
I  am  acquainted  with  the  people.  I  know  their  fituation. 
They  have  no  money.  Requifitions  may  yet  be  complied 
with.  Induftry  and  frugality  may  enable  the  people  to  pay 
moderate  taxes,  if  laid  by  thofe  who  have  a  knowledge  of 
their  fituation,  and  a  feeling  for  them.  If  the  tax-gather- 
ers come  upon  us,  they  will,  like  the  locufts  of  old,  de- 
ft.ro v  us.  They  will  have  pretty  high  falaries,  and  will  ex- 
ert themfelves  to  opprefs  us.  When  we  confider  thefe 
.things,  we  fhould  be  cautious.     They  will  be  weighed,  I 

truft, 


(  "I  ) 

truft,  by  the  Houfe.  Nothing  faid  by  the  gentlemen  o% 
the  other  fide,  has  obviated  my  obje&ionf. 

Governor  JohnJIon — Mr.  Chairman,  The  gentleman  who 
was  lad  up,  ftill  infrfts  on  the  great  utility  which  would 
refult  from  that  mode  which  has  been  hitherto  found  in- 
effectual. It  is  amazing  that  pall:  experience  will  not  in- 
ftrudl:  him.  When  a  merchant  follows  a  fimilar  mode  — 
when  he  purchafes  dear  and  fells  cheap,  he  is  called  a 
fwindler,  and  muft  foon  become  a  bankrupt.  This  ftate 
deferves  that  moft  difgraceful  epithet.  We  are  fwindlers 
— we  gave  three  pounds  per  hundred  weight  for  tobacco, 
and  fold  it  at  three  dollars  per  hundred  weight,  after  hav- 
ing paid  very  confiderable  expences  for  tranfporting  and 
keeping  it.  The  United  States  are  bankrupts.  They  are 
confidered  fuch  in  every  part  of  the  world.  They  borrow 
money,  and  promife  to  pay — they  have  it  not  in  their  pow- 
er, and  they  are  obliged  to  afk  of  the  people  to  whom  they 
owe,  to  lend  them  money  to  pay  the  very  intereft.  This 
is  difgraceful  and  humiliating.  By  thefe  means  we  are 
paying  compound  intereft.  No  private  fortune,  however 
great — -no  (late,  however  affluent,  can  (land  this  moft  de- 
structive mode.  This  has  proceeded  from  the  inefficacy  of 
requifitions.  Shall  we  continue  the  fame  practice  ?  Shall 
we  not  rather  ftruggle  to  get  over  our  misfortunes ■?  »I  hope 
we  fhall. 

Another  Member  on  the  fame  fide,  fays,  that  it  is  im- 
proper to  take  the  power  of  "taxation  out  of  the  hands  of 
the  people.  I  deny  that  it  is  taken  out  of  their  hands  by 
this  fyftem.  Their  immediate  Reprefentatives  lay  thefe 
taxes.  Taxes  are  neceflary  for  every  government.  Can 
there  be  any  danger  when  thefe  taxes  are  laid  by  the  Re- 
prefentatives of  the  people  ?  If  there  be,  where  can  po- 
litical fafety  be  found  ?  But  it  is  faid  that  we  have  a  fmall 
proportion  of  that  reprefentation.  Our  proportion  is  equal 
to  the  proportion  of  money  we  fhall  have  to  pay.  It  is 
therefore  a  full  proportion,  and  unlefs  we  fuppofe  that  all 
the  Members  of  Congrefs  (hall  combine  to  ruin  their  con- 
flituents,  we  have  no  reafon  to  fear.  It  is  faid  (I  know 
not  from  what  principle)  that  our  Reprefentatives  will  be 
taken  from  the  fea-coaft,  and  will  not  know  in  what  man- 
ner to  lay  the  tax  to  fuit  the  citizens  of  the  weftern  part 
#f  the  country.  I  know  not  whence  that  idea  arofe.    The 

gentlemen 


(  **  ) 

gentlemen  from  the  weftward  are  not  precluded  from 
voting  for  Reprefentativee.  They  have  it  therefore  in  their 
power  to  fend  them  from  the  weftward,  or  the  middle 
parts  of  the  date.  They  are  more  numerous,  and  can 
fend  them  or  the  greater  part  of  them.  I  do  not  doubt  but 
they  will  fend  the  moft  proper,  and  men  in  whom  they 
can  put  confidence,  and  will  give  them,  from  time  to  time, 
inftruclions  to  enlighten  their  minds. 

Something  has  been  faid  with  regard  to  paper  money. 
I  think  very  little  can  be  faid  in  favour  of  it  *,  much  may 
be»faid,  very  juftly,  againft  it. 

Every  man  of  property — every  man  of  confiderable 
tranfa&ions — whether  a  merchant,  planter,  mechanic,  or 
of  any  other  condition,  muft  have  felt  the  baneful  influ- 
ence of  that  currency.  It  gave  us  relief  for  a  moment. 
It  affifted  us  in  the  profecution  of  a  bloody  war.  It  is  de- 
ftruttive  however,  in  general,  in  the  end.  It  was  ftruck 
in  the  laft  inftance,  for  the  purpofe  of  paying  the  officers 
and  foldiers."  The  motive  was  laudable.  I  then  thought, 
and  ftill  do,  that  thofe  gentlemen  might  have  had  more 
adv  -.ntage  by  not  receiving  that  kind  of  payment.  It  would 
have  been  better  for  them  and  for  the  country,  had  it  not 
been  emitted.  We  have  involved  ourfelves  in  a  debt  of 
f  .2o#,ooo.  We  have  not,  with  this  fura,  honeftly  and 
fairly  paid  /\  5  0,000.  Was  this  right  ?  But,  fay  they, 
there  was  no  circulating  medium.  This^want  wats  necef- 
fary  to  be  fupplied.  It  is  a  doubt  with  me  whether  the 
circulating  medium  be  increafed  by  an  emiffion  of  paper 
currency.  Before  the  emiffion  of  the  paper  money,  there 
was  a  great  deal  of  hard  money  among  us.  For  thirty 
years  paft  I  had  not  known  fo  much  fpecie  in  circulation 
as  we  had  at  the  emiffion  of  paper  money,  in  1783.  That 
medium  was  increafing  daily.  People  from  abroad  bring 
fpecie,  for,  thank  God,  our  country  produces  articles 
which  are  every  where  in  demand.  There  is  more  fpecie 
in  the  country  than  is  generally  imagined,  but  the  pro- 
prietors keep  it  locked  up.  No  man  will  part  with  his 
fpecie.  It  lies  in  his  cheft.  It  is  alked,  why  not  lend  it 
out  ?  The  anfwer  is  obvious  :  That  fhould  he  once  let  it 
get  out  of  his  power,  he  never  can  recover  the  whole  of 
it.  If  he  bring  fuit,  he  will  obtain  a  verdidt  for  one  half 
of  it.    This  is  the  reafon.  of  our  poverty.    The  fcarcity  of 

money 


(  Ut  ) 

*noriey  muft  be  in  fome  degree  owing  to  this,  and  the  fpe* 
cie  which  is  now  in  this  country,  might  as  well  be  in  any 
other  part  of  the  world.  If  our  trade  was  once  on  a  re- 
fpectable  footing,  we  ihouid  iind  means  of  paying  that 
enormous  debt. 

Another  obfervation  was  made,  which  has  not  yet  beer! 
anfwered,  viz.  that  the  demands  of  the  Unfted  States  will 
be  fmaller  than  thofe  of  the  dates,  for  this  reafen — th£ 
United  States  will  only  make  a  demand  of  the  intereft  o£ 
the  public  debts  *,  the  dates  muft  dena and  both  principal 
and  intereft  :  For  I  prefume  no  (late  can  on  an  emergency 
produce,  without  the  aid  of  individuals,  a  fum  fufficient 
for  that  purpofe  ;  but  the  United  States  can  borrow  ori 
the  credit  of  their  funefs,  arifing  from  their  power  of  lay- 
ing taxes,  fuch  funis  as  will  be  equal  to  the  emergency. 

There  will  be  always  credit  given  where  there  is  a  good 
fecurity.  No  man  who  is  not  a  mifer,  will  hefitate  to 
truft  where  there  is  a  refpeclable  fecurity  ;  but  credulity 
itfelf  would  not  truft  where  there  was  no  kind  of  fecurity, 
but  an  abfolute  certainty  of  lo.Gng.  Mankind  wi(h  to  make 
their  money  productive  ;  they  will  therefore  lend  it  where 
there  is  a  fecurity  and  certainty  of  recovering  it,  and  no' 
longer  keep  it  hoarded  in  ftrong  boxes. 

This  power  is  eflential  to  the  very  exifterice  of  the  go- 
vernment. Requisitions'  afe  fruitlefs  and  idle..  Every 
expedient  propofed  as  an  alternative,  or  to  qualify  this 
power,  is  replete  with  inconvenience.  It  appears  to  me 
therefore,  upon  the  whole,  that  this  article  ftands  much 
better  as  it  is,  than  in  any  other  manner. 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  I  do  not  prefume  td  rife 
to  difcufs  tills"  claufe,  after  the  very  able,  and,  in  my  opi- 
nion, unanswerable  arguments  which  have  been  urged  iri 
favour  of  it  j-  ,but  merely  to  correct  an  error  which  fell 
from  a  very  rcfpe£tab!e  Member  [Mr.  M'Dowall]  on  the 
other  fide.  It  was,  that  Congrefs,  by  interfering  with* 
the  mode  of  elections,  might  continue  themfelves  in  of- 
fice. I  thought  that  this  was  fufficientty  explained  yefter- 
<day.  There  is  nothing  in  the  Conftitution  to  empower 
Congrefs  to  continue  themielves  longer  than  the  time  fpe- 
cified.  It  fays  exprefsly,  that  the  Houfe  of  Reprefenta- 
tives  (hall  confift  of  Members  chofen  for  two  years,  and 
t&at  the  Senate  fliall  be  compofed  of  Senators  chofen  for 


(     *M     ) 

ix  years.  At  the  expiration  of  thefe  terms,  the  right  of 
election  reverts  to  the  people  and  the  dates.  Nor  is  there 
any  thing  in  the  Conftitution  to  warrant  a  contrary  fup- 
pofition.  The  claufe  alluded  to,  has  no  reference  to  the 
duration  of  Members  in  Congrefs,  but  merely  as  to  the 
time  and  manner  of  their  election.  ^ 

Now  that  Tarn  up,  Sir,  I  beg  leave  to  take  notice  of  a 
fuggeition,  that  Congrefs   couid  as  eafily  borrow    money 
when  they  had  the  ultimate  power  of  laying  taxes,  as  if 
they  poffeffed  it  in  the  firft  inftance.    I  entirely  differ  from 
that  opinion.     Had  Congrefs  the  immediate  power,  there 
would  be  no  doubt  the  money  would  be  raifed.     In  the 
other  mode,  doubts   might  be  entertained   concerning  it. 
For  can  any  man  fuppofe,  that  if  for  any  reafons,  the  ftate 
Legiflatures  did  not  think  proper  to  pay  their  quotas,  and 
Congrefs  fliould  be  compelled  to   lay  taxes*  that  it  would 
not  raife  alarms  in  the  ftate  ?   Is  it  not  reafonable  to  think 
that  the  people  would  be  more  apt  to  fide  with  their  ftate 
Legislature,  who,  indulged  them,  than  with  Congrefs,  who 
impofed  taxes  upon  them  ?    They  would  fay,    "  Had  we 
"  been    able  to    pay,  our   ftate  Legiflature  would    have 
*c  raifed  the  money.  They  know  and  feel  for  our  diftreffes, 
*c  but  Congrefs  have  no  regard  for  our  fituation,  and  have 
**  impofed  taxes  on  us  we  are  unable  to  bear"     This  is, 
Sir,   what  would   probably  happen.     Language  like   this, 
would  be  the  high  road  to  popularity  :  In  all  countries,  and 
particularly  in  free  ones,  there  are  many  ready  to  catch  at 
fuch  opportunities  of  making    themfelves  of  confequence 
with  the  people.     General  difqontent  would  probably  en- 
fue,  and  a  ferious  quarrel  take  place  between  the  general 
and  the  ftate  governments.     Foreigners,  who  would  view 
our  fituation  narrowly  before  they  lent  their  money,  would 
certainly  be  lefs  willing  to  rifk  it  on  fuch  contingencies  as 
thefe,  than  if  they  knew  there  was  a  direct,  fund  for  their 
payment,  from  which  no  ill  confequences  could  be  appre- 
hended.  The  difference  between  a  people  who  are  able  to 
borrow,  and  thofe  who  are  not,  is  extremely  great.'    Upon 
acritical  emergency,  it  may  be  impoffible  to  raife  the  full 
fum  wanted  immediately  upon  the  people  :    In  this  cafe, 
if  the  public  credit  is  good,  they  may  borrow  a  certain 
fum,  and  raife  for  the  prefent  only  enough  to  pay  the  in- 
^ereft,  deferring  the  payment  of  the  principal  till  the  pub- 
lic 


(     «'S    ) 

lie  is  more  able  to  bear  it.  In  the  other  cafe,  where  rm 
money  can  be  borrowed,  there  is  no  resource  if  the  whole 
fum  cannot  be  raifed  immediately.  The  d:rTcrence  may 
perhaps  be  ftated  as  twenty  to  one.  An  hundred  thoufand 
pounds  therefore  may  be  wanted  in  the  one  cafe  :  Five 
thoufand  pounds  may  be  fufficient  for  the  prcfent,  in  the 
other.  Surely  this  is  a  difference  of  thd  utmoft  moment. 
I  mould  not  have  rifen  at  all,  were  it  not  for  the  itrong 
impreffion  which  might  have  been  made  by  the  error  com- 
mitted by  the  worthy  gentleman  on  the  other  fide.  I 
hope  I  (hall  be  excufed  for  the  time  I  have  taken  up  with 
the  additional  matter,  though  it  was  only  Hating  what 
had  been  urged  with  great  propriety  before. 

Mr.  Goudy — Mr.  Chairman,  This  is  a  difpute  whether 
Congrefs  fhall  have  great  enormous  powers.  I  am  not 
able  to  follow  thefe  learned  gentlemen  through  all  the  la- 
byrinths of  their  oratory.  Some  reprefent  us  as  rich  and 
not  honed;  and  others  again  reprefent  us  as  honeft  and 
not  rich.  We  have  no  gold  or  fiiver,  no  fuhflantiai  mo- 
ney to  pay  taxes  with.  This  claufe,  with  the  claufe  of 
elections,  will  totally  deilroy  our  liberties.  The  fubjecT 
of  our  consideration  therefore  is,  whether  it  be  proper  to 
give  any  man  or  itt  of  men,  an  unlimited  power  over  our 
purfe,  without  any  kind  of  controul.  The  purfe  firings  are 
given  up  bv  this  claufe.  The  fword  is  alio  given  up  by 
this  fyftem.  Is  there  no  danger  in  giving  up  both  ?  There 
is  no  danger  we  are  told.  It  may  be  fo,  but  I  am  jealous 
and  fufpicious  of  the  liberties  of  mankind  :  And  if  it  be 
a  character  which  no  man  wifhes  but  myfelf,  I  am  willing 
to  take  it.  Sufpicions  in  fmall  communities,  are  a  pelt  to 
mankind  •>  but  in  a  matter  of  this  magnitude,  which  con- 
cerns the  intereil  of  millions  yet  unborn,  fufpicion  is  a. 
very  noble  virtue.  Let  us  fee,  therefore,  how  far  we  give 
power,  for  when  It  is  once  given,  we  cannot  take  it  away. 
It  is  faid  that  thofe  who  formed  this  Conftitution,  wera 
great  and  good  men.  "We  do  not  difpute  it.  We  alfo  ad- 
mit that  great  and  learned  people  have  adopted  it.  But 
I  have  a  judgment  of  my  own,  and  though  not  fo  well  in- 
formed always  as  others,  yet  I  will  exert  it  when  manifeft 
danger  prefents  itfelf.  When  the  power  of  the  purfe  and 
the  fword  are  given  up,  we  dare  not  think  for  ourfelves. 
la  cafe  of  war,  the  lait  man  and  the  laft  penny  would  be 

extorted 


(    Mi    ) 

lexlorted  from  us.  That  the  Conftitution  has  a  tendency 
to  tleftroy  the  itate  governments,  muft  be  clear  to  every 
man  of  common  underftanding.  Gentlemen,  by  their 
learned  arguments,  endeavour  to  conceal  the  danger  from 
us.  I  have  no  notion  of  this  method  of  evading  argu- 
ments, and  of  clouding  them  over  with  rhetoric,  arid  I 
mud  fay,  fophiitry  too.  $ut  I  hope  no  man  will  be  led 
aftray  with  them. 

Governor  Johnjlon  obferved,  that  if  any  fophiftieal  ar- 
guments had  been  made  ufe  of,  they  ought  to  be  pointed 
but  •,  and  no  body  could  doubt  that  it  was  in  the  power  of 
ta  learned  divine  [alluding  to  Mr.  Caldwell]  to  (hew  their 
fophiftry. 

Governor  Johnjlon  being  informed  of  his  miftake  in 
taking  Mr.  Gaudy  for  Mr.  Caldwell,  apologized  for  it. 

Mr.  Porter — Mr.  Chairman,  I  mull  fay  that  I  think  the 
gentleman  laft  up  was  wrong,  for  the  ether  gentleman 
was,  in  my  opinion,  right.  This  is  a  money  claufe.  \ 
would  fain  know  whence  this  power  originates.  I  have 
heard  it  faid  that  the  Legiilature  were  villains,  and  that 
this  power  was  to  be  exercifed  by  the  Reprefentatives  of 
the  people.  When  a  building  is  raifed,  it  fhuuld  be  on 
folid  ground — Every  gentleman  muft  agree  that  we  fhould 
not  build  a  fu  per  ft  rupture  on  a  foundation  of  villains. 
Gentlemen  fay  that  the  mafs  of  the  people  are  honeft — 
I  hope  gentlemen  will  confider  that  we  fhould  build  the 
jftru&ure  on  the  people,  and  not  on  the  Reprefentatives 
of  the  people.  Agreeably  to  the  gentleman's  argument 
[Mr.  Hill]  our  Reprefentatives  will  be  mere  villains.  I 
ex  peel:  that  very  learned  arguments,  and  powerful  oratory 
will  be  difplayed  on  this  occasion.  I  expecl:  that  the  great 
cannon  from  Halifax  [meaning  Mr.  Davie]  will  difcharge 
iire  balls  among  us,  but  large  batteries  are  often  taken  by 
fmall  arms. 

Mr.  Blood-worth  wiflied  that  gentlemen  would  defift 
from  making  perfonal  reflections.  He  was  of  opinion  that 
it  was  wrong  to  do  fo,  and  incompatible  with  their  duty 
to  their  conftftuents.  That  every  man  had  a  right  to  dis- 
play his  abilities,  and  he  hoped  they  would  no  longer  re- 
ilecl:  upon  one  another. 

From  the  fecond  to  the  eight  claufe  read  without  any 
obfervation. 


(     "7    ) 

Mi  nth  claufe  read. 

Several  Members  wifhed  to  hear  an  explanation  of  this 
<claufe.  Mr.  Madeline  looked  upon  this  claufe  as  a  very 
valuable  part  of  the  Constitution,  becaufe  it  confulted  the 
eafe  and  convenience  of  the  people  at  large  :  For  that  if 
the  Supreme  Court  were  at  one  fixed  place,  and  no  otl  jr 
tribunals  eilavhihed,  nothing  could  poihbly  be  more  inju- 
rious. That  h  was  therefore  neceflary  that  Congrefs  ftiouidl 
have  power  to  couftitute  tribunals  in  different  dates,  for 
t}ie  trial  of  common  ca-ufes,  and  to  have  appeals  to  the 
Supreme  Court  in  matters  oi  more  magnitude  :  That  that 
was  his  idea,  but  if  not  fatisfattory,  he  truited  other  gen- 
tlemen would  explain  it.  That  it  would  be  more  explain- 
ed when  they  came  to  the  Judiciary. 

The  tentir  and  eleventh  claufes  read  without  any  ob- 
servation. 

Twelfth  claufe  read. 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  This  claufe  is  of  fo  much 
importance,  that  we  ought  to  confider  it  with  the  molt 
ferious  attention.  It  is  a  power  veiled  in  Congrefs,  which, 
in  my  opinion,  is  abfolutely  indifpeniable  ;  yet  there  have 
been,  perhaps,  more  objections  made  to  it,  than  any  other 
power  veiled  in  Congrefs.  For  my  part,  I  will  obferve  ge- 
nerally, that  fo  iar  from  being  difpleafed  with  that  jealoufy 
$nd  extreme  caution  with  which  gentlemen  confider  every 
power  propofed  to  be  given  to  this  government,  they  give 
me  the  utmoft  fatisfadion.  I  believe  the  pafhon  for  li- 
berty is  ilronger  in  America  than  in  any  other  country  in 
the  world:  Here  every  man  is  ftrongly  imprefied  with  its 
importance,  and  every  breaft  glows  for  the  prefervation  of 
it.  Every  jealoufy,  not  incompatible  with  the  indifoenfa- 
ble  principles  of  government,  is  undoubtedly  to  be  com- 
mended :  But  thefe  principles  muil,  at  all  events,  be  ob- 
ferved.  The  powers  of  government  ought  to  be  compe- 
tent to  the  public  fafety.  This,  indeed,  is  the  primary 
objeft  of  all  governments.  It  is  the  duty  of  gentlemen  who 
form  a  Conftitution,  to  take  care  that  no  power  fhould  be 
wanting  which  the  fafety  of  the  community  requires. 
The  exigencies  of  the  country  muil  be  provided  for,  not 
only  in  refpe£l  to  common  and  ufual  cafes,  but  for  occa- 
sions which  do  not  frequently  occur.  If  fuch  a  proviiiott 
|s  not  made,  critical  occafioas  may  arifc,  when  there  m.uft 

be 


(     »«     ) 

be  cither  an  ufurpation  of  power,  or  the  public  fafety  emi- 
nently endangered  ;  for  befides  the  evils  attending  the 
frequent  change  of  a  Conftitution,  the  cafe  may  not  ad- 
mit of  fo  flow  a  remedy.  In  confidering  the  powers  that 
ought  to  be  veiled  in  any  government,  poffibie  abufes  ought 
not  to  be  pointed  out,  without  at  the  fame  time  confider- 
ing their  ufe.  No  power  of  any  kind  or  degree  can  be 
given,  but  what  may  be  abufed  :  We  have  therefore  only 
to  confider,  whether  any  particular  power  is  abfolutely  ne- 
cefTary.  If  it  be^  the  power  muft  be  given  and  we  mult  run 
the  rifk  of  theabufe,  confidering  our  nfkof  this  evil,  as  one 
of  the  conditions  of  the  imperfecl:  ftate  of  human  nature, 
where  there  is  no  good  without  the  mixture  of  lb  me  evil. 
At  the  fame  time  it  is  undoubtedly  our  duty  to  guard  a- 
gainft  abufes  as  much  as  poiftble.  In  America,  we  enjoy 
peculiar  blelTmgs :  The  people  are  diftinguxfhed  by  the 
poffeflion  of  freedom  in  a  very  high  degree,  unmixed  with 
fchofe  oppreflions  the  freeft  countries  in  Europe  fuffer.  But 
we  ought  to  confider  that  in  this  country  as  well  as  others, 
it  is  equally  neceffary  to  reftrain  and  fupprefs  internal  com- 
motions, and  to  guard  againll  foreign  hoftility.  There  is 
1  believe,  no  government  in  the  world  without  a  power 
to  raife  armies.  In  fome  countries  in  Europe,  a  great  force 
is  neceffary  to  be  kept  up  to  guard  againft  thofe  numerous 
armies  maintained  by  many  fovereigns  there  ;  where  an 
army  belonging  to  one  government  alone,  fometimes  a- 
jnounts  to  two  hundred  thoufand  or  four  hundred  thou- 
sand men.  Happily  we  are  fi mated  at  a  great  diltance 
from  them,  and  the  inco&fiderable  power  to  the  north  of 
*if  is  not  likely  foon  to  be  very  formidable.  But  though 
our  fituation  places  us  at  a  remote  danger,  it  cannot  be 
pretended  we  are  in  no  danger  at  all.  I  believe  there  is  no 
man  who  has  written  on  this  fubje£t,  but  has  admitted 
that  this  power  of  railing  armies  is  neceffary  in  time  of 
war;  but  they  do  not  choofe  to  admit  of  it  in  a  time  of 
peace.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  in  time  of  peace,  there 
will  not  be  bccafion  at  any  time,  but  for  a  very  fmall  num- 
ber of  forces  ;  poflibly  a  few  garrifons  may  be  neceffary  to 
guard  the  frontiers,  and  an  infurrection  like  that  lately  in 
Maffachufetts,  might  require  fome  troops.  But  a  time  of 
war  is  the  time  when  the  power  would  probably  be  exerted 
to  any  extent.  Let  us,  however,  coniider  the  confequences 

oi 


#f  a  limitation  of  this  power  to  a  time  of  war  only.  One 
moment's  confideration  will  thew  the  impolicy  of  it  in  the 
moit  glaring  manner  We  certainly  ought  to  guard  againft 
the  machinations  of  other  countries.  We  know  not  what 
defigns  may  be  entertained  againft  us  ;  but  furely  when 
known,  we  ought  to  endeavour  to  counteract  their  effecls; 
fuch  defigns  may  be  entertained  in  a  time  of  profound  peace 
as  well  as  after  a  declaration  of  war.  Now  fuppofe,  for 
inftance,  our  government  had  received  certain  intelligence 
that  the  Britiih  government  had  formed  a  fcheme  to  at- 
tack New- York  next  April,  with  ten  thoufand  men; 
would  it  not  be  proper  immediately  to  prepare  againft  ir  ? 
and  by  fo  doing  the  fcheme  might  be  defeated.  But  if 
Congrefs  had  no  fuch  power,  becaufe  it  was  a  time  of 
peace,  the  place  muft  fall  the  inftant  it  was  attacked,  and 
it  might  take  yean  to  recover  what  might  at  firft  have  been 
feafonably  defended.  This  reftriftion,  therefore,  cannot 
take  place  with  fafety  to  the  community,  and  the  power 
muft  of  courfe  be  left  to  the  direction  of  the  general  go- 
vernment. I  hope  there  will  be  little  neceffity  for  the  ex- 
ercife  of  this  power ;  and  I  truft  that  the  univerfal  re- 
fentment  and  refinance  of  the  people  will  meet  every  at- 
tempt to  abufe  this  or  any  other  power.  That  high  fpirit 
for  which  they  are  diftinguifhed,  I  hope  will  ever  exift,  and 
it  probably  will  as  long  as  we  have  a  republican  form  of 
government.  Every  man  feels  a  confeioufnefs  of  perfonal 
equality  and  independence  :  Let  him  look  at  any  part  of 
the  continent,  he  can  fee  no  fuperiors*  This  perfonal  in- 
dependence is  the  fureft  fafe-guard  of  the  public  freedom. 
But  is  it  probable  that  our  own  Reprefentatives,  chofen 
for  a  limited  time,  can  be  capable  of  deftroying  them- 
felves,  their  families,  and  fortunes,  even  if  they  have  no  re- 
gard to  their  public  duty  ?  When  fuch  confiderations  are 
involved,  furely  it  is  very  unlikely  that  they  will  attempt 
to  raife  an  army  againft  the  liberties  of  their  country. 
Were  we  to  eftablifh  an  hereditary  nobility,  or  a  (et  of 
men  who  were  to  have  exclufive  privileges,  then  indeed 
our  jealoufy  might  be  well  grounded.  But  fortunately 
we  have  no  fuch.  The  reftriclion  contended  for,  of  no 
Handing  army  in  time  of  peace,  forms  a  part  of  our  own 
ilate  Conftitution.  What  has  been  the  confequence  ?  In 
.Pecembcr,  1786,  the  AtTembly  flagrantly  violated  it,  by 

jaifing 


(       **>      ) 

raifing  two  hundred  and  one  men  for  two  years,  for  the 
defence  of  Davidfon  county.  I  do  not  deny  that  the  in- 
tention might  have  been  good,  and  that  the  Affembly  really 
thought  the  fituation  of  that  part  of  the  couritrj  required 
fuch  a  defence.  But  this  makes  the  argument  ftill  itroiv^er 
agamit  the  impolicy  of  fuch  a  reftri6tion,  fmce  our  own 
experience  points  out  the  danger  rtfulting  from  it:  For  I 
take  it  for  granted,  that  we  could  not  at  that  time  be  faid 
to  be  in  a  ftate  of  war.  Dreadful  might  the  condition  or* 
this  country  be,  without  this  power.  We  muft  truft  our 
friends  or  truft  our  enemies.  There  is  one  reftritTtion  on 
this  power,  which  I  believe  is  the  only  one  that  ou^ht  to 
be  put  upon  it.  Though  Congrefs  are  to4iave  the  power 
of  raifing  and  fupporting  armies,  yet  they  cannot  appro* 
priate  money  for  that  purpofe>for  a  longer  time  than  two 
years.  Now  we  will  fuppofe  that  the  majority  of  the  two 
Houfes  fhouid  be  capable  of  making  a  bad  ufe  of  this  pow- 
er, and  fhouid  appropriate  more  money  to  ra-ife  an  army 
than  is  n-'-cefTary.  The  appropriation  we  have  teen  cannot 
be  conftitutional  for  more  than  two  years  :  Within  that 
time  it  might  command  obedience.  But  at  the  end  of  the 
iecond  year  from  the  firft  choice,  the  whole  Houfe  of  Re- 
presentatives muft  be  re-chefen,  and  alfo  one-third  of  the 
Senate.  .  The  people  being  inflamed  with  the  abufe  of 
power  of  the  old  Members,  would  turn  them  out  with 
indignation.  Upon  their  return  home  they  would  meet 
the  univerfal  execrations  of  their  fellow-  citizens — Inftead 
of  the  grateful  plaudits  of  their  county,  fo  dear  to  every 
feeling  mind,  they  would  be  treated  with  the  utmoft  re- 
fentment  and  contempt: — Their  names  would  be  held  in 
everlafting  infamy ;  and  their  meafures  would  be  inftantly 
reprobated  and  changed  by  the  new  Members.  In  two 
years,  a  fyftem  of  tyranny  certainly  could  not  fucceed  in 
the  face  of  the  whole  people  ;  and  the  appropriation  could 
not  be  with  any  fafety  for  lefs  than  that  period.  If  it  de-* 
pended  on  an  annual  vote,  the  confequence  might  be,  that 
at  a  critical  period, when  military  operations  were  neceflary, 
the  troops  would  not  know  whether  they  were  entitled  to 
pay  or  not,  and  could  not  fafely  aft  till  they  knew  that  the 
annual  vote  had  pafTed.  To  refufe  this  power  to  the  go- 
vernment, would  be  to  invite  infults  and  attacks  from  other 
nations.   Let  us  not,  for  God's  fake,  be  guilty  of  fuch  in* 

%  difcretio$f 


(  til  ) 

iifcretlon  as  to  truft  to  our  enemies  mefcy,  but  give*,  as  l§ 
our  duty,  a  fufficient  power  to  government  fo  protect  their 
country,  guarding  at  the  fame  time  againft  abuies  as  well  f 
as  we  can.  We  well  know  what  tin's  country  fuffcred  by 
the  ravages  of  the  Britifti  army  daring  the  war.  How 
could  we  have  been  faved  but  by  an  army  ?  Without  that 
refource  we  mould  foon  have  felt  the  miserable  confequen- 
ces  j  and  this  day,  in  Head  of  having  the  honour,  the  great- 
eft  any  people  ever  enjoyed,  to  chocfe  a  government  which 
our  reafon  recommends,  we  mould  have  been  groaning 
under  the  moll  intolerable  tyranny  that  was  ever  felt.  We 
ou^ht  not  to  think  thefe  dangers  are  entirely  over.  The 
Britifli  government  is  not  friendly  to  us  :  They  dread  the 
rifing  glory  of  America:  Ther  tremble  for  the  Weft-In- 
dies, and  their  colonies  to  the  north  of  us :  They  have 
counteracted  us  on  every  occafion  fince  the  peace.  Inftead 
of  a  liberal  and  reciprocal  commerce,  they  have  attempt- 
ed to  confine  us  to  a  moft  narrow  and  ignominious  one* 
Thsir  pride  is  ftill  irritated  with  the  difappointment  o£ 
their  endeavours  to  enflave  us.  They  know  that  on  the 
record  of  hiftory  their  conduct  towards  us  muft  appear  in 
the  moft  dif^racefu:  light.  Let  it  alfo  appear  on  the  record 
of  hiftory,  that  America  was  equally  wife  and  fortunate  ia 
peace  as  well  as  in  war.  Let  it  be  faid,  that  with  a  tem- 
per and  unanimity  unexampled,  tiiey  corrected  the  vices? 
of  an  imperfect  government,  and  framed  a  new  one  ort 
the  baiis  of  juftice  and  liberty  :  That  though  all  did  not 
concur  in  approving  the  particular  ftru£lure  of  this  govern- 
ment, yet  that  the  minority  peaceably  and  refpecHully  fufo- 
mitted  to  the  decifion  of  the  greater  number.  This  is  $ 
fpe£lacle  fo  great,  that  if  it  mould  fucceed,  this  muft  b« 
confidered  the  greateft  country  under  Heaven ;  for  ther© 
is  no  inftance  of  any  fuch  deliberate  change  of  govern- 
ment in  any  other  nation  that  ever  exilted.  But  howf 
would  it  gratify  the  pride  of  our  enemy  to  fay :  «  Ws 
u  could  not  conquer  you,  but  you  have  ruined  yourfelves. 
"  You  have  fooliftily  quarrelled  about  trifles.  You  are  un- 
*.?  fit  for  any  government  whatever.  You  have  feparated 
"from  us,  when  you  were  unable  to  govern  yourfelves* 
*<  and  you  now  defervedly  feel  all  the  horrors  of  anarchy.** 
I  beg  pardon  for  faying  fo  much.  I  did  not  intend  it  when 
I  began,  But  the  consideration  of  one  of  the  moft  im- 
Q^  gpjrunt 


(  m  ) 

jiortant  parts  of  the  plan  excited  all  my  feelings  on  the  fuD* 
jeel:.  I  fpeak  without  any  affectation  in  exprefling  my  ap- 
prehension of  foreign  dangers — the  belief  of  them  is 
ftrongly  imprefied  on  my  mind.  I  hope  therefore  the  gen- 
tlemen of  the  committee  will  excufe  the  warmth  with 
which  I  have  fpoken.  I  mall  now  take  leave  of  the  fub- 
jeel;.  I  flatter  myfelf  that  gentlemen  will  fee  that  this  pow- 
er is  absolutely  neceflary,  and  muft  be  veiled  fomewhere  5 
that  it  can  be  veiled  no  where  fo  well  as  in  the  general  go- 
vernment, and  that  it  is  guarded  by  the  only  reftri&ioa 
which  the  nature  of  the  thing  will  admit  of. 

Mr.  Hardiman  defired  to  know,  if  the  people  were  at- 
tacked or  harrafled  in  any  part  of  the  (late,  if  on  the  fron- 
tiers for  inftance,  whether  they  muft  not  apply  to  the  ftate 
Legislature  for  affiftance  ? 

Mr.  Iredell  replied,  that  he  admitted  that  applicatioa 
might  be  immediately  made  to  the  ftate  Legiflature,  but 
that  by  the  plan  under  confideration,  the  ftrength  of  the 
union  was  to  be  exerted  to  repel  invafions  of  foreign  ene- 
mies and  fupprefs  domeftic  infurre&ions  ;  and  that  the  pof- 
fibility  of  an  inftantaneous  and  unexpected  attack  in  time 
of  profound  peace,  iUuftrated  the  danger  of  reftricting  the 
power  of  raifing  and  fupporting  armies. 
The  reft  of  the  eighth  Section  read  without  any  obfervation, 
Firft  claufe  of  the  ninth  Section  read. 

Mr.  J.  M^Dowall  wiihed  to  hear  the  reafons  of  this  re- 
striction. 

Mr.  Spaight  anfwered,  that  there  was  a  conteft  between 
the  northern  and  fouthern  ftates  :  That  the  fouthern  ftates, 
whofe  principal  fupport  depended  on  the  labour  of  Slaves, 
would  not  confent  to  the  defire  of  the  northern  ftates  to 
exclude  the  importation  of  Slaves  absolutely :  That  South- 
Carolina  and  Georgia  infilled  on  this  claufe  as  they  were 
now  in  want  of  hands  to  cultivate  their  lands  :  That  in  the 
courfe  of  twenty  years  they  would  be  fully  Supplied  :  That 
the  trade  would  be  abolished  then,  and  that  in  the  mean 
time  fome  t*x  or  duty  might  be  laid  on. 

Mr.  M'Doivall  replied,  that  the  explanation  was  juft 
fuch  as  he  expected,  and  by  no  means  Satisfactory  to  him, 
and  that  he  looked  upon  it  as  a  very  objectionable  part  of 
the  fyftem. 

Mr.  Ir*dell-~Mr.  Chairman,  I  rife  to  exprefs  Sentiment* 

finulat 


(    1*3    ) 

#milar  to  thofe  of  the  gentleman  from  Craven.  For  my 
part,  were  it  practicable  to  put  an  end  to  the  importation 
of  flaves  immediately,  it  would  give  me  the  greateft  plea* 
fure,  for  it  certainly  is  a  trade  utterly  inconfiftent  with  tho 
rights  of  humanity,  and  under  which  great  cruelties  have 
been  exercifed.  When  the  entire  abolition  ot  flavery  takes 
place,  it  will  be  an  event  which  muft  be  pleafing  to  every 
generous  mind,  and  every  friend  of  human  nature;  but  we 
often  wifh  for  things  which  are  not  attainable.  It  was  the 
wifti  of  a  great  majority  of  the  Convention  to  put  an  end 
to  the  trade  immediately,  but  the  ftates  of  South-Carolina 
2nd  Georgia  would  not  agree  to  it.  Confider  then  what 
would  be  the  difference  between  oar  prefent  fituation  in 
this  refpecl,  if  we  do  not  agree  to  the  Conftitution,  and 
what  it  will  be  if  we  do  agree  to  it.  If  we  do  not  agree 
to  it,  do  we  remedy  the  evil  ?  No,  Sir,  we  do  not.  For  if 
the  Conftitution  be  not  adopted,  it  will  be  in  the  power 
of  every  ftate  to  continue  it  forever.  They  may  or  may 
not  abolifh  it  at  their  discretion,  But  if  we  adopt  the  Con- 
ftitution the  trade  muft  ceafe  after  twenty  years  if  Con- 
grefs  declare  fo,  whether  particular  ftates  pleafefoor  not; 
furely  then  we  gain  by  it,  This  was  the  utmoft  that  could 
be  obtained,  I  heartily  wifh  more  could  have  been  done. 
But  as  it  is,  this  government  is  nobly  diftinguiftied  above 
others  by  that  very  provifion.  Where  is  there  another 
country  jn  which  fuch  a  reftri£tion  prevails  ?  We  there- 
fore, Sir,  fet  an  example  of  humanity,  by  providing  for 
the  abolition  of  this  inhuman  traffic,  though  at  a  diftant 
period.  I  hope  therefore  that  this  part  of  the  Conftituti* 
on  will  not  be  condemned,  becaufc  it  has  not  ftipulated 
for  what  was  impracticable  to  obtain, 

Mr.  Spmght  further  explained  the  claufe.  That  the  \U 
snitation  of  this  trade  to  the  term  of  twenty  years,  was  a 
compromise  between  the  eaftern  ftates  and  the  fouthera 
ilates.  South-Carolina  and  Georgia  wiftied  to  extend  the 
term.  The  eaftern  ftates  infilled  on  the  entire  abolition 
of  the  trade.  That  the  ftate  of  North-Carolina  had  not 
thought  proper  to  pafs  any  law  prohibiting  the  importa- 
tion of  flaves,  and  therefore  its  Delegates  in  the  Conven- 
tion did  not  think  themfelves  authorised  to  contend  for  an 
immediate  prohibition  of  it. 

Mr.  Iredell  added  to  what  he  had  iaid  before.  That  the 

ftate* 


<     "4     ) 

ftates  of  Georgia  and  South-Carolina,  had  loft  a  great 
many  flaves  during  the  war,  and  that  they  wifhed  to  iup- 
p\y  the  lofs. 

Mr.  Galloway— Mr,  Chairman,  The  explanation  give* 
to  this  ciauie,  does  not  fatisfy  my  mind.  I  wifn  to  fee 
this  abominable  trade  pnt  an  end  to.  But  in  cafe  it  be 
thought  proper  to  continue  this  abominable  traffic  for 
twenty  years,  yet  I  do  not  wifli  to  fee  the  tax  on  the  im- 
portation extended  to  all  perfons  whntfoever.  Our  fitua- 
tion  is  different  from  the  people  to  the  north.  We  want 
citizens.  They  do  not.  Inftead  of  laying  a  ta:r>  we  ought 
to  give  a  bounty,  to  encourage  foreigners  to  come  among 
us.  With  refpeS  to  the  abolition  of  flavery,  it  require* 
the  utmoft  confides 'don.  The  property  of  the  fouthern 
ftates  confids  princely  of  flaves.  If  they  mean  to  do 
away  flavery  altogether,  this  property  will  be  deftroyed. 
I  apprehend  it  means  to  bring  forward  manumiffion.  If 
we  manurmt  oiir  flaves,  what  country  (hall  we  fend  them 
to?  It  is  irripoffible  for  us  to  be  happy,  if  after  manu- 
miiTion  they  are  to  nv$  among  us. 

♦     Mr.  7r^//-Mr.  Chairman,  The  worthy  gentleman,  I 
believe,  h?&  mifunderftoc-d  this  claufe,  which' runs  in  the 
following  words,  "  The  migration  or  importation  of  fuch 
perfons  as  zny  of  the   dates  now  exifting,  fhall  think  pro- 
per to  admit,  O^li  not  be  prohibited  by  the  Cdngrefs,  prior 
to  the  year  iSo3,  but  a  tax  or  duty  may  be   impofed  om 
fuch importation^  hot   exceeding  t$n  dollars  for   ench  pcr- 
ibn."     Now,  Sir,    obferve    that   the  eaftern   ftates,  who- 
Jong  ago   hav-  tf&oltfhed  flavery,  did  not  approve   ©f  the 
exprefSon -flaws,  they  therefore  ufed  another  that  anfwer- 
ed  the    fame  purpofe.     The  Committee    will  obferve  the 
diftindtion.  between  the  two  words  migration  and  importa- 
tion.    The  flrft  part  of  the  claufc   will  extend   to  perfons 
who  come  into  the  country  as  free  people  or  are  brought 
as  flaves.     But  the  latt  part  extends  to 'flaves  only.     The 
word  migration  refers  to  free  perfons  ;  but  the  word  importa- 
tion refers  to  flaves,  becaufe  free  people  cannot  be  faid  to  be 
imported.     The  tax   therefore  is  only  to  be  laid  on  flaves 
who  are  imported,  and  not  on  free  perfons  who  migrate. 
I  further  beg  leave  to  fry,  that  the  gentleman  is  miftaken 
in  another  thing.    He  feems  to  fay  that  this  extends  to  the 
abolition  of  flavery.    Ig  there  any  thing  in  this  Conftitu. 

tioa 


(    «s    ) 

ikon  which  fays  that  CongTefs  {hall  have  it  in  their  powas? 
to  aboliih  the  flavery  of  thofe  flaves  who  are  now  in  the 
country  ?  Is  it  not  the  plain  meaning  of  it,  that  after 
twenty  years  they  may  prevent  the  future  importation  of* 
ilaves  ?  It  does  noi  extend  to  thofe  now  in  the  country. 
There  is  another  cirtumflancc  to  be  obferved.  There  is 
no  authority  veiled  in  Congrefs  to  re  (train  the  ftates  in  the 
interval  of  twenty  years,  from  doing  what  they  pleafe. 
If  they  wifli  to  inhibit  fuch  importation,  they  may  do  fo. 
Our  next  Ailembly  may  put  an  entire  end  to  the  importa- 
tion of  flaves. 

The  reft  of  the  ninth  fedlion  read  without  any  obfer- 
vatiom 

Article  fecond,  feclion  firft. 

Mr.  Davie — Mr  Chairman.*  I  muft  exprefs  my  aftonifh- 
ment  at  the  precipitancy  with  which  we  go  through  tnis 
bufinefs.  Is  it  not  highly  improper  to  pafs  over  in  filence 
any  part  of  this  Conftitution,  which  has  been  loudly  ob- 
jected to  ?  We  go  into  a  committee  to  have  a  freer  dif- 
cuffion.  -  I  am  forry  to  fee  gentlemen  hurrying  us  through 
and  fupprefling  their  objections,  in  order  to  bring  them 
forward  at  an  unfeafonable  hour.  We  are  aflembled  here 
to  deliberate  for  our  own  common  welfare,  and  to  decide 
mpon  a  question  of  infinite  importance  to  our  country. 
What  i*  the  caufe  of  this  filence  and  gloomy  jealoufy  in 
gentlemen  of  the  oppofition  ?  Thic  department  has  been 
iiiiiverfaliy  objected  to  by  them.  The  m@ft  virulent  in- 
vectives, the  moft  opprobrious  epithets,  and  the  mod  in- 
decent fcurrility,  have  been  ufed  and  appl^d  againfh  this 
part  of  tke  Conftitution.  It  has  been  reprefenterf.  as  in- 
compatible with  any  degree  of  freedom.  V^fty,  therefore, 
do  not  gentlemen  oder  their  o'»jc£Hons  now,  tltat  we  may 
examine  their  force,  if  they  have  any  ?  The  claufc  meets 
rny  entire  approbation.  I  only  rife  to  (hew  the  principle 
©rt  which  it  was  formed.  The  principle  is,  the  reparation 
of  the  executive  from  the  legiflative~a  principle  which 
pervades  all  free  governments.  A  difpute  arofe  in  the 
Convention,  concerning  the  re-eligibility  of  the  Prefident,  , 
It  Was  the  opinion  of  the  deputation  from  this  ftate,  that 
he  fhould  be  elected  for  five  or  feven  years,  and  be  after- 
wards ineligible.  It  was  urged,  in  fupport  of  this  opini- 
#fy  that  the  return  of  public  officers  into  the  common 

nuft 


imafs  of  &e  people,  where  they  would  feel  the  tone  they 
had  given  to  the  adminiftration  of  the  laws,  was  the  beft 
fecurity  the  public  had  for  their  good  behaviour  :  That  it 
would  operate  as  a  limitation  to  his  ambition,  at  the  fame 
time  that  it  rendered  him  more  independent  :  That  when 
once  in  poffeflion  of  that  office,  he  would  move  Heaven 
and  earth  to  fecure  his  re-ele&ion,  and  perhaps  become  the 
cringing  dependent  of  influential  men.  That  our  opinion 
was  fupported  by  fome  experience  of  the  effects  of  this 
principle  in  feveral  of  the  dates.  A  large  and  very  re* 
fpettable  majority  were  of  the  contrary  opinion.  It  was 
faid,  that  fuch  an  exclufion  would  be  improper  for  many 
reafons ;  that  if  an  enlightened,  upright  man,  had  dif* 
charged  the  duties  of  the  office  ably  and  faithfully,  it 
would  be  depriving  the  people  of  the  benefit  of  his  ability 
and  experience,  though  they  highly  approved  of  him.  That 
it  would  render  the  Prefident  lefs  ardent  in  his  endeavours 
to  acquire  the  efteem  and  approbation  of  his  country,  if 
he  knew  that  he  would  be  abfolutely  excluded  after  a  given 
period.  And  that  it  would  be  depriving  a  man  of  fingu-r 
lar  merit,  even  of  the  rights  of  eHizenfhip.  It  was  aifa 
faid,  that  the  day  might  come,  when  the  confidence  of 
America  would  be  put  in  one  man,  and  that  it  might  be 
dangerous  to  exclude  fuch  a  man  from  the  fervicc  of  his 
country.  It  was  urged  likewife,  that  no  undue  influence 
could  take  place  in  his  elc&jon.  That  as  he  was  to  be 
elected  on  the  fame  day  throughout  the  United  States,  no, 
man  could  fay  to  himfelf,  /  am  to  be  the  man.  Under  thefe 
confiderations,  a  large,  refpe&able  majority  voted  for  it  as 
it  now  {lands*  With  refpeft  to  the  unity  of  the  Execu^ 
tive,  the  fuperior  energy  and  fecrecy  wherewith  one  per- 
fon  can  aft,  was  one  of  the  principles  on  which  the  Con- 
vention went :  But  a  more  predominant  principle  was^ 
the  more  obvious  refpoiffibility  of  one  perfon.  It  was  ob- 
ferved,  that  if  there  were  a  plurality  of  perfons,  and  a 
crime  mould  be  committed,  when  their  conduct  came 
to  be  examined,  it  would  be  impoffible  to  fix  the  fact  on 
any  one  of  them  :  But  that  the  public  were  never  at  a  lofs, 
when  there  was  but  one  man.  For  thefe  reafons,  a  great 
majority  concurred  in  the  unity,  and  re-elegibility  aU 
fo,  of  the  Executive.  I  thought  proper  to  (hew  the 
^irit  of  the  ieputatioa  from  this  Hate,    However,  I 

~ "?■."■"     "  ''    hewtily 


r  «*7  )    . 

tieartily  concur  in  it  as  it  now  (lands,  as  the  mode  of  liis 
election  precludes  every  poflibility  of  corruption  or  im- 
proper influence  of  any  kind. 

Mr.  Jojeph  Taylor  thought  it  improper  to  object  on  every 
trivial  cafe.  That  this  claufe  had  been  argued  on  in  fome 
degree  before,  and  that  it  would  be  an  ufelefs  wafte  of 
time  to  dwell  any  longer  upon  it.  That  if  they  had  the 
power  of  amending  the  Conftitution,  that  every  part  need 
not  be  difcufled,  as  fome  were  not  objectionable.  And 
that  for  his  own  part,  he  would  object  when  any  eflentiai 
defect  came  before  the  Houfe. 

Second,  third  and  fourth  claufes  read. 

Mr.  J.  Taylor  objected  to  the  power  of  Congrefs  to  de- 
termine the  time  of  choofmg  the  Electors,  and  to  deter- 
mine the  time  of  electing  the  Prefident,  and  urged  that  it 
was  improper  to  have  the  election  on  the  fame  day  through- 
out the  United  States.  That  Congrefs,  not  fatisfied  with 
their  power  over  the  time,  place  and  manner  of  elections 
of  Reprefentatives,  and  over  the  time  and  manner  of  electi- 
ons of  Senators,  aftid  their  power  of  railing  an  army,  wifti* 
ed  likewife  to  controul  the  election  of  the  Electors  of  the 
Prefident.  That  by  their  army,  and  the  election  being  on, 
the  fame  day  in  all  the  ftates,  they  might  compel  the  elec«* 
tors  to  vote  as  they  pleafe. 

Mr.  Spaight  anfwered,  that  the  time  of  choofing  the 
Electors  was  to  be  determined  by  Congrefs,  for  the  fake 
of  regularity  and  uniformity.  That  if  the  ftate9  were  to 
determine  it,  one  might  appoint  it  at  one  day,  and  ano- 
ther at  another,  &c,  and  that  the  election  being  on  the 
fame  day  in  all  the  ftates  would  prevent  a  combination 
between  the  Electors. 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  It  gives  me  great  aftonifh* 
ment  to  hear  this  objection,  becaufe  I  thought  this  to  be  % 
moft  excellent  claufe.  Nothing  is  more  neceflary  than  to  pre- 
vent every  dangerof  influence.  Had  the  time  of  election  been 
different  in  different  ftates,  the  Electors  chofen  in  one  ftate 
might  have  gone  from  ftate  to  ftate  and  conferred  with  the 
other  Electors,  and  the  election  might  have  been  thus  carried 
on  under  undue  influence.  But  by  this  provifion^  the  Elec- 
tors muft  meet  in  the  different  ftates  on  the  fame  day,  and 
cannot  confer  together.  They  may  not  even  know  who  are 
fhe  Ekctors  in,  the  other  ftates.     There  can  be  therefore  no 

fcm4 


(      «28      ) 

fetid  of  combination.  It  is  probable,  that  the  man  who  It 
the  object  of  the  choice  of  thirteen  different  ftates,  the 
Electors  in  each  voting  unconne&edly  with  the  reft,  mult 
be  a  perfon  who  poffefiTes  in  a  high  degree  the  confidence 
and  refpe£t-  of  his  country. 

Governor .  Johnjlon  exprefled  doubts  with  refpedt  to  the 
perfons  by  whom  the  Electors  were  to  be  appointed.  Some, 
he  faid,  were  of  opinion  that  the  people  at  large  were  to 
choofe  them,  and  others  thought  the  ftate  Legiflatures 
were  to  appoint  them. 

Mr.  Iredell  was  of  opinion,  that  it  could  not  be  done 
with  propriety  by  the  ftate  Legiflatures,  becaufe  as  they 
Were  to  direct  the  manner  of  appointing,  a  law  would  look 
very  awkward,  which  fhould  fay  "  They  gave  the  power  of 
(f  fuch  appointments  to  themfelves." 

Mr.  Maclaine  thought  the  ftate  Legiflatures  might  di- 
rect the  Electors  to  be  chofen  in  what  manner  they  thought 
proper,  and  they  might  direct  it  to  be  done  by  the  people 
at  large.  ^ 

Mr.  Davie  was  of  opinion,  that  it  was  left  to  the  wif- 
dom  of  the  Legiflatures  to  direct  their  election  in  what- 
ever maimer  they  thought  proper. 

Mr.  Tayhr  (till  thought  the  power  improper  with  re- 
fpect  to  the  time  of  cliooGng  the  Electors.  This  power 
appeared  to  him  to  belong  properly  to  the  ftate  Legiflatures, 
nor  could  he  fee  any  purpofe  it  could  anfwer  but  that  of 
an  augmentation  of  the  Congreffional  powers,  which  he 
faid  were  too  great  already.  That  by  this  power  they 
might  piolong  the  elections  to  feven  years,  and  that  though 
this  would  be  direct  oppofition  to  another  part  of  the 
Conftitution,foph!ft'y  would  enable  them  to  reconcile  them, 

Mr.  Spaight  replied,  that  he  was  furprifed  that  the  gen- 
tleman objected  to  the  power  of  Congrefs  to  determine  the 
time  of  choofing  the  Electors,  and  not  to  that  of  fixing  the 
day  of  the  election  of  the  Prefident.  That  the  power  in 
the  one  cafe  could  not  poflibly  anfwer  the  purpofe  of  uni- 
formity without  having  it  in  the  other.  That  the  power  m 
both  cafes  could  be  exercifed  properly  only  by  one  general 
fuperintending  power.  That  if  Congrefs  had  not  this  pow- 1 
er,  there  would  be  no  uniformity  at  all,  and  that  a  great 
deal  of  time  would  be  taken  up  iu  Qrdes  to.  agree  upon  th* 
lime. 


(  12$  ) 

The  committee  now  rofe.  Mr.  Prefident  refumed  the 
chair,  and  Mr.  Kennion  reported,  that  the  committee  had* 
according  order,  again  had  the  faid  propofed  Conftitution 
under  their  confideration,  and  had  made  a  further  progrefe 
therein,  but  not  having  time  to  go  through  the  fame*  had 
directed  him  to  move  for  leave  to  lit  again. 

Refilvedj  That  this  Convention  will  on  Monday  next, 
again  refolve  itfelf  into  a  Committee  of  the  whole  Conven- 
tion on  the  faid  propofed  plan  of  government. 

The  Convention  then  adjourned  until  Monday  next, 
nine  o'clock. 


MONDAY,     July  28,    1788. 

The  Convention  met  according  to  adjournment,  and 
immediately  refolved  itfelf  into  a  committee  of  the  whole 
Convention,  to  take  into  further  confideratios  the  propofed 
Conftitution  of  government  for  the  United  States. 

The  fecond  fe£tion  of  the  fecond  article  read. 

Mr.  Iredell-^Ax.  Chairman,  This  part  of  the  Conftitu* 
tion  has   been  much  objected  to.     The  oiBce  of  fuperin- 
tending  the   execution  of  the  laws  of  the  union,  is  an  of- 
fice of  the  utmoft  importance.     It  is  of  the  greateft  con* 
fequence  to  the  happinefs  of  the  people  of  America,  that 
the  perfon  to  whom  this  great  truft  is  delegated  fliould  be 
worthy  of  it.     It  would  require  a  man  of  abilities  and  ex- 
perience :  It  would  alfo  require  a  man  who  porTcrTed   in  a 
high  degree  the  confidence  of  his  country.     This  being  the 
cafe,  it  would  be  a  great  defect  in  forming  a  Conftitution 
for  the  United  States,  if  it  was  fo  conftrudled  that  by  any 
accident  an  improper  perfon  could  have  a  chance  to  obtain 
that  office.     The  Committee  will  recollect,  that  the  Prefi- 
dent is  to  be  ele&ed  by  Electors  appointed  by  each  ftate, 
according  to  the  number  of  Senators  and  Reprefentatives 
to  which  the  ftate  may  be  entitled  in  the  Congrefs :  That 
they  are  to  meet  on  the  fame  day  throughout  all  the  ftatesj 
and  vote  by  ballot  for  two  perfons,  one  of  whom  (hall  not 
be  an  inhabitant  of  the  fame  ftate  with  rhemfelves.   Thefe 
votes  are  afterwards  to  be  tranfmitted  under  feal  to  the  feat 
of  the   general  government.     The  perfon  who  has  the 
greateft  number  of  votes,  if  it  be  a  majority  of  the  whole, 
will  be  the  Prefident.     If  more  than  one  have  a  majority, 
and   equal  votes,  the  Houfe  of  Reprefentatives  are   to 
&  choofe 


(   n*  ) 

£hoofe  one  of  them.  If  none  Rave  a  majority  of  votes, 
then  the  Houfe  of  Representatives  are  to  choofe  which 
of  the  perfons  they  think  proper,  out  of  the  five  higheft 
on  the  lift.  The  perfon  having  the  next  greateft  number 
of  votes  is  to  be  the  Vice-Prefident,  unlefs  two  or  more 
fhould  have  equal  votes,  in  which  cafe  the  Senate  is  to 
choofe  one  of  them  for  Vice-Prefident.  If  I  recollect 
right,  thefe  are  the  principal  chara&eriftrcs.  Thus,  Sir, 
two  men  will  be  in  office  at  the  fame  time.  The  Prefident, 
who  poflefles  in  the  higheft  degree  the  confidence  of  his 
country ;  and  the  Vice-Prefident,  who  is  thought  to  be  the 
siext  perfon  in  the  union  moft  fit  to  perform  this  truft. 
Here,  Sir,  every  contingency  is  provided  for.  No  fac- 
tion or  combination  can  bring  about  the  election.  It  is 
probable,  that  the  choice  will  always  fall  upon  a  man  of 
experienced  abilities  and  fidelity.  In  all  human  probabili- 
ty, no  better  mode  of  election  could  have  been   devifed* 

The  reft  of  the  firft  fection  read  without  any  obfervation^ 

Second  fection  read. 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr-  Chairman,  I  was  hi  hopes  that  fome 
Other  gentleman  would  have  fpoken  to  this  claufe.  It 
conveys  very  important  powers,  and  ought  not  to  be  paus- 
ed by.  I  beg  leave  in  as  few  words  as  poffible  to  fpeafe 
my  fentiments  upon  it.  I  believe  moft  of  the  Governors 
of  the  different  ftates,  have  powers  fimilar  to  thofe  of  the 
Prefident.  In  aJmoil  every  country  the  Executive  has  the, 
command  of  the  military  forces.  From  the  nature  of  the 
thing,  the  command  of  armies  ought  to  be  delegated  to  one 
perfon  only.  The  fecrecy,  difpatch  and  decifion  which  are 
neceflary  in  military  operations,  can  only  be  expected  from 
one  perfon.  The  Prefident  therefore  is  to  command  the 
military  forces  of  the  United  States,  and  this  power  I 
think  a  proper  one  ;  at  the  fame  time  it  will  be  found  to 
be  fuflkiently  guarded.  A  very  material  difference  may 
be  obferved  between  this  power,  and  the  authority  of  the 
King  of  Great-Britain  under  fimilar  circumftances.  The 
King  of  Great-Britain  is  not  only  the  Commander  in  Chief 
of  the  land  and  naval  forces,  but  has  power  in  time  of  war 
to  raife  fleets  and  armies.  He  has  alfo  authority  to  declare 
war.  The  Prefident  has  not  the  power  of  declaring  war 
by  his  own  authority,  nor  that  of  raifing  fleets  and  armie?* 
Th$fe  powers  are  veiled  in  other  hands.    The  power  de* 

daring 


(     13'     ) 

glaring  war  is  exprefsly  given  to  Congrefs,  that  is,  to  thv 
two  branches  of  the  Legiflature,  tike  Senate  compofed  of 
Reprefentatiyes  of  the  (late  Legiflaturcs,  the  Houfe  of  Re- 
prefentatives  deputed  by  the  people  at  large.  They  have 
alfo  exprefsly  delegated  to  them,  the  powers  of  raifing  and 
fupporting  armies,  and  of  providing  and  maintaining  $ 
navy. 

With  regard  to  the  militia,  it  mud  be  obferved,  that 
though  he  has  the  command  of  them  when  called  into  the 
ecltual  fervice  of  the  United  States,  yet  he  has  not  the 
power  of  calling  them  out.  The  power  of  calling  them 
out,  is  veiled  in  Congrefs,  for  the  purpofe  of  executing 
the,laws  of  the  union.  When  the  militia  are  called  out 
for  any  purpofe,  fome  perfon  muft  command  them  ;  and 
who  fo  proper  as  that  perfon  who  has  the  beft  evidence 
of  his  poffefling  the  general  confidence  of  the  people  $ 
I  truft  therefore,  that  the  power  of  commanding  the  mili- 
tia when  called  forth  into  the  aclual  fervice  of  the  United 
States,  will  not  be  objected  to. 

The  next  part  which  fays,  "  That  he  may  require  the. 
opinion  in  writing  of  the  principal  officers,"  is  in  fome 
degree  fubflituted  for  a  Council.  He  is  only  to  confulj; 
them  if  he  thinks  proper.  Their  opinion  is  to  be  given: 
him  in  writing.  By  this  means  he  will  be  aided  by  their 
intelligence,  and  the  neceffity  of  their  opinions  being  in- 
writing,  will  render  them  more  cautious  in  giving  them, 
and  make  them  refponfible  fliould  they  give  advice  mani- 
Jfeftly  improper.  This  does  not  diminifh  the  refponfibili- 
ty  of  the  Prefident  himfelf.  They  might  otherwife  have 
colluded,  and  opinions  have  been  given  too  much  under 
his  influence. 

It  has  been  the  opinion  of  many  gentlemen,  that  the 
President  mould  have  a  Council.  This  opinion  probably 
has  been  derived  from  the  example  in  England.  It  would 
be  very  proper  for  every  gentleman  to  confider  attentively, 
whether  that  example  ought  to  be  imitated  by  us.  Altho* 
it  be  a  refpe&able  example,  yet  in  my  opinion  very  fatis- 
factory  reafons  can  be  affigned  for  a  departure  from  it  in 
this  Conftitution. 

It  was  very  difficult,  immediately  on  our  feparation  frort| 
Great-Britain,  to  difengage  ourfelves  entirely  from  ideas  of 
government  we  had  been  ufed  to.     We  had  been  accuf- 

tomecl 


(   n*  ) 

tamed  to  a  Council  under  the  old  government,  and  took 
it  for  granted  we  ought  to  have  one  under  the  new.     But 
examples  ought  not  to  be  implicitly  followed  •,  and  the  rea- 
sons which  prevail  in  Great-Britain  for  a  Council,  do  not 
apply  equally  to  us.     In  that  country  the  executive  autho- 
rity is  vefted  in  a  magiflrate  who   holds  it  by  birth-right. 
He  has  great  powers  and  prerogatives  5  and  it  is  a  coniti- 
tutional  maxim,  that  he  can  do  no  wrong.     We  have  expe- 
rienced that  he  can   do  wrong,  yet  no  man  can  fay  fo  ia 
his  own  country.     There  are  no  courts  to  try  him  for  any 
crimes  1  nor  is  there  any  conftitutional  method  of  depriv- 
ing him.  of  his  throne.     If  he  lofes  it,  it  mult  be  by.  a  ge- 
neral refiftance  of  his  people  contrary  to  forms  of  law,  aa 
at  the  revolution  which  took  place  about  a  hundred  years 
ago.     It  is  therefore  of  the  utmoft  moment  in  that  coun- 
try, that,  whoever  is  the  imtrument  of  any  ac~l  of  govern- 
ment (hou-ld  be  perfonally  refponfible  for  it,  finee  the  King 
is  not ;   and  for  the  fame  reafon,    that  no  acl:   of  govern* 
sjient  (hou.ld  be  exercifed  but  by  the  inflrumentality   of" 
fome  perfon,  who  cair  be  accountable  for  it.     Every  thing; 
therefore  that  the  King  does  mull  be  by  fome  advice,  audi 
the  advifer  of  courfe  anfwerabie.     Under  our  Conftituti- 
on  we  are  much  happier*     No.  man  lias  an  authority  to  ir&- 
Jure  another   with   impunity.     No  man  is  better  than- hiis 
fellow-citizens,  nor  can  pretend  to  any  fuperiority  over  the 
meaneft  man.  in.  the  country.     If  the  Prefident  does  a  fin* 
gle  a£t,  by  which  the  people  are  prejudiced,.,  he  is,  punifh^ 
sible  himfelf,  and  no  other  man  merely  to  fcreen  him.     lit 
be  commits  any  mifciemeanor  in  office,  he  is  impeachable,, 
removable  fjrom,  office,  and  incapacitated  to  hold  any  of- 
£ce  of  honour,  trull  or  profit.     If  he  commits  any  crime*, 
he  is  punilhable  by  the  laws  of  his  country,  and  in  capital 
cafes  may  be  deprived  of  his  life..    This  being  the  cafe>( 
there  is  not.   the  fame  reafon  here  for  having  a  Council,, 
which  exifts  in  England.     It  is,  however,  much  to  be  de- 
fired,  that  a  man  who  has  fuch  extennve   and   important 
buunefs  to  perform,  fhould  have  the  means  of  fome  affift- 
ance  to  enable  him  to  difcharge  his  arduous  employment. 
The  advice  of  the  principal  executive  officers,  which  he 
can  at  all  times  command,  will  in  my  opinion  anfwer  this* 
valuable  purpofe.     He  can  at  no  time  want  advice,   if  he 
dfcfir.es  it,  as  the  principal  officers  will  always  be  on  the 

%Oti 


£pot,  Thofe  officers  from  their  abilities  and  experience 
will  probably  be  able  to  give  as  good,  if  not  better  advice* 
than  any  Counfellors  would  do  ;  and  the  folemnity  of  the 
advice  in  writing,  which  mud  be  preserved,  would  be  a 
great  check  upon  them. 

Bcfides  thefe  considerations,,  it  was  difficult  for  the  Con- 
vention to  prepare  a  Council  that  would  be  unexceptionable, 
That  jealoufy  which  naturally  exids  between  the  different 
dates,  enhanced  this  difficulty.  If  a  few  Counfellors  were 
to  be  chofen  from  the  northern,  fourhern  or  middle  dates, 
or  from  a  few  dates  only,  undue  preference  might  be  giv- 
en to  thofe  particular  dates  from  which  they  fliould  come. 
If  to  avoid  this  difficulty,  one  Counfellor  fhould  be  fent 
from  each  date,  this  would  require  great  expence,  which 
is  a  confederation  at  this  time  of  much  moment,  efpecially 
.as  it  is  probable,  that  by  the  method  propofed,  the  Prefi- 
dent  may  be  equally  well  advifed  without  any  expence  at  all. 
We  ought  alfo  to  confider,  that  had  he  a  Council,  by  whofe 
-advice  he  was  bound  to  a£t,  his  refponfibility  in  all  fuch 
cafes  mud  be  deftroyed.  You  furely  would  not  oblige  him 
to  follow  their  advice,  and  punifh  him  for  obeying  it.  If 
Called  upon  on  any  occafion  of  diflike,  it  would  be  natural 
for  him  to  fay,  «  You  know  my  Council  are  men  of  in- 
'*"  tegrity  and  ability  :  I  could  not  act  againd  their  opinio 
<®(  ons,  though  I  confefs  my  own  was  contrary  to  theirs." 
JThis,  Sir,  would  be  pernicious.  In  fuch  a  fituation,  he 
anight  eafily  combine  with  his  Council,  and  it  might  be  im- 
||)offible  to  fix  a  fa&  upon  him.  It  would  be  difficult  often 
*to  know,  whether  the  Prefident  or  Counfellors  were  mod 
no  blame.  A  thoufand  plaufible  excufes  might  be  made, 
which  would  efcape  detection.  But  the  method  propofed 
fin  the  Conditution  creates  no  fuch  embarraflment.  It  is 
vplain  and  open.  And  the  Prefident  wilt  perfonally  have 
the  credit  of  good,  or  the  cenfure  of  bad  meafures; 
fincc,  though  he  may  afk  advice,  he  is  to  ufe  his  own  judg- 
ment in  following  or  rejecting  it.  For  all  thefe  reafons  I 
am.clearly  of  opinion,  that  the  claufe  is  better  as  it  dands 
"than  if  the  Prefident  were  to  have  a  Council.  I  think  eve- 
ry good  that  can  be  derived  from  the  inftitution  of  a  Coun- 
cil, may  be  expected  from  the  advice  of  thefe  officers,, 
without  its  being  liable  to  the  difadvantages  to  which  it  ap- 
pears, to  me  the  inditution  of  .a  Council  would  be. 

.Another 


{     '34     ) 

Another  power  that  he  has  is  to  grant  pardons,  except 
In  cafes  of  impeachment.     I  believe  it  is   the  Tenfe  of  a 
great  part  of  America,  that  this  power  mould  be  exercifed. 
by  their  Governors.     It  is  in  fevera!   dates  on  the  fame 
footing  that  it  is  here.     It  is  the  genius  of  a   republican 
government,  that  the  laws  mould  he  rigidly  executed  with- 
out the  influence  of  favour  or  ill-will ;  That  when  a  man 
commits  a  crime,  however  powerful  he  or  his  friends  may 
be,  yet  he  mould  be  punifhed  for  it ;  and   on   the  other 
hand,  though  he  {hould  be  univerfally  hated  by  his  coun- 
try, his  real  guilt  alone  as  to  the  particular  charge   is    to 
Operate  againft  him.     This   ftri£t  and  fcrupulous  obferr 
vance  of  juftice  is  proper  in  all  governments,  but  it  is  par- 
ticularly iiidifpenfable  in  a  republican  one  5  becaufe  in  fuch 
a  government,  the  law  is    fuperior  to  every  man,  and  no 
man  is  fuperior  to  another.     But  though  this  general  prin- 
ciple be  unqueftionable,  furely  there  is  no  gentleman   in 
the  committee,  who   is  not   aware  that  there  ought  to  be 
exceptions   to  it  y  becaufe   there  may   be  many  inftances, 
where  though  a  man  offends  againft  the  Utter  of  the  law, 
yet  peculiar  circumflances  in  his  cafe  may  entitle  him  to 
mercy.     It  is  impofhble  for  any  general  law  to  forefee  and 
provide  for  all  poffible  cafes  that  may  arife,  and  therefore 
an  inflexible  adherence  to   it  in  every  inftance,  might  fre- 
quently be  the  caufe  of  very  great  injuftice.     For  this  rea-* 
fon,  fuch  a  power  ought  to  exift  fomewhere  ;  and  where 
could  it  be  more  properly  vefted,  than  in  a  man  who  had 
received  fuch  ftrong  proofs  of  his  poiTefiing  the  higheft  conr 
iidence  of  the  people  ?  This  power  however  only  refers  to 
offences  againft  the  United  States,  and  not  againft  parti- 
cular ftateg.     Another  reafon  for  the  Prefident  poiTeffing 
this  authority,  is  this :  It  is  often   neceflary  to  convict,   a 
man  by  means  of  his  accomplices:  We  have  fufficient 
experience  of  that  in  this  countrv.     A  criminal  would  of- 
ten go  unpunifhed,  were  not  this   method  to  be  purfued 
againft  him.  In  my  opinion,  till  an  accomplice^  own  dan- 
ger h  removed,  his   evidence  ought  to  be  regarded   with 
great  diffidence.     If  in  civil  caufes  of  property,  a  witnefs 
muft  be  entirely  difinterefted,  how  much  more  proper  is  it 
he  mould  be  fo  in  cafes  of  life  and  death  !  This  power  is 
naturally  vefted  in  the  Prefident,  becaufe  it  is   his  duty  to 
patch  pver  the  public  fafety,  and  as  that  may  frequently 

require 


(  m  \ 

require  the  evidence  of  accomplices  to  bring  great  offend- 
ers to  juftice,  he  ought  to  be  entrufted  with  the  moft  ef- 
fectual means  of  procuring  it. 

I  beg  leave  farther  to  obfevve,  that  for  another  reafon  I 
think  there  is  a  propriety  in  leaving  this  power  to  the  ge- 
neral discretion  of  the  executive  magiftrate,  rather  than  to 
fetter  it  in  any  manner  which  has  been  propefed.  It  may 
happen,  that  many  men,  upon  plaufible  pretences,  may  be 
feduced  into  very  dangerous  meafures  againft  their  country* 
They  may  aim  by  an  infurreclion  to  redrefs  imaginary 
grievances,  at  the  fame  time  believing,  upon  falfe  fuggef- 
tions,  that  their  exertions  are  neceiTary  to  fave  their  coun- 
try from  deltruclion.  Upon  cool  reflection  however,  they 
poffibly  are  convinced  of  their  error,  and  clearly  fee  thro' 
the  treachery  and  villainy  of  their  leaders.  In  this  fitua- 
tion,  if  the  Prefident  poffefled  the  power  of  pardoning, 
they  probably  would  immediately  throw  themfelves  on  the 
equity  of  the  government,  and  the  whole  body  be  peace- 
ably broke  up.  Thus,  at  a  critical  moment,  the  Prefident 
might  prevent  perhaps  a  civil  war.  But  if  there  was 
no  authority  to  pardon,  in  that  delicate  exigency,  what 
would  be  the  confequence  ?  The  principle  of  felf-prefer- 
vation  would  prevent  their  parting.  Would  it  not  be  na- 
tural for  them  to  fay,  "  We  (hall  be  puniftied  if  we  dif- 
•' band.  Were  ■  we  Aire  of  mercy  we  would  peaceably 
"  part.  But  v/e  know  not  that  there  is  any  chance  of  this. 
u  We  may  as  well  meet  one  kind  of  death  as  another. 
"  We  may  as  well  die  in  the  field  as  at  the  gallows."  I 
therefore  fubmit  to  the  committee,  if  this  power  be  no£ 
highly  neceiTary  for  fuch  a  purpofe.  V/e  have  feen  a. 
happy  inftance  of  the  good  effecT;  of  fuch  an  exercife  of 
mercy  in  the  ftate  of  Maffachufetts,  where  very  lately  there* 
was  fo  formidable  an  infurre&ion.  I  believe  a  great  majo- 
rity of  the  infurgents  were  drawn  into  it  by  falfe  artifices. 
They  at  length  faw  their  error,  and  were  willing  to  difband. 
Government,  by  a  wife  exercife  of  lenity,  after  having 
fhewn  its  power,  generally  granted  a  pardon  ;  and  the 
whole  party  were  difperfed.  There  is  now  as  much  peace 
in  that  country  as  in  any  ftate  in  the  union. 

A  particular  inftance  v*hich  occurs  to  me,  (hews  th$ 
utility  of  this  power  very  ftrongly.  Suppofe  we  were  in- 
volved in  war.     It  would  be  then  neceiTary  to  know  the 

defigns 


tfefigns  of  the  enemy.     This  kind  of  knowledge  cannot  al- 
ways be  procured  but  bymeansof#>7V.f,afet  of  wretches  whom 
all  nations  defpifc,  but  whom  all  employ,  and  as  they  would 
affuredly   be   ufed  againfl   us,  a  principle   of  felf  defence 
would  urge  and  juftify  the  ufe  of  them  on  our  part.     Sup- 
pofe  therefore  the  Prefident  could   prevail  upon  a  man  of 
fome  importance  to  go  over  to  the  enemy,  in  order  to  give 
him  fecret  information  of  his  meafures.     He  goes  off  pri- 
vately to  the  enemy.     He  feigns  refentment    againfl  his 
country  for  fome   ill  ufnge,  either  real  or  pretended,  and* 
is  received  poffibly  into  favour  and  confidence.     The  peo- 
ple would  not  know  the  purpofe  for  which  he  was  employ- 
ed.    In  the  mean  time  he  fecretly  informs  the  Prefident 
of  the  enemy's  defigns,  and  by  this  means,  perhaps  thofe 
defigns  are  counteracted,  and  the  country  faved  from  de- 
ftruclion.     After  his  bufinefs  is  executed,  he  returns  into 
his  own  country,  where   the  people,  not  knowing  he  had 
rendered  them  any  fervice,  are  naturally  exafperated  againfl 
him  for  his  fuppofed  treafon.     I  would  a(k  any  gentleman 
whether  the  Prefident  ought  not  to  have  the  power  of  par- 
doning this  man.     Suppofe  the  concurrence  of  the  Senate, 
or   any  ether  body  was  necerTary,  would    this  obnoxious 
perfon  be  properly  fare  ?  We  know  in  every  country  there 
is  a  ftrong  prejudice  againfl  the  executive  authority.     If  a 
prejudice   of  this  kind,  on  fuch  an   occafion,    prevailed 
againfl  the  Prefident,  the  Prefident  might  be  fufpe£led  of 
being  influenced  by  corrupt  motives,  and  the    application, 
in  favour  of  this  man  be  rejected      Such  a   thing  might 
very  pofhbly  happen  when  the  prejudices  of  party    were 
ftrong,  and  therefore  no  man  fo  clearly  entitled  as  in  the 
cafe  I  have  fuppofed,  ought  to  have  his  life  expofed  to  fo 
hazardous  a  contingency. 

The  power  of  impeachment  is  given  by  this  Conflitu- 
tion,  to  bring  great  offenders  to  punifhment.  It  is  calcu- 
lated to  bring  them  to  punifhment  for  crimes  which  it  is 
not  eafy  to  defcribe,  but  which  every  one  mufl  be  con- 
vinced is  a  high  crime  and  mifdemeanor  againfl  the  go- 
vernment. This  power  is  lodged  in  thofe  who  reprefent 
the  great  body  of  the  people,  becaufe  the  occafion  for  its 
exercife  will  arife  from  a£ls  of  great  injury  to  the  commu- 
nity, and  the  objects  of  it  may  be  fuch  as  cannot  beeafily 
reached  by  an  ordinary  tribunal.    The  trial  belongs  to  the, 

Senate, 


(     i37    > 

Senate,  left  an  inferior  tribunal  fhould  be  too  mucli  awed 
fey  (o  powerful  an  accufer.  After  a  trial  thus  folemnly 
conduced,  it  is  not  probable  that  it  would  happen  once 
in  a  thoufand  times,  that  a  man  actually  convicted,  would 
be  entitled  to  merry  ;  aid  if  the  Prefident  had  the  power 
of  pardoning  in  fuch  a  cafe,  this  gr&at  check  upon  high 
officers  of  {fate  would  lefe  much  of  its  influence.  It  feems 
therefore  proper,  that  the  general  power  of  pardoning 
fhould  be  abridged  in  this  particular  inflnnce.  The  pu- 
nlihmenc  annexed  to  conviction  on  impeachment,  can  only 
be  removal  from  office,  and  disqualification  to  hold  ai  y 
pi.ice  of  honour,  truft  or  profit.  But  the  peifon  convicted 
is  further  liable  to  a  trial  at  common  law,  and  may  receive 
fuch  common  law  punifhment  as  belongs  to  a  defcriptibri 
pf  fuch  offences,  if  it  be  ore  puniihable  by  that  law.  I 
•hope,  for  the  reafons  I  have  dated,  that  the  whole  of  this 
;claufe  will  be  approved  by  the  committee.  rl  he  regula- 
tions altogether,  in  my  opinion,  areas  wifely  contrived 
as  they  could  be.  It  is  impoflible  for  imperfect  beings  to> 
form  a  perfect  fyftem.  If  the  prefent  one  may  be  pro- 
ductive of  pofiible  inconveniences,  we  are  not  to  reject  it 
for  that  reafoilj  but  inquire  whether  any  other  fyftem  coulcl 
be  devifed  which  would  be  attended  with  fewer  inconve- 
niences, in  proportion  to  the  advantages  refulting.  But 
we  ought  to  be  exceedingly  attentive  in  examining,  and 
flill  more  cautious  in  deciding,  left  we  fhould  condemn 
what  may  be  worthy  of  applaufe,  or  approve  of  what  may 
be  exceptionable.  I  hope,  that  in  the  explanation  of  this 
claufe,  I  have  not  improperly  taken  up  the  time  of  the* 
committee. 

Mr.  Miller  acknowledged,  that  the  explanatiori  of  this 
claufe  by  the  Member  from  Edenton,  had  obviated  fome 
objections  which  he  had  had  to  it  :  But  (till  he  could  not 
-entirely  approve  of  it.  He  could  not  fee  the  neceffitv  of 
Veiling  this  power  in  the  Prefident.  He  thought  that  his 
influence  would  be  too  great  in  the  country,  and  particu-. 
larly  over  the  military,  by  being  the  Commander  in  Chief  of 
the  army,  navy  and  militia.  He  thought  he  could  too  ea- 
fily  abufe  fuch  lexcenfiye  powers  *,  and  was  of  opinion^ 
that  Congrefs  ought  to  have  power  to  direct  the  motions 
fcf  the  army.     He  confidered  it  as  a  defect  in  the  Confti- 

S  twit  ion* 


(     '3*    ) 

fution,  that  it  wa9  not  exprefsly  provided    that  Congrefg 
fhould  have  rhe  direction  of  the  motions  of  the  army. 

Mr.  S-paight  anfwered,  that  it  was  true  that  the  com- 
mand of  the  army  and  navy  was  given  to  the  Prefident  : 
But  that  CongrefSj  who  had  the  powf-r  pf  raifing  armies,' 
could  certainly  prevent  any  abufe  of  that  authority  in  the 
Prefident.  That  they  alone  had  the  means  of  fupporting 
armies,  and  that  the  Prefident  was  impeachable  if  he  in 
any  manner  abufed  his  truft.  Hfe  was  furprifed  that  any 
objection  fhould  be  made  to  giving  the  command  of  the 
army  to  one  man  ;  That  it  was  well  known,  that  the  di- 
rection of  an  army  could  not  be  properly  exercifed  by  £ 
numerous  body  of  men  :  That  Congrefs  had  in  the  lair, 
war  given  the  exclufive  command  of  the  army  to  the  Com- 
mander in  Chief  ;  and  that  if  they  had  not  done  fo,  per- 
haps the  independence  of  America  would  not  have  been 
eftablifhed. 

Mr.  Porter — Mr.  Chairman,  There  is  a  power  veiled; 
in  the  Senate  and  Prefident  to  make  treaties,  which  thai! 
be  the  fupreme  law  of  the  land.  Which  among  us  can 
Call  them  to  account  ?  I  always  thought  that  there  could 
no  proper  exercife  of  power,  without  the  fuflfrage  of  the; 
people  :  Yet  the  Houfe  of  Reprefentatives  has  no  power 
to  intermeddle  with  treaties  The  Prefident  and  feveit 
Senators,  as  nearly  as  I  can  remember,  can  make  a  treaty 
which  will  be  of  great  advantage  to  the  northern  dates, 
and  equal  injury  to  the  fouthern,  fhites.  They  might  give 
up  the  rivers  and  territory  of  the  fouthern  ftates  :  Yet  in 
the  preamble  of  the  Conftitution,  they  fay,  all  the  Peoplr 
have  done  i  I  mould  be  glad,  to  know  what  power  there/ 
is  of  calling  the  P*  efident  and  Senate  to  account. 

Mr.  Spaight  .anfwered,  that  under  the  Confederation, 
two-thirds  of  the  ftates  might  make  treaties.  That  if  the  Se- 
nators from  all  the  ftates  attended  when  a  treaty  was  about 
to  be  made,  two-thirds  of  the  ftates  would  have  a  voice  in 
its  formation.  He  added,  that  he  would  be  glad  to  afk 
th«  gentleman,  what  mode  there  was  of  calling  the  pre- 
fent  Congrefs  to  account. 

Mr.  Porter  repeated  his  objection.  He  hoped  that  gen* 
tlemen  would  not  impofe  on  the  Houfe.  That  the  Prefix 
dent  could  make  treaties  with  two-thirds  of  the  Senate  ? 
Taat  the  P* efideot  in  that  cafe,  voted  rather  in  si  legifla- 

tivfc 


five,  than  in  an  executive  capacity,  which  he  thought  ini* 
politic. 

5  Governor  Johnflon — TSfir.  Chairman,  In  my  opinion,  i{ 
|here  be  any  difference  between  this  Conftitution  and  the 
Confederation,  with  refpeft  to  treaties,  the  Conftitution 
is  more  fafe  than  the  Confederation.  We  know  that  two 
Members  from  each  (late,  have  a  right  by  the  Confedera- 
tion to  give  the  vote  of  that  (late,  and  two- thirds  of  the 
ftates  have  a  right  alfo  to  make  treaties'.  By  this  Conftituti- 
on two-thirds  of  the  Senators  cannot  make  treaties  without 
the  concurrence  of  the  Prefident.  Here  is  then  an  addi- 
tional guard.  The  calculation  that  feven  or  eight  Senators, 
with  the  Prefident,  can  make  treaties,  is  totally  erroneous. 
Fourteen  is  a  quorum.  Two-thirds  of  which  are  ten.  It 
is  upon  the  improbable  fuppofition  that  they  will  not  at- 
tend, that  the  objection  is  founded,  that  ten  men  with  the 
prefident  can  make  treaties.  Can  it  be  reafonably  fup- 
pofed  that  they  will  not  attend  when  the  moft  important 
bufinefs  is  agitated  5  when  the  interefts  of  their  refpec- 
tive  ftates  are  moft  immediately  affe£ted. 

Mr.  Machine  obferved,  that  the  gentleman  was  out  of 
order  with  his  objection.  That  they  had  not  yet  come  to 
$he  claufe  which  enables  the  Senate  and  Prefident  to  make 
treaties. 

The  fecond  claufe  of  the  fecond  fetlion  read. 

Mr.  Spencer — Mr.  Chairman,  I  rife  to  declare  my  dif- 
japprobation  of  this  likewife.  It  is  an  elTential  article  in 
<©ur  Conftitution,  that  the  legislative,  the  executive  and  the 
lupreme  judicial  powers  of  government,  ought  to  be  forever 
feparate  and  diftin£t  from  each  other.  The  Seriate  in  the 
propofed  government  of  the  United  States,  are  pofiefled 
of  the  legiflative  authority  in  conjun&ion  with  the  Houfe 
of  Representatives.  They  are  likewife  poffefTed  of  the 
fole  power  of  trying  all  impeachments,  which  not  being  re- 
strained to  the  officers  of  the  United  States,  may  be  in- 
tended to  include  all  the  officers  of  the  feveral  ftates  in  the 
union.  And  by  this  claufe  they  poflefs  the  chief  of  the 
executive  power — they  are  in  effecT;  to  form  treaties,  which 
are  to  be  the  law  of  the  land,  and  they  have  obvioufly  in 
effeft  the  appointment  of  all  the  officers  of  the  United 
States  •,  the  Prefident  may  nominate,  but  they  have  a  ne- 
gative upon  his  nomination,  till  he  has  exhaufted  the  num- 
ber 


(     Mo     ) 

hex  of  thofe  he  wifhes  to  be  appointed  :  He  will  be  oblig- 
ed finally  to  acquiefce  in  the  appointment  of  thofe  which 
the  Senate  (hall  nominate,  or  elfe  no  appointment  will 
take  place.  Hence  it  is  eafy  to  perceive,  that  the  Prefident, 
in  order  to  do  any  bu.fi  nefs,  or  to  anfw.er  any  purpcfe  in 
iiis  department  of  his  office,  and  to  keep  himfelf  out  of 
perpetual  hot  water,  will  be  under  a  necefnty  to.  form  a. 
connection  with  that  powerful  body,  and  be  contented  to, 
put  himfelf  at  the  head  of  the  leading  members  who  corn- 
pole  it,  I  do  not  expect  at  this  day,  that  the  outline  and 
organization  of  this  propofed  government  will  be  ma- 
terially altered.  But  I  cannot  but  be  of  opinion,  that 
the  government  would  have  been  infinitely  better  and  more 
iecure,if  the  Prefident  had  been  provided  with  a  {landing 
Council,  cooipofcd  of  one  Member  from  each  of  the  dates, 
the  duration  of  whofe  office  might  have  been  the  fame  as. 
that  of  the  Prefident's  office,  or  for  any  other  period  that: 
jrnight  have  been  thought  more  proper.  For  it  can  hardly  be. 
^uppofed,  that  if  two  Senators  can  be  fent  from  each  (late, 
who  are  fit  to  give  counfel  to  the  Prefident,  that  one  fuch 
cannot  be  found  in  each  date,  qualified  for  that  purpofe. 
Upon  this  plan,  one  half  the  expence  cf  the  Senate,  as  a, 
Handing  Council  to  the  Prefident  in  the  recefs  of  Con.-. 
grefs,  would,  evidently  be  faved  ;  each  date  would  have, 
equal  weight  in  this  Council,  as  it  has  now  in  the  Senate  i 
And  what  renders  this  plan  the  more  eligible  is,  that  twet 
\ery  important  confequences  would  refult  from  it,  which, 
cannot  refult  from  the  prefent  plan.  The  fird  is,  that  the. 
\vhoIe  executive  department,  being  feparate  and  didincl; 
from  that  of  the  kgiflative  and  judicial,  would  be  amena- 
ble to  the  judice  of  the  land— the  Prefident  and  his  Coun- 
cil, or  either  or  any  of  them,  might  be  Impeached,  tried 
and  condemned  for  any  mifdemeanor  in  office.  Whereas 
on  the  prefent  plan  propofed,  the  Senate  who  are  to  advife 
the  Prefident,  and  who  in  effect:  are  poflefled  of  the  chief 
executive  power,  let  their  conduct:  be  what  it  will,  are  not 
amenable  to  the  public  judice  of  their  country  -,  if  they. 
j>iav  be  impeached,  there  is  no  tribunal  inveded  with  juris- 
diction to  try  them.  It  is  true  that  the  propofed  Cohdi- 
tution  provides,  that  when  the  Prefident  is  tried  the  Chief- 
judice  fhall  prefide.  But  I  take  this  to  be  very  little  more. 
than  a  farce.    What  can  the  Seaate  try  him  for  ?  For  do* 

ing 


(     MI     ) 

lag  that  which  they  have  advifed  him  to  do,  and  whicii 
without  their  advice  he  would  not  have  done.  Except 
what  he  may  do  in  a  military  capacity,  when  I  prefume  he 
will  be  entitled  to  be  tried  by  a  court-martial  of  General 
officers,  he  can  do  nothing  in  the  executive  department 
without  the  advice  of  the  Senate,  unlefs  it  be  to  grant 
pardons,  and  adjourn  the  two  Houfcs  of  Congrefsto  fome 
day  to  which  they  cannot  agree  to  adjourn  themfeives,  pro- 
bably to  focne  term  that  may  be  convenient  to  the  leading 
Members  of  the  Senate.  I  cannot  conceive  therefore,  that 
the  Prefident  can  ever  be  tried  by  the.  Senate  with  any  ef- 
fect, or  to  any  purpofe,  for  any  mifdemeanor  in  his  office, 
linlefs  it  mould  extend  to  high  treafon,  or  unlefs  they  (houla 
wifh  to  fix  the  odium  of  any  meafure  on  him,  in  order  to 
exculpate*  themfeives ;  the  latter  of  which  I  cannot  fup- 
pofe  will  ever  happen. 

Another  important  confe.quence  of  the  plan  I  wifh  had 
taken  place,  is,  that  the  office  of  the  Prefident  being  there- 
by uncon ne£ted  with  that  of  the  legiflative,  as  well  as  the 
Judicial,  he  would  enjoy  that  independence  which  is  ne- 
ceffary  to  form  the  intended  check  upon  the  a£h  patted  by 
£he  Legislature  before  they  obtain  the  fan&ion  of  laws, 
put  on  the  prefent  plan,  from  the  ncceffary  connection  of 
ithe  Prefident's  office  with  that  of  the  Senate,  I  have  little 
ground  to  hope,  that  his  firmnefs  will  long  prevail  againfl: 
the  overbearing  power  and  influence  of  the  Senate,  fo  far  as 
to  anfwer  the  purpofe  of  any  confiderable  check  upon  the 
a&s  they  may  think  proper  to  pafs  in  conju&ion  with  the 
Houfeof  Reprefentatives.  For  he  will  foon  find,  that  un- 
lefs he  inclines  to  compound  with  them,  they  can  eafily 
fiinder  and  controul  him  in  the  principal  articles  of  his  of- 
iice.  But  if  nothing  elfe  could  be  faid  in  favour  of  the 
plan  of  a  (landing  Council  to  the  Prefident,  independent  of 
£he  Senate,  the  dividing  the  power  of  the  latter  would  be 
Sufficient  to  recommend  it ;  it  being  of  the  utmoft  imporr 
.tance  toward  the  fecurity  of  the  government,  and  the  li- 
berties of  the  citizens  under  it.  For  I  think  it  muft  be 
^obvious  to  every  unprejudiced  mind,  that  the  combining 
in  the  Senate,  the  power  of  legiflation  with  a  controulirtg 
fhare  in  the  appointment  of  all  the  officers  of  the  United 
States,  except  thofe  chofen  by  the  people,  and  the  power 
of  trying  all  impeachmen^  that  may  bs  fount}  againfl:  fucfy 

officers^ 


(     Ml    ) 

officers,  invefts  the  Senate  at  once  with  fuch  an  enormity 
oT  power,  and  with  fuch  an  overbearing  and  uncontroulabie 
influence,  as  is  incompatible  with  every;  idea  of  fafety  to 
the  liberties  of  a  free  country,  arid  is  calculated  to  (wallow 
tip  all  other  powers,  and  to  render  that  body  a  cjefpotic 
ariftocracy.    ■■' 

'•  Mr.  Porter  recommended  the  molt  ferious  confixleratioa 
when  they  were  about  to  give  away  power-  That  they 
were  not  only  about  to  give  away  power  to  legiflate  of 
make  laws  of  a  fupreme  nature,  and  to  mske  treaties,  which 
might  facrifice  the  moil  valuable  interefts  of  the  commu- 
nity; bat  to  give  a  power  to  the  general  government  to 
drag  the  inhabitants  to  any  part:  of  the  world  as  long  as 
they  pleafed.  That  they  eugh£  not  to  put  it  in  the  power 
of  any  man  or  any  fet  of  men  to'  do  fo  j  and  tliat  the  re- 
prefentation  was  defective,  being  not  a  fubftantial  imme- 
diaterepfeferitation,"  He  obfefved  that  as  treaties  were 
the  fupreme  law  of  the  land,  the  Houfe  of  Repr»  fentativts 
ought  to  have  a  vote  in  making  them,  as  well  as  in  parting 
them.  '•  >    • 

'  Mr.  J.  M'B.Giva  H—Mr.  Chairman,  Permit  me,  Sir,  to 
make  a  few  observations,  to  (hew  how  improper  it  is  to* 
place  fo  much  power  in  fo  few  men,  without  any  refpon- 
fibility  whatever.  Let  us  confider  what  number  of  them* 
Xs  necefTary  to  tranfacl:  the  mod  important  bufinefs.  Two- 
thirds  of,  the  members  prefenr,  with  the  Prefident,  can 
snake  a  treaty.  Fourteen  of  them  are  a  quorum,  twqJ 
thirds  of  which  are  ten.  Thefe  ten  may  make  treaties  and 
alliances.  They  may  involve  usi.n  any  difficulties,  and  dif- 
pofe  of  us  in  any  manner  they  pleafe.  Nay  eight  is  a  ma- 
jority of  a  quorum, and  can  ^o  every  thing  but  make  treaties. 
How  unfafe  are  we,  when  we  have  no  power  of  bringing 
thofe  to  an  account.  It  is  abfurd  to  try  them  before  their 
own  body.  Qur  lives  and  property  are  in  the  hands  of 
eight  or  nine  men.  Will  thefe  gentlemen  entruft  their 
tights  in  this  manner? 

„  Mr.  Davie—* Mr.  Chairman,  Altho'.treaties  are  mere  con- 
ventional acls  between  the  contracting  parties, yet  by  the  law 
©f  nations  th-ey  are  thefupremelawof the  land  to  their  refpec* 
tive  citizens  or  fubje&s.  All  civilized  nations  have  concurred 
in  confid^ring  them  as  paramount  to  an  ordinary  acl:  of  le- 
gation. This  concurrence  is  founded  on  the  reciprocal  con- 
!¥  ■  - "  -.  venience 


yeriience  and  foltd:  advantages  arifing  from  It.  A  due  obfe?~ 
vance  of  treaties  makes  nations  more  friendly  to  e.ich  other* 
arid  is  the  only  meansof  renderinglefs  frequent  thofe  mutual 
hostilities,  which  tend  to  depopulate  and  ruin  contending 
nations.  It  extends  and  facilitates  that  commercial  inter- 
Courfe,  which  founded  on  the  univerfal  protection  of  pri- 
vate property,  has  in  a  meafure  made.the  World, one  nation. 
The  power  of  making  treaties  has  in  all  countries  and 
governments  been  placed  in  the  executive  departments. 
This  has  not  only  been  grounded  on  the  necefiity  and  rea- 
jfon  arifing  from  that  degree  '  of  fecrecy,  defign  and  difc? 
patch,  which  are  always  neceffary  in  negociations  betweea 
liations,  but  to  prevent  their  being  impeded,  or  carried  in** 
to  effect,  by  the  violence,  animofity  and  heat  of  parties, 
v^hich  roo often  infecl  numerous  bodies,  v 'Both -  of  thefe 
reafons  preponderated  in  the  foundation  of  this  part  of  thei 
fyftem.  It  is  true,  Sir,  that  the  late  treaty  between  tiie 
United  States  and  Great-Britairi,  has  not,  in  fome  of  the 
ft'ates,  been  held  as  the  fupreme  law  of  the  land.  Even  in 
this  ftate  an  a£l  of  AiTembly  pafled  to  declare  its  vali- 
dity. But  no  doubt  that  treaty  was  the  fupreme  law  of 
the  land  without  the  fanclion  of  the  AfTembly  -f  becaufe, 
fry  the  Confederation,  Congrefs  hjtd  power  to  make  trea- 
ties. It  was  one  of  thofe  original  rights  of  fovereignty 
which  were  veiled  in  them  ;  and  it  was  not  the. deficiency 
of  constitutional  authority  in  Congrefs  to  make  treaties, 
that  produced  the  necefiity  of  a  law  to.  declare  their  vali«* 
dity  \  but  it  was  owing  to  the  intire  imbecility  of  the  Con- 
federation. On  the  principle  of  the  propriety  of  veiling 
this  power  in  the  executive  department,  it  would  feero. 
that  the  whole  power  of  making  treaties  ought  to  be  left 
to  the  Prefident,  whc%  bemg  elected  by  the  people  o£ 
the  United  States  at  large,  will  have  their  general  intereft 
at  heart*  But  that  jealoufy  of  executive  power  which  has 
fhewn  itfelf  fo  ftrongly  in  all  the  American  governments* 
\voiild  not  admit  this  improvement.  Intereft,  Sir,  has  a 
moft  powerful  influence  over  the  human  mind,  and  is  the. 
bafis  on  which  all  the  tranfa£Hons  of  mankind  are*  built* 
It  was  mentioned  before,  that  the  extreme  jealoufy  of  true 
little  ftates,  and  between  the  commercial  dates  and  the 
non-importing  dates,  produced  the  nee  effity  of  giving  an 
equality  of  fuffrage  to  the  fenate.    The  fame  caufes  made 


(     M4     ) 

h  indifpenfable  to  give  to  the  Senators,  as  Rpprefentatives 
of  dates,  the  power  of  making,  or  rather  ratifying,  trea- 
ties. Although  it  militates  againft  every  idea  of  ju(t  pro- 
portion,that  the  little  (late  of  Rhorfe-Iilmd  mould  have  the 
fame  fuffrage  with  Virgina,  or  the  great  commonwealth 
Of  Maffachufetts  ;  yet  the  fmall  ftates  would  not  eonfent 
to  confederate,  without  an  equal  voice  in  the  formation 
of  treaties.  Without  the  equality,  they  apprehended  that 
their  intereft  would  be  neglected  or  facrificed  in  negocia- 
tions.  This  difficulty  could  not  be  got  over.  It  arofe 
from  the  unalterable  nature  of  things.  Every  man  was 
convinced  of  the  inflexibility  of  the  little  ftates  in  this 
point :  It  therefore  became  neceffary  to  give  them  an  ab- 
folute equality  in  making  treaties. 

The  learned  gentleman  on  my  right  [Mr.  Spencer]  after 
faying  that  this  was  an  enormous  power,  and  that  blend- 
ing the  different  branches  of  government  was  dangerous, 
faid,  that  fuch  accumulated  powers  were  inadmimbJe  and 
contrary  to  all  the  maxims  of  writers.  It  is  true,  the  great 
Montefquieu  and  fevcral  other  writers,  have  laid  it  down; 
as  a  maxim  not  to  be  departed  from,  that  thi  legiflative, 
executive  and  judicial  powers,  mould  be  feparate  and  di£- 
tincl:.  But  the  idea  thatthefe  gentlemen  had  in  view,  has' 
been  mifconceived  or  mifreprefented.  An  abfolute  and 
complete  feparation  is  not  meant  by  them.  It  is  impofTi- 
ble  to  form  a  government  upon  t'hefe  principles.  Thofe' 
ftates  who  had  made  an  abfolute  feparation  of  thefe  three 
powers  their  leading  principle,  have  been  obliged  to  de- 
part from  it.  It  is  a  principle  in  facl:,  which  is  not  to  be 
found  in  any  of  the  ftate  governments.  In  the  govern- 
ment of  New- York,  the  Executive  and  Judiciary  have  a 
negative  fimilar  to  that  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States.  This  is  a  junction  of  all  the  three  powers,  and 
has  been  attended  with  the  mod  happy  effects.  In  this 
ftate  and  mod  of  the  others,  the  executive  and  judicial 
powers  are  dependent  on  the  Legiflature.  Has  not  the 
Legiflature  of  this  ftate  the  power  of  appointing  the  Judg-* 
es  ?  Is*it  not  in  their  power  alfo  to  fix  their  compenfation  ? 
"What  independence  can  there  be  in  perfons  who  are  obli- 
ged to  be  obfequious  and  crtriging  for  their  office  and  fa- 
lary  ?  Are  not  our  Judges  dependent  on  the  Legiflature  for 
©very  morfel  they  eat  ?  It  is  not  difficult  to  difcern  what 

effe& 


(     '45    ) 

effect  this  may  have  on  human  nature.  The  meaning  of* 
this  maxim  I  take  to  be  this,  that  the  whole  legiflative, 
executive,  and  judicial  powers,  mould  not  be  exclufively 
blended  in  any  one  particular  inltance.  The  Senate  try 
impeachments.  This  is  their  only  judicial  cognizance.  As 
to  the  ordinary  objects  of  a  judiciary,  fuch  as  the  decifion 
of  controverfies,  the  trial  of  criminals,  &c  the  judiciary- 
is  perfectly  feparate  and  diftinct  from  the  legiflative  and 
executive  branches.  The  Houfe  of  Lords  in  England, 
have  great  judicial  powers,  yet  this  is  not  confidered  as  a 
blemilh  in  their  Conftitution.  Why  ?  Becaufe  they  have 
not  the  whole  legiflative  power.  Montefquieu,  at  the  fame 
time  that  he  laid  down  this  maxim,  was  writing  in  praife 
of  the  Rritifh  government.  At  the  very  time  he  recom- 
mended this  diftinction  of  powers,  he  pafled  the  higheft 
eulogium  on  a  Conftitution  wherein  they  were  all  partially 
blended.  So  that  the  meaning  of  the  maxim,  as  laid  down 
by  him  and  other  writers,  mud  clearly  be,  that  thefe 
three  branches  muft  not  be  entirely  blended  in  one  body. 
And  this  fyftem  before  you,  comes  up  to  the  maxim  more 
completely  than  the  favourite  government  of  Montefquieu. 
The  gentleman  from  Anfon  has  faid,  that  the  Senate  de~ 
ftroys  the  independence  of  the  Prefident,  becaufe  they 
muft  confirm  the  nomination  of  officers.  The  neceflity  of 
their  interfering  in  the  appointment  of  officers,  refulted 
from  the  fame  reafon  which  produced  the  equality  of  fuf- 
frage.  In  other  countries,  the  Executive  or  Chief  Ma- 
gistrate alone  nominates  and  appoints  officers.  The  fmall 
ftates  would  not  agree  that  the  Houfe  of  Reprefentatives 
fhould  have  a  voice  in  the  appointment  to  offices  ;  and  the 
extreme  jealoufy  of  all  the  ftates,  would  not  give  it  to  the 
Prefident  alone.  In  my  opinion,  it  is  more  proper  as  it  is 
than  it  would  be  in  either  of  thofe  cafes.  The  intereft  of 
each  ftate  will  be  equally  attended  to  in  appointments,  and 
the  choice  will  be  more  judicious  by  the  junction  of  the 
Senate  to  the  Prefident.  Except  in  the  appointments  of 
officers,  and  making  of  treaties,  he  is  not  joined  with 
them  in  any  inftance.  He  is  perfectly  independent  of  them 
in  his  election.  It  is  impoffible  for  human  ingenuity  to 
devife  any  mode  of  election  better  calculated  to  exclude 
undue  influence.  He  is  chofen  by  Electors  appointed  by 
♦the  people.     He  is  elected  on  the  fame  day  in  every  (late, 

T  f» 


(     *4<5    ) 

fo  that  there  can  be  no  poffible  combination  between  the 
Electors.  The  afFe&ions  of  the  people  can  be  the  only 
influence  to  procure  his  election.  If  he  make  a  judicious 
nomination,  is  it  to  be  p relumed  that  the  Senate  will  not 
concur  in  it  ?  Is  it  to  be  fuppofed  the  Legiflatures  will 
choofe  the  moft  depraved  men  in  the  Hates  to  reprefent 
them  in  Congrefs  ?  Should  he  nominate  unworthy  charac- 
ters, can  it  be  reasonably  concluded  that  they  will  confirm 
it  ?  He  then  fays,  that  the  Senators  will  have  influence  to 
get  themfelves  re-elected,  nay,  that  they  will  be  perpetu- 
ally elected.  I  have  very  little  apprehenfion  on  this  ground. 
I  take  it  for  granted,  that  the  man  who  is  once  a  Senator, 
will  very  probably  be  out  for  the  next  fix  years.  Legifla- 
tive  influence  changes — Other  perfons  rife,  who  hare  par- 
ticular connections  to  advance  them  to  office.  If  the  Se- 
nators ftay  fix  years  out  of  the  ftate  governments,  their 
influence  will  be  greatly  diminifhed.  It  will  be  impoffible 
for  the  moft  influential  character  to  get  himfelf  re-elected 
after  being  out  of  the  country  fo  long.  There  will  be  an 
entire  change  in  fix  years.  Such  futile  objections  I  fear 
proceed  from  an  aver  (ion  to  any  general  fyftem.  The 
fame  learned  gentleman  fays,  that  it  would  be  better,  were 
a  Council  confiding  cf  one  from  every  ftate,  fubftiruted 
to  the  Senate.  Another  gentleman  has  objected  to  the 
fmalinefs  of  this  number.  This  (hews  the  impoflibility  of 
fatisfying  all  mens  minds.  I  beg  this  committee  to  place 
thefe  two  objections  together,  and  fee  their  glaring  incon- 
fiftency.  If  there  were  thirteen  Counfellors,  in  the  man- 
ner he  propofes,  it  would  deftroy  the  refponfibility  of  the 
Prefident.  He  muft  have  acted  alfo  with  a  majority  of 
them.  A  majority  of  them  is  feven,  which  would  be  a 
quorum — a  majority  of  thefe  would  be  four,  and  every 
a<St  to  which  the  concurrence  of  the  Senate  and  the  Pre- 
fident is  necefiary,  could  be  decided  by  thefe  four-  Nay, 
lefs  than  a  majority,  even  one  would  fuflke  to  enable  them 
to  do  the  moft  important  acts-.  This,  Sir,  would  be  the 
effect  of  this  Council.  The  deareft  interefts  of  the  com- 
munity would  be  trufted  to  two  men*  Had  this  been  the 
cafe,  the  loudeft  clamours  would  have  been  raifed,  with 
juftice,  againft  the  Conftitution,  and  thefe  gewtlemen  would 
have  loaded  their  own  propofition  with  the  moft  virulent 
abufe, 

Oo 


(     '47     ) 

On  a  due  consideration  of  this  claufe,  It  appears  tha$ 
this  power  could  not  have  been  lodged  as  fafely  any  where 
elfe  as  where  it  is.  The  honourable  gentleman  [Mr. 
M'Dowall]  has  fpoken  of  a  confolidaticn  in  this  govern- 
ment. That  is  a  very  ftrange  inconfiftency,  when  he 
points  out  at  the  fame  time,  the  ncceflity  of  lodging  the 
power  of  making  treaties,  with  the  Reprcfentatives,  where 
the  ilea  of  a  confolidation  can  alone  exift*,  and  when  he 
objects  to  placing  it  in  the  Senate,  where  the  federal  prin- 
ciple is  completely  preferred.  As  the  Senate  reprefents 
the  fovercignty  of  the  dates,  whatever  might  &ffecl  the 
ftates  in  their  political  capacity,  ought  to  be  left  to  them, 
This  is  the  certain  means  of  preventing  a  confolidation. 
How  extremely  abfurd  is  it  to  call  that  difpofition  of  pow- 
er a  confolidation  of  the  ftates,  which  mull  to  all  eternity 
prevent  it  ?  I  have  only  to  add  the  principle  upon  which 
the  General  Convention  went. — That  the  power  of  mak- 
ing treaties  could  no  where  be  fo  fafely  lodged  as  in  the 
Prefident  and  Senate  ;  and  the  extreme  jealoufy  fubfifting 
between  fome  of  the  ftates,  would  not  admit  of  it  elfe- 
where.  If  any  man  will  examine  the  operation  of  that 
jealoufy, in  his-own  bread,  as  a  citizen  of  North-Carolina, 
he  will  foon  feel  the  inflexibility  that  refults  from  it,  and 
perhapl  be  induced  to  acknowledge  the  propriety  of  this 
arrangement. 

Mr.  M'Dowall  declared  that  he  was  of  the  fame  opim- 
nion  as  before,  and  that  he  believed  the  obfervations  which* 
the  gentleman  had  made  on  the  apparent  inconfiflency  of 
his  remarks,  would  have  very  little  weight  with  the  com- 
mittee. That  giving  fuch  extenGve  powers  to  fo  few  men 
in  the  Senate,  was  extremely  dangerous  \  and  that  he  was 
not  the  more  reconciled  to  it  from  its  being  brought  about 
by  the  inflexibility  of  the  fmall,  pitiful  dates  to  the  north. 
He  fuppofed,  that  eight  Members  in  the  Senate  from  thofe 
dates,  with  the  President,  might  do  the  mod  important 
ads. 

Mr.  Spaighi — Mr.  Chairman,  The  gentleman  objecls. 
to  the  fmaliefs  of  the  number,  and  to  their  want  of  refpon- 
fibility.  He  argues  as  if  the  Senators  were  never  to  at- 
tend, and  as  if  the  northern  Senators  were  to  attend  more 
regularly  than  thofe  from  the  fouth.  Nothing  can  be, 
more  unreasonable  than  to  funpofe,   that  they  will  be  ah- 

fent 


(     I4«     ) 

&nt  on  the  moft  important  occasions.  What  refponfibilU 
ty  is  there  in  the  prefent  Congrefs  that  is  not  in  the  Se- 
nate ?  What  refponfibility  is  there  in  our  (late  Legifla- 
tare  ?  The  Senators  are  as  refponfible  as  the  Members  of 
our  Legiflature.  It  is  to  be  obferved,  that  though  the  Se- 
nators are  not  impeachable,  yet  the  President  is.  He  may 
be  impeached  and  punifhed  for  giving  his  confent  to  a  trea- 
ty, whereby  the  intereft,  of  the  community  is  manifeftly 
facrificed. 

Mr.  Spencer— 'Wr.  Chairman,  The  Worthy  gentleman 
from  Halifax  has  endeavoured  to  obvkte  my  objecliona- 
againtt  the  want  of  refponfibility  in  the  Prefident  and  Se- 
nators, and  againft  the  extent  of  their  power.  He  has 
not  removed  my  objections.  It  is  totally  out  of  their  pow- 
er to  fhew  any  degree  of  refponfibility.  The  Executive  is 
tried  by  his  advifers.  The  reafons  I  urged  are  fo  cogent 
and  ftrong  with  me,  that  I  cannot  approve  of  this  claufe. 
I  can  fee  nothing  of  any  weight  againft  them.  [Here  Mr* 
Spencer  fpoke  fo  low  that  he  could  not  be  diftin£tly  heard. j 
I  would  not  give  the  Prefident  and  Senators  power  to  make 
treaties,  becaufe  it  deftroys'  their  refponfibility.  If  a  bad 
treaty  be  made,  and  he  be  impeached  for  it,  the  Senate 
■will  not  pronounce  fentence  againft  him,  becaufe  they  ad- 
vifed  him  to  make  it.  If  they  had  legiflative  power  only7 
it  would  be  unexceptionable  ;  but  when  they  have  the  ap- 
pointment of  officers,  and  fuch  extenfrve  executive  powers,. 
it  gives  them  fuch  weight  as  is  inadmiffible.  Notwith- 
itanding  what  gentlemen  have  faid  in  defence  of  the 
claufe,  the  influence  of  the  Senate  ftill  remains  equally 
formidable  to  me.  The  Prefident  can  do  nothing  unlefs^ 
they  concur  with  him.  In  order  to  obtain  their  concur- 
rence, he  will  comprcmife  with  them.  Had  there  been 
fuch  a  Council  as  I  mentioned,  to  advife  him,  the  Senate- 
would  not  have  had  fuch  dangerous  influence,  and  the  re- 
fponfibility of  the  Prefident  would  have  been  fecured.  This- 
feems  obvioufly  clear  to  be  the  cafe. 

Mr.  Porter — Mr.  Chairman,  I  only  rife  to  make  one  ob* 
fervation  on  what  the  gentleman  has  faid.  He  told  us,  that 
if  the  Senators  were  not  amenable  the  Prefident  was — I 
beg  leave  to  afk  the  gentleman,  if  it  be'not  inconfiftent 
that  they  fhould  punifh  the  Prefident,  whom  they  ad- 
yifed  themfelves  to   do  what  he  is  impeached  for.     My 

•bje&ioH 


(      K» 


<®bjection  ftill  remains.  I  cannot  find  it  in  the  lead  or>via~ 
ted. 

Mr.  Bloochuorth  defired  to  be  informed  whether  treaties 
were  not  to  be  fubmittedto  the  Parliament  in  Great-Britain 
fcefore  they  were  valid. 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  The  objections  to  this  claufe 
•deferve  great  confideration.  I  believe  it  will  be  eafy  to  ob- 
viate the  objections  againd  it,  and  that  it  will  be  found  t© 
■have  been  necefiary,  for  the  reafons  dated  by  the  gentle- 
man from  Halifax,  to  ved  this  power  in  fome  body  compof- 
cd  of  Re;prefentat?ives  of  dates,  where -their  voices  fhould 
be  equal :  For  in  this  cafe  the  fovereignty  of  the  dates  is 
.particularly  concerned ;  and  the  great  caution  of  giving 
the  dates  an  equality  of  fufFrage  in  making  treaties,  was 
for  the  exprefs  purpofe  of  taking  care  of  that  fovereignty,, 
and  attending  to  their  intereds,  as  political  bodies,  in  foreign 
^negotiations.  It  is  objected  to  as  improper,  becaufeif  the 
*Frefident  or  Senate  mould  abufe  their  truft,  there  is  not 
■fufficient  refponfibiiity,  fince  he  can  only  be  tried  by  the 
'Senate,  by  who'fe  advice  he  acted  -,  and  the  Senate  cannot 
*be  tried  at  all.  1  beg  leave  to  obferve,  that  when  any  man 
as  impeached,  it  mud  be  for  an  error  of  the  heart,  and  not 
♦of  the  head.  God  forbid,  that  a  man  in  any  country  ia 
'the  world,  fhould  be  liable  to  be  punifhed  for  want  of  judg- 
ement. This  is  not  the  cafe  here.  As  to  errors  of  the 
lieart  there  is  fufficient  Refponfibiiity.  Should  thefe  be 
•committed,  there  is  a  ready  way  to  bring  him  to  punifhment. 
This  is  a  refponfibiHty  which  anfwers  every  purpofe  that 
could  be  defired  by  a  people  jealous  of  their  liberty.  I  pre- 
sume that  if  the  Prefident,  with  the  advice  of  the  Senate* 
ihould  make  a  treaty  with  a  foreign  power,  and  that  trea- 
ty fhould  be  deemed  unwife,  or  againd  the  intered  of  the 
country,  yet  if  nothing  could  be  objected  againd  it  but  the 
'difference  of  opinion  between  them  and  their  condituents, 
they  could  not  judly  be  obnoxious  to  punifhment.  If  they 
were  punifhable  for  exercifing  their  own  judgment,  and 
not  that  of  their  condituents,  no  man  who  regarded  hh 
reputation  would  accept  the  office  cither  of  a  Senator  or 
Prefident.  Whatever  midake  a  man  may  make,  he  ought 
not  to  be  punifhed  for  it,  nor  his  poderity  rendered  infa- 
mous. But  if  a  man  be  a  villain,  and  wilfully  abufes  hi* 
trud,  he  is  to  be  held  up  as  a  public  offender,  and  ignomi- 
SiGufly  punifhed.  Jl> 


t     «5?    ) 

A  public   officer  ought  not  to  aft  from    a  principle  of 
fear.     Were   he  punifhable  for   want  of  judgment,    he 
would  be  continually  in  dread.     But  when  he  knows  that 
nothing  but  real  guilt    can  difgrace  him,  he  may  do  his 
duty  firmly  if  he  be  an  honed  man,  and   if  he  be  not,  a 
juft  fear  of  difgrace,  may  perhaps,  as  to  the  public,  have 
nearly  the  eiTeA  of  an  intrinfic  principle  of  virtue.      Ac- 
Cording  to  thefe  principles,  I  fuppofe  the  only  inftances  in 
which  the  Prefident  would  be  liable  to  impeachment,  would 
be  where  he  had  received  a  bribe,  or  had  acted  from  fome 
corrupt  motive  or  other.     If  the  Prefident  had  received  a 
bribe  without  the  privity  or  knowledge  of  the  Senate,  from 
a  foreign  power,  and   had,  under  the    influence   of  that 
biibe,  had   addrefs   enough  with  the  Senate,  by  artifices 
and  mifreprefentations,  to   feduce  their  con  fen  t  to  a  per- 
nicious treaty — if  it  appeared  afterwards  that  this  was  the 
cafe,  would  not  that  Senate  be  as   competent    to  try    him 
as  anv  other  perfons  whatsoever  ?  Would  they  not  exclaim 
againft  his  villainy  ?  Would  they  not  feel  a  particular  re- 
'fentrsent  againft  him  for  their  being  made  the  inflrumcnt 
of  his  treacherous  purpofes  ?  In  this   fituation,  if  any  ob- 
jection could   be  made  againft  the  Senate  as  a   proper  tri- 
bunal, it  might  more  properly  be  made  by  the  Prefident 
himfelf,  left  their  refentment   {hould  operate  too  ftronglv, 
rather  than  by  the  public,  on  the  ground  of  a  fuppofed 
partiality.     The  Prefident  miift  certainly  be  punifliuble  for 
giving  falfe  information  to   the  Senate.     He  is  to  regulate 
all  intercourfe  with  foreign  powers,  and  it  is  his  duty  to 
impart  to  the  Senate  every  material  intelligence  he  receives. 
If  it    fiiould  appear  that  he   has  not   given  them   full  in- 
formation,  but  has  concealed  important  intelligence  which 
he  ought  to  have  communicated,  and  by  that  means  induc- 
ed them  to  enter  into  mjfures  injurious  to  their  country, 
znd  whicli  they  would  irot  have  confented  to  had  the  true 
ilate  of  things  been  difclofed  to  them — In  this  cafe,  I  afk 
•whether,  upon  an  impeachment  for  a  mifdemeanor  upon 
fuch  an  account,  the  Senate  would   probably  favour  him  ? 
With  refpccl  to  the  impeachability  of  the  Senate,  that  is 
a  matter  of  doubt.     There  have  been  no  inftances  of  im- 
peachment for    legiflative    mifdemeanors :    And  we  mail 
^ind,  upon  examination,  that  the  inconveniences  rcfulting 
from  iuch  impeachments,  would  more  than  preponderate 

the 


(  'JI  ) 

the  advantages.  There  is  no  greater  honour  in  the  worM, 
than  being  the  reprefentative  of  a  free  people — There  id 
no  truft  on  which  the  happinefs  of  the  people  has  a  greater 
dependence.  Yet,  whoever  heard  of  impeachiug  a  Mem- 
ber of  the  Legiflature  for  any  legiflative  mifcondu£l  ?  Ic 
would  be  a  great  check  on  the  public  bufmefs,  if  a  Mem- 
ber of  the  Aflembly  was  liable  to  punifhment  for  his  con- 
duct, as  fuch.  Unfortunately  it  is  the  cafe,  not  only  in 
other  countries  but  even  in  this,  that  divifions  and  differ- 
ences in  opinion  will  continually  arife.  On  many  quef- 
tions,  there  will  be  two  or  more  parties.  Thefe  often 
judge  with  little  charity  of  each  other,  and  attribute  every 
opposition  to  their  own  fyftem  to  an  ill  motive.  We  know 
this  very  well  from  experience  ;  but,  in  my  opinion,  this 
condant  fufpicion  is  frequently  unjuft.  I  believe  in  gene- 
ral, both  parties  really  think  themfelves  right,  and  that  the 
majority  of  each  commonly  a£t.  with  equal  innocence  of 
intention.  But,  with  the  ufual  want  of  charity  in  thefe 
cafes,  how  dangerous  would  it  be  to  make  a  Member  of 
the  Legiflature  liable  to  impeachment  (  A  mere  difference 
of  opinion  might  be  interpreted  by  the  malignity  of  party, 
into  a  deliberate,  wicked  aelicn.  It,  therefore,  appears  to 
me  at  lead  very  doubtful,  whether  it  would  be  proper  to 
render  the  Senate  impeachable  at  all ;  efpecially  as  in  the 
branches  of  executive  government,  where  their  concur- 
rence is  required,  the  Prefident  is  the  primary  agent,  and 
plainly  refponfible  \  and  they  in  fact  are  but  a  Council  to 
validate  proper,  or  reftrain  improper,  conduct  in  him. — i 
But  if  a  Senator  is  impeachable,  it  could  only  be  for  cor- 
ruption, or  fome  other  wicked  motive  •,  in  which  cafe, 
furely  thofe  Senators  who  had  acTedifrom  upright  motives, 
would  be  competent  to  try  him,  Suppofe  there  had  been 
fuch.a  Council  as  was  propofed,  confiding  of  thirteen,  one 
from  each  ftate,  to  afiift  the  Prefident  in  making  treaties, 
&c.  more  general  alarm  would  have  been  excited,  and 
flronger  oppofition  made  to  this  Conflitution,  than  even 
at  prefent — The  power  of  the  Prefident  would  have  ap- 
peared more  formidable,  and  the  dates  would  have  loft  one 
half  of  their  fecurity  ;  fince,  inftead  of  two  Reprefenta- 
tives,  which  each  has  now  for  thofe  purpofes,  they  would 
have  had  but  one.  A  gentleman  from  New-Hanover  has 
afked^  whether  it  is  not  the  practice  in  Great-Britain  to 

fubrais 


(      '52      ) 

£ubmit  treaties  to  Parliament,  before  they  are  efteemed  va« 
lid.  The  King  has  the  fole  'authority,  by  the  laws  of  tha$ 
Country,  to  make  treaties.  After  treaties  'are  made,  they 
are  frequently  difcuffed  in  the  two  Houfes  of  Parliament ; 
where,  of  late  years,  the  mod  important  meafures  of  go- 
vernment have  been  narrowly  examined.  It  is  ufual  to 
move  for  an  addrefs  of  approbation  ;  and  fuch  has  been 
the  complaifance  of  Parliament  for  a  long  time,  that  this 
feldom  hath  been  with-held.  Sometimes  they  pafs  an  aft 
in  conformity  to  the  treaty  made  :  But  this  I  believe  is  not 
for  the  mere  purpofe  of  confirmation,  but  to  make  altera- 
tions in  a  particular  fyftem,  which  the  change  of  circttm- 
ftances  requires.  The  constitutional  power  of  making 
treaties  is  veiled  in  the  crown  •,  and  the  power  with  whom 
a  treaty  is  made,  confiders  it  as  binding  without  any  a£t  of 
Parliament,  unlefs  an  alteration  by  fuch  is  provided  for  in 
the  treaty  itfelf,  which  I  believe  is  fometimes  the  cafe. 
When  the  treaty  of  peace  was  made  in  1763,  it  con- 
tained ftipulations  for  the  furrender  of  fome  iflands  to  the 
French.  The  iflands  were  given  up,  I  believe,  without  any 
acl:  of  Parliament.  The  power  of  making  treaties  is  very 
important,  and  muft  be  veiled  fomewhere,  in  order  to  coun- 
teract the  dangerous  defigns  of  other  countries,  and  to  be 
able  to  terminate  a  war  when  it  is  begun.  Were  it  known 
that  our  government  was  weak,  two  or  more  European 
powers  might  combine  againfl  us.  Would  it  not  be  politic 
to  have  fome  power  in  this  country,  to  obviate  this  danger 
by  a  treaty  ?  If  this  power  was  injudicioully  limited,  the* 
nations  where  the  power  was  poffefled  without  reftri&ion, 
would  have  greatly  the  advantage  of  us  in  negociation ;  and 
every  one  muft  know,  according  to  modern  policy,  of  what 
moment  an  advantage  in  negociation  is.  The  honourable 
Member  from  Anfon  faid,  that  the  accumulation  of  all  the 
different  branches  of  power  in  the  Senate,  would  be  dan- 
gerous. The  experience  of  other  countries  fhews  that  thi* 
fear  is  without  foundation.  What  is  the  Senate  of  Great- 
Britain  oppofed  to  the  Houfe  of  Commons,  although  it  be 
compofed  of  an  hereditary  nobility,  of  vaft  fortunes,  and 
entirely  independent  of  the  people  ?  Their  weight  is  far 
inferior  to  that  of  the  Commons.  Here  is  a  ftrong  inftanee 
of  the  accumulation  of  powers  of  the  different  branches 
•f  government  without  producing  any  inconvenience.  That 

Senate, 


(     >53    ) 

Senate,  Sir,  is  a  feparate  branch  of  the  Legiflature,  is  the 
great  conftitutional  Council  of  the  Crown,  and  decides  oft 
lives  and  fortur  ,s  in  impeachments,  befides  being  the  ul- 
timate tribunal  for  trying  controversies  refpecling  private 
rights.  Would  it  not  appear  that  all  thefe  things  mould 
render  them  more  formidable  than  the  other  Hcufe  ?  Yet 
the  Commons  have  generally  been  able  to  carry  every  thing 
before  them.  The  circumitance  of  their  reprefenting  the 
great  body  of  the  people,  alone  gives  them  great  weight. 
This  weight  has  great  authority  added  to  it,  by  their  pol- 
fefling  the  right  (a  right  given  to  the  people's  Reprefenta- 
tives  in  Congrefs)  of  exclusively  originating  money  bills. 
The  authority  over  money  will  do  every  thing.  A  govern- 
ment cannot  be  fupported  without  money.  Our  Repre- 
fentativ,es  may  at  any  time  compel  the  Senate  to  agree  to 
areafonable  meafure,by  with-holding  fupplies  till 'the  mea- 
fure  is  confented  to.  There  was  a  great  debate  in  the  Con- 
vention, whether  the  Senate  (hould  have  an  equal  power 
of  originating  money  bills.  It  was  ftrongly  infilled  by 
fome  that  they  mould ;  but  at  length  a  majority  thought  it 
unadvifeable,  and  the  claufe  was  palled  «*s  it  now  ftands. 
I  have  reafon  to  believe  our  own  Reprefentatives  had  a 
great  {hare  in  eftablilhing  this  excellent  regulation,  and  in 
my  opinion  they  deferve  the  public  thanks  for  it.  It  has 
been  objected,  that  this  power  mud  neceflarily  injure  the 
people,  inafmuch  as  a  bare  majority  of  the  Senate  might 
alone  be  affembled,  and  eight  would  be  fufEcient  for  a  de- 
cifion.  This  is  on  a  fuppofition  that  many  of  the  Sena- 
tors would  neglect,  attending.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the 
gentlemen  who  will  be  honored  with  feats  in  Congrefs* 
will  faithfully  execute  their  truft,  as  well  in  attending  as 
in  every  other  part  of  their  duty.  An  objection  of  this 
fort,  will  go  againft  all  government  whatever.  Pofliblc 
abufe  and  neglect  of  attendance,  are  objections  which  may 
be  urged  againft  any  government  which  the  wifdom  of 
man  is  able  to  conftruffc.  When  it  is  known  of  how  much 
importance  attendance  is,  no  Senator  would  dare  to  incur 
the  univerfal  refentment  of  his  fellow-citizens,  by  grofsly 
abfenting  himfelf  from  his  duty.  Do  gentlemen  mean 
that  it  ought  to  have  been  provided  by  the  Conttitution, 
that  the  whole  body  fhould  attend  before  particular  bufi- 
»efs  was  done  ?  Then  it  would  be  in  the  power  of  a  fevr 
U  men* 


(    *S4    1 

men,  by  negletling  to  attend,  to  obftru£l  the  publfc  bti- 
finefs,  and  podibly  bring  on  the  deftru&ion  of  their  coun- 
try. If  this  power  be  improperly  veiled,  it  is  incum- 
bent on  gentlemen  to  tell  us  in  what  body  it  could  be  more 
fafcly  and  properly  lodged.  I  believe,  On  a  ferious  confi- 
deration,  it  will  be  found  that  it  was  neceffary,  for  the 
reafons  mentioned  by  the  gentleman  fro'm  Halifax,  to  velt 
the  power  in  the  Senate  or  in  fome  other  body  reprefenting 
equally  the  fovereignty  of  the  ftates,  and  that  the  power,- 
as  given  in  the  Constitution,  is  not  likely  to  be  .attended 
with  the  evils  which  fome  gentlemen  apprehend.  The 
only  real  ftcurity  of  liberty  in  any  country,  is  the  iealoufy 
and  cifcumfpettion  of  the  people  themfelves.  Let  theni 
be  watchful  over  their  rulers.  Should  they  find  a  combi- 
nation aga"«nft  their  liberties,  and  all  other  methods  appear 
infufficient  to  preferve  them,  thev  have,  thank  God,  an 
ultimate  remedy.  That  pbweif  which  created  the  govern- 
ment, can  deftrOy  it.  Should  the  government,  on  trial, 
be  found  to  want  amendments',  thofe  amendments  can  be 
iriade  in  a  regular  method,  in  a  mode  prefcribed  by  the 
Conftitution  itfelf.  Maffachufetts,  South  Carolina,  New- 
Harapfhire,  and  Virginia,  have  all  propofed  amendments  5 
but  they  all  concurred  in  the  neceftity  of  an  immediate 
N  adoption*  A  conftitutional  mode  of  altering  the  Confti- 
tution itfelf,  is  perhaps,  what  has  never  been  linown  among 
mankind  before.  We  have  this  fecurity,  in  addition  to 
the  natural  watchfulnefs  of  the  people,  which  I  hope  will 
never  be  found  wanting.  The  objections  I  have  anfwered, 
deferved  all  pofftble  attention,  and  for  my  part  I  fhall  aU 
ways  refpeil  that  iealoufy  which  aiifes  from  the  love  of 
public  liberty. 

Mr.  Spencer — Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  that  no  argument 
<ian  be  ufed  to  {hew  that  this  power  is  proper.  If  the 
whole  legislative  body — if  the  Houfe  of  Representatives 
do  not  interfere  in  making  treaties,  I  think  they  ought  at 
leaft  to  have  the  fan£tion  of  the  whole  Senate.  The  wor- 
thy gentleman  laft  up,  has  mentioned  two  cafes  wherein 
he  fuppofes  that  impeachments  will  be  fairly  tried  by  the 
Senators.  He  fuppofes  a  cafe  where  the  Prefident  had 
been  guilty  of  corruption,  and  by  that  means  had  brought 
over  and  got  the  fan&ion  of  two- thirds  of  the  Senators* 
and  that  if  it  fhould  be  afterwards  found  that  he  brought 

ther# 


(   *s$   ) 

them  over  by  artifices,  that  they  would  be  a  proper  body 
to  try  him.  As  they  will  be  ready  to  throw  the  odium 
pff  their  own  fhoulders  on  him,  they  may  pronounce  fen- 
jtence  again  ft  him.  He  mentions  another  cafe,  where,  if 
a  majority  was  obtained  by  bribing  fome  of  the  Senators, 
that  thofe  who  were  innocent  might  try  thofe  who  were 
guilty.  I  think  that  thefe  cafes  will  happen  but  rarely  in 
comparifon  to  other  cafes,  where  the  Senators  may  advife 
the  Prefulent  to  deviate  from  his  duty,  and  where  a  maT 
jority  of  them  may  be  guilty.  And  ihould  they  be  tried 
by  their  own  body  when  thus  guilty,  does  not  every  body 
fee  the  impropriety  of  it  ?  It  is  unjverfally  difgracefui, 
odious,  and  contemptible  ro  have  a  trial  where  the  Judges 
are  acceffary  to  the  mifdemeanor  of  the  accufed.  Whe- 
ther the  accufation  againft  him  be  true  or  not,  if  afraid 
for  themfelyes,  they  will  endeavour  to  throw  the  odium 
upon  him.  There  is  an  extreme  difference  between  the 
cafe  of  trying  this  officer  and  that  of  trying  their  own 
Members.  They  are  fo  different  that  I  confider  they  will 
always  acquit  their  own  Members,  and  if  they  condemr* 
the  Prefident,  it  will  be  to  exonerate  themfelves.  It  ap- 
pears to  me,  that  the  powers  are  too  extenfive,  and  not 
fuffioiently  guarded.  I  dp  not  wilh  that  an  ariftocracy 
(hould  be  inftituted.  An  ariftocracy  may  arifc  out  of  this 
government,  though  the  Members  be  not  hereditary.  I 
yould  therefore  wilh  that  ev&ry  guard  fhould  be  placed,  in 
order  to  prevent  it.  I  wifh  gentlemen  would  refledl  that 
the  powers  of  the  Senate  are  fo  great  in  their  legiflative 
and  judicial  capacities,  that  when  addad  to  their  executive 
powers,  particularly  their  interference  in  the  appointment 
pf  all  officers  in  the.  continent,  that  tfiey  will  render  their 
power  fo  enormous  as  to  enable  them  to  deftroy  our  rights 
and  privileges.  This,  Sir,  ought  to  be  ftri&ly  guarded 
againft. 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  The  honourable  gentleman 
mud  be  miftaken.  He  fuggefts  that  an  ariftocracy  will 
arife  out  of  this  government.  Is  there  any  thing  like  an 
ariftocracy  in  this  government  ?  This  infinuation  is  un- 
candidly  calculated  to  alarm  and  catch  prejudices.  la  this 
government  there  is  not  the  leaft  fymptom  of  an  arifto- 
cracy, which  is,  where  the  government  is  in  a  feledl  body 
pf  men   entirely   independent   of  the  people  j  as  for  in- 

ftance, 


(  tjtf  ) 

ftarice,  an  hereditary  nobility,  or  a  Senate  for  life  filling 
top  vacancies  by  their  own  authority.  Will  any  Member 
of  this  government  hold  his  flation  by  any  fuch  tenure  ? 
Will  not  all  authority  flow,  in  every  inftance,  directly  or 
indirectly  from  the  people  ?  It  is  contended  by  that  gen- 
tleman, that  the  addition  of  the  power  of  making  treaties, 
to  their  other  powers,  will  make  the  Senate  dangerous  : 
That  they  would  be  even  dangerous  to  the  Reprefentatives 
of  the  people.  The  gentleman  has  not  proved  this  in 
theory.  Whence  will  he  adduce  an  example  to  prove  it  ? 
What  pafTes  in  England,  directly  difproves  his  afiertion. 
In  that  country  the  Reprefentatives  of  the  people  are  chofen 
under  undue  influence  j  frequently  by  direct  bribery  and 
corruption.  They  are  elected  for  feven  years,  and  many 
of  the  Members  hold  offices  under  the  crown,  fome  du- 
ring pleafure,  others  for  life.  They  are  alfo  not  a  genu- 
ine reprefentation  of  the  people,  but,  from  a  change  of 
circumftances,  a  mere  fhadow  of  it.  Yet  under  thefe  dis- 
advantages, they  having  the  fole  power  of  originating 
money  bills,  it  has  been  found  that  the  power  of  the  King 
and  Lords  is  much  lefs  confiderable  than  theirs.  The  high 
prerogatives  of  the  King,  and  the  great  power  and  wealth 
of  the  Lords,  have  been  more  than  once  mentioned  in 
the  courfe  of  the  debates.  If  under  fuch  circumftances, 
fuch  Reprefentatives,  mere  (hadows  of  Reprefentatives, 
by  having  the  power  of  the  purfe,  and  the  facred  name  of 
the  people  to  rely  upon,  are  an  over  match  for  the  King 
and  Lords,  who  have  fuch  great  hereditary  qualifications, 
we  may  fafely  conclude  that  our  own  Reprefentatives, 
who  will  be  a  genuine  reprefentation  of  the  people,  and 
have  equally  the  right  of  originating  money  bills,  will  at 
leaft  be  a  match  for  the  Senate,  pofleffing  qualifications 
fo  inferior  to  thofe  of  the  Houfe  of  Lords  in  England.  It 
feems  to  be  forgotten  that  the  Senate  is  placed  there  for 
a  very  valuable  purpofe — as  a  guard  againft  any  attempt 
of  consolidation.  The  Members  of  the  Convention  were 
as  much  averfe  to  confolidation  as  any  gentleman  on  thi* 
floor ;  but  without  this  inftitution  (I  mean  the  Senate, 
where  the  Suffrages  of  the 'dates  are  equal)  the  danger 
would  be  greater.  There  ought  to  be  fome  power  given  to 
the  Senate  to  counteract  the  influence  of  the  people  by 
their  biennial  reprefentation  in  the  other  Houfe,  in  order 

t© 


(    iS7    ) 

to  preferve  completely  the  foverelgnty  of  the  ftates.  IF 
the  people  through  the  medium  of  their  Reprefentatives 
pofleifcd  a  (hare  in  making  treaties  and  appointing  officers, 
would  there  not  be  a  greater  balance  of  power  in  the 
Houfe  of  Reprefentatives  than  fuch  a  government  ought 
to  poffefs  ?  It  is  true  that  it  would  be  very  improper  if  the 
Senate  had  authority  to  prevent  the  Houfe  of  Reprefenta- 
tives from  protecting  the  people.  It  would  be  equally  fo, 
if  the  Houfe  of  Reprefentatives  were  able  to  prevent 
the  Senate  from  protecting  the  fovereignty  of  the  ftates. 
It  is  probable  that  either  Houfe  would  have  fufficient  au- 
thority to  prevent  much  mifchief.  As  to  the  fuggeftion 
of  a  tendency  to  ariftocracy,  it  is  totally  groundlefs.  I 
difdain  every  principle  of  ariftocracy.  There  is  not  a 
ihadow  of  an  ariftocratical  principle  in  this  government. 
The  Prelident  is  only  chofen  for  four  years — liable  to  be 
Impeached — and  dependent  on  the  people  at  large  for  his 
re-election.  Can  this  mode  of  appointment  be  faid  to 
have  an  ariftocratical  principle  in  it  £  The  Senate  h  chofen 
by  the  Legiflatures.  Let  us  confider  the  example  of  other 
states,  with  refpedr,  to  the  conftruction  of  their  Senate. 
In  this  point  moft  of  them  differ  ;  though  they  almoft  all 
concur  in  this,  that  the  term  of  election  for  Senators  is 
longer  than  that  for  Reprefentatives.  The  reafon  of  this 
is,  to  introduce  liability  into  the  laws,  and  to  prevent  that 
mutability  which  would  refult  from  annual  elections  o£ 
hoth  branches.  In  New-York  they  are  chofen  for  three 
■years.  In  Virginia  they  are  chofen  for  four  years  ;  and  in 
Maryland  they  are  chofen  for  five  years.  In  this  Confti- 
&ution,  although  ^they  are  chofen  for  fix  years,  one-third 
^o  out  every  fecond  year  (a  method  purfued  in  fome  of  the 
llate  Conftitutions)  which  at  the  fame  time  fecures  {labi- 
lity to  the  laws,  and  a  due  dependence  on  the  flate  Le- 
giflatures. Wjill  any  man  fay  that  there  are  any  ariftocra- 
tical principles  in  a  body  who  have  no  power  independent 
of  the  people,  and  whereof  one-third  of  the  Members  are 
■chofen  every  fecond  year,  by  a  wife  and  felecl:  body  of 
Electors  ?  I  hope,  therefore,  that  it  will  not  be  confidered 
that  there  are  any  ariftocratical  principles  in  this  govern- 
•snent,and  that  it  will  be  given  up  as  a  point  not  to  be  con- 
tended for.  The  gentleman  contends  that  a  Council  ought 
to  be  inftkuted  in  this  cafe.     One  objection  ought  to  be 

compared 


r  »58  ) 

compared  with  another.     It  has  been  objected  againft  the 
jponftitution,  that  it  will  be  productive  of  great  expence. 
Had  there   been  a  Council,  it  would*  have  been  objected, 
that   it  was    calculated   for  creating  new    offices    and  in- 
creafing  the  means  of  undue   influence.     Though  he  ap- 
proves of  a  Council,  others  would  not.     As  to  offices,  the 
Senate  has  no  other  influence  but  a  reftraint  on  improper 
appointments.     The   Prefident    propofes  fuch  a  man   for 
fuch  an  office — -The  Senate  has  to  confider  upon  it — If  they 
think  him  improper,  the  Prefident  mufl  nominate  another, 
whofe  appointment  ultimately  again  depends  upon  the  Se- 
nate.    Suppofe  a  man  nominated  by  the  Prefident,  with 
what  face  would  any  Senator  pbje^  to  him  without  a  good 
reafon  ?  There  mult  be  fome  decorum  in  every  public  bo- 
dy.    He  would  not  fay,    '« I  do  not  choofe  this  man,  be- 
€t  caufe  a  friend   of  mine  wants  the  office."     Were  he  to 
objeel  to  'the  nomination  of  the  Prefident,   without  align- 
ing any    reafon,  his  conduct   would  be   reprobated,  and 
flill  might  not  anfwer  his   purpofe.     Were  an  office  to  be 
Vacant,  for  which  an  hundred  men  on  the  continent  were 
equally  well  qualified,  there  would  be  an  hundred  chances 
to  one,  whether  his  friend  would  be  nominated  to  it.   Thiji 
in  efFe6t,  is  but  a  reftriction  on  the  Prefident.    The  power 
of  the  Senate   would  be  more  likely  to  be  abufed  were  it 
veiled  in  a  Council  of  Thirteen,  of  which  there  would  be 
one  from  each  date.     One  man  could  be  more  eafily  in- 
fluenced than  two,     We  have  therefore  a  double  fecurity. 
I  am  firmly  of  opinion,  that  if  you  take  all  the  powers  of 
the  Prefident   and  Senate   together,  the  vafl  influence  of 
theReprefentatives  of  the  people,  will  preponderate  againft 
them  in   every  cafe  where  the  public  good  is  really    con.r 
cerned. 

Mr.  Bloodiodrth — Mr.  Chairman,  I  confefs  I  am  forry  to 
take  up  any  time  ;  I  beg  leave  to  make  a  few  obfervations, 
for  it  would  be  an  Herculean  tafk,  and  difagreeable  to  this 
committee,  to  mention  every  thing.  It  has  indeed  been 
objecTed  and  urged,  that  the  refponfibility  of  the  Senate, 
was  not  fufficient  to  fecure  the  ftates.  When  we  confider 
the  length  of  the  term  for  which  they  are  elected',  and 
the  extent  of  their  powers,  we  mufl  be  perfuaded  that 
there  is  no  real  fecurity.  A  gentleman  has  faid  that  the 
Afiembly  of  North- Carolina  are  rogues.  It  is  then  pro- 
bable 


(    ijj     ) 

table  that  they  may  be  corrupted.  In  this  cafe  we  hafe* 
not  a  fufficient  check  on  thofe  gentlemen  who  are  gone  fi* 
years.  A  parallel  is  drawn  between  them  and  the  Mem- 
bers of  our  Aflembly  ;  but  if  you  reflect  a  moment,  you  will 
find  that  the  comparifon  is  not  good.  There  is  a  rtiponfi- 
bility  in  the  Members  of  the  Arfembly  ,  at  the  end  of  a  year 
they  are  liable  tp  be  turned  out.  This  is  not  the  cafe  with 
the  Senators.  I  beg  gentlemen  to  confider  the  fcxtreme 
difference  between  the  two  cafes.  Much  is  faid  about  trea- 
ties. I  do  not  dread  this  fo  much  as  what  will  arife  trom  the 
jarring  interefts  of  the  eaftern,  ibut.hefn,  and  the  middle 
ftates.  They  are  different  in.  foil^  climate,  cuftoms,  pro- 
duce and  every  thing.  Regulations  will  be  made  evidently 
to  the  difadvantage  of  fome  part  of  the  community,  and 
mod  probably  to  ours.  I  will  not  take  up  more  of  the 
time  of  the  committe.     ; 

Third  claufe  of  the   fecond  feclion  of  the  fecond  arti- 
cle read. 

.  Mr.  Machine — It  has  been  objected  to  this  part,  that 
the  power,  of  appointing  officers  was  femething  like  a 
monarchical  power.  Congrefs  are  not  to  be  fitting  at  ail 
times  s.  they  will  only  fit  from  time  to  time  as  the  public 
bufinefs  may  fender  it  neceffary.  Therefore  the  Executive 
ought  to  make  temporary  appointments^  as  well  as  receive 
AmbafTadors  and  other  Public  Minifters.  This  power  can 
be  veiled  no  where  but  in  the  Executive,  becaufe  he  is 
perpetually  acting  for  the  public.  For  though  the  Senate 
is  to  advife  him  in  the  appointment  of  officers,  &c,  yet, 
during  their  recefs,-  the  Prelident  muft  do  this  bufinefs  or 
elfe  it  will  be  neglected,  and  fuch.  neglect  may  occafiori 
public  inconveniences.  But  there  is  an  objection  made  to 
another  part,  that  has  not  yet  been  read.  His  power  ot 
adjourning  both  Houfes  when  they  difagree,  has  been  by 
fome  people  conftrued  to  extend  to  any  length  of  time. 
If  gentlemen  look  at  another  part  of  the  Constitution, 
they  will  find  that  there  is  a  pofitive  injunction  that  the 
fcongrefs  muft  meet  at  haft  once  in  every  year:  So  that  he 
cannot,  were  he  fo  inclined,  prevent  their  meeting  within 
a  year.  Gne  of  the  bed  provilions  contained  in  it  is,  that 
he  ffiaUcommiffion  all  officers  of  the  United  States,  and 
fhall  take  care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed.  If  be 
takes  care  to  lee  the  laws  faithfully  executed,  it  will  be 

mors* 


(     itfo    ) 

atore  than  is  done  in  any  government  on  the  continent, 
for  I  will  venture  to  fay  that  our  government,  and  thofe  of 
the  other  ftates,  are,  with  refpect  to  the  execution  of  the 
laws,  in  many  refpects,  mere  cyphers. 

Reft  of  the  article  read  without  any  obfervations. 

Article  third,  firft  and  fecond  fections  read. 

Mr.  Speneer  —Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  objections  to  this 
article.  I  object  to  the  exclufive  jurifdiction  of  the  Fede- 
ral Court  in  all  cafes  of  law  and  equity  arifing  under  the 
Conftitution  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  to  the 
appellate  jurifdiction  of  controverfies  between  the  citizens 
of  different  ftates,  and  a  few  other  inftances.  To  thefe 
I  object  becaufe  I  believe  they  will  be  oppreffive  in  theiy 
operation.  I  would  wifh  that  the  Federal  Court  mould 
not  interfere  or  have  any  thing  to  do  with  controverfies> 
to  the  decifion  of  which  the  ftate  judiciaries  might  be  fully 
competent,  nor  with  fuch  controverfies  as  muft  carry  the? 
people  a  great  way  from  home.  With  refpect  to  the  ju- 
arifdiction  of  cafes  arifing  under  the  Conftitution,  when 
we  reflect  on  the  very  extenfive  objects  of  the  plan  of  go- 
vernment— the  manner  in  which  they  may  arife — and  the 
multiplicity  of  laws  that  may  be  made  with  refpect  to 
them,  the  objection  againft  it  will  appear  to  be  well  found- 
ed. If  we  confider  nothing  but  the  articles  of  taxation, 
duties,  and  excifes,  and  the  laws  that  might  be  made  with 
refpect  to  thefe,  the  cafes  will  be  almoft  infinite.  If  we 
confider  that  it  is  in  coatemplation  that  a  ftamp  duty  (hall 
take  place  throughout  the  continent ;  that  all  contracts 
ihall  be  on  ftamp  paper ;  that  no  contracts  mould  be  of 
validity  but  what  would  be  thus  ftamped  ^  thefe  cafes  will 
be  fo  many  that  the  confequences  would  be  dreadful.  It 
would  be  neceffary  to  appoint  Judges  to  the  Federal  Su- 
preme Court,  and  other  inferior  departments,  and  fuch 
a  number  of  inferior  courts  in  every  diftrict  and  county, 
with  a  correfpondent  number  of  officers,  that  it  would 
coft  an  immenfe  expence  without  any  apparent  neceffity  5 
which  muft  operate  to  the  diftrefs  of  the  inhabitants. — 
There  will  be,  without  any  manner  of  doubt,  clafhings 
and  animofities  between  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Federal 
Courts  and  of  the  ftate  courts,  fo  that  they  will  keep  the 
country  in  hot  water.  It  has  been  faid  that  the  impro- 
priety of  this  was  mentioned  by  fome  in  the  Convention. 


(     i6i     ) 

1  cannot  fee  the  reafons  of  giving  the  Federal  Courts  jll- 
rifdiction  in  thefe  cafes,  but  I  am  fure  it  will  occafion 
great  expence  unnecefTarily.  The  ftate  judiciaries  will 
have  very  little  to  do.  It  will  be  almoft  ufelefs  to  keep 
them  up.  As  all  officers  are  to  take  an  oath  to  fupporc 
the  general  government,  it  will  carry  every  thing  before 
it.  This  will  produce  that  consolidation  through  the 
United  States  which  is  apprehended.  I  am  fure  that  I  do 
not  fee  that  it  is  poffible  to  avoid  k.  I  can  fee  no  power 
that  can  keep  up  the  little  remains  of  the  power  of  the 
dates.  Our  rights  are  not  guarded.  There  is  no  decla- 
ration of  rights,  to  fecure  to  every  member  of  the  fociety 
thofe  unalienable  rights  which  ought  not  to  be  given  up  to 
any  government.  Such  a  bill  of  rights  would  be  a  check 
upon  men  in  power.  Inftead  of  fuch  a  bill  of  rights, 
this  Constitution  has  a  claufe,  which  may  warrant  en- 
croachments on  the  power  of  the  refpe£tive  ftate  Legifla- 
tures.  I  know  it  is  faid  that  what  is  not  given  up  to  the 
United  States  will  be  retained  by  the  individual  dates.  I 
know  it  ought  to  be  fo,  and  mould  be  fo  underftood;  but, 
Sir,  it  is  not  declared  to  be  fo.  In  the  confederation  it  is 
exprefsly  declared  that  all  rights  and  powers,  of  any  kind 
whatever,  of  the  feveral  ftates,  which  are  not  given  lip 
to  the  United  States,  are  exprefsly  and  abfolutely  retained 
to  be  enjoyed  by  the  ftates.  There  ought  to  be  a  bill  o£ 
rights,  in  order  that  thofe  in  power  may  not  ftep  over  the 
boundary  between  the  powers  of  government  and  the 
rights  of  the  people,  which  they  may  do,  when  there  is 
nothing  to  prevent  them.  They  may  do  fo  without  a  bill 
of  rights  •,  notice  will  not  be  readily  taken  of  the  encroach- 
ments of  ruleis,  and  they  may  go  a  great  length,  before 
the  people  are  alarmed.  Oppreffions  may  therefore  take 
place  by  degrees,  but  if  there  were  exprefs  terms  and 
bounds  laid  down,  when  thefe  were  pafled  by,  the  people 
would  take  notice  of  them,  and  oppreffions  would  not  be 
carried  on  to  fuch  a  length.  .  I  look  upon  it  therefore  that 
there  ought  to  be  fomething  to  confine  the  power  of  this 
government  within  its  proper  boundaries.  I  know  thac 
feveral  writers  have  faid  that  a  bill  of  rights  is  not  necef- 
fary  in  this  country ;  that  fome  ftates  had  them  not,  and 
that  others  had.  To  thefe  I  anfwer,  that  thofe  ftates  that 
^are  then}  not  sis  bills  of  right,  ftrjftjy  fo  galled,  hav« 

X  them 


(  tffl  ) 

them  in  the  frame  of  their  conftitution,  which  is  nearly 
the  fame. 

There  has  been  a  comparifon  made  of  our  (ituation 
with  Great-Britain.  We  have  no  crown  or  prerogative  of 
a  King  like  the  Britim  Conftitution.  I  take  it,  that  the 
fubje<3  has  been  mifunderftood.  In  Great- Britain,  when 
the  King  attempts  to  ufurp  the  rights  of  the  people,  the 
declaration  and  bill  of  rights  are  a  guard  againft  him.  A 
bill  of  rights  would  be  neceffary  here  to  guard  againft  our 
rulers.  I  wifh  to  have  a  bill  of  rights,  to  fecure  thofe  un- 
alienable rights,  which  are  called  by  fome  refpeclable  wtU 
ters  the  rejiduum  of  human  rights,  which  are  never  to  be 
given  up.  At  the  fame  time  that  it  would  give  feeurity  to 
Individuals,  it  would  add  to  the  general  ftrength.  It  might 
not  be  fo  neceffary  to  have  a  bill  of  rights  in  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  if  fuch  means  had  not  been 
made  ufe  of,  as  endanger  a  consolidation  of  all  the  ftates  y 
but  at  any  event  it  would  be  proper  to  have  one,  beeatrfe 
though  it  might  not  be  of  any  other  fervice,  it  would  at 
lead  fatisfy  the  minds  of  the  people.  It  would  keep  the 
ftates  from  being  fwal lowed  up  by  a  confolidated  govern- 
ment. For  the  reafons  I  before  gave,  I  think  that  the  ju- 
rifdi&ion  of  the  Federal  Court,  with  refpecl  to  all  cafes 
in  law  and  equity,  and  the  laws  of  Congrefs,  and  the  ap- 
peals in  all  cafes  between  citizens  of  different  ftates,  &c* 
is  inadmiffible.  I  do  not  fee  the  neceflaty  that  it  fhould  be 
vefted  with  the  cognizance  of  all  thefe  matters.  I  am  de- 
firous,  and  have  no  objection  to  their  having  one  Supreme 
Federal  Court  for  general  matters  ;  but  if  the  Federal 
Courts  have  cognizance  of  thofe  fubje&s  which  I  mention- 
ed, very  great  oppreffions  may  arife.  Nothing  can  be  more 
©ppreflive  than  the  cognizance  with  refpecl:  to  controver- 
sies between  citizens  of  different  ftates.  In  all  cafes  of 
appeal,  thofe  perfons  who  are  able  to  pay,  had  better  pay 
down  in  the  firft  inftance,  though  k  be  unjuft,  than  be  at 
fuch  a  dreadful  expence,  by  going  fuch  a  diftance  to  the 
Supreme  Federal  Court,  Some  of  the  moft  refpe&able 
ftates  have  propofed  by  way  of  amendment,  to  ftrikc 
out  a  great  part  of  thefe  two  claufes.  If  they  be  admit- 
ted as  they  are,  it  will  render  the  country  entirely  un- 
happy. On  the  contrary,  I  fee  no  inconvenience  from  r«- 
iating  the  power  «ti  has  been  propof«4.    I  am  of  opinion 


{     $)    ) 

that  it  is  inconfiftent  with  the  happinefs  of  the  psople  t# 
admit  thefe  two  claufes.  The  ftate  Courts  are  fu  Indent 
to  decide  the  common  controversies  of  the  people,  with- 
out diftrefling  them  by  carrying  them  to  fuch  far  diftanfc 
tribunals.  If  I  did  not  confider  thefe  two  claufes  to  be 
dangerous,  I  mould  not  object  to  them.  I  mean  not  to 
object  to  any  thing  that  is  not  abfolutely  neceflary.  J  wi£J| 
to  be  candid,  and  not  be  prejudiced  or  warped. 

Mr.  Spaight — Mr.  Chairman,  The  gentleman  infinuate* 
that  differences  exifted  in  the  Federal  Convention  refpect- 
ing  the  claufes  which  he  objects  to.  "Whoever  told  him 
fo  was  wrong,  for  I  declare,  that  in  that  Convention,  the 
unanimous  defire  of  all,  was  to  keep  feparate  and  diftinct 
the  objects  of  the  jurifdiction  of  the  federal  from  that  of 
the  ftate  judiciary.  They  wiihed  to  feparate  them  as  ju- 
dicioufly  as  poflibte,  and  to  confult  the  eafe  and  conveni- 
ence of  the  people,  The  gentleman  objects  to  the  cog- 
nizance of  all  cafes  in  law  and  equity  arifing  under  th^ 
Constitution  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States.  This  oh? 
Jection  is  very  aftoniftiing.  When  any  government  is 
cftablifhed,  it  ought  to  have  power  to  enforce  its  laws,  or 
dfe  it  might  as  well  have  no  power.  What  but  that  is  the 
aife  of  a  Judiciary  ?  The  gentleman,  from  his  profeflion^ 
mud  know  that  no  government  can  exift  without  a  Judi- 
ciary to  enforce  its  laws,  by  diftinguiftring  the  difobedient 
from  the  reft  of  the  people,  and  impofing  Sanctions  for 
lecuring  the  execution  of  the  laws.  As  to  the  inconveni- 
ence of  diftant  attendance,  Congrefs  has  power  of  efta- 
blifhing  inferior  tribunals  in  each  ftate,  fo  as  to  accommo- 
elate  every  citizen.  As  Congrefs  have  it  in  their  power 
will  they  not  do  it  f  Are  we  to  elect  men  who  will  wan? 
jtonly  and  unneceiTarily  betray  us  ? 

Mr.  Machine — Mr.  Chairman,  I  hoped  that  fome  gen- 
tleman more  capable  than  myfelf,  would  have  obviated 
the  objections  to  this  part.  The  objections  offered  by  the 
gentleman,  appear  to  me  totally  without  foundation.  He 
told  us  that  thefe  claufes  tended  to  a  consolidation  of  the 
flates.  I  cannot  fee  how  the  ftates  are  to  be  confolidatei 
by  eftablifhing  thefe  two  claufes.  He  enumerated  a  num- 
ber of  cafes  which  would  be  involved  within  the  cogni- 
zance of  the  Federal  Courts;  cuftoms,  excifes,  duties,, 
Samp  4utiqs,  a  ftamp  on  every  article,  on  every  contract^ 


(     I«4     ) 

in  order  to  bring  all  perfons  into  the  Federal  Court ;  and 
iaid  that  there  would  be  neceffarily  courts  in  every  diftri£t 
and  county,  which  would  be  attended  with  enormous  and 
needlefs  expence,  for  that  the  ftate  courts  could  do  every 
thing.  He  went  on  further,  and  faid  that  there  would  be 
a  neceffity  of  having  fheriffs  and  other  officers  in  thefe  in- 
ferior departments.  A  wonderful  picture  indeed,  drawn 
up  in  a  wonderful  manner !  I  will  venture  to  fay  that  the 
gentleman's  fuggeftions  are  not  warranted  by  any  reason- 
able conftruction  of  the  Conftitution.  The  laws  can,  in> 
general,  be  executed  by  the  officers  of  the  ftates;  State 
courts  and  ftate  officers  will,  for  the  rnoft  part,  probably 
anfwer  the  purpofe  of  Gongrefs  as  well  as  any  other.  But 
the  gentleman  fays  that  the  ftate  courts  will  be  fwallowed 
up  by  the  Federal  Courts.  This  is  only  a  general  aftertion, 
unfupported  by  any  probable  reafons  or  arguments.  The 
objects  of  each  are  feparate  and  diftincT:.  I  fuppofe  that 
whatever  courts  there  may  be,  they  will  be  eftablifhed  ac- 
cording to  the  convenience  of  the  people;  This  we  muft 
fuppofe  from  the  mode  of  electing  and  appointing  the 
Members  of  the  government.  State  officers  will  as  much 
as  poffible  be  employed,  for  one  very  confiderable  reafon^, 
I  mean  to  leffien  the  expence.  But  he  imagines  that  the 
oath  to  be  taken  by  officers,  will  tend  to  the  fubverfion  o£ 
our  ftate  governments  and  of  our  liberty;  Can  any  go- 
vernment exift  without  fidelity  in  its  officers  I  Ought  not 
the  officers  of  every  government  to  give  fome  fecurity  for 
the  faithful  difcharge  of  their  truft  ?  The  officers  are  only;- 
to  be  fworn  to  fupport  the  Conftitution,  and  therefore  will! 
only  be  bound  by  their  oath  fo  far  as  it  {hall  be  ftricl:lp 
purfued.  No  officer  will  be  bound  by  his  oath  to  fupport 
any  a£t  that  would  violate  the  principles  of  the  Con  ft  w 
tution. 

The  gentleman  has  wandered  out  of  his  way,  to  tell  us 
what  has  fo  often  been  faid  out  of  doors ;  that  there  is  no 
declaration  of  rights,  that  confequently  all  our  rights  are  ta- 
ken away.  It  would  be  very  extraordinary  to  have  a  bill  of 
rights,  becaufe  the  powers  of  Gongrefs  are  exprefsly  de- 
fined, and  the  very  definition  of  them  is  as  valid  and  ef- 
ficacious a  check  as  a  bill  of  rights  could  be,  without  the 
dangerous  implication  of  a  bill  of  rights.  The  powers  of 
Congrefs  are  limited  and  enumerated.    We  fay  we  have 

give* 


(    i«S    ) 

given  them  thofe  powers,  but  we  do  not  fay  we  have  giyen 
them  more.  We  retain  all  thofe  rights  which  we  have  not 
given  away  to  the  general  government.  The  gentleman 
is  a  profeffional  man.  If  a  gentleman  had  made  his  laft 
will  and  teftament,  and  devifed  or  bequeathed  to  a  particu- 
lar perfon  the  fixth  part  of  his  property,  or  any  particular 
fpecific  legacy,  could  it  be  faid  that  that  perfon  fhould 
have  the  whole  eftate  ?  If  they  can  afiume  powers  not  enu- 
merated, there  was  no  occafion  for  enumerating  any  pow- 
ers. The  gentleman  is  learned  :  Without  recurring  to  his 
learning,  he  may  only  appeal  to  common  fen fe,  it  will  in- 
form him,  that  if  we  had  all  power  before,  and  give  away 
but  a  part,  we  ftill  retain  the  reft.  It  is  as  plain  a  thing 
as  pofiibly  can  be,  that  Congrefs  can  have  no  power  but 
what  we  exprefsly  give  them.  There  is  an  exprefs  claufe,, 
which, however  difingenuoufly  it  has  been  perverted  from  its 
4rue  meaning,  clearly  demonftrates  that  they  are  confined  to 
thofe  powers  which  are  given  them.  This  claufe  enables 
?them  to  make  all  laws  which  ihall  be  neceffary  and  proper 
ibr  carrying  into  execution  the  foregoing  powers,  and  all 
aother  powers  veiled  by  this  Conftitutionin  the  government 
of  the  United  States,  ^©r  any  department  or  officers  there- 
of. This  claufe  fpecifies  that  they  (hall  make  laws  to  car- 
ary  into  execution,  all  the  powers  vejled  by  this  Conftittt- 
j&ion,  confequently  they  can  make  no  laws  to  execute  any 
<*ather  power.  This  claufe  gives  no  new  power,  but  de- 
clares that  thofe  already  given  are  to  be  executed  by  pro- 
sper laws.     I  hope  this  will  fatisfy  gentlemen. 

Governor  Johnjlon — Mr.  Chairman,  The  learned  mem- 
ifeer  from  Anfon  fays,  that  the  Federal  Courts  have  exclu- 
ifive  jurifdiction  of  all  cafes  in  law  and  equity  arifing  un>- 
*der  the  Conftitution  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States. 
The  opinion  .which  1  have  always  entertained  is,  that  they 
•will  in  thefe  cafes,  as  well  as  in  feveral  others,  have  con- 
current jurifdiclion  with  the  ftate  Courts,  and  not  exclu- 
sive jurifdi&ion.  I  fee  nothing  in  this  Conftitution  which 
hinders  a  man  from  bringing  fuit  wherever  he  thinks  he 
can  have  juftice  done  him.  The  jurifdi&ion  of  thefe 
courts  is  eftablifhed  for  fome  purpofes  with  which  the  ftate 
courts  have  nothing  to  do,  and  the  Conftitution  takes  no 
power  from  the  ftate  courts  which  they  now  have.  They 
^iUliave  the  fame  bufmefs  which  they  have  now,  and  if 

4b* 


(     «<55    ) 

fo,   they  will  have  enough  to  employ  their  timer     We 
know  that  the   gentlemen  who  prefide  in  our  Superior 
Courts,    have   more   bufinefs  than  they   can   determine. 
Their  complicated  jurifdi&ion,  and  the  great  extent  o£ 
country,  occafions  them  a  vaft  deal  of  bufinefs.     The  ad- 
dition of  the  bufinefs  of  the  United  States  would  be  no 
manner  of  advantage  to  them.     It  is  obvious  to  every  one,, 
that  there  ought  to  be  one  Supreme  Court  for  national  pur- 
pofes.     But  the  gentleman  fays  that  a  bill  of  rights  was  ne- 
ceffary.     It  appears  to  me,  Sir,  that  k  would  have  been 
the  higheft  abfurdity  to  undertake  to  define  what  rights  the 
people  of  the  United  States  were  entitled  to :  For  that 
would  be  as  much  as  to  fay,  they  were  entitled  to  nothing 
elfe.     A  bill  of  rights  may  be  neceffary  in  a  monarchical 
government,  whofe  powers  are  undefined.     Were  we  in 
the   fituation  of   a   monarchical  country  ?■  No,  Sir.     E- 
very  right  could  not  be  enumerated,  and  the  omitted  rights, 
would  be  facrificed,  if  feeurity  arofe  from  an  enumeration.. 
The  Congrefs  cannot  aflume  any  other  powers  than  thofe 
exprefsly  given  them,  without  a  palpable  violation   of  the^ 
Conftitution.     Such  objections  as  this,  I  hope  will  have 
no  effect  on  the  minds  of  any  Members  in  this  Houfe^ 
When,  gentlemen  obje6t  generally,  that  it  tends  to  confo- 
lidate  the  ftates.  and  dejroy  the  ftate  Judiciaries,  thep 
©ught  to  be  explicit,  and   explain  their  meaning.     They* 
make  ufe  of  contradictory  arguments.     The  Senate  repre-* 
fents  the  ftates,  and  can  alone  prevent  this  dreaded  con- 
solidation :  Yet  the  powers  of  the  Senate  are  objected  to.. 
The  rights  of  the  people,  in  my  opinion,  cannot  be  affect- 
ed by  the  Federal  Courts.     I  do   not  know  how  inferior 
courts  will  be  regulated.     Some  fuppofe  the  ftate  court* 
will  have  this  bufinefs.     Others  have  imagined  that  the 
continent   would  be   divided   into  a  number  of  diftricvts, 
where  courts  would  be  held  fo  as  to  fuit  the  convenience 
«f  the  people.     Whether  this  or  fome  other  mode  will  be 
appointed  by  Congrefs,  I  know  not,  but  this  I  am  fure  of, 
that  the  ftate  judiciaries  are  not  diverted  of  their  prefent 
judicial  cognizance,  and  that  we  have  every  feeurity  that 
our  eafe  and  convenience  will  be  confulted.     Unlefs  Con- 
grefs had  this  power,  their  iaws  could  not  be  carried  into 
*KecutioR> 

Mr. 


(     i*7    ) 

Mr.  Bloodworth — Mr.  Chairman,  The  worthy  gentle- 
man up  laft,  has  given  me  information  on  the  fubjecl:, 
which  I  had  never  heard  before.  Hearing  fo  many  opi- 
nions, I  did  not  know  which  was  right.  The  honorable 
gentleman  has  faid  that  the  (late  courts  and  the  Courts  o£ 
the  United  States,  would  have  concurrent  jurifdi&ion.  I 
beg  the  committee  to  reflect  what  would  be  the  confe- 
quences  of  fuch  meafures.  It  has  ever  been  confidered  that 
the  trial  by  jury  was  one  of  the  greateft  rights  of  the  peo- 
ple. I  afk  whether,  if  fuch  caufes  go  into  the  Federal 
Court,  the  trial  by  jury  is  not  cut  off,  and  whether  there 
is  any  fecurity  that  we  (hall  have  juftice  done  us.  I  afk  i£ 
there  be  any  fecurity  that  we  (hall  have  juries  in  civil 
caufes.  In  criminal  cafes  there  are  to  be  juries,  but  there 
is  no  provifion  made  for  having  civil  caufes  tried  by  jury. 
This  concurrent  juridiclion  is  inconfiftent  with  the  fecu- 
rity of  that  great  right.  If  it  be  not,  I  would  wifii  to 
hear  how  it  is  fecured.  I  have  liftened  with  attention  to 
what  the  learned  gentlemen  have  faid,  and  have  endea- 
voured to  fee  whether  their  arguments  had  any  weiglft,  but 
I  found  none  in  them.  Many  words  have  been  fpoken, 
and  long  time  taken  up,  but  with  me  they  have  gone  in  at 
one  ear  and  out  at  the  other.  It  would  give  me  much 
pleafure  to  hear  that  the  trial  by  jury  was  fecured. 

Mr.  J,  M'Dowall—Mx.  Chairman,  The  objections  to 
this  part  of  the  Conftitution  have  not  been  anfwered  to  my 
fatisf action  yet.  We  know  that  the  trial  by  a  jury  of  the 
vicinage,  is  one  of  the  greateft  fecurities  for  property.  I£ 
caufes  are  to  be  decided  at  fuch  a  great  diftance,  the  poor 
will  be  opprefled  5  in  land  affairs  particularly,  the  wealthy 
fuitor  will  prevail.  A  poor  man,  who  has  a  juft  claim  or* 
a  piece  of  land,  has  not  fubftance  to  {land  it.  Can  it  be 
fuppofed  that  any  man,  of  common  circumftances,  can 
(land  the  expence  and  trouble  of  going  from  Georgia  to 
Philadelphia,  there  to  have  a  fuit  tried  ?  And  can  it  be  juft- 
ly  determined  without  the  benefit  of  a  trial  by  jury  ?  Thefe 
are  things  which  have  juftly  alarmed  the  people.  What 
made  the  people  revolt  from  Great-Britain  ?  The  trial  by 
jury,  that  great  fafeguard  of  liberty,  was  taken  away,  and 
a  ftamp  duty  was  laid  upon  them.  This  alarmed  thera, 
and  led  them  to  fear  that  greater  oppreflions  would  take 
|la9«i    W«  th^j  r«fcfU<J.    It  i&YQ^ei  HI  ty  »  war,  an* 


(     xtfS    ) 

caufed  us  to  relinquifli  a  government  which  made  us  hatV 
py  in  every  thing  elfe.  The  war  was  very  bloody,  but  we 
got  our  independence.  "We  are  now  giving  away  our  dear 
bought  rights.  We  ought  to  confider  what  we  are  about 
to  do  before  we  determine. 

Mr.  Spaight — Mr.  Chairman,  The  trial  by  jury  was  not 
forgotten  in  the  Convention11,  the  fubjec}  took  up  a  confi- 
derable  time  to  inveftigate  it.  It  was  impoffrble  to  make 
any  one  uniform  regulation  for  all  the  ftates,  or  that  would 
include  all  cafes  where  it  would  be  neceflary.  It  was  im- 
poflible,  by  one  expreflion,  to  embrace  the  whole.  There 
are  a  number  of  equity  and  maritime  cafes  in  fome  of  the 
ftates,  in  which  jury  trials  are  not  ufed.  Had  the  Con- 
vention faid,  that  all  caufes  fhould  be  tried  by  a  jury,  equi- 
ty and  maritime  cafes  would  have  been  included.  It  was. 
therefore  left  to  the  Legislature  to  fay  in  what  cafes  it 
fhould  be  ufed  ;  and  as  the  trial  by  jury  is  in  full  force  in 
the  ftate  courts,  we  have  the  fulleft  fecurity. 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  waited  a  confidera- 
ble  tirtle,  in  hopes  that  fome  other  gentleman  would  fully 
difcufs  this  point.  I  conceive  it  to  be  my  duty  to  fpeak  on 
every  fubietl,  whereon  I  think  I  can  throw  any  light,  and 
it  appears  to  me  that  fome  things  ought  to  be  faid  which 
no  gentleman  has  yet  mentioned.  The  gentleman  from, 
New-Hanover  faid,  that  our  arguments  went  in  at  one  ear 
and  out  at  the  other.  This  fort  of  language,  on  fo  folemn 
and  important  an  occafion,  gives  me  pain.  [Mr.  Blood' 
worth  here  declared,  that  he  did  not  mean  to  convey  any 
difrefpedtful  idea  by  fuch  an  expreflion — that  he  did  not- 
mean  an  abfolute  neglect  of  their  arguments,  but  that  they 
were  not  fufficient  to  convince  him — that  he  mould  be  for- 
ry  to  give  pain  to  any  gentleman — that  he  had  liftened, 
and  ftill  would  liften  with  attention  to  what  would  be  faid. 
Mr.  Iredell  then  continued.]  I  am  by  no  means  furprifed 
at  the  anxiety  which  is  exprefled  by  gentlemen  on  this  fub- 
je£t.  Of  all  the  trials  that  ever  were  inftituted  in  the 
world,  this,  in  my  opinion,  is  the  beft,  and  that  which  I 
hope  will  continue  the  longeft,  If  the  gentlemen  who 
compofed  the  Convention  had  defignedly  omitted  it,  no 
man  would  be  more  ready  to  condemn  their  conduct  than 
myfelf.  But  I  have  been  told,  that  the  omiffion  of  it 
arofe  from  the  difficulty  of  eftablifhing  one  uniform  unex- 
^ ,  septionabls 


(  m  ) 

ieptionable  mode  ;  this  mode  of  trial  being  different  i« 
many  particulars  in. the  feveral  ftates.  Gentlemen  will  be! 
pleafed  to  confider,  that  there  is  a  material  difference  be- 
tween an  article  fixed  in  the  conftitution,  and  a  regulation 
by  law.  An  article  in  the  conftitution,  however  inconve- 
nient it  may  prove  by  experience,  can  only  be  altered  by- 
altering  the  Conftitution  itfelf,  which  manifeftly  is  a  thing 
that  ought  not  to  be  done  often.  When  regulated  by  law* 
it  can  eafily  be  occafionally  altered,  fo  as  beft  to  fuit  the 
conveniences  of  the  people.  Had  there  been  an  article  in 
the  Conftitution  taking  away  that  trial,  it  would  juftly 
have  excited  the  public  indignation.  It  is  not  taken  away 
by  the  Conftitution.  Though  that  does  not  provide  ex- 
prefsly  for  a  trial  by  jurv  in  civil  cafes,  it  does  not  fay  that 
there  (hall  not  be  fuch  a  trial.  The  reafons  of  the  omif- 
fion  have  been  mentioned  by  a  Member  of  the  late  Gene- 
ral Convention,  [Mr.  Spaight.]  There  are  different  prac- 
tices in  regard  to  this  trial  in  different  ftates.  In  fome  cafesl 
they  have  no  juries  in  admiralty  and  equity  cafes ;  in  others 
they  have  juries  in  thefe  cafes,  as  well  as  in  fuits  at  com- 
mon law.  I  beg  leave  to  fay,  that  if  any  gentleman  of  abi- 
lity, and  knowledge  of  the  fubjecl:,  will  only  endeavour  to 
fix  upon  any  one  rule,  that  would  be  pleafing  to  all  the 
ftates  under  the  imprefhon  of  their  prefent  different  habits, 
he  will  be  convinced  that  it  is  impracticable.  If  the  practice 
of  any  particular  ft  ate  had  been  adopted,  others  probably* 
whofe  practice  had  been  different,  would  have  been  dis- 
contented. This  is  a  conference  that  naturally  would 
have  enfued,  had  the  provifion  been  made  in  the  Conftitu- . 
tion  itfelf.  But  when  the  regulation  is  to  be  by  law,  as 
that  law  when  found  injudicious  can  be  eafily  repealed,  $ 
majority  may  be  expecled  to  agree  upon  fome  method, 
Gnce  fome  method*  or  other  muft  be  firft  tried,  and  there 
is  a  greater  chance  of  the  favourite  method  of  one  ftate 
being  in  time  preferred.  It  is  not  to  be  prefumed,  that 
the  Congrefs  would  dare  to  deprive  the  people  of  this  va- 
luable privilege.  Their  own  intereft  will  operate  as  an  ad- 
ditional guard,  as  none  of  them  could  tell  how  foon  they 
might  have  occafion  for  fuch  a  trial  themfelves.  The 
greateft  danger  from  ambition  is  in  criminal  cafes.  But 
Here  they  have  no  option.  The  trial  muft  be  by  jury  in 
the  ftate  wherein  the  offence  is  committed,  and  the  wrif 


(     *7°     ) 

of  habeas  corpus  will  in  the  mean  time  fecure  the  citizen 
againft  arbitrary  imprifonment,  which  has  ^>een  the  prin- 
cipal flurce  of  tyranny  in  all  ages. 

As  to  the  claufe  refpe£Hhg  cafes  arifing  tinder  the  Con* 
ftitution  and  the  laws  of  the  union,  which  the  honourable 
Member  objected  to,  it  muft  be  obferved,  that  laws  are  ufe- 
lefs  unlefs  they  are  executed*  At  prefeht  Congrefs  have 
powers  which  they  cannot  execute.  After  making  laws 
which  affect  the  deareft  intefefts  of  the  people,  in  the  con- 
stitutional mode,  they  have  no  way  of  enforcing  them. 
The  fituation  of  thofe  gentlemen  who  have  lately  ferved 
in  Congrefs  muft  have  been  very  difagreeable.  Congrefs 
have  power  to  enter  into  negociations  with  foreign  nations^ 
but  cannot  compel  the  obfervance  of  treaties  that  they 
make.  They  have  been  muchdiftreffed  by  their  inability  ta 
pay  the  preffing  demands  of  the  public  creditors.  They  have 
been  reduced  fo  low  as  to  borrow  principal  to  pay  intereft.' 
Such  are  rhe  unfortunate  conferences  of  this  unhappy, 
fituation!  Thefe  are  the  effecls  of  the  pernicious  mode  of 
requifitions.  Has  any  ftate  fully  paid  its  quota  ?  1  believe 
not,  Sir.  Yet  I  am  far  from  thinking  that  this  has  beeni 
owing  altogether  to  an  uriwillingriefs  to  pay  the  debts.  It 
may  have  been  in  fome  inftances  the  cafe,  but  I  believe  not 
in  all.  Our  ftate  Legiflature  has  no  way  of  raifing  any 
eonfiderable  fiim  but  by  laying  dire£t  taxes.  Other  ftates' 
have  imports  of  confequence.  Thefe  may  afford  them  a 
confiderable  relief,  but  our  ftate  perhaps  could  not  have 
raifed  its  full  quota  by  direcl  taxes,  without  impofing  bur- 
thens too  heavy  for  the  people  to  tear.  Suppofe  in  this 
fituation,  Congrefs  had  proceeded  to  enforce  their  requifi- 
tions, by  fending  an  army  to  collect  them  ;  what  would 
nave  been  the  confequence  ?  Civil  war ;  in  which  the  in- 
nocent muft  have  fuffered  with  the  guilty.  Thofe  who 
were  willing  to  pay,  would  have  been  equally  diftreffed 
with  thofe  who  were  unwilling.  Requifitions  thus  having 
failed  of  their  purpofe,  it  is  propofed  by  this  Cohftitution, 
that  inftead  of  collecting  taxes  by  the  (word,  application 
Ihall  be  made  by  the  government  to  the  individual  citizens. 
If  any  individual  difobeys,  the  courts  of  juftice  can  giv£ 
immediate  relief.  This  is  the  only  natural  and  effectual 
method  of  enforcing  laws.  As  to  the  danger  of  concur-* 
ient  jurifdiclions,  has  any  inconvenience  refulted  from  the 

concurrent 


(     *7i     ) 

concurrent  jurifdi£tfons,  in  fundry  cafes,  of  the  fuperioc. 
and  county  cpurts  of  this  ftate  ?  The  inconvenience  of  at* 
tending  at  a  great  diftance,  which  has  been  fo  much  ob- 
jected to,  is  one  which  would  be  fo  general,  that  there  is 
ho  doubt  but  that  a  majority  would  always  feel  themfelves 
and  their  conftitueuts  perfonally  interefted  in  preventing  it. 
I  have  no  doubt,  therefore,  that  proper  care  will  be  taken 
to  leffen  this  evil  as  much  as  pollible,  and  i.n  particular, 
that  an  appeal  %q  the  Supreme  pourt  will  not  be  allowed, 
but  in  cafes  of  great  importance,  where  ^he  object  may 
be  adequate  to  the  expence.  The  Supreme  Court  may 
pofiibly  be  directed  to  fit  alternately  in  different  parts  o£ 
the  union. 

The  propriety  of  having  a  Supreme  Court  in  every  go- 
vernment, muft  be  obvious  to  every  man  of  reflection. 
There  can  be  no  other  way  of  fecuring  the  ad  minift  ration, 
of  juftice  uniformly  in,  the  feveral  ftates.  There  might  be 
otherwife  as  many  different  adjudications  on  the  fame  fub> 
ject,  as  there  are  ftates.  It  is  to  be  hoped,  that  if  this 
government  be  eftablifhed,  connexions  ftili  more  intimate 
than  the  prefent,  will  fubfift  between  the  different  ftates. 
The  fame  meafure  of  juftice  therefore,  as  to  the  objecl^ 
of  their  common  concern,  ought  to  prevail  in  all.  A  man 
in  North-Carolina  for  inftance,  i|  he  owed  £.100  here, 
and  was  compellable  to  pay  it  in  good  money,  ought  tO( 
have  the  means  of  recovering  the  fame  fum,  if  due  to  him, 
in  Rhode-Ifland,  and  not  merely  the  nominal  fum,  at 
about  an  eighth  or  tenth  part  of  its  intrinfic  value.To  obviate 
fuch  a  grievance  as  this,  the  Conftitution  has  provided  a 
tribunal  to  adminifter  equal  juftice  to  all.  '  *-' 

A  gentleman  has  (aid,  that  the  ftamp-a£t,  and  the  tak- 
ing away  of  the  trial  by  jury,  were  the  principal  caufes  of 
refiftance  to  Great-Britain,  and  feemed  to  infer,  that  oppo- 
fition  would  therefore  be  juftified  to  this  part  of  the  fyftem. 
The  ftamp-aft  was  much  earlier  than  the  immediate  caufe 
of  our  independence.  But  what  was  the  great  ground  of 
oppofition  to  the  ftamp-a£t,  ?  Surely  it  was,  becaufe  the  acl: 
was  not  paued  by  our  own  Representatives,  but  by  thofe 
of  Great-Britain.  Under  this  Conftitution,  taxes  are  to 
be  impofedjjy  our  own  Reprefentatives  in  the  General 
Congrefs.  The  fewnefs  of  their  number  will  be  compen^ 
fated  by  the  weight  and  importance  of  their  characters. 

Our 


<       ft*      ) 

Our  Representatives  will  be  in  proportion  to  thofe  of  the 
other  ftates.  This  cafe  is  certainly  not  like  that  of  taxa- 
tion by  a  foreign  Legiflature.  In  refpeft  to  the  trial  by  ju- 
ry,  its  being  taken  away  in  certain  cafes,  was  to  be  fure 
one  of  the  caufes  afligned  in  the  declaration  of  indepen- 
dence. But  that  was  done  by  a  foreign  Legiflature,  which 
might  continue  it  fo  forever,  and  therefore  jealoufy  was 
juftly  excited.  But  this  Conftitution  has  not  taken  it  away, 
and  it  is  left  to  the  difcretion  of  our  own  Legiflature,  to 
aft  in  this  refpeft,  as  their  wifdom  fhall  direft.  In  Great- 
Britain,  the  people  fpeak  of  the  trial  by  jury  with  admira- 
tion. No  Monarch  or  Minifter,  however  arbitrary  in  his 
principles,  would  dare  to  attack  that  noble  palladium  of 
liberty.  The  enthufiafna  of  the  people  in  its  favour  would 
in  fuch  a  cafe  produce  general  refiftance.  That  trial  re- 
mains unimpaired  there,  although  they  have  a  confiderable 
{landing  army,  and  their  Parliament  has  authority  to  abo- 
li{h  it  if  they  pleafe.  But  woe  be  to  thofe  who  fhould  at- 
tempt it !  If  it  be  fecure  in  that  country,  under  thefe  cir- 
cumftances,  can  we  believe  that  Congrefs  either  would  or 
could  take  it  away  in  this  ?  Were  they  to  attempt  it,  their 
authority  would  be  inftantly  refilled.  They  would  draw 
down  on  themfelves  the  refentment  and  deteftation  of  the 
people.  They  and  their  families,  fo  long  as  any  remained 
in  being,  would  be  held  in  eternal  infamy,  and  the  attempt 
prove  as  unfuccefsful  as  it  was  wicked. 

"With  regard  to  a  bill  of  rights,  this  is  a  notion  origin- 
ating in  England,  where  no  written  Conflitution  is  to  be 
found,  and  the  authority  of  their  government  is  derived 
from  the  moft  remote  antiquity.  Magna  Charta  itfelf  is 
no  Conftitution,  but  a  folemn  inftrument  afcertaining  cer- 
tain rights  of  individuals,  by  the  Legiflature  for  the  time 
being,  and  every  article  of  which  the  Legiflature  may  at 
any  time  alter.  This,  and  a  bill  of  rights  alfo,  the  inven- 
tion of  later  times,  were  occafioned  by  great  ufurpations 
of  the  crown,  contrary,  as  was  conceived,  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  their  government,  about  which  there  was  a  va- 
riety of  opinions.  But  neither  that  inftrument  or  any 
other  inftrument  ever  attempted  to  abridge  the  authority 
of  Parliament,  which  is  fuppofed  to  be  without  any  limit- 
ation whatever.  Had  their  Conftitution  been  fixed  and 
eertajnj  4  bill  of  rights  would  have  been  ufelefs,  for  the 

Conftitution 


(     *73     ) 

Conftifatibn  would  have  (hewn  plainly  the  extent  of  tha&. 
authority  which  they  were  difputing  about.     Of  what  ufe 
therefore  can  a    bill  of  rights   be   in  this   Constitution, 
where  the  people  exprefsly  declare  how  much  power  they 
do  give,  and  confequenjtly  retain  all  they  do  not  ?    It  is  ^ 
declaration  of  particular  powers  by  the  people  to  their  Re- 
prefentatives  for  particular  purpofes.     It  may  be  consider- 
ed as  a  great  power  of  attorney,  under  which  no  power 
can  be  exercifcd  but  what  is  exprefsly  given.     Did  any  man; 
ever  hear  before  that  at  the  end  of  a  power  of  attorney  it- 
was  faid,  that  the  Attorney  mould  not  exercife  more^pow- 
er  than  was  there  given  him  ?  Suppofe  for  inftance  a  man 
had  lands  in  the  counties  of  Anfon  and  Cafwell,  and  he, 
fhould  give  another  a  power  of  attorney  to  fell  his  lands  in, 
Anfon  •,  would  the  other  have  any  authority  to  fell  the  lands 
in  Cafwell  ?  or  could  he  without  abfurdity  fay,  "  'Tis  true. 
f*  you  have  not  exprefsly  authorifed  me  to  fell  the  lands  in, 
"  Cafwell,  but  as  you  had  lands  there,  and  did  not  fay  I; 
*c  fhoujd  not,  I  thought  I  might  as  well  fell  thofe  lands  as_ 
"  the  other."     A  bill  of  rights,  as  I*  conceive,  would  not 
only  be  incongruous,  but  dangerous.     No  man,  let  his  in- 
genuity be  what  it  will,  could  enumerate  all  the  individu- 
al rights  not  relinquished  by  this  Conftitutiom     Suppofe 
therefore  an  enumeration  of  a  great  many,  but  an  omiflioi\, 
of  fome,  and  that  long  after  all  traces  of  our  prefent  difputes 
were  at  an  end,  any  of  the  omitted  rights  (hould  be  inva^ 
ded,  and  the  invafion  be  complained  of  ;  what  would  be, 
the  plaufible  anfwer  of  the  government  to fuch  a  complaints- 
Would  they  not  naturally  fay,  "  We  live  at  a  great  diftance 
u  from  the  time  when  this  Conftitution  was  eftablifhed. 
u  We  can  judge  of  it  much  better  by  the  ideas  of  it  en-. 
"  tertained  at  the   time,  than  by  any  ideas  of  our  own., 
"  The  bill  of  rights  pafled  at  that  time,  (hewed  that  the. 
<c  people  did  not  think  every  power  retained  which  was  not 
*i  given,  elfe  this  bill  of  rights  was  not  only  ufelefs,  but 
<{  abfurd.     But  we  are  not  at  liberty  to  charge  an  abfurdi- 
<f  ty  upon  our  anceftors,  who  have  given  fuch  ftrong  proofs 
*'  of  their  good  fenfe,  as  well  as  their  attachment  to  liber* 
*«  ty.     So  long  as  the  rights  enumerated  in  the  bill  of  rights 
"  remain  unviolated,  you  have   no  reafon  to  complain. 
u  This  is  not  one  of  them."     Thus  a  bill  of  rights  might 
operate  as  a  fnare,  rather  than  a  protection.    If  we  ha^ 

formc4 


(     *74    ) 

Jormcd  a  General  Legiflature,  with  undefined  powers,  a 
>ill  of  rights  would  not  only  have  been  proper,  but  necef- 
fary  ;  and  it  wouM  have  then  operated  as  ari  exception  to 
the  legiflative  authority  in  fuch  particulars.  It  has  this  ef- 
iecl:  in  refpecT:  to  fome  of  the  American  Conftitutions, 
where  the  powers  of  legiflation  are  general.  But  where 
they  are  powers  of  a  particular  nature,  and  exprefsly  de- 
fined, as  in  the  cafe  of  the  Conftitution  before  us,  I  think, 
for  the  reafons  j  have  given,  a  bill  of  rights  is  not  on\f 
unneceffary,  but  would  be  abfurd  and  dangerous. 

Mr.  J.  MiDpwali-—lAx.  Chairman,  The  learned  gen- 
tleman made  ufe  of  feveral  arguments  to  induce  us  to  be- 
liever  that  the  trial  by  jury  in  civile  cafes  was  not  in  dan- 
ger, and  obferyed,  that  in  criminal  cafes  it  is  provided, 
that  the  trial  is  to  be  in  the  (late  where  the  crime  was  com- 
mitted. Suppofe  a  crime  is  committed  at  the  Miffifippi — 
the  man  may  be  tried  at  Edenton.  They  ou;ght  to  be  tried 
by  the  people  of  the  vicinage ;  for  when  the  trial  is  at  fuch 
an  immenfe  diftance,  the  principal  privilege  attending  the 
trial  by  jury  is  taken  away  :  Therefore  the  trialought  to  be 
limited  to  a  diftric"t,  or  certain  part  of  the  ftate.  It  has  been 
laid  by  the  gentleman  from  Edenton,  that  our  Represen- 
tatives will  have  virtue  and  wifdom  to  regulate  all  thefe 
things.  But  it  would  give  me  much  fatisfa&ion,  in  a  mat- 
ter of  this  importance,  to  fee  it  absolutely  fecured.  The 
depravity  of  mankind  militates  againft  fuch  a  degree  of 
confidence.     \  wifti  to  fee  every  thing  fixed. 

Governor  JohnJIon— Mr.  Chairman,  The  obfervations  of 
the  gentleman  laft  up,  confirm  what  the  other  gentleman 
faid.  I  mean,  that  as  there  are  diflimilar  modes  with  re- 
fpecT: to  the  trial  by  jury  in  different  dates,  there  could  be 
no  general  rule  fixed  to  accommodate  all.  He  fays  that 
this  claufe  is  defective,  becaufe  the  trial  if  not  to  be 
by  a  jury  of  the  vicinage.  Let  us  look  at  the  ftate  of  Vir- 
ginia, where,  as  long  as  I  have  known  it,  the  laws  have 
been  executed  fo  as  to  fatisfy  the  inhabitants,  and  I  believe 
as  well  as  in  any  part  of  the  union.  In  that  country  ju- 
ries are  fummoned  every  day  from  the  by-ftanders.  We 
may  expe£r.  lefs  partiality,  when  the  trial  is  by  ftrangers ; 
and  were  I  to  be  tried  for  my  property  or  life,  I  would  ra- 
ther be  tried  by  difinterefted  men,  who -were  not  biafled, 
e£an  by  men  wfco  were  perhaps  intimate  friends  of  my  op- 
ponent. 


(    '75    ) 

ponent.  Our  mode  is  different  from  theirs,  but. whether 
theirs  be  better  than  ours  or  not,  is  not  the  queftion.  It 
would  be  improper  for  our  Delegates^to  impoie  our  mode 
upon  them,  or  for  theirs  to  imipofe  their  mode  upon  us. 
The  trial  will  probably  be  in  each  ftate  as  it  has  been  hi- 
therto ufed  in  fuch  ftate,  or  otherwife  regulated  as  conve- 
niently as  poffible  for  the  people.  The  Delegates  who  are 
to  meet  in  Congrefs  will,  I  hope,  be  men  of  virtue  ancl 
wifdbm.  If  not,  it  will  be  our  own  fault.  They  will 
have  it  in  their  power  to  make  neceflary  regulations  to  ac- 
commodate the  inhabitants  of  each  ftate.  In  the  Confti- 
tution,  the  general  principles  only  are  laid  down.  It  will 
be  the  object  of  the  future  legitimation  of  Congrefs,  to  make 
fuch  laws  as  will  be  moft  convenient  for  the  people.  With 
regard  to  a  bill  of  rights  fo  much  f£oken  of,  what  the  gen- 
tleman from  Edenton  has  faid,  I  hope  will  obviate  the  ob- 
jections againft  the  want  of  it.  In  a  monarchy,  all  power 
may  be  fuppofed  to  be  vefted  in  the  Monarch,  except  what 
may  be  referved  by  a  bill  of  rights.  In  England,  in  eve- 
ry inftance  where  the  rights  of  the  people  are  not  declared, 
the  prerogative  of  the  King  is  fuppofed  to  extend.  But 
in  this  country  we  fay,  that  what  rights  we  do  riot  give 
away  remain  with  us.  •-,.,. 

Mr.  Bldodivorth — Mr.  Chairman,  The  footing  on  which! 
the  trial  by  jury  is  in  the  Conftitution,  does  not  fatisfy  me. 
Perhaps  I  am  miftaken,  but  if  I  underftand  the  thing  right,* 
the  trial  by  jury  is  taken  away.  If  the  Supreme  Federal 
Court  has  jurifdi£tion  both  as  to  law  and  fadt,  it  appears 
io  me  to  be  taken  away.  The  honourable  gentleman 
who  Was  in  the  Convention,  told  us,  that  the  claufe,  as  it 
now  (lands,  refulted  from  the  difficulty  of  fixing  the  mode 
of  trial.  I  think  it.  was  eafy  to  have  put  it  on  a  fecurtf 
footing.  But  if  the  genius  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States  is  fo  diffimilar,  that  our  liberties  cannot  be  fecured,; 
we  can  never  hang  long  together.  Intereft  is  the  band  of 
focial  union,  and  when  this  is  taken  aWay,  the  union  itfelf 
muft  difTolve. 

Mr.  Machine — Mr.  Chairman,  I  do  not  take  the  fciter- 
£fts  of  the  dates  to  be  fo  diffimilar ;  I  take  them  to  be  all 
nearly  alike,  and  inseparably  connected.  It  is  impoffiblef 
to'  lay  down  any  constitutional  rule  for  the  government  o£ 
all  the  different  ftates  in  each  particular. ,  But  it  will  be 

e*fy 


(  I#  ) 


te  trie 


'eafy  For  the  Legiflature  to  make  laws  to  accommodate 
people  in  every  part  of  the  union,  as  circumftances  may 
arife.  Jury  trial  is  not  taken  away  in  fuch  cafes  where  it 
may  be  found  neceflary.  Altho'  the  Supreme  Court  has 
cognizance  of  the  appeal,  it  does  not  follow  but  that  the 
trial  by  jury  may  be  had  in  the  court  below,  and  the  tefti- 
mony  tranfmitted  to  the  Supreme  Court,  who  will  then 
finally  determine  on  a  review  of  all  the  circumftances. 
This  is  well  known  to  be  the  practice  in  fome  of  the  ftates. 
In  our  own  ftate  indeed,  when  a  caufe  is  inftituted  in  the 
county  court,  and  afterwards  there  is  an  appeal  upon  it, 
a  new  trial  is  had  in  the  fuperior  court,  as  if  no  trial  had 
been  had  before.  In  other  countries  hoWever,  when  a  tri- 
al is  had  in  an  inferior  court,  and  an  appeal  is  taken,  no 
teftimony  can  be  given  in  the  court  above,  but  the  court 
determines  upon  the  circumftances  appearing  upon  the  re- 
cord. If  I  am  right,  the  plain  inference  is,  that  there 
may  be  a  trial  m  the  inferior  courts,  and  that  the  record 
including  the  teftimony  may  be  fent  to  the  Supreme  Court* 
But  if  there  is  a  neceffity  for  a  jury  in  the  Supreme  Court, 
ft  will  be  a  very  eafy  matter  to  empanel  a  jury  at  the  bar 
of  the  Supreme  Court,  which  may  fave  great  expence  and 
be  very  convenient  to  the  people.  It  is  impoffible  to  make 
every  regulation  at  once.  Congrefs,  who  are  our  own 
^.eprefentatives,  will  undoubtedly  make  fuch  regulations 
as  will  Xuit  the  convenience  and  fecure  the  liberty  of  the 
people. 

Mr.  Iredell  declared  it  as  his  opinion,  that  there  might 
be  juries  in  the  fuperior  court  as  well  as  in  the  inferior 
courts,  and  that  it  was  in  the  power  of  Congrefs  to  regu- 
late it  fo. 

Mr.  Prefident  now  refumed  the  Chair,  and  Mr.  Ken- 
nion  reported,  That  the  committee  had,  according  to  the 
order  of  the  day,  again  had  the  propofed  Conftitution  un- 
der confideration,  and  had  made  further  progrefs  therein, 
but  not  having  time  to  go  through  the  fame,  had  defired 
him.  to  move  to  the  Convention  for  leave  to  fit  again, 

Refolvedy  That  this  Convention  will  to-morrow  again 
difiblve  itfelf  into  a  committe  of  the  whole  Houfe,  to  take 
into  further  confideration  the  propofed  plan  of  govern- 
ment. 

The  Convention  then  adjourned  until  to-morrow  morn- 
ing, nine  oclock,  TUESDAY,, 


j  (   m   3 

[Ji  TUESDAY,    July  29,    1788. 

The  Convention  met  according  to  adjournment,  and  re* 
folved  itfelf  into  a  committee  of  the  whole  Convention,' 
to  take  into  further  confederation  the  propofed  plan  of  go- 
Ternment. 

Mr.  Kennion  in  the  Chair. 

Mr.  Spencer— Mr.  Chairman,  I  hope  to  be  excufed  for 
making  fome  obfervations  on  what  was  faid  yefterday,  by 
gentlemen  in  favour  of  thefe  two  daufes.  The  motion 
which  was  made  that  the  committee  mould  rife,  precluded 
me  from  (peaking  then.  The  gentlemen  have  (hewed  much  • 
moderation  and  candour  in  conducting  this  buiiriefs :  But 
I  dill  think  that  my  obfervations  are  well  founded,  and 
that  fome  amendments  are  neceflary.  The  gentlemen  faid 
all  matters  not  given  up  by  this  form  of  government,  were 
retained  by  the  refpedtive  dates.  I  know  that  it  ought  to 
be  fo  ;  it  is  the  general  doctrine,  but  it  is  neceflary  that 
it  fhould  be  exprefsly  declared  in  the  Conftitution,  and 
not  left  to  mere  conftru&iori  and  opinion.  I  am  autho- 
rifed  to  fay  it  Was  heretofore  thought  neceflary.  The 
Confederation  fays  exprefsly,  that  all  that  was  not  given 
up  by  the  United  States,  was  retained  by  the  refpeclive 
ftates.  If  fuch  a  claufe  had  been  inferted  in  this  Con^ 
ftitution,  it  would  have  fuperceded  the  neceflity  of  a  bill 
of  rights.  But  that  not  being  the  cafe,  it  was  neceflary 
that  a  bill  of  rights,  or  fomething  of  that  kind,  (hould  be 
a  part  of  the  Conftitution.  It  was  ©bferved,  that  as  the 
Conftitution  is  to  be  a  delegation  of  power  from  the  feve- 
ral  ftates  to  the  United  States,  a  bill  of  rights  was  un* 
neceflary.  But  it  will  be  noticed  that  this  is  a  different, 
Cafe.  The  ftates  do  not  a£t  in  their  political  capacities, 
but  the  government  is  propofed  for  individuals.  The  very* 
caption  of  the  Conftitution  (hews  that  this  is  the  cafe. 
The  expreflion,  "We  the  people  of  the  United  States/* 
Ihews  that  this  government  is  intended  for  individuals.; 
there  ought  therefore  to  be  a  bill  of  rights.  Tarn  ready 
to  acknowledge  that  the  Congrefs  ought  to  have  the  power 
of  executing  its  laws.  Heretofore,  becaufe  all  the  laws 
of  the  Confederation  were  binding  on  the  ftates  in  their 
political  Capacities,  courts  had  nothing  to  do  with  them  ; 
but  now  the  thing  is  entirely  different.  The  laws  of  Con- 
grefs will  be  binding  on  individuals,    and  tftofe  things 

Z  which. 


t     il*    1 

which  concern  individuals  will  be  brought  properly  before 
the  courts.  In  the  next  place,  all  the  officers  are  to  take 
an  oath  to  carry  into  execution  this  general  government, 
and  are  bound  to  fupport  every  act  of  the  government,  of 
whatever  nature  it  may  be.  This  is  a  fourth  reafon  for 
fecuring  the  rights  of  individuals.  It  was  alfo  obferved, 
that  the  Federal  Judiciary  and  the  courts  of  the  nates 
tinder  the  federal  authority,  would  have  concurrent  jurif- 
diction  with  refpeft  to  any  fubjecl:  that  might  arife  under 
the  Conftitution.  I  am  ready  to  fay  that  I  mod  heartily 
wifh  that  whenever  this  government  takes  place,  the  two 
jurifdictions  and  the  two  governments,  that  Is,  the  gene- 
ral and  the  feveral  ftate  governments,  may  go  hand  in  hand, 
and  that  there  may  be  no  interference,  but  that  every  thing 
may  he  rightly  conducted.  But  I  will  sever  concede  that 
it  is  proper  to  divide  the  bufinefs  between  the  two  differ- 
ent courts.  I  have  no  doubt  but  there  is  wifdom  enough 
in  this  ftate  to  decide  the  bufinefs  in  a  proper  manner^ 
without  the  neceflity  of  federal  afliftance  to  do  our  bufi- 
nefs. '  The  worthy  gentleman  from  Ederiton,  dwelt  a  con- 
siderable time  on'  the  obfervations  on  a  bill  of  rights,  con- 
tending that  they  were  proper  only  in  monarchies,  which 
were  founded  on  different  principles  from  thofe  of  our 
government ;  and  therefore,  though  they  might  be  necef- 
fary for  others,  yet  they  were  not  neceffary  for  us.  I  ftilj 
think  that  a  bill  of  r  rghts  is  neceffary.  This  neceflity  arifes 
from  the  nature  of  human  focieties.  When  individuals 
enter  into  fociety,  they  give  up  fome.  rights  to  fecure  the 
reft.  There  are  certain  human  rights'  that  ought  not  to  be 
given  up,  and  which  ought  in  fome  manner  to  be  fecured. 
With  refpecl:  to  thefe  great  effential  rights,  no  latitude 
ought  to  be  left.  They  are  the  moft  ineftimable  gifts  of 
the  great  Creator,  and  therefore  ought  not  be  deftroyed^ 
tut  ought  to  be  fecured.  They  ought  to  be  fecured  to  in- 
dividuals in  confederation  of  the  other  rights  which  they* 
give  up  to  fupport  fociety. 

The  trial  by  jury  has  been  alfo  fpoken  of.  Every  per- 
fon  who  is  acquainted  with  the  nature  of  liberty,  need  not 
be  informed  of  the  importance  of  this  trial.  Juries  are 
tailed  the  bulwarks  of  our  rights  and  liberty  ;  and  na 
country  can  ever  be  enflaved  as  long  as  thofe  cafes  which 
a^ec^  fcbejx  lives  a$d  pronerty,  ars  to  be  decided  in  a: 

grea^ 


{     »79    ) 

great  meafure,  by  the  confent  of  twelve  honeft,  difintefct 
tefted  men, /  taken  from  the  refpectable  body  of  yeomanry. 
.'It  is  highly  improper  that  any  claufe  which  regards  the 
Security  of  the  trial  by  jury  mould  be  any  way  doubtful. 
In  the  claufe  that  has  been  read,  it  is  .ascertained  that  cri- 
minal cafes  are  to  be  tried  by  jury,  in  the  ftates  wherein 
they  are  committed.  It  has  been  objected  to  that  claufe, 
that  it  is  not  Sufficiently  explicit.  I  think  that  it  is  not0 
■  It  was  obferved,  that  one  may  be  taken  at  a  great  diftance. 
One  reafon  of  the  refiftance  to  the  Britifli  government 
was,  becaufe  they  required  that  we  mould  be  carried  to4 
the  country  of  Great-Britain,  to  be  tried  by  juries  of  that 
country,  Put  we  infilled  on  being  tried  by  juries  of  the" 
vicinage  in  our  own  country.  I  think  it  therefore  proper, 
that  Something  explicit  ftiould  be  Said  with  reSpect  to  the; 
vicinage. 

With  regard  to  that  part  that  the  Supreme  Court  (hall 
have  appelfate  jurisdiction  both  as  to  law  and  fact,  it  has 
been  obferved,  that  though  the  FederarCourt  might  decide 
without  a  juryj  yet  the  court  below,  which  tried  it,  might 
have  a  jury.  I  alk  the  gentleman  what  benefit  would  be 
received  in  the  Suit  by  having  a  jury  trial  in  the  court  be- 
low, when  the  verdict:  is  fet  afide  in  the  Supreme  Court. 
It  was  intended  by  this  claufe  that  the  trial  by  jury  mould 
he  fupprefled  in  the  Superior  and  inferior  courts.  It  has 
'been  faid  in  defence  of  the  omiffion  concerning  the  trial 
By  jury  in  civil  cafes,  that  one  general  regulation  could 
mot  be  .made — that  in  Several  cafes  the  Constitution  of  fe- 
deral ftates  did  not  require  a  trial  by  jury  ;  for  inftance,  in 
cafes  of  equity  and  admiralty,  whereas  in  others  it  did  %. 
and  that  therefore  it  was  proper  to  leave  this  Subject  at 
large.  I  am  fure  that  for  the  fecurity  of  liberty  they  ought 
to  have  been  at  the  pains  of  drawing  Some  line.  I  think 
that  the  reSpectable  body  Who  formed  the  Conftitution, 
HioulcMiave  gone  So  far  as  to  put  matters  on  fuch  a  footing 
as  that  there  fhould  be  no  danger.  They  might  have  pro- 
vided that  all  thofe  cafes  which  are  now  triable  by  a  jury, 
fliould  be  tried  in  each  (late  by  a  jury,  according  to  the' 
mode  ufually  practised  in  fuch  ftate.  This  would  have 
been  eafily  done  if  they  had  been  at  the  trouble  of  writing 
live  or  fix  lines.  Had  it  been  done,  we  mould  have  beer^ 
faffed  to  fay  that  our  rights  and  liberties  were  not  en{ 

dangerecy? 


^angered.  If  we  adopt  this  claufe  as  it  is,  I  think,  not- 
y.'ithftanding  what  gentlemen  have  faid,  that  there  will  be 
danger.  There  ought  to  be  fome  amendments  to  it,  to  put 
this  matter  on  a  fure  footing.  There  does  not  appear  to 
ine  to  be  any  kind  of  neceiTity  that  the  Federal  Court 
{hould  have  jurifdi£lion  in  the  body  of  the  country.  I  am 
.ready  to  give  up  that  in  the  cafes  exprefsly  enumerated, 
aa  appellate  jurifdi<Stion,  except  in  one  or  two  inftances, 
might  be  given.  I  with  tbem  alfo  to  have  jurifciiction  in 
maritime  affairs,  and  to  try  offences  committed  on  the  high 
feas.  But  in  the  body  of  a  ftate,  the  jurifdielion  of  the 
courts  in  that  (late  might  extend  to  carry  into  execution 
the  laws  of  Gongrefs.  It  mud  be  unneceffary  for  the  Fe- 
deral Courts  to  do  it,  and  would  create  trouble  and  ex- 
pence  which  might  be  avoided.  In  all  cafes  where  appeals 
are  proper,  I  will  agree  that  it  is  necetTary  there  mould  be 
one  Supreme  Court.  Were  thofe  things  properly  regu- 
lated, fo  that  the  Supreme  Court  might  not  be  oppreifive, 
I  ihfiuld  have  no  objection  to  it. 

Mr.  -Davie — Mr,  Chairman,  Yefterday  and  to-day  I 
have  given  particular  attention  to  the  obfervations  of  the 
gentleman  lad  up.  I  believe,  however,  thaj;  before  we  take 
into  confideration  thefe  important  claufes,  it  will  be  ne- 
ceflary  to  confider  in  what  manner  laws  can  be  executed, 
For  my  own  part,  I  know  but  two  ways  in  which  the  laws 
can  be  executed  by  any  government.  If  there  be  any 
other,  it  is  unknown  to  me.  The  firft  mode  is  coercion 
by  military  force,  and  the  fecond  is  coercion  through  the 
judiciary.  With  refpedt  to  coercion  by  force,  I  {hall  fup- 
pofe  that  it  is  fo  extremely  repugnant  to  the  principles  of 
j allice  and  the  feelings  of  a  free  people,  that  no  man  will 
fupport  it.  It  mult  in  the  end  terminate  in  the  deftruc~tion 
of  the  liberty  of  the  people.  I  take  it,  therefore,  that 
there  is  no  rational  way  of  enforcing  the  laws  but  by  the 
jnftrumentality  of  *the  Judiciary.  From  thefe  premifes 
we  are  left  only  to  confider  how  far  the  jurifdielion  of  the 
judiciary  ought  to  exend.  It  appears  to  me  that  the  Ju- 
diciary ought  to  be  competent  to  the  decifion  of  any  quef- 
fion  arifing  out  of  the  Conftitution  itfelf.  On  a  review  of 
the  principles  of  all  free  governments,  it  feems  to  me  alfo 
^eceffary  that  the  judicial  power  (hould  be  co-extenfive 
with  the  legiflativc.     It  is"  neceflary  in  all  governments, 

but? 


but  particularly  in  a  federal  government,  that  its  jucjiciar/ 
Ihould  be  competent  to  the  decifion  of  all  queftions  arifing 
put  of  the  Conftitution.     If  I  underftand  the  gentleman 
right,  his  objection  was  not  to  the  defined  jurifdiclion, 
but  to  the  general  jurisdiction,  which  is  exprefled   thus, 
"  The  judicial  power  fhall  extend  to  all  cafes  in  law  and 
equity  arifing  under    this  Cpnftitution,  the   laws  of  the 
United  States,  and   treaties  made  or  which  fhall  be  made 
under  their  authority,"  and  alfo  to  the  appellate  jurisdic- 
tion in  fome  inftances.     Every  Member  who  has  read  the. 
Constitution  with  attention,  mufl  obferve   that  there  are_ 
certain  fundamental  principles  in  it,  both  of  a  pofitive  and 
negative  nature,  which,  being  intended  for   the  general 
advantage  of  the  community,  ought  not  to  be  violated  by 
any    future   legiflation  of    the  particular    flates.      Every 
Member  will  agree  that  the  pofitive  regulations  ought  itj, 
be  carried   into  execution,  and  that  the  negative  reftric- 
tions  ought  not  to  be  disregarded  or  violated.     Without  a, 
Judiciary,  the  injunctions  of  the  Conftitution  may  be  dif- 
obeyed,  and  the  pofitive  regulations  neglected  or  contra- 
vened.    There  are  certain   prohibitory  provifions  in  this. 
Conftitution,  the  wifdom   and  propriety  of  which  munV 
ftrike  every  reflecting  mind,  and  certainly  meet  with  the. 
warmed  approbation  of  eyery  citizen  of  this  Hate.     It  pro-, 
vides,  "That no  ftate  fhall,  without  the  confentof  Con- 
grefs,  lay  any  imports  or  duties  on  imports  or  exports, 
except  what  may  be  absolutely  neceifary  for  executing  its. 
infpection  laws— that  no  preference  fhall  be  given  by  any 
regulation  of  commerce  or  revenue,  to  the  ports  of  one 
Hate  over  thofe  of  another — and  that  no  (late  fhall  emit 
bills,  of    credit — make     any    thing  but  gold  and     filver 
coin  a  tender  in  payments  of  debts — pafs  any  bill  of  at- 
tainder, ex  poll  facto  law,  or  law  impairing  the  obligation, 
of  contracts."     Thefe  reflections  ought  to  fupercede  the. 
laws  of  particular  flates.     With  refpect  to  the  prohibitory 
provifions,  that  no  duty  or  impofl  fhall  be  laid  by  any  par- 
ticular Hate,  which  is  fo  highly  in  favour  of  us  and  the 
other  non-importing  flates,   the   importing  flates   might 
make  laws  laying  duties  notwithstanding,  and  the  Con- 
ftitution might  be  violated  with  impunity,  if  there  were 
no  power  in  the  general  government  to  correct  and  coun- 
-teract  fuch  laws.     This  great  object  can  only  be  fafely  and 

completely 


{      *f»     ) 

iompletfelj  obtained  by  the  inftrumentaljty  of  the  Federal 
judiciary*     Would  not   Virginia,  who   has  raifed    many 
ihoufand  pounds  out  of  our  citizens  by  he*  imports,  (till 
avail  herfelf  of  the  fame  advantage  it  there  were  no  con- 
ftitutional  power  to  counteract:  her  regulations  ?    If  cafes 
arifing  under  the  Qonftilution  were  left  to  her  own  courts, 
might  (he  not  dill  continue  the  fame  practices  ?  But  we  are 
•  now  to  look    for  juftice  to    the  controlling  power  of  the 
Judiciary  of  the  United  States.     If  the  Virginians   were 
to  continue  to  opprefs  us  by  laying  duties,  we  can  be  re- 
lieved by  a  recurrence  to  the    general  Judiciary.     This  re- 
flriction  in    the  Conftitution,   is  a  fundamental  principle 
which  is  not  to  be  violated,  but  which   would  have  been 
a  dead  letter  were  there  no  Judiciary  conftituted  to  enforce 
obedience  to  it.     Paper  money  and  private  contracts  were 
in   the  fame  condition.     Without   a  general    controuling 
Judiciary,  laws  might  be  ma^e  m  particular  ftates  to  en- 
able its  citizens  to  defraud  the  citizens  of  other  ftates.    Is 
it  probable  that  if  a  citizen  of  South-Carolina  owed  a  fum 
pf  money  to  a  citizen  of  this  Rate,  that  the    latter  would 
be  certain  of  recovering  the   full  value  in   their  courts  ? 
That   flate  might  in  future,  as  they  have    already  done, 
make    pine-barren  acts  to  difcharge    their   debts.     They 
might  fay  that  our  citizens  mould  be  paid  in  flerile  inarable 
Jands,  at  an  extravagant  price.     They  might  pafs  the  mod 
iniquitous  inftalment  laws,  procraftinating  the  payment  of 
debts  due  from  their  citizens,  for   years — nay,  for   ages. 
Is  it  probable  that  we   mould  get  juftice  from  their  own 
judiciary,  who  might  confider  themfelves  obliged  to   obey 
the  )&vs  of  their  own  ftate  ?  Where  then  are  we  to  look 
for  juftice  ?  To  thejudiciary  of  the  United  States.    Gen« 
tlemen   niuft   have  obferved   the  contracted   and   narrow 
minded  regulations  of  the  individual  ftates,  and  their  pre- 
dominant difpofition  to  advance  the  interefts  of  their  own 
citizens  to  the  prejudice  of  others.     Will  not  thefe  evils 
be  continued  if  there^  be  no  reftraint  ?  The  people  of  the 
United   States  have   one   common  intereft — they  ace  all 
members  of  the  fame  community,  and  ought  to  have  juf- 
tice adminiftered  to  them  equally  in  every  part  of  the  con- 
tinent, in  the  fame  manner,  with  the  fame  difpatch,  and  on 
the  fame  principles.  It  is  therefore  abfolutely  neceflary  that 
the  Judiciary  of  the  union,  flaould  have  jurifdi&ion  in  aj| 
\    "-    '  '  ca<j}# 


c  »|-5 ) 

fcafes  afifing  iii  law  and  equity  under  the  Conflitutio'n, 
Surely  there  mould  be  fomewhere  a  conftitutional  authori- 
ty for  carrying  inter  execution  coriftitutional  pro'vifions, 
btherwife,  as  I  have  already  (aid,  they  would  be  a  dead 
letter. 

"With  refpeft  to  their  having  jurifdidlion  of  all  cafes 
arifing  under  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  although  I 
have  a  very  high  refpeel:  for  the  gentleman,  I  heard  his 
objection  to  it  with  furprife.  I  thought,  if  there  were  any- 
political  axiom  under  the  fun,  it  mull  be  that  the  judicial 
power  ought  to  be  co-extenfive  with  the  legiflative.  The 
federal  government  ought  to  poffefs  the  means  of  carrying 
the  laws  into  execution.  This  pofitiori  will  not  be  dis- 
puted. A  government  would  be  a  jelo  de  ft  to  put  the 
execution  of  its  laws  under  the  controul  of  any  other 
body.  If  laws  are  not  to  be  carried  into  execution  by  the 
interpofition  of  the  Judiciary,  how  is  it  to  be  done  ?  I 
have  already  obferved,  that  the  mind  of  every  honed  man. 
who  has  any  feeling  for  the  happinefs  of  his  country,  muft* 
nave  the  higheft  repugnance  to  the  idea  of  military  coer- 
cion. The  only  means  then,  of  enforcing  obedience  t& 
the  legiflative  authority,  muft  be  through  the  medium  o£ 
the  officers  of  peace.  Did  the  gentleman  carry  his  ob-< 
je£tion  to  the  extenfion  of  the  judicial  power  to  treaties  ^ 
It  is  another  principle  which  I  imagine  will  not  be  contro- 
verted, that  the  genera!  Judiciary  ought  to  be  competent 
to  the  decifion  of  all  queftions  which  involve  the  general 
welfare  or  the  peace  of  the  union.  It  was  neceiTary  that 
treaties  mould  operate  as  laws  upon  individuals.  TheJ> 
ought  to  be  binding  upon  us  the  moment  they  are  made- 
They  involve  in  their  nature,  not  only  our  own  rights  but 
thofe  of  foreigners.  If  the  rights  of  foreigners  were  left 
to  be  decided  ultimately  by  thirteen  diflincl:  judiciaries, 
there  would  neceflarily  be  unjuft  and  contradictory  de- 
ci(ion§.  If  our  courts  of  juftice  did  not  decide  in  favour 
of  foreign  citizens  and  fubjecls  when  they  ought,  it  mighc. 
involve  the  whole  union  in  a  war.  There  ought,  there- 
fore, to  be  a  paramount  tribunal,  which  mould  have  am- 
ple power  to  carry  them  into  effecT:.  To  the  decifion  of 
all  caufes  which  might  involve  the  peace  of  the  union, 
may  be  referred  alfo,  that  of  controverfies  between  the 
fcitiaens  or  fubje&s  of  foreign  ftates  and  the  citizens  of  the 

Uaiteti 


(  m  ) 

United  States.  It  has  been  laid  down  by  all  writers,  that 
the  denial  of  juftice  is  one  of  the  juft  eaufes  of  war.  If 
thefe  controverfies  were  left  to  the  decifion  of  particular 
ftates,  it  would  be  in  their  power  at  any  time,  to  involve 
the  whole  continent  in  a  war,  ufually  the  greateft  of  all 
national  calamities.  It  is  certainly  clear,  that  where  the 
peace  of  the  union  is  affected,  the  general  Judiciary  ought 
to  decide.  It  has  generally  been  given  up,  that  all  cafes 
of  admiralty  and  maritime  jurifdiclion  {hould  alfb  be  de- 
termined by  them.  It  has  been  equally  ceded  by  the 
ftrongeft  oppofers  to  this  government,  that  the  Federal 
Courts  mould  have  cognizance  of  controverfies  between 
two  or  more  ftates ;  between  a  ftate  and  the  citizens  of 
another  ftate,  and  between  the  citizens  of  the  fame  'ftate 
claiming  lands  under  the  grant  of  different  ftates.  Its  ju- 
rifdiclion in  thefe  cafes  *•  neceffary,  to  fecure  impartiality 
in  decifions,  and  preferve  tranquility  among  the  ftates.  It 
is  impoflibie  that  there  (hould  be  impartiality  when  a 
party  arretted  is  to  be  Judge. 

The  fecurity  of  impartiality  is  the  principal  reafon  for 
giving  up  the  ultimate  decifion  of  controverfies  between 
citizens  of  different  ftates.  It  is  effential  to  "the  intereft 
of  agriculture  and  commerce,  that  the  hands  of  the  ftates 
(hould  be  bound  from  making  paper  money,  inftalment 
laws,  or  pine-barren  aBs.  By  fuch  iniquitous  laws  the 
merchant  or  farmer  may  be  defrauded  of  a  confiderable 
part  of  his  juft  claims.  But  in  the  federal  court  real 
money  will  be  recovered  with  that  fpeed  which  is  neceffa- 
ry to  accommodate  the  circumftances  of  individuals.  The 
tedious  deiays  of  judicial  proceedings  at  prefent  in  fome 
ftates,  are  ruinous  to  creditors.  In  Virginia  many  fuits 
are  twenty  or  thirty  years  fpun  out  by  legal  ingenuity,  and 
the  defective  conftruclion  of  their  judiciary.  A  citizen 
of  Maffachufetts  or  this  country  might  be  ruined  before  he 
could  recover  a  debt  in  that  ftate.  It  is  neceffary  therefore 
in  order  to  obtain  juftice,  that  we  recur  to  the  Judiciary 
of  the  United  States,  where  juftice  muft  be  equally  admi- 
niftered,  and  where  a  debt  may  be  recovered  from  the  ci- 
tizen of  one  ftate  as  foon  as  from  the  citizen  of  another. 

As  to  a  bill  of  rights,  which  has  been  brought  forward 
£n  a  manner  I  cannot  account  for,  it  is  unneceffary  to  fay 
'any  thing.  The  learned  gentleman  has  faidy  that  by  a  con- 
current 


.     {    i«5    ) 

current  jurifdi&ion  the  laws  of  the  United  States  muft 
iieccffarily  clafh  with  the  laws  of  the  individual  dates,  in 
confequence  of  which  the  laws  of  the  Hates  will  be  ob- 
structed, and  the  (late  governments  abforbed.  This  can- 
not be  the  cafe.  There  is  not  one  inftance  of  a  power 
given  to  the  United  States,  whereby  the  internal  policy  or 
adminiftration  oi  the  ftates  is  affected.  There  is  no  in- 
ftance that  can  be  pointed  out,'  wherein  the  internal  policy 
of  the  ftate  can  be  affected  by  the  Judiciary  of  the  United 
States.  He  mentioned  impoft  laws.  It  has  been  given  up 
on  all  hands,  that  if  there  was  a  neceffity  of  a  Federal 
Court,  it  was  on  this  account.  Money  is  difficult  to  be 
got  into  the  treafury.  The  power  of  the  Judiciary  to  en- 
force the  federal  laws  is  necefTary  to  facilitate  the  collec- 
tion of  the  public  revenues.  It  is  well  known  in  this  ftate 
with  what  reluctance  and  backward nefs  Collectors  pay  up 
the  public  monies.  .  We  have  been  making  laws  after  laws 
to  remedy  this  evil  and  ftill  find  them  ineffectual.  Is  it 
not  therefore  necefTary  to  enable  the  general  government 
to  compel  the  delinquent  receivers  to  be  punctual  ?  The 
honourable  gentleman  admits  that  the  general  government 
ought  to  legiflate  upon,  individuals  inftead  of  ftates.  Its 
laws  will  otherwife  be  ineffectual,  but  particularly  with 
refpect  to  treaties.  .We  have  feen  with  what  little  cere- 
mony the  ftates  violated  the  peace  with  Great- Britain. 
Congrefs  had  no  power  to  enforce  its  observance.  The 
fame  caufe  will  produce  the  fame  effect.  We  need  not 
flatter  ourfelves  that  fimilar  violations  will  always  meet 
with  equal  impunity.  I  think  he  muft  be  of  opinion  up- 
on more  reflection,  that  the  jurifdiction  of  the  federal  Ju- 
diciary could  not  have  been  conftructed  otherwife  with 
fafety  or  propriety.  It  is  necefTary  that  the  Conftitution 
fiiould  be  carried  into  effect,  that  the  laws  mould  be  exe- 
cuted, juftice  equally  done  to  all  the  community,  and  trea- 
ties obferved.  Thefe  ends  can  only  be  accomplifhed  by  a 
general  paramount  Judiciary.  Thefe  are  my  fentiments, 
and  if  the  honourable  gentleman  will  prove  them  errone- 
ous, I  (hall  readily  adopt  his  opinions. 

Mr.  Maclaine — Mr,  Chairman,  I  beg  leave  to  make  a 
few  obfervations.  One  of  the  gentleman's  objections  to 
the  Conftitution  now  under  consideration  is,  that  it  is  not 
the  act  of  the  ftates  but  of  the  people  >  but  that  it  ought 

A  a  t# 


(    M    J 

to  be  the  act  of  the  dates,  and  he  inftances  the  delegation 
of  power  by  the  ftates  to  the  Confederation  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  war  as  a  proof  of  this  pofnion.  I 
hope,  Sir,  that  all  power  i?  in  the  people  and  not  in  the 
ftate  governments.  If  he  will  not  deny  the  authority  of 
the  people  to  delegate  power  to  agents,  and  to  devife  fuch 
a  government  as  a  majority  of  them  thinks  will  promote 
their  happinefs,  he  will  withdraw  his  objection.  The  peo- 
ple, Sir,  are  the  only  proper  authority  to  form  a  govern- 
ment. They,  Sir,  have  formed  their  ftate  governments, 
and  can  alter  them  at  pleafure,  Their  tranfeendent  pow- 
er is  competent  to  fornv  this  or  any  other  government 
which  they  think  promotive  of  their  happinefs.  But  the 
gentleman  contends  that  there  ought  to  be  a  bill  of  rights, 
or  fomething  of  that  kind — fomething  declaring  expreff- 
ly,  that  all  power  not  exprefsly  given  to  the  Conftitution^ 
ought  to  be  retained  by  the  ftates,  and  he  produces  the 
Confederation  as  an  authority  for  its  neceffity.  When  the 
Confederation  was  made,  we  were  by  no  means  fo  well  ac- 
quainted with  the  principles  of  government  as  we  are  now. 
We  were  then  jealous  of  the  power  of  our  rulers,  and 
had  an  idea  of  the  Britilh  government  when  we  entertain- 
ed that  jealoufy.  There  is  no  people  on  earth  fo  well  ac- 
quainted with  the  nature  of  government  as  the  people  of 
America  generally  are.  We  know  now,  that  it  is  agreed 
upon  by  mod  writers,  and  men  of  judgment  and  reflec- 
tion, that  all  power  is  in  the  people  and  immediately  de- 
rived from  them.  The  gentleman  furely  muft  know,  that 
if  there  be  certain  rights  which  never  can  nor  ought  to  be 
given  up  ;  thefe  rights  cannot  be  faid  to  be  given  away, 
merely  becaufe  we  have  omitted  to  fay  that  we  have  not 
given  them  up.  Can  any  fecurity  arife  from  declaring  that 
we  have  a  right  to  what  belongs  to  us  ?  Where  is  the  ne- 
ceffity of  fuch  a  declaration  ?  If  we  have  this  inherent, 
this  unalienable,  this  indefeafible  title  to  thofe  rights,  if 
they  are  not  given  up,  are  they  not  retained  ?  If  Congrefs 
fhould  make  a  law  beyond  the  powers  and  the  fpirit  of  the 
Conftitution,  fhould  we  not  fay  to  Congrefs,  w  You  have 
"  no  authority  to  make  this  law.  There  are  limits  beyond 
**  which  you  cannot  go.  You  cannot  exceed  the  power 
**  prescribed  by  the  ConfUtutiorit    You  are  amenable  t« 


(    ««7    ) 

i  «*  us  for  your  conduct.    This  act  is  unconftitutional.    We 
\  ||  will  disregard  it,  and  punifh  you  for  the  attempt." 
|      But  the  gentleman  feems  to  be  moft  tenacious  of  the  ju- 
I  dicial  power  of  the  ftates.     The  honourable  gentleman 
]  muft  know,  that  the  doctrine  of  reservation  of  power  not 
i  relinquimed,  clearly  demonftrates  that  the  judicial  power 
:  of  the  ftates  is  not  impaired.     He  afks,  with  refpect  to 
the  trial  by  jury,  when  the  caufe  has  gone  up  to  the  Su- 
perior Court,  and  the  verdict  is  fet  afide,  what  benefit 
,;  arifes  from  having  had  a  jury  trial  in  the  inferior  Court  I  | 
i  would  a(k  the  gentleman,  what  is  the  reafon,  that  on  a 
fpecial  verdict  or  cafe  agreed,  the  decifion  is  left  to  the 
court  ?  There  are  a  raumber  of  cafes  where  juries  cannot 
decide.     When  a  jury  finds  the  fact  fpecially,  or  when  it 
is  agreed  upon  by  the  parties,  the  decifion  is  referred  tot 
i  the  court.     If  the  law  be  againil  the  party,  the  court  de» 
cides  againft  him  \  if  the  law  be  for  him,  the  court  judges^ 
accordingly.     He  as  well  as  every  gentleman  here  muft 
I  know,  that  under  the  Confederation  Congrefs  fet  afide  ju- 
ries.    There  was  an  appeal  given  to  Congrefs,  did  Con- 
grefs determine  by  a  jury  ?  Every  party  carried  his  teftt- 
mony  in  writing  to  the  Judges  of  Appeal,  and    Congrefs 
determined  upon  it. 

The  diftin&ion  between  matters  of  law  and  of  fact,  ha$ 
not  been  fufficiently  underftood,  or  has  been  intentionally 
mifreprefented.  On  a  demurrer  in  law,  in  which  the 
facts  are  agreed  upon  by  the  parties,  the  law  arifing  there- 
upon is  referred  to  the  court.  An  inferior  court  may  give 
an  erroneous  judgment ;  an  appeal  may  be  had  from  this 
court  to  the  Supreme  Federal  Court,  and  a  right  decifion. 
had.  This  is  an  inftance  wherein  it  can  have  cognizance 
•f  matter  of  law  folely.  In  cafe§  where  the  exiftenee  o£ 
facts  has  been  firft  difputed  by  one  of  the  parties,  and  af- 
terwards eftabliftied  as  in  a  fpecial  verdict, the  confederation, 
of  thefe  facts,  blendid  with  the  law,  is  left  to  the  court. 
In  fuch  cafes  Inferior  Courts  may  decide  contrary  to  juf- 
tice  and  law,  and  appeals  may  be  had  to  the  Supreme 
Court.  This  is  an  inftance  wherein  it  may  be  faid  they  have 
jurifdiction  both  as  to  law  and  fact.  But  where  facts  on- 
ly are  difputed,  and  where  they  are  once  eftabliftied  by  a 
verdict,  the  opinion  of  the  judges  of  the  Supreme  Cour$ 

cannot*  • 


(     »8*     ) 

cannot,  I  conceive,  fet  afide  thefe  facts,  for  I  do  not  think 
they  have  power  fo  to  do  by  this  conftruction  . 

The  Federal  Court  has  jurifdiction  only  in  fome  in- 
ftances.  There  are  many  inftances  in  which  no  court 
but  the  date  courts  can  have  any  jurifdiction  whatfo- 
ever,  except  where  parties  claim  land  under  the  grant  of 
different  ftates,  or  the  fubject  of  difpute  arifes  under  the 
Conftitution  itfelf.  The  ftate  courts  have  exclufive  jurif- 
diction over  every  other  poflible  controverfy  that  can  arife 
between  the  inhabitants  of  their  own  ftates;  nor  can  the 
Federal  Courts  intermeddle  with  fuch  difputes  either  ori- 
ginally or  by  appeal.  There  is  a  number  of  other  inftances 
where  though  jurifdiction  is  given  to  the  Federal  Courts, 
it  is  not  taken  away  from  the  ftate  courts.  If  a  man  in 
South-Carolina  owes  me  money,  I  can  bring  fuit  in  the 
courts  of  that  (late,  as  well  as  in  any  inferior  Federal 
Court.  I  think  gentlemen  cannot  but  fee  the  propriety  of 
leaving  to  the  general  government  the  regulation  of  the  in- 
ferior federal  tribunals.  This  is  a  power  which  our  own  ftate 
Legiflature  has.     We  may  truft  Congrefsas  well  as  them. 

Mr.  Spencer  anfwered,  That  the  gentleman  laft  up  had 
mifunderftood  him.  He  did  not  object  to  the  caption  of 
the  Conftitution,  but  he  inftanced  it  to  (hew  that  the 
United  States  were  not,  merely  as  ftate9,  the  objects  of 
the  Conftitution  *,  but  that  the  laws  of  Congrefs  were  to 
operate  upon  individuals  arid  not  upon  ftates.  He  then 
continued— I  do  not  mean  to  contend,  that  the  laws  of 
the  general  government  ihould  not  operate  upon  individu- 
als. I  before  obferved  that  this  was  necefTary,  as  laws 
could  not  be  put  in  execution  againft  ftates,  without  the 
agency  of  the  fword,  which  initead  of  anfwering  the  ends 
of  government  would  deftroy  it. —I  endeavoured  to  {hew, 
that  as  the  government  was  not  to  operate  againft  ftates 
but  againft  individuals,  the  rights  of  individuals  ought  to 
be  properly  fecured.  In  order  to  conftitute  this  fecurity, 
it  appears  to  me  there  ought  to  be  fuch  a  claufe  in  the 
Conftitution  as  there  was  in  the  Confederation,  exprefsly 
declaring,  that  every  power,  jurifdiction  and  right,  which 
are  not  given  up  by  it,  remain  in  the  ftates.  Such  a  claufe 
would  render  a  bill  of  rights  unneceflary.  But  as  there 
is  no  fuch  claufe  I  contend,  that  there  ihould  be  a  bill  of 
?4ghts,  ascertaining  and  fecuring  the  great  rights  of  the 

ftates 


(     18?     ) 

ftates  and  people.  Befidcs  my  objection  to  the  revifion  o£ 
facts  by  the  Federal  Court,  and  the  insecurity  of  jury  trial, 
I  confider  the  concurrent  junfditHon  of  thofe  courts  with 
the  (late  courts,  as  extremely  dangerous.  It  muft  be  ob-. 
vious  to  every  one,  that  if  they  have  fuch  a  concurrent 
jurifdit"tion, they  mult  in  tinae  takeaway  the  bufinefs  from 
the  ftate  courts  entirely.  I  do  not  deny  the  propriety  of 
having  Federal  Courts ;  but  they  fhould  be  confined  to 
federal  bufinefs,  and  ought  not  to  interfere  in  thofe  cafes 
where  the  ftate  courts  are  fully  competent  to  decide.  The 
ftate  courts  can  do  their  bufinefs  without  federal  afiiftance, 
I  do  not  know  how  far  any  gentleman  may  fuppofe,  that 
I  may  from  my  office  be  biaffed  in  favour  of  the  ftate  ju-> 
rifdi£Hon.  I  am  no  more  interefted  than  any  other  indi- 
vidual. I  do  not  think  it  will  affect  the  refpe&able  office 
which  I  hold.  Thofe  courts  will  not  take  place  immedi- 
ately, and  even  when  they  do,  it  will  be  a  long  time  be- 
fore their  concurrent  jurifdi&ion  will  materially  affect  the 
ftate  judiciaries — I  therefore  confider  myfelf  as  difintereft- 
cd.  I  only  wifh  to  have  the  government  fo  conftructed 
as  to  promote  the  happinefs,  harmony  and  liberty  of  eve- 
ry individual  at  home,  and  render  us  refpectable  as  a  nati- 
on abroad.  I  wifh  the  queftion  to  be  decided  coolly  and 
calmly,  with  moderation,  candour  and  deliberation, 

Mr.  Machine  replied,  That  the  gentleman's  objections 
to  the  want  of  a  bill  of  rights,  had  been  fufficiently  an- 
fwered.  That  the  federal  jurisdiction  was  well  guarded* 
and  that  the  Federal  Courts  had  not,  in  his  opinion,  cog- 
nizance in  any  one  cafe  where,  it  could  be  alone  veiled  in 
the  ftate  judiciaries  with  propriety  or  Safety.  The  gen- 
tleman, he  faid,  had  acknowledged  that  the  laws  of  the 
union  could  not  be  executed  under  the  exifting  govern-* 
ment,  and  yet  he  objected  to  the  Federal  Judiciary's  hav- 
ing cognizance  of  fuch  laws,  though  it  was  the  only  pro- 
bable means  whereby  they  could  be  enforced.  The  treaty 
of  peace  with  GreaNBritain  was  the  Supreme  law  of  the 
land,  yet  it  was  disregarded  for  want  of  a  Federal  Judici- 
ary. The  ftate  judiciaries  did  not  enforce  an  observance 
of  it.  The  ftate  courts  were  highly  improper  to  be  en* 
trufted  with  the  execution  of  the  federal  laws,  as  they 
were  bound  to  judge  according  to  the  ftate  laws,  which 
•light  be  repugnant  to  thofe  of  the  union. 

Mr, 


(    *9°    ) 

Mr.  IredeI!-~Mr.  Chairman,  I  beg  leave  to  make  a  few 
observations  on  fome  remarks  that  have  been  made  on  this 
part  of  the  Constitution.  The  honourable  gentleman  faid 
that  it  was  very  extraordinary  that  the  Convention  mould 
rot  have  taken  the  trouble  to  make  an  addition  of  five  or 
(ix  lines,  to  fecure  the  trial  by  jury  in  civil  cafes.  Sir,  if 
by  the  addition,  not  only  of  five  or  fix  lines,  but  of  five 
or  fix  hundred  lines,  this  invaluable  object  could  have 
been  fecured,  I  fhould  have  thought  the  Convention  cri- 
minal in  omitting  it;  and  inftead  of  meriting  the  thanks  of 
their  country,  as  I  think  they  do  now,  they  might  juftly 
have  met  with  its  refentment  and  indignation.  I  am  per- 
fuaded  that  the  omifiion  arofe  from  the  real  difficulty (of 
the  cafe.  The  gentleman  fays  that  a  mode  might  have 
been  provided,  whereby  the  trial  by  jury  might  have  been 
fecured  Satisfactorily  to  all  the  ftates.  I  call  on  him 
to  (hew  that  mode — I  know  of  none — nor  do  I  think 
jt  poflible  for  any  man  to  devife  one  to  which  fome 
dates  would  not  have  objected.  It  is  faid  indeed,  that 
it  might  have  been  provided  that  it  fhould  be  as  it 
had   been   heretofore.     Had  this   been   the   cafe,  furely 

it  would   have   been   highly  incongruous. The    trial 

by  jury  is  different  in  different  ftates.  It  is  regulated 
in  one  way  in  the  ftate  of  North-Carolina,  and  in  ano- 
ther way  in  the  .ftate  of  Virginia.  It  is  eftablifhed  in 
a  different  way  from  either  in  feveral  other  ftates.  Had  it 
then  been  inferted  in  the  Conftitution,  that,  the  trial  by 
jury  (hould  be  as  it  had  been  heretofore,  there  would  have 
been  an  example,  for  the  firft  time  in  the  world,  of  a  Ju- 
diciary belonging  to  the  fame  government  being  different 
in  different  parts  of  the  fame  country.  "What  would  you 
think  of  an  a£t  of  Aflembly  which  inould  require  the  tri- 
al by  jirry  to  be  had  in  one  mode  in  the  county  of  Orange, 
3»  another  mode  in  Granville,  and  in  a  manner  different 
from  both  in  Chatham  ?  Such  an  acl:  of  Aflembly,  fo  ma- 
nifeftly  injudicious,  impolitic  and  unjuft,  would  be  re- 
pealed next  year.  But  what  would  you  fay  of  our  Confti- 
tution, if  it  authorised  fuch  an  abfurdity  ?  The  mifchief 
then  could  not  be  removed  without  altering  the  Conftitu- 
tion itfelf.  It  muft  be  evident  therefore,  that  the  addition 
contended  for  would  not  have  anfwered  the  purpofe.  If 
the  method  of  any  particular  ftate  had  been  eftablifhed^  it 

would 


(    '9«    ) 

Would  have  been  objected  to  by  others,  becaufe  whatever 
inconveniences  it  might  have  been  attended  with,  nothing 
but  a  change  in  the  Constitution  itfelf  could  have  removed 
them  j  whereas,  as  it  is  now,  if  any  mode  eftablilhed  by 
Congrefs  is  found  inconvenient,  it  can  eafily  be  altered  by 
a  fingle  act  of  legifiation.  Let  any  gentleman  confider  the 
difficulties  in  which  the  Convention  was  placed.  An  uni- 
on  was  abfolutely  neceflary.  Every  thing  could  be  agreed 
upon  except  the  regulation  of  the  trial  by  jury  in  civil 
cafes.  They  were  all  anxious  to  eftabliffi  it  on  the  beft 
footing,  but  found  they  could  fix  upon  no  permanent  rule 
that  was  not  liable  to  great  objections  and  difficulties.  If 
they  could  not  agree  among  themfelves,  they  had  ftill  lefs 
reafon  to  believe  that  all  the  ftates  would  have  unanimouf- 
ly  agreed  to  anv  one  plan  that  could  be  propofed.  They 
therefore  thought  it  better  to  leave  all  fuch  regulations  to 
the  Legiilature  itfelf,  conceiving  there  could  be  no  real 
danger  in  this  cafe  from  a  body  compofed  of  our  own  Re- 
prefentatives,  who  could  have  no  temptation  to  undermine 
this  excellent  mode  of  trial  in  civil  cafes,  and  who  would 
have  indeed  a  perfonal  intereft  in  common  with  others,  in 
making  the  adminiftratioa  of  juftice  between  man  anc^ 
man  fecure  and  eafy.  In  criminal  cafes,  however,  no  la- 
titude ought  to  be  allowed.  In  thefe  the  greateft  danger 
from  any  government  fubfifts,  and  accordingly  it  is  pro- 
vided, that  there  (hall  be  a  trial  by  jury  in  all  fuch  cafes  in 
the  ftate  wherein  the  offence  is  committed.  I  thought  the 
objection  again  ft  the  want  of  a  bill  of  rights  had  been  ob- 
viated unanfwerably.  It  appears  to  me  moft  extraordina- 
ry. Shall  we  give  up  any  thing  but  what  is  positively 
granted  by  that  inftrument  ?  It  would  be  the  greateft  ab- 
surdity for  any  man  to  pretend,  that  when  a  Legiilature  is 
formed  for  a  particular  purpofe,  it  can  have  any  authority 
but  what  is  fo  exprefsly  given  to  it,  any  more  than  a  man 
acting  under  a  power  of  attorney  could  depart  from  the 
authority  it  conveyed  to  him,  according  to  an  inftance 
which  I  ftated  when  fpeaking  on  the  fubject  before.  As 
for  example — If  I  had  three  tracts  of  land,  one  in  Orange, 
another  in  Cafwell,  and  another  in  Chatham,  and  I  gave 
a  power  of  attorney  to  a  man  to  fell  the  two  tracts  in  O- 
range  and  Cafwell,  and  he  mould  attempt  to  fell  my  land 
m  Chatham;  would  any  man  of  common  fenfe  fuppofe  he 

had 


{     «9*    ) 

jh^d  authority  to  do  fo  ?  In  like  manner,  I  {ay,  the  future 
Congrefs  can  have  no  right  to  exercife  any  power  but  what 
is  contained  in  that  paper.  Negative  words,  in  my  opini- 
on, could  make  the  matter  no  plainer  than  it  was  before* 
The  gentleman  fays  that  unalienable  rights  ought  not  to 
be  given  up.  Thofe  rights  which  are  unalienable  are  not 
alienated.  They  ftill  remain  with  the  great  body  of  the 
people.  If  any  right  be  given  up  that  ought  not  to  be, 
let  it  be  fhewn.  Say  it  is  a  thing  which  affecls  your  coun- 
try, and  that  it  ought  not  to  be  furrendered—  this  would 
be  reafonable.  But  When  it  is  evident  that  the  exercife  of 
any  power  not  given  up  would  be  an  ufurpation,  it  would 
be  not  only  ufelefs  but  dangerous  to  enumerate  a  number 
of  rights  which  are  not  intended  to  be  given  up;  becaufe 
it  would  be  implying  in  the  ftrongeft  manner,  that  every 
right  not  included  in  the  exception  might  be  impaired  by 
the  government  without  ufurpation,  and  it  would  be rim* 
poflible  to  enumerate  every  one.  Let  any  one  make  what 
collection  or  enumeration  of  rights  he  pleafes,  I  will  im- 
mediately mention  twenty  or  thirty  more  rights  not  con- 
tained in  it.  v 
.  Mr  B/oodwortb—Mv.  Chairman,  1  have  liftened  with 
attention  to  the  gentleman's  arguments,  but,  whether  it 
be  for  want  of  fuihcient  attention,  or  from  the  groiTnefs 
of  mv  ideas,  I  cannot  be  fatisfied  with  his  defence  of  the 
omiflion  with  refpecl  to  the  trial  by  jury.  He  fays  that  it 
would  be  impoflible  to  fall  on  any  fatisfa&ory  mode  of  re- 
gulating the  trial  by  jury,  becaufe  there  are  various  cus- 
toms relative  to  it  in  the  different  dates.  Is  this  a  fatif- 
fa&ory  caufe  for  the  omifhon  ?  Why  did  it  not  provide 
that  the  trial  by  jury  mould  be  preferved  in  civil  cafes  ? 
It  has  faid  that  the  trial  mould  be  by  jury  in  criminal  cafes, 
and  yet  this  trial  is  different  in  it*  manner  in  criminal  cafes 
in  the  different  ftates.  If  it  has  been  poflible  to  fecure 
it  in  criminal  cafes,  notwithstanding  the  diverfity  con- 
cerning it,  why  has  it  not  been  poflible  to  fecure  it  in 
civil  cafes  ?  I  wifh  this  to  be  cleared  up.  By  its  not  being 
provided  for,  it  is  exprefsly  provided  againft.  I  ftill  fee 
the  necf  ffity  of  a  bill  of  rights.  Gentlemen  ufe  contra- 
dictory arguments  on  this  fubje&,  if  I  recollect  right* 
Without  the  moft  exprefs  reftri&ions,  Congrefs  may  tram- 
ple on  your  rights.     Every  poflible  precaution  ftiould  be 

taken 


{  m  ) 

taken  when  we  grant  powers.  P.ulers  are  always  difpofed 
to  abufe  them.  I  beg  leave  to  call  gentlemens  re  collection 
to  what  happened  uflder  our  Confederation.  By  it  nine 
ftates  are  required  to  make  a  treaty,  yet  feven  dates  faid 
that  they  couid,  with  propriety,  repeal  part  of  the  inflruc- 
tions  givsn  our  fecretary  for  foreign  affairs,  which  pro- 
hibited him  from  making  a  treaty  to  give  up  the  Mifiifippi 
to  Spain,  by  which  repeal  the  reft  of  his  inftructions  en- 
abled him  to  make  fuch  treaty  :  Seven  ftates  actually  did 
repeal  the  prohibitory  part  of  thefe  inilructions,  and  they 
infifted  it  was  legal  and  proper.  This  was  in  fact  a  vio- 
lation of  the  Confederation.  If  gentlemen  thus  put  what 
conftruction  they  pleafe  upon  words,  how  (hall  we  be  re- 
drefTed  if  Congrefs  (hall  fay  that  all  that  is  not  exprefled 
is  given  up,  and  they  aflume  a  power  which  is  exprefsly 
inconfiilent  with  the  rights  of  mankind.  Where  is  the 
power  to  pretend  to  deny  its  legality  ?  This  has  occurred 
to  me,  and  I  wifh  it  to  be  explained. 

Mr.  Spencer — 'Mr.  Chairman,  The  gentleman  exprefies 
admiration  as  to  what  we  object  with  refpedt  to  a  bill  o£ 
rights,  and  infills  that  what  is  not  given  up  in  the  Con- 
ftitution, is  retained.  He  mult  recollect  I  faid  yefterday, 
that  we  could  not  guard  with  too  much  care,  thofe  effen- 
tial  rjghts  and  liberties  which  ought  never  to  be  given  up. 
There  is  no  exprefs  negative — no  fence  againft  their  being 
trampled  upon.  They  might  exceed  the  proper  boundary 
without  being  taken  notice  of.  When  there  is  no  rule  but 
a  vague  doctrine,  they  might  make  great  ftrides  and  get 
into  poffeffion  of  fo  much  power,  that  a  general  infurrec- 
tion  of  the  people  would  be  neceltary  to  bring  an  alter- 
ation about.  But  if  a  boundary  were  fet  up,  when  th© 
boundary  is  paffed,  the  people  would  take  notice  of  it 
immediately.  Thefe  .are  the  obfervations  which  I  made, 
and  I  have  no  doubt  that  when  he  coolly  reflects,  he  will 
acknowledge  the  neceflity  of  it.  I  acknowledge,  however, 
that  the  doctrine  is  right.  But  if  that  Conftitution  is  not 
fatisfactory  to  the  people,  I  would  have  a  bill  of  rights, 
or  fomething  of  that  kind,  to  fatisfy  them. 

Mr.  Locke — Mr.  Chairman,  I  wifli  to  throw  fome  parti- 
cular light  upon  the  fubject  according  to  my  conceptions. 
I  think  the  Conftitution  neither  iafe  nor  beneficial,  as  it 
grants  powers  unbounded,  without;  reftrictions.  One 
B  b  gentfemaa 


C   m  > 

gentleman  has  faid,  that  it  was  neceflary  to  give  cogni- 
zance of  caufes  to  the  Federal  Court,  becaufe  there  was 
partiality  in  the  Judges  of  the  dates ;  that  the  ftate  Judges 
could  not  be  depended  upon  in  caufes  arifing  under  the. 
Gonftitution  and  laws  of  the  union.  I  agree  that  impar- 
tiality in  Judges  is  indifpenfable.  But  I  think  this  altera- 
tion will  not  produce  more  impartiality  than  there  is  now 
in  our  courts,  whatever  evils  it  may  bring  forth.  Mult 
there  not  be  Judges  in  the  Federal  Courts — and  thofe 
Judges  taken  from  fome  of  the  ftates  ?  The  fame  partiality 
therefore  may  be  in  them.  For  my  part  1  think  it  dero- 
gatory to  the  honour  of  this  ftate  to  give  this  Jurifdi&ior* 
to  the  Federal  Courts.  It  muft  be  fuppofed  that  the  fame 
paflions,  difpofitions,  and  failings  of  humanity  which  at- 
tend the  ftate  Judges,  will  be  equally  the  lot  of  the  Fede- 
ral Judges.  To  juftify  giving  this  cognizance  to  thofe 
courts,  it  muft  be  fuppofed  that  all  juftice  and  equity  are 
given  up  at  once  in  the  ftares.  Such  reafoning  is  very 
ft/range  to  me..  I  fear  greatly  for  this  ftate  and  other  ftates. 
I  find  there  has  a  confiderable  ftrefs  been  laid  upon  the. 
injuftice  of  laws  made  heretofore.  Great  reflections  are 
thrown  on  South-Carolina  for  paffing  pine-barren  and  in» 
Jtalmetit  laws,  and  on  this  ftate  for  making  paper  money^ 
I  wilh  thofe  gentlemen  who  made  thofe  obfervations,  would 
confider  the  neceflity  which  compelled  us  in  a  great  mea- 
fure  to  make  fuch  money.  I  never  thought  the  law  which 
authorifed  it,  a  good  law.  If  the  evil  could  have  been 
avoided,  it  would  have  been  a  very  bad  jaw.  But  ne- 
ceflity, Sir,  juftified  it  in  fome  degree.  I  believe  I  have 
gained  as  little  by  it  as  any  in  this  houfe.  If  we  are  to 
Judge  of  the  future  by  what  we  have  feen,  we  fhall 
find  as  much  or  more  injuftice  in  Congrefs  than  in  our 
Legiflature.  Neceflity  compelled  them  to  pafs  the  law  in 
order  to  fave  vaft  numbers  of  people  from  ruin.  I  hope  to 
be  excufed  in  obferving,  that  it  would  have  been  hard  for 
our  late  continental  army  to  law  down  their  arms,  with 
which  they  had  valiantly  and  fuccefsfully  fought  for  their 
country,  without  receiving  or  being  promifed  and  affiired 
of  fome  compenfation  for  their  paft  fervices.  What  a  fi- 
tuation  would  this  country  have  been  in,  if  they  had  had 
the  power  over  the  purfe  and/word  ?  If  they  had  had  the. 
powers  given  up  by  this  Conftitution,  what  a  wretched 

fituatioa 


^situation  would  this  country  have  been  in  ?  Congrefs  waf 
iinable  to  pay  them,  but  paiTed  many  refolutions  and  law* 
in  their  favour,  particularly  one,  that  each  (late  fhould 
inake  up  the  depreciation  of  the  pay  of  the  continental 
line,  who  were  diftrefled  for  the  want  of  an  adequate 
compensation  for 'their  fervices.  This  ftate  could' not  pay 
her  proportion  in  fpecie.  To  have  laid  a  tax  for  that  pur- 
pofe,  would  have  been  oppreflive.  What  was  to  be  done  I 
The  only  expedient  was  to  pa<s  a  law  to  make  paper  mo- 
ney, and  make  it  a  tender.  The  continental  line  was  Sa- 
tisfied, and  approved  of  the  meafure;  it  being  done  at 
their  inftance  in  fome  degree.  Notwithstanding  it  was 
fuppofed  to  be  highly  beneficial  to  the  ftate,  it  is  found  to 
he  injurious  to  it.  Saving  expence  is  a  very  great  object, 
t>ut  this  incurred  much  expence.  This  fubjecl:  has  for 
rnany  years  embroiled  the  ftate.  But  the  fituation  of  the 
Country  is  fuch,  and  the  diftrefles  of  the  people  fo  great, 
that  the  public  meafures  muft  be'  accommodated  to  their 
circumftances  with  peculiar  delicacy  and  caution,  or  ano- 
ther infurrection  may  be  the  confequen^el  As  to  what 
the  gentleman  faid  of  the  trial  by  jury— it  furprifes  me 
imuch  to  hear  gen  tie  men  of  fuch  great  abilities,  fpeak  fucH. 
Slanguage.  It  is  clearly  infecure,  nor  can  ingenuity  and 
fubtle  arguments  prove  the  contrary.  I  truft  this  country 
is  toofenfible  of  the  value  of  liberty,  and  her  citizens 
have  bought  it  too  dearly  to  give  it  up  haftily. 

Mr.  Iredell—  Mr.  Chairman,  I  hope  that  fome  other 
gentleman  will  anfwer  what  has  been  faid  by  the  gentle- 
men who  have  fpoken  laft.  I  only  rife  to  anfwer  the 
queilion  of  the  MermSer  from  New-Hanover,  which  was; 
If  there  was  fuch  a  difficulty  in  eftabliihing  the  trial 
by  jury  in  civil  cafes,  that  the  Convention  could  not 
concur  in  any  mode,  why  the  difficulty  did  not  extend 
to  criminal  cafes  ?  J  beg  leave  to  fayr  that  the  difficul- 
ty in  this  cafe  does  not  depend  fo  much  on  the  mode  o£ 
proceeding,  as  on  the  difference  of  the  fubjeds  of  contro- 
Verfy,  and  the  laws  relative  to  them.  In  fome  ftates  there 
are  no  juries  in  admiralty  and  equity  cafes.  In  other  ftates 
there  are  juries  in  fuch  cafes.  In  fome  ftates  there  are  no 
ctiftinft  courts  of  equity,  though  in  moft  ftates  there  are. 
II  believe,  that  if  an  uniform  rule  had  been  fixed  by  the 
Conftitution,  it  would  have  tfifpleafed  fome  ftates  fo  fat 

that ; 


(   i0    ) 

that  they  would  have  rejected  the  Conflitution  altogether. 
Had  it  been  declared  generally,  as  the  gentleman  menti- 
oned, it  would  have  included  equity  and  maritime  cafes, 
and  created  a  neceflity  of  deciding  them  in  a  manner  dif- 
ferent from'  that  in  which  they  have  been  decided  hereto- 
fore in  many  of  the  flates ;  which  would  very  probably 
have  met  with  the  difapprobation  of  thofe  dates.  We 
have  been  told,  and  I  believe  this  was  the  real  reafon  why 
they  could  not  concur  in  any  general  rule.  I  have  great 
refpeil  for  the  characters  of  thofe  gentlemen  who  formed 
the  Convention,  and  I  believe  they  were  not  capable  of 
overlooking  the  importance  of  the  trial  by  jury,  much  lefs 
of  defignedly  plotting  againfl  it.  But  I  fully  believe  that 
the  real  difficulty  of  the  thing  was  the  caufe  of  the  omif- 
fion.  I  truft  fufficient  reafons  have  been  offered,  to  (hew 
that  it  is  in  no  danger.  As  to  criminal  cafes,  I  mult  ob- 
ferve,  that  the  great  inftrument  of  arbitrary  power  is  cri- 
minal profecutions.  B^  the  privilege  of  the  habeas  corpus 
no  man  can  be  confined  without  enquiry,  and  if  it  fhould 
appear  he  has  «been  Committed  contrary  to  law,  he  rauft 
be  discharged.  That  diverfity  which  is  to  be  found  in  ci- 
vil controverfies,  does  not  fubfifl  in  criminal  cafes.  That 
diverfity  which  contributes  to  the  fecurity  of  property  in 
civil  cafes,  would  have  pernicious  effects  in  criminal  ones. 
There  is  no  other  fafe  mode  to  try  thefe  but  by  a  jury.  If 
any  man  had  the  means  of  trying  another  his  own  way  ; 
or  were  it  left  to  the  controul  of  arbitrary  Judges,  no  man 
■would  have  that  fecurity  for  Hfe  and  liberty  which  every 
freeman  ought  to  have.  I  prefume  that  in  no  ftate  on  the 
continent  is  a  man  tried  on  a  criminal  accufation  but  by 
a  jury.  It  was  neceflary  therefore  that  it  fhould  be  fixed 
in  the  Conflitution,  that  the  trial  fhould  be  by  jury  in  cri- 
minal cafes,  and  fuch  difficulties  did  not  occur  in  this  a?  in 
the  other  cafe.  The  worthy  gentleman  fays,  that  by  not  be- 
ing provided  for  in  civil  cafes  it  is  exprefsly  provided  againfl, 
and  that  what  is  not  expreffed  is  given  up.  Were  it  fo, 
:no  man  would  be  more  againfl  this  Conflitution  than  my- 
felf.  I  fhould  deteft  and  oppofe  it  as  much  as  any  man. 
But,  Sir,  this  cannot  be  the  cafe.  I  beg  leave  to  fay  that 
that  conflru£lion  appears  to  me  abfurd  and  unnatural.  As 
jt  could  not  be  fixed  either  on  the  principles  of  uniformi- 
ty or  diverfity,  it  mufl  be  left  to  Congrefs  to  modify  it. 


(    '97    ) 

If  they  eftablifh  it  in  any  manner  by  law,  and  find  it  in- 
convenient, they  can  alter  it.  But  I  am  convinced  that  a 
majority  of  the  Representatives  of  the  people,  will  never 
attempt  to  eftablift  a  mode  opprefhve  to  their  conftituents* 
as  it  will  be  their  own  intereft  to  take  care  of  this  right. 
But  it  is  obferved  that  there  ought  to  be  a  fence  provided 
againft  future  encroachments  of  power.  If  there  be  not 
fuch  a  fence  it  is  a  caufe  of  objection.  I  readily  agree 
there  ought  to  be  fuch  a  fence.  The  inftrument  ought  to 
contain  fuch  a  definition  of  authority  as  would  leave  no 
doubt,  and  if  there  be  any  ambiguitv  it  ought  not  to  be 
admitted.  He  fays  this  conftruction  is  not  agreeable  to 
the  people,  though  he  acknowledges  it  is  a  right  one.  Ira 
my  opinion  there  is  no  man  of  any  reafon  at  all,  but  muft 
be  Satisfied  with  fo  clear  and  plain  a  definition.  If  the  Con- 
grefs  mould  claim  any  power  not  given  them,  it  would  be  as- 
bare  an  ufurpation  as  making  a  King  in  America.  If  thi& 
Conftitution  be  adopted,  it  muft  be  prefumed  the  inftru- 
ment will  be  in  the  hands  of  every  man  in  America,  to  fee 
whether  authority  be  ufurped  ;  and  any  perfon  by  infpe£t- 
ing  it  may  fee  if  the  power  claimed  be  enumerated.  If  it. 
be  not,  he  will  know  it  to  be  an  ufurpation. 

Mr.  Maclaine-~Mr.  Chairman,  A  gentlemen  lately  up* 
[Mr.  Locke]  has  informed  us  of  his  doubts  and  fears  re- 
fpecling  the  Federal  Courts.  Me  is  afraid  for  this  flat® 
and  other  ftates.  He  fuppofes  that  the  idea  of  giving  cog- 
nizance of  the  laws  of  the  union  to  Federal  Courts,  muft 
have  arifen  from  fufpicions  of  partiality  and  want  of  com- 
mon integrity  in  our  ftate  Judges.  The  worthy  gentle- 
man is  miftaken  in  his  conftru&ion  of  what  I  faid.  I  did 
not  perfonally  reflect  on  the  members  of  our  ftate  judicia- 
ry. Nor  did  I  impute  the  impropriety  of  veiling  the  ftate 
judiciaries  with  exelufive  jurifdi£Hon  over  the  laws  of  the 
union,  and  cafes  arifing  under  the  Conftitutior*,  to  any 
want  of  probity  in  the  Judges.  But  if  they  be  Judges  of 
the  local  or  ftate  laws,  and  receive  emoluments  for  a£lin£ 
in  that  capacity,  they  will  be  improper  perfons-.to  judge  of 
the  laws  of  the  union.  A  federal  Judge  ought  to  be  fole- 
ly  governed  by  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  receive 
his  falary  from  the  treafury  of  the  United  States.  It  is 
impoffible  for  any  Judges,  receiving  pay  from  a  fingle 
ftate,  to  be  impartial  in  cafes  where  the  local  laws  or  inter* 

Sfttf 


i  $f  ) 

tils  of  that  ft  ate  clafh  with  the  laws  of  the  union,  or  the 
general  interefts  of  America.  We  have  inftances  here 
which  prove  this  partiality  in  fuch  cafes.  It  is  alfo  fo  in 
other  ftates.  The  gentleman  has  thrown  out  fomething 
very  uncommon.  He  likens  the  powers  given  by  this  Con- 
ilitution  to  giving  the  late  army  the  purfe  and  the  (word. 

I  am  rhuch  aftonifhed  that  fuch  an  idea  ihould  be  thrown 
out  by  that  gentlemen,  becaufe  his  refpecl  ability  is  well 
known.  If  he  confiders  but  a  moment,  he  muft  fee  that 
his  obfervation  is  bad,  and  that  the  comparifon  is  extreme- 
ly abfurd  and  improper.  The  purfe  and  the  fword  muft  be 
given  to  every  government.  The  fword  is  given  to  the 
Executive  Magiftra'te';  but  the  purfe  remains  by  this  Con- 
stitution in  the  Reprefentatives  of  the  people.  We  know 
very  well  that  they  cannot  raife  one  milling  but  by  the 
confent  of  the  Reprefentatives  of  the  people.  Money 
bills  do  not  even  originate  in  the  Senate;  they  originate 
folelyiri  the  other  houfe.  Every  appropriation  muft  be  by 
law.  We  know  therefore  that  no  Executive  Magiftrate  or 
officer,  can  appropriate  a  fhilling  but  as  he  is  authorifed  by 
law.  With  refpecT:  to  paper  motley,  the  gentleman  has 
acted  and  fpoken  with  great  candour.  He*  was  againft 
paper  money  front  the  firft  emiffion.  There  was  no  other 
way  tofatisfy  the  late  army  but  by  paper  money,  there  be- 
ing not  a  fhilling  of  fpecie  in  the  ftate.  There  were  other 
modes  adopted  by  other  ftates,  which  did  not  produce  fuch 
inconveniences.  There  was  however  a  considerable  ma- 
jority of  that  Aflembly  who  adopted  the  idea,  that  not  one 
fhilling  more,  paper  money,  fhould  be  made,  becaufe  of 
the  evil  confequences  that  muft  neceflarily  follow.  The 
experience  of  this  country  for  many  years  has  proved  that 
fuch  emiffions  involve  us  in  debts  and  diftrefTes,  deftroy 
bur  credit  and  produce  no  good  confequence  ;  yet  contra- 
ry to  all  good  policy  the  evil  was  repeated. 

With  refpecl:  to  our  public  fecurity  and  paper  money, 
the  apprehehfions  of  gentlemen  are  groundlefs.  I  believe 
this  Conftitufion  cannot  affect  them  at  all.  In  the  10th 
fe&ion  of  the  firft  article,  it  is  provided  among  other  re- 
ftri&ions,  "  that  no  ftate  (hall  emit  bills  of  credit,  make 
••  any  thing  but  gold  or  filver.coin  a  tender  inpayment  of 
**  debts,  or  pafs  any  law  impairing  the  obligation  of 'con- 

II  tra&s."    Now,  Sir,  this  has  no  retrofpe&ive  view.    It 

looks 


C    *99   ) 

Ipoks  to  futurity. — It  is  conceiyed  by  many  people,  that 
the  moment  this  new  Conftitution  is  adopted,  our  prefent 
paper  money  will  fink  to  nothing,  for  my  part,  I  believe 
$hat  inftead  of  finking  it  will  appreciate.  If  we  adopt,  it 
will  rife  in  value,  fo  that  twenty  {hillings  of  it  will  be 
equal  to  two  Spanifh  milled  dollars  and  an  half*  Paper 
money  is  as  good  as  gold  and  filver  where  there  are  proper 
funds  to  redeem  it,  and  no  danger  of  its  being  encreafed* 
Before  the  late  war  our  paper  money  fluctuated  in  .value. 
Thirty- fix  years  ago,  when  I  came  into  the  country,  our 
paper  money  was  at  feven  {hillings  id  the  dollar.  A  few/ 
years  before  the  late  War,  the  merchants  of  Great-Britairi 
remonftrated  to  the  Miniftry  of  that  country,  that  they 
loft  much  of  their  debts  by  paper  money  lofing  its  value. 
This  caufed  an  order  to  be  made  through  aJl  the  dates  not 
to  pafs  any  money  bilLs  whatever.  The  effect  of  this  wasi 
that  our  money  appreciated.  At  the  commencement  o£ 
the  war,  our  paper  money  in  circulation  was  equal  to  gold 
or  filver.  But  it  is  faid  that  on  adoption,  all  debts  con- 
tracted heretofore,  muft  then  be  paid  in  gold  or  filver 
coin.  I  believe  that  if  any  gentleman  .will  attend  to  the 
claufe  above  recited,  he  will  find^that  it  has  no  retrofpec- 
tive  but  a  profpective  view.  It  does  not  look  back  but 
forward.  It  does  not  deftroy  the  paper  money  which  is 
now  actually  made,  but  prevents  us  from  making  any  more. 
This  is  much  in  our  favour,  becaufe  we  may  pay  in  thq 
money  we  contracted  for  (or  fuch  as  is  ecjual  in  value  to> 
it)  and  the  very  reftri£Uoh  againft  an  increafe  of  it  will 
add  to  its  value.  It  is  in  the  power  of  the  Legiflature  to 
c.ftablifh  a  fcale  of  depreciation  to  fix  the  value  of  it ; 
There  is  nothing  againft  this  in  the  Conftitution  ;  on  the 
contrary  it  favours  it.  I  fhould  be  much  injured  if  it  was 
really  to  be  the  cafe  that  the  paper  money  fhould  fink. 
4-fter  the  Conftitution  was  adopted,  I  fhould  think  my- 
felf,  as  a  holder  of  our  paper  money,  pofTefted  of  conti- 
nental fecurity.  .  I  am  convinced  our  money  will  be  good: 
money,  and  if  I  was  to  fpeculate  in  any  thing,  I  would, 
in  paper  money,  though  I  never  did  fpeculate.  I  fhould 
l?e  fatisfied  that  I  fhould  make  a  profit.  Why  fay  that  the 
ftate  fecurity  will  be  paid  in  gold  and  filver  after  all  thefe 
things  arc  confidered  ?    Every   real,  actual   debt  of  the 

ftate* 


,    (     400     > 

ftate,  ought  to  be   discharged  in  real,  and   not   nominal 
value,  whether  the  Conftitution  be  adopted  or  not. 

Mr.  Baft  took  a  general  view  of  the  original  and  appel- 
late jurifdi&ion  of  the  Federal  Court.  He  confidered  the 
Conftitution  neither  necefTary  nor  proper.  He  declared 
that  the  lail  part  of  the  firft  paragraph  of  the  fecond  Sec- 
tion, appeared  to  him  totally  inexplicable.  He  feared  that 
dreadful  oppreffion  would  be  committed  by  carrying  peo- 
ple too  great  a  diftance  to  decide  trivial  caufes.  He  ob- 
served that  gentlemen  of  the  law  and  men  of  learning  did 
not  concur  in  the  explanation  or  meaning  of  this  Confti- 
tution. For  his  part,  he  Said,  he  could  not  underftand  it, 
although  he  took  great  pains  to  find  out  its  meaning,  and 
although  he  flattered  him  Self  with  the  pofleffion  of  com- 
mon fenfe  and  reafon.  He  always  thought  that  there  ought 
to  be  a  compact  between  the  governors  and  governed ; 
Some  called  this  a  compact,  others  faid  it  was  not.  From 
the  contrariety  of  opinions,  he  thought  the  thing  was  ei- 
ther uncommonly  difficult,  or  absolutely  unintelligible.  He 
wifhed  to  reflect  on  no  gentleman,  and  apologized  for  his 
ignorance,  by  obferving  that  he  never  went  to  School,  and 
had  been  born  blind  j  but  he  wifhed  for  information,  and 
fuppofed  that  every  gentleman  would  confider  his  defire 
as  laudable. 

Mr-  Maclaine  firft,  and  then  Mr.  Iredell,  endeavoured 
to  Satisfy  the  gentleman  by  a  particular  explanation  of  the 
whole  paragraph.  It  was  obferved,  that  if  there  lhould 
be  a  controversy  between  this  ft  ate  and  the  I£ing,s  of  France 
or  Spain,  it  muft  be  decided  in  the  Federal  Court.  Or  if 
there  fhould  arife  a  controverSy  between  the  French  King 
or  any  other  foreign  power,  or  one  of  their  Subjects  or  citfc- 
aens,and  one  of  our  citizens,  it  muft  be  decided  there  alfo* 
The  diftinction  between  the  words  citizen  an&fubjecJ  was  ex- 
plained— that  the  former  related  to  individuals  of  popular 
governments  ;  the  latter  to  thofe  of  monarchies.  As  for  in- 
ftance,  a  difpute  between  this  ftate  or  a  citizen  of  it,  and  a 
perfonjin  Holland.  The  word  foreign  citizen  would  proper- 
ly refer  to  Such  perfon.  If  the  difpute  was  between  this  ftate 
and  a  perfon  in  France  or  Spain,  the  word  foreign  Subject 
would  apply  to  this — and  all  fuch  controverfies  might  be  de- 
cided in  the  Federal  Court — That  the  words  citizens  or fuh- 
jecls  in  that  part  of  the  claufe,  could  only  apply  to  foreign 

sitizctw 


(     ioi     ) 

citizens  or foreign  fubjeBs,  and  another  part  of  the  Conftitu> 
tion  made  this  plain,  by  confining  difputes  in  general  be* 
tween  citizens  of  the  fame  ftate,  to  the  fingle  cafe  o£ 
their  claiming  lands  under  grants  of  different  ftates. 

The  laft  claufe  of  the  fecond  feclion  under  confidera- 
tion. 

Mr.  Madame — Mr.  Chairman,  An  objection  was  made 
yefterday  by  a  gentleman  againft  this  claufe,  becaufe  it 
confined  the  trial  to  the  ftate  ;  and  he  obferved,  that  a  per- 
fon  oh  the  Miffifippi  might  be  tried  in  Edenton.  Gentle- 
men ought  to  confider  that  it  was  impoflible  for  the  Con- 
vention, when  devifing  a  general  rule  for  all  the  ftates,  to 
defcend  to  particular  diftritla.  The  trial  byjury  is  fecur- 
cd  generally,  by  providing  that  the  trial  mall  be  in  the  ftate 
where  the  crime  was  committed.  It  is  left  to  Congrefs  to 
make  fuch  regulations  by  law,  as  will  fuit  the  circumftan- 
ces  of  each  itate.  It  would  have  been  impolitic  to  fix  the 
mode  of  proceeding,  becaufe  it  would  alter  the  prefent  , 
mode  of  proceeding  in  fuch  cafes,  in  this  ftate  or  in  feve* 
ral  others.  For  there  is  fuch  a  diilimilarity  in  the  proceed- 
ings of  different  ftates,  that  it  would  be  impoflible  to  make 
a  general  law  which  would  be  fatisfa&ory  to  the  whole. 
But  as  the  trial  is  to  be  in  the  ftate,  there  is  no  doubt  bu£ 
Jt  will  be  in  the  ufual  and  common  mode  pradtifed  in  the 
ftate. 

Third  fe£tion  read  without  any  obfervation. 

Article  fourth.  The  firft  fe£Hon,  and  two  firft  claufes 
©f  the  fecond  fe£Uon,  read  without  any  obfervation. 

The  laft  claufe  read. 

Mr.  Iredell  t  begged  leave  to  explain  the  reafon  of  this 
claufe.  In  fome  of  the  northern  ftates  they  have  emanci- 
pated all  their  Haves.  If  any  of  our  Haves,  faid  he,  go  there 
and  remain  there  a  certain  time,  they  would  by  the  prefent 
laws,  be  entitled  to  their  freedom  •»  fo  that  their  mafters 
could  not  get  them  again.  This  would  be  extremely  pre- 
judicial to  the  inhabitants  of  the  fouthern  ftates,  and  to 
prevent  it,  this  claufe  is  inferted  in  the  Conftitution  — 
Though  the  word  Jlave  be  not  mentioned,  this  is  the  mean- 
ing of  it.  The  northern  Delegates,  owing  to  their  parti- 
cular fcruples  on  the  fubjecl:  of  llavery,  did  not  choofe  the 
word  Jlave  to  be  mentioned. 

The  reft  q£  the  fourth  article  read  without  any  obferva* 
fi9D»  Q  €  Artick 


(     iot    ) 

Article  fifth. 

Mr.  Iredell— Wit.  Chairman,  This  is  a  very  important 
claufe.  In  every  other  conftitutiori  of  government  that 
I  have  ever  heard  or  read  of,  no  provifion  is  made  for 
neceffary  amendments.  The  misfortune  attending  mod 
conftitutions  which  have  been  deliberately  formed,  has. 
been,  that  thofe  who  formed  them  thought  their  wif°* 
dom  equal  to  all  poflible  contingencies,  and  that  there 
could  be  no  error  in  what  they  did.  The  gentlemen 
who  framed  this  Coriftitution  thought  with  much  more 
diffidence  of  their  own  capacities  ;  and  undoubtedly  with- 
out a  provrfion  for  amendment  it  would  have  been  more 
juftly  liable  to  objection,  and  the  characters  of  its  fra- 
mers  would  have  appeared  much  lefs  meritorious.  TlnY 
indeed  is  one  of  the  greateft  beauties  of  the  fyftem,  and 
fhould  ftrcngly  recommend  it  to  every  candid  mind.  The 
Conftitution  pf  anjr  government  which  can  not  be  regu- 
larly amended  when  its  defects  are  experienced  reduces  this 
people  to  this  dilemma — they  muft  either  fubmit  to  its  op- 
preffions,  or  bring  about  amendments  more  or  lefs  by  a 
civil  war.  Happy  this,  the  country  we  live  in  !  The  Con-' 
ftitution  before  us,  if  it  be  adopted,  can  be  altered  with 
as  much  regularity  and  as  little  confufion,  as  any  a£t  of 
Aflembly — net  indeed  quite  fo  eafily,  which  would  be 
extremely  impolitic  ;  but  if  is  a  moft  happy  cifcumftanceV 
that  there  is  a  remedy  in  the  fyftem  itfelf  for  ks  own  fal-" 
libility,  fo  that  alterations  can  without  difficulty  be  made 
ag'reea&])e  to  the  general-  fenfe  of  the  people.  Let  us 
attend  to  the  manner  in  which  amendments  may  be  made:' 
The  proportion  for  amendments  may  arife- from  Con- 
grefs itfelf,  when  two-thirds  of  both  Houfes  fhall  deem 
it  neceffary.  If  they  fhould  not,  aind  yet  amendments  be 
generally  wifhed  for  by  the  people,  two-thirds  of  the  Le-' 
giflatures  of  the  different  ftates  may  require  a  general 
Convention  for  the  purpofe,  in  which  cafe  Congrefs  are 
under  the  neceflity  of  convening  one.  Any  amendments 
which  either  Congrefs  fhall  propofe,  or  which  fhall  be  pro- 
pofed  by  fuch  General  Convention,  are  afterwards  to  be 
fubmitted  to  the  Legiflatures  of  the  different  ftates,  or 
Conventions  called  for  that  purpofe,  as  Congrefs  fhall  think 
proper  j  and  upon  the  ratification  of  three-fourths  of  the 
$ates,  wiU  become  a  part  of  the  Coaftitutioru    By  refer-' 

rin$ 


(     *°3     ) 

pfng  this  bufinefs  to  the  Legiflatures,  expencc  would  f*e 
fav^d  ;  and  in  general  it  may  be  prefumed,  they  would 
fpeik  the  genuine  SenSe  of  the  people.  It  may,  however, 
on  Some  occafions,  be  better  to  confult  an  immediate  dele^ 
gation  for  that  Special  purpofe.  This  is  therefore  left  dis- 
cretionary. It  is  highly  probable  that  amendments  agreed 
to  in' either  of  theSe  methods,  would  be  conducive  to  the 
public  welfare,  when  So  large  a  majority  of  the  ftates  con- 
sented to  them.  And  in  one  of  thefe  modes,  amendment* 
that  are  now  wifhed  for,  may  in  a  fhort  time  jbe  made  to 
ihis  Constitution  by  the  ftates  adopting  it. 

It  is  however  to  be  obServed,  that  the  firft  and  fourth 
claufes  in  the  ninth  Section  of  the  firft  article,  are  protect- 
ed from,  any  alteration  till  the  year  1808,  And  in  order 
,that  no  confolidation  fhould  take  place,  it  is  provided, 
that  no  date  mail,  by  any  amendment  or  alteration,  be 
ever  deprived  of  an  equal  Suffrage  in  the  $enate  with- 
out its  own  conSent*  The  two  firft  prohibitions  are 
with  reSpecT:  to  the  cenfus,  according  to  which  direel  tax- 
es are  impofed,  and  with  reSpecl:  to  the  importation  o£ 
flaves.  As  to  the  firft,  it  muft  be  obferved,  that  there  is 
a  material  difference  between  the  northern  and  Southern, 
ftates.  The  northern  ftates  have  been  much  longer  fettled, 
and  are  much  fuller  of  people  lhan  the  Southern,  but  have 
not  land  in  equal  proportion  nor  Scarcely  any  flaves.  The 
fubjeel:  of  this  article  was  regulated  with  great  difficulty, 
and  by  a  Spirit  of  conceflion  which  it  would  not  be  pru- 
dent to  difturb  for  a  good  many  years.  In  twenty  years 
there  will  probably  be  a  great  alteration,  and  then  the  Sub- 
ject may  be  reconfidered  with  leSs  difficulty,  and  greater 
coolneSs.  In  the  mean  time  the  compromise  was  upon 
the  beft  footing  that  could  be  obtained.  A  compromifq 
likewiSe  took  place  in  regard  to  the  importation  of  flaves. 
It  is  probable  that  all  the  members  reprobated  this  inhu- 
man traffic,  but  thoSe  of  South-Carolina  and  Georgia 
would  not  confent  to  an  immediate  prohibition  of  it;  onet 
s;eafon  of  which  was,  that  during  the  laft  war  they  loft  * 
vaft  number  of  negroes,  which  lofs  they  wifh  to  fupply. 
In  the  mean  time  it  is  left  to  the  ftates  to  admit  or  prohi- 
bit the  importation,  and  Congrefs  may  impofe  a  limited 
duty  upon  it, 

Bfr, 


{    **4    ) 

Mr.  Baft  obferved,  that  it  was  plain,  that  the  intlrocluc- 
tion  of  amendments  depended  altogether  on  Congrefs. 

Mr.  Iredell  replied,  that  it  was  very  evident  that  it  did 
Jiot  depend  on  the  will  of  Congrefs  ;  For  that  the  Legifla* 
tures  of  three  fourths  of  the  dates  were  authorised  to 
make  application  for  calling  a  Convention  to  propofe 
amendments,  and  on  fuch  application,  it  is  provided  that 
Congrekjhall  call  fuch  Convention,  fo  that  they  will  have 
no  option. 

Article  ilxth.     Firft  claufe  read  without  any  obfervation. 

Second  claufe  read. 

Mr.  Iredell — This  claufe  is  fuppofed  to  give  \po  much 
power,  when  in  fact  it  only  provides  for  the  execution  of 
thofe  powers  which  are  already  given  in  the  foregoing  ar- 
ticles. What  does  it  fay  ?  That  "  this  Constitution,  and 
*<  the  laws  of  the  United  States  which  {hall  be  made  in 
u  purfuance  thereof,  and  all  treaties  made  or  vhich  (hall 
*<  be  made  under  the  authority  of  the  United  States,  fhall 
€f  be  the  fupreme  law  of  the  land ;  and  the  Judges  in  eve- 
«<  ry  Hate  (hall  be  bound  thereby,  any  thing  in  the  confti* 
•*  tution  of  laws  of  any  Hate  to  the  contrary  notwithftand* 
«c  ing."  What  is  the  meaning  of  this,  but  that  as  we  have 
given  power  we  will  fupport  the  execution  of  it  ?  We  fhould 
atl:  like  children  to  give  power  and  deny  the  legality  of  exe- 
cuting it.  It  is  faying  no  more  than  that  when  We  adopt  the 
government  we  will  maintain  and  obey  it  ;  in  the  fame 
manner  as  if  the  Conftitution  of  this  {late  had  faidf 
that  when  a  law  is  pafled  in  conformity  to  it  we 
mult  obey  that  lavv".  Would  this  be  objected  to  ?  Then 
when  the  Congrefs  paJTes  a  law  confident  with  the  Con- 
ftitution, it  is  to  be  binding  on  the  people.  If  Congrefs 
under  pretence  of  executing  one  power,  fliould  in  facl; 
ufurp  another,  thev  will  violate  the  Conftitution.  I  pre- 
fume  therefore  that  this  explanation,  which  appears  to  me 
the  plaineft  in  the  world,  will  be  entirely  fatisfa&ory  to 
the  committee. 

Mr-  Bloodnvorth ^-Mr.  Chairman,  I  cortfefs  his  explana- 
tion is  not  fatisfa&ory  to  me — I  wifh  the  gentleman  had 
gone  further.  I  readily  agree,  that  it  is  giving  them  no 
more  power  than  to  execute  their  laws.  But  how  far 
does  this  go  ?  It  appears  to  me  to  fweep  off  all  the  Con- 
ftitutipns  pf  the  {iates.     It  is  a  total  repeal  of  every  acT: 

and 


(    *®J    ) 

a«d  Conftitution  of  the  dates.  The  Judges  are  fworft  td 
Uphold  it.  It  will  produce  an  abolition  of  the  itate  govern- 
ments.    Its  fovereigaty  abfolutelv  annihilates  them. 

Mr,  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  Every  power  delegated  td 
Congrefs,  is  to  be  executed  by  laws  made  for  that  purpofe. 
It  is  neceifary  to  particular  fe  the  powers  intended  to  be 
given  in  the  Conftitution,  as  having  no  exigence  before. 
But  after  having  enumerated  what  we  give  up,  it  follows 
of  courfe,  that  whatever  is  done  by  virtue  of  that  autho- 
rity, is  legal  without  any  new  authority  or  power.  The 
queftion  then  under  this  claufe.  will  a' ways  be— whether 
Congrefs  has  exceeded  its  authority  ?  If  it  has  not  exceed- 
sd  it  we  muft  obey,  othtrwife  not.  This  Conftitution 
when  adopted  will  become  a  part  of  our  ftate  Conitii  ution, 
and  the  latter  muft  yield  to  the  former  only  in  thofe  cafes 
where  power  is  given  by  it.  It  is  not  to  yield  to  it  in  any 
other  cafe  whatever.  For  inftancev  there  is  nothing  in  thtf 
Conftitution  of  this  ftate  eftabliming  the  authority  of  a 
Federal  Court.  Yet  the  Federal  Court  when  eftablifhed, 
will  be  as  constitutional  as  the  Superior  Court  is  now  un- 
der our  Conftitution.^-It  appears  to  me  merely  a  general 
claufe,  the  amount  of  which  is,  that  when  they  pafs  an 
a&,  if  it  be  in  the  execution  of  a  power  given  by  the  Con* 
ftitution,  it  fhall  be  binding  on  the  people,  otherwife  not» 
As  to  the  fufficiency  or  extent  of  the  power,  that  is  ano<* 
ther  confederation,  and  has  been  difcufled  before. 

Mr.  Bloodivorthy  This  claufe  will  be  the  deftru&ion  o£ 
every  law  which  will  come  in  competition  with  the  laws 
of  the  United  State?.  Thofe  laws  and  regulations  which 
have  been  or  (hall  be  made  in  this  ftate,  muft  be  deftroyed 
by  it  if  they  come  in  competition  with  the  powers  of  Con- 
grefs. Is  it  not  neceflary  to  define  the  extent  of  its  ope- 
ration ?  Is  not  the  force  of  our  tender  laws  deftroyed  by 
it  ?  The  worthy  gentleman  from  Wilmington  has  endea- 
voured to  obviate  the  objection  as  to  the  Conftitution's  de- 
ftroying  the  credit  of  our  paper  money  and  paying  debts 
in  coin,  but  unfatisfattorily  to  me.  A  man  afTigns  by  le- 
gal fiction  a  bond  to  a  man  in  another  ftate — Could  that 
bond  be  paid  by  money  ?  I  know  it  is  very  eafy  to  be 
wrong.  I  am  confeious  of  being  frequently  fo.  I  endea- 
vour t»  be  open  to  conviction.    This  claufe  feems  to  m$ 

too 


(     tO$     ) 

rtsp  general,  and  I  think  its  extent  ought  to  be  limited  an# 

if-  ,  r  °uW  fuPP°fe  every  rcafonable  man  would 

think  fonae  amendment  to  it  was  necefiary. 
^  Mr.  Machine— Mr.  Chairman,  That  it  will  deftroy  the 
ilate  fovereignty  is  a  Very  popular  argument.  I  beg  leave 
to  have  the  attention  of  the  committee.  Government  is 
formed  for  the  happinefs  and  prosperity  of  the  people  at 
iarge.  The  powers  given  it  are  for  their  own  good.  We 
iave  found  by  feveral  years  experience,  that  government 
*a*j5n.  b?  lt^f  nominally,  without  adequate  power,  is  not 
luthciertt  to  promote  their  profperity.  Sufficient  powers 
muft  be  g,ven  to  it.  The  powers  to  be  given  the  general 
government,  are  propofed  to  be  withdrawn  from  the  au- 
thority of  the  ftate  governments,  in  order  to  proteft  and 
iecure  the  anion  at  large.  This  propofal  is  made  to  the 
people.  No  man  will  deny  their  authority  to  delegate 
powers  and  recall  them,  in  all  free  countries. 

But,  fays  the  gentleman  laft  up,  the  conftruclion  of  the 
Mnititution  is  in  the  power  of  Congrefs,  and  it  will  de- 

-   aJ  r-  f0y?rd$nty  of  the  ft*te  governments.     It  may  be 
juftly  faid,  that  it  diminifhes  the  power  of  the  ftate  Legif- 
latoreg,-  and  the  diminution  is' necefiary  to  the  fatetv  and 
profperity  of  the  people.     But   it  may  be  fairly  faid/  that 
the  members  of  the  general  government,  the  Prefident, 
Senators  and  Reprefcntatives  whom  we  fend  thither  by  our 
tree  fuffrasres  to  confult  our  common  intereft,  will  not 
wiih  to  deftroy  the  ftate  governments,  becaufe  the  exiftence 
ot  the  general  government  will  depend  on  that  of  the  ftate 
.governments.     But  what  is  the  fovereignty,  and  who  is 
Congrefs?  One  branch— the  people  at 'large,  and  the  other 
branch  the  ftates  by  their  Reprefentativesi     Do  people  fear 
the  delegation  of  power  to  themfelves— to  their  own  Re- 
prefentatives  ?  But  he  objefts,  that  the  laws  of  the  union 
are  to  be  the  fupreme  laws  of  the  land.     Is  it  not  proper 
that  their  laws  mould  be  the  law  of  the  land,  and  para- 
mount  to  thofe  of  any  particular  ftate?  Or  is  it  proper 
that  the  laws  of  any  particular  ftate  mould  controul  the 
Jaws   of  the  United  States?    Shall  a  part  controul  the 
whole  ?  To  permit  the  local  laws  of  any  ftate  to  controul 
the  laws  of  the  union,  would  be  to  give  the  general  govern- 
ment no  powers  at  all.     If  the  Judges  are  not  to  be  bound 
*>y  *t,  the  powers  of  Congrefs  will  be  nugatory.    This  is 

felf-evidejg; 


(      2°7  -   ) 

{elf-evident  and  plain.  Bring  it  home  to .  every  under-, 
ftanding ;  it  is  fo  clear  it  will  force  itfelf  upon  it.  The 
worthy  gentleman  fays,  in  contradiction  to  what  I  have 
obferved,  that  the  claufe  which  reftrains  the  ftates  from 
emitting  paper  money,  «§cc.  will  operate,  upon  the  prefent 
circulating  paper  money,  and  that  gold  and  filver  muft  pay 
paper  contradict  ,  Tlie  claufe  cannot  poflibly  have  a  retro- 
spective view.  It  cannot  affect  the  exitting  currency  in 
any  manner,  except  to  enhance  its  value  by  the  prohibition 
of  future  emiffions.  It  is  contrary  to  the  univerfalpiinn 
ciples  of  jurifprudence^,  t that  a  law  or  Conftitution  mould 
have  a  retrofpe&ive  operation,  unlefs  it  be  exprefsly 
provided  that  it  mail.  Does  he  deny  the  power  of  th*.  Le- 
giflature  to  fix  a  fcale  of  depreciation  as  a  criterion  to  re- 
gulate cbntra&s  made  for  depreciated  money  ?  As  to  the 
queftion  he  has  put  of  an  afligned;  bond,  I  anfwer  that  it 
jpan  be  paid  with  paper  money.  For  this  reafon — the  af- 
fignee  can  be  in  no  better  fituation  than  the  affignor.  .  I£ 
at  be  regularly  transferred,  it  will  appear  what  perfon  had 
ithe  bond  originally,  and  the  prefent  pofleffbr  can  recoveP 
inothing  but  what  the  original  holder  of  it  could..  Another 
reafon  which  may  be  urged  is,  that  the  Federal  Courts* 
could  have  no  cognizance  of  fuch  a  fuit.  Thofe  courts 
have  no  jurifdi£lion  in  cafes  of  debt  between  the  citizens 
Qf  the  fame  ftate.^  The  afftgnor  being  a  citizen  of  the 
fame  ftate  with  the  debtor,  and  afiigning  it  to  a  citizen  of 
another  ftate  to  avofd  the  intent  of  the  Conftitution,  the 
affignee  can  derive  no  advantage  from  the  aflignment,  ex- 
cept what  the  affignOr  had  a  right  to,  and  consequently  the 
gentleman's  objection  falls  to  the  ground.     t,       • 

Every  gentleman  muft  fee  the  neceffity  for  the  laws  of 
the  union  to  be  paramount  to  thofe  of  the  feparate  ftates ;' 
and  that  the  powers  given  by  this  Conftitution  muft  be  ex- 
ecuted. What,  (hall  we  ratify  a  government  and  then 
fay  it  ftiall  not  operate  ?  This  would  be  the  fame  as  not  to 
ratify.  As  to  amendments^  the  be  ft  characters  in  the  coun- 
try, and  thofe  whom  fmoft  highly  efteem,  wifti  for  amendr 
tments.  Some  parts  of  it  are  not  organized  to  my  wifti. 
But  I  apprehend  no  danger  from  the  ftructure  of  the  go- 
vernment. One  gentleman  [Mr.  Bafs]  faid  he  thought  it 
neither  neceflary  nor  proper.  For  my  part,  I  think  it  ef- 
Jential  to  our  very  exiitexice  as  a  nationy  and  our  happinef§ 


(      26*      ) 

and  profperity  as  a  free  people.  The  men  who  compofed 
jt  were  men  of  great  abilities  and  various  minds.  They 
carried  their  knowledge  with  {hem,  It  is  the  refult,  not 
only  of  great  wifdom  and  mutual  refle&ion,  but  of  "  mu- 
«<  tual  deference  and  concefliom**  It  has  trifling  faults, 
but  they  are  not  dangerous.  Yet  at  the  fame  time  I  de- 
clare, that  if  gentlemen  propofe  amendments,  if  they  be 
not  fuch  as  would  deftroy  the  government  entirely,  there 
Is  not  a  fingle  Member  here  more  willing  to  agree  to  them 
than  myfelf 

Mr.  Davie^Mr.  Chairman,  Permit  me,  Sir,  to  make 
a  few  obfervations  on  the  operation  of  the  claufe  fo  often 
mentioned,  This  Conftitution,  as  to  the  powers  therein 
granted,  is  conftantly  to  be  the  fupreme  law  of  the  land. 
$£very  power  ceded  by  it  muft  be  executed,  without  being 
counteracted  by  the  laws  or  Conititutions  of  the  individual 
ftates.  Gentlemen  fhould  diftinguiih  that  it  is  not  to  be 
the  fupreme  law  in  the  exercife  of  a  power  not  granted. 
It  can  be  fupreme  only  in  cafes  confiftent  with  the  power© 
fffecifically  granted,  and  not  in  usurpations.  If  you  grant 
any  power  to  the  federal  government,  the  laws  made  inj 
pu*uance  of  that  power,  muft  be  fupreme  and  uncon- 
trouled  in  their  operation.  This  confequence  is  involved 
in  the  very  nature  and  neceflity^  of  the  thing.  The  only 
rational  enquiry  is,  whether  thofe  powers  are  neceffary, 
and  whether  they  are  properly  granted.  To  fay  that  you 
have  vefted  the  federal  government  with  power  to  legiflate 
for  the  union,  andjhen  deny  the  fupremacy  o  the  laws, 
is  a  folccifm  in  terms.  With  refpecl:  to  its  operation  on 
our  own  paper  money,  I  believe  that  a  little  confideration 
will  fatisfy  every  man  that  it  cannot  have  the  effe£t  affert- 
ed  by  the  gentleman  from  New-Hanover.  The  Federal 
Convention  knew  that  feveral  (bates  had  large  fums  of  pam- 
per money  in  circulation,  and  that  it  was  an  interefting 
property,  and  they  were  fenfible  that  thofe  ftates  would 
never  content  to  its  immediate  deftruclion,  or  ratify  any 
fyftem  that  would  have  that  operation.  The  mifchief  al- 
ready done  could  not  be  repaired  •,  all  that  could  be  done 
was  to  form  fome  limitation  to  this  great  political  evik 
As  the  paper  money  had  become  private  property,  and  th© 
pbje^  of  numberlefs  contracts,  it  could  not  be  deftroye<# 
$r  intermeddled  witfc  ia  that  fituatioa*  although  its  banc* 


t  S09  ) 

fill  tendency  was  obvious  and  undeniable  ;  it  was,  however, 
effecting  an  important  object  to  put  bounds  to  this  grow* 
ing  mifchief.  If  the  ilates  had  been  compelled  to  fink 
the  paper  money  inftantly,  the  remedy  might  have  been 
worfe  than  the  difeafe.  As  we  could  not  put  an  immedi- 
ate end  to  it,  we  were  content  with  prohibiting  its  future 
i  increafe,  looking  forward  to  its  entire  extinguifhment  when, 
1  the  ftates  that  had  an  emiflion  circulating,  ihould  be  able  to 
call  it  in  by  a  gradual  redemption.  In  Pennfylvania,  their 
paper  money  was  not  a  tender  in  difcharge  of  private  con- 
tracts;  in  South-Carolina  their  bills  became  eventually  a 
tender ;  and  in  RhodeTfland,  New-York,  New-Jerfey, 
and  North-Carolina  the  paper  money  was  made  a  legal 
tender  in  all  cafes  whatfoever.  The  other  dates  were  fen- 
(ible  that  the  dedrucYion  of  the  circulating  paper,  would 
be  a  violation  of  the  rights  of  private  property,  and  that 
fuch  a  meafure  would  render  the  acceflion  of  thofe  dates 
to  the  fydem  abfolutely  impracticable.  The  injudice  and 
pernicious  tendency  of  this  difgraceful  policy  were  viewed 
with  great  indignation  by  the  dates  which  adhered  to  the 
principles  of  judice.  In  Rhode-Iiland  the  paper  money 
had  depreciated  to  eight  for  one,  and  a  hundred  per  cent, 
with  us.  The  people  of  Maffachufetts  and  Connecticut 
had  been  great  fufferers  by  the  difhonedy  of  Rhode-Ifland, 
and  (imilar  complaints  exided  againd  this  date.  This 
claufe,  becaufe  in  fome  meafure  a  preliminary  with  the  ^a* 
gentlemen  who  reprefented  the  other  dates,  "  Youhave/fgff 
(aid  they,  "  by  your  iniquitous  laws  and  paper  emiflions^r 
i  fhamefully  defrauded  our  citizens.  The  Confederation 
"  prevented  our  compelling  you  to  do  them  judice,  but 
"  before  we  confederate  with  you  again,  you  mud  not 
**  only  agree  to  be  honed,  but  put  it  out  of  your  power 
«  to  be  otherwife."  Sir,  a  Member  from  Rhode-Ifland 
itfelf,  could  not  have  fet  his  face  againd  fuch  language. 
The  claufe  was,  I  believe,  unanimoufly  atTented  to ;  it 
has  only  a  future  afpe£t,  and  can  by  no  means  have  a  re- 
trofpe£Uve  operation.  And  I  trud  the  principles  upon 
which  the  Convention  proceeded,  will  meet  the  approba-* 
tion  of  every  honed  man.  ^ 

Mr.  Cabarrus — Mr.  Chairman,  I  contend  that  the  claufe 
which  prohibits  the  dates  from  emitting  bills  of  credit, 
will  not  affett  our  prefent  paper  money.    The  claufe  has 


(     2i6     ) 

iao  retrofpe£Hve  view.  This  Conftitution  declares  in  the 
molt  pofitive  terms,  that  no  ex  pojl  fafto  law  (hall  be  paffed 
by  the  general  government.  Were  this  claufe  to  operate 
yetrofpe&ively,  it  would  clearly  be  ex  poft  fa5lo%  and  re- 
pugnant to  the  exprefs  provision  of  the  Conftitution.  How* 
then  in  the  name  of  God,  can  the  Conftitution  take  our 
paper  money  away  ?  If  we  have  contracted  for  a  fum  of 
money  we  ought  to  pay  according  to  the  nature  of  our 
contract: .  Every  honeft  man  will  pay  in  fpecie  who  engag- 
ed to  pay  it.  But  if  we  have  contracted  for  a  fum  of  paper 
money,  it  muft  be  clear  to  every  man  in  this  committee* 
that  we  fliall  pay  in  paper  money.  This  is  a  Conftitution 
for  the  future  government  of  the  United  States.  It  does 
not  look  back.  Every  gentleman  muft  be  fatisfied  on  the 
lead  reflection,  that  our  paper  money  will  not  be  deftroy- 
td.  To  fay  that  it  will  be  deftroyed,  is  a  popular  argu- 
ment, but  not  founded  in  fact  in  my  opinion.  I  had  my 
doubts,  but  on  confideration  I  am  fatisfied. 

Mr.  Bloodworth —Mr.  Chairman,  I  beg  leave  to  afk,  if 
the  payment  of  fums  now  due  be  expojt  fafto  ?  Will  it  be 
an  ex  poftfaBo  law,  to  compel  the  payment  of  money  now 
due  in  filver  coin  ?  If  fuit  be  brought  in  the  Federal  Court 
againft  one  of  our  citizens  for  a  fum  of  money,  will  paper 
money  be  received  to  fatisfy  the  judgment  ?  I  enquire  for 
information — ray  mind  is  not  yet  fatisfied.  It  has  been 
faid  that  we  are  to  fend  our  own  gentlemen  to  reprefent  us, 
and  that  there  is  not  the  leaft  doubt  they  will  puf  that  con* 
ftrutlion  on  it  which  will  be  moft  agreeable  to  the  peo- 
ple they  reprefent.  But  it  behoves  us  to  cotifider,  whether 
they  can  do  fo  if  they  would  when  they  mix  with  the  bo- 
dy of  Congrefs.  The  northern  fta'tes  are  much  more  po- 
pulous than  the  fouthern  ones.  To  the  north  of  the  Suf- 
quehannah  there  are  thirty-fix  Representatives,  and  to  the 
fouth  of  it  only  twenty-nine  ;  they  will  always  out-vote 
us.  Sir,  we  ought  to  be  particular  in  adopting  a  Confti- 
tution which  may  deftroy  our  currency,  when  it  is  to  be 
the  fupreme  law  of  the  land,  and  prohibits  the  emifliori 
of  paper  money.  I  am  not,  for  my  own  part,  for  giving 
an  indefinite  power.  Gentlemen  of  the  bed  abilities  dif* 
fer  in  the  conftru&ion  of  the  Conftitution.  The  Mem* 
bers  of  Congrefs  will  differ  too.  Human  nature  is  fallible. . 
1  am  not  for  throwing  ourfelves  out  of  the  union.    Buc 


(      21*      ) 

we  ought  to  be  cautious  by  propofing  amendments.  Th#. 
majority  in  feveral  great  adopting  ftates  was  very  trifling,. 
Several  of  them  have  propofed  amendments,  but  not  in  the 
mode  moft  fatisfa&ory  to  my  mind.  I  hope  this  Convene 
tion  never  will  adopt  it  till  the  amendments  are  a&ually 
obtained. 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  With  refpe&  to  this  claufe, 
it  cannot  have  the  operation  contended  for.  There  is  no- 
thing in  the  Conftitution  which  afFecls  our  prefent  paper 
money.  It  prohibits  for  the  future  the  emitting  of  any» 
but  it  does  not  interfere  with  the  paper  money  no^v  actu- 
ally in  circulation  in  feveral  ftates.  There  is  an  exprefs 
claufe  which  protects  it.  It  provides  that  there  fhall  be  no 
fx  poji  fatlo  law.  This  would  be  expoft faBo^  if  the  construc- 
tion contended  for  were  right,  as  has  been  obferved  by  ano- 
ther gentleman.  If  a  fuit  were  brought  againft  a  man  in) 
the  Federal  Court,  and  execution  (hould  go  againft  hi$ 
property,  I  apprehend,  he  would,  under  this  Conftitution| 
have  a  right  to  pay  our  paper  money,  there  being  nothing 
in  the  Conftitution  taking  away  the  validity  of  it.  Every 
individual  in  the  United  States,  will  keep  his  eye  watch- 
fully over  thofe  who  adminifter  the  general  government 
and  no  ijfurpation  of  power  will  be  acquiefced  in.  The  pof- 
fibility  of  ufurping  powers  ought  not  to  be  objected  againft 
it.  Abufe  may  happen  in  any  government.  The  only 
refource  againft  ufarpation,  is  the  inherent  right  of  the 
people  to  prevent  its  exercife.  This  is  the  cafe  in  all  free 
governments  in  the  world.  The  people  will  refill  if  the 
government  ufurp  powers  not  delegated  to  it.  We  muft 
jrun  the  rifle  of  abufe.  We  muft  take  care  to  give  no  more 
power  than  is  necelTary,  but  having  given  that  we  muft 
fubmit  to  the  poflible  dangers  arifing  from  it.  With  re- 
fpeQ:  to  the  great  weight  of  the  northern  ftates,  it  will 
not,  on  a  candid  examination,  appear  fo  great  as  the  gen- 
tleman fuppofes.  At  prefent  the  regulation  of  our  repre- 
sentation is  merely  temporary.  Whether  greater  or  lefs  it 
■will  hereafter  depend  on  a£tual  population.  The  extent 
of  this  ftate  is  very  great,  almoft  equal  to  that  of  any  ftate 
in  the  union.  And  our  population  will  probably  be  in 
proportion.  To  the  north  of  Pennfylvania  there  are  twen- 
ty-feven  votes.  To  the  fouth  of  Pennfylvania  there  are 
thirty  votes,  leaving  Pennfylvania  out.     Pennfylvania  has 

eight 


(      212      ) 

tight  votes.  Tn  the  divifion  of  what  is  called  the  norther* 
and  fouthern  interefts,  Pennfylvania  does  not  appear  to 
be' .decidedly  in  either  fcale.  Though  there  may  be  a  com- 
bination of  the  northern  ftates,  it  is  not  certain  that  the 
intereft  of  Pennfylvania  will  coincide  with  theirs.  If  at 
any  time  fhe  join  us,  we  (hall  have  thirty-eight  againft 
twenty-feven.  Should  (he  be  againft  us,  they  will  have 
only  thirty-five  to  thirty.  There  are  two  ftates  to  the 
northward  who  have,  in  fome  refpe£l,  a  fimilarity  of  in- 
terefts with  ourfelves.  What  is  the  fituation  of  New- 
Jerfey  ?  It  is  in  one  refpeft  Hmilar  to  ours.  Moft  of  the 
goods  which  they  ufe  come  through  New-York,  and  they 
pay  for  the  benefit  of  New- York,  as  we  pay  for  that  of 
Virginia.  It  is  fo  with  Connecticut,  fo  that  in  every 
queftion  between  importing  and  non-importing  ftates,  we 
may  expecl  that  two  of  the  northern  ftates  would  proba- 
bly join  with  North-Carolina.  It  is  impoffible,  perhaps, 
to  deftroy  altogether  this  idea  of  feparate  interefts.  But 
the  difference  between  the  ftates  does  not  appear  to  me  fo 
great  as  the  gentleman  imagines  ;  and  I  beg  leave  to  fay, 
that  in  proportion  to  the  increafe  of  population,  the  fouth- 
ern ftates  will  have  greater  weight  than  the  northern,  as 
they  have  fuchJarge  quantities  of  land  ftill  uncultivated, 
which  is  not  fo  much  the  cafe  to  the  north.  If  we  fhould 
fufFer  a  frhall  temporary  inconvenience,  we  ftiall  be  com- 
penfated  for  it  by  having  the  weight  of  population  in  out 
favour  in  future. 

Mr.  Bloodivorth—Mt.  Chairman,  When  I  was  in  Con- 
grefs,  the  fouthern  and  northern  interefts  divided  at  Su£- 
quehanna.  I  believe  it  is  fo  now.  The  advantage  to  be 
gained  by  future  population  is^no  argument  at  all.  Do  we 
gain  any  thing  when  the  other  ftates  have  an  equality  of 
Members  i»  the  Senate,  notwithstanding  the  increafe  of 
Members  in  the  Houfe  of  Representatives  ?  This  is  no> 
confequence  at  all.  I  am  forrv  to  mention  it,  but  I  cart 
produce  an  ihftance  which  will  prove  the  facility  of  mif- 
conftruclion.  [Here  Mr.  Bloodivorth  cited  an  inftance 
which  took  place  in  Congrefs  with  refpecl  to  the  Indian 
trade,  which  not  having  been  diftinelly  heard  is  omitted.} 

They  mav  trample  on  the  rights  of  the  people  of  North- 
Cirolina  if  there  be  not  fufficient  guards  and  checks.  I 
©uly  mentioned  this  to  fhew  that  there  may  be  mifconftruc- 

tionsj 


(    **3     ) 

flons,  and  that  in  fo  important  a  cafe  as  a  Confutation, 
every  thing  ought  to  be  clear  and  intelligible,  and  no 
ground  left  for  difputes. 

Mr.  Caldwell — Mr.  Chairman,  It  is  very  evident  that 
there  is  a  great  neceflity  for  perfpicuity.  In  the  fweeping 
elaufe  there  are  words  which  are  not  plain  and  evident. 
It  fays,  that  "  this  Constitution  and  the  laws  of  the  Unit* 
*c  ed  States  which  {hall  be  made  in  purfuance  thereof,  &c. 
**  mail  be  the  fupreme  law  of  the  land/'  The  word  pur* 
fuanee  is  equivocal  and  ambiguous  ;  a  plainer  word  woul4 
be  better.  They  may  purfue  bad  as  well  as  ^ood  meafures, 
and  therefore  the  word  is  improper — it  authorifes  bad  mea- 
fures. Another  thing  is  remarkable,  that  gentlemen  as 
an  anfwer  to  every  improper  part  of  it,  tell  us  that  every 
thing  is  to  be  done  by  our  own  Reprefentatives,  who  are 
to  be  good  men.  There  is  no  fecurity  that  they  will  be 
Co,  or  continue  to  be  fo.  Should  they  be  virtuous  when 
elected,  the  laws  of  Congrefs  will  be  unalterable.  Thefe 
laws  nusft  be  annihilated  by  the  fame  body  which  made 
them.  It  appears  to  me  that  the  laws  which  they  make, 
cannot  be  altered  without  calling  a  Convention.  [Mr. 
Caldwell  added  fome  reafons  far  this  opini©n#  but  fpoke 
too  low  to  be  heard.] 

'Governor  Johnfton — Mr  Chairman,  I  knew  that  manv 
gentlemen  in  this  Convention  were  not  perfectly  fatisfied 
<with  every  article  of  this  Conftitution,  but  I  did  not  ex- 
pect fo  many  would  object:  to  this  elaufe.  The  Conftitu- 
tion muft  be  the  fupreme  law  of  the  land,  otherwife  it 
•will  be  in  the  power  of  any  one  ftate  to  counteract  the 
other  ftates,  and  withdraw  itfelf  from  the  union.  The 
laws  made  in  purfuance  thereof  by  Congrefs,  ought  to  be 
the  fupreme  law  of  the  land,  otherwife  anyone  ftate  might 
repeal  the  laws  of  the  union  at  large.  Without  this 
elaufe,  the  whole  Conftitution  would  be  a  piece  of  blank 
|3aper.  Every  treaty  fhould  be  the  fupreme  law  of  the 
land  ;  without  this,  any  one  ftate  might  involve  the  whole 
€inion  in  war.  The  worthy  member  who  was  laft  up, 
&as  ftarted  an  objection  which  I  cannot  anfwer.  I  do  not 
Itnow  a  word  in  the  Englifh  language  fo  good  as  the  word 
purfuance^  to  exprefs  tfie  idea  meant  and  intended  by  the 
Conftitution.  Can  any  one  understand  the  fentence  any 
*tfher  way  than  this  ?  When  Congrefs  makes  a  law  in  vi*> 

tuc 


(      ?I4     ) 

fue  of  their  conftitutional  authority,  it  will  be  an  a8uai 
Jaw.  I  do  not  know  a  more  expreflive  or  a  better  way  of 
reprefenting  the  idea  by  words.  Every  law  confident  with 
the  Conftitution,  will  have  been  made  in  purfuance  of  the 
powers  granted  by  it.  Every  ufurpation  or  law  repugnant 
to  it,  cannot  have  been  made  in  purfuance  of  its  powers^ 
The  lattter  will  be  nugatory  and  void.  I  am  at  a  lofs  to 
know  what  he  means,  by  faying  the  laws  of  the  union  will 
he  unalterable.  Are  laws  as  immutable  as  Conftitutions  ? 
Can  any  thing  be  more  abfurd  than  aflimiiating  the  one  to 
the  other  ?  The  idea  is  not  warranted  by  the  Conftitution, 
nor  confluent  with  reafon. 

Mr.  J.  M'Dotvall  wifhed  to  know  how  the  taxes  are 
to  be  paid  which  Congrefs  were  to  lay  in  this  (late.  He 
afkecr  if  paper  money  would  difcharge  them.  He  calcu- 
lated that  the  taxes  would  be  higher,  and  did  not  know 
how  they  could  be  difcharged.  For  fays  he,  every  man  is 
to  pay  fo  much  more,  and  the  poor  man  has  not  the  money 
locked  up  in  his  cheft.  He  was  of  opinion  that  our  laws 
could  be  repealed  entirely  by  thofe  of  Congrefs. 

Mr,  Maciaine — Mr.  Chairman,  Taxes  mud  be  paid  in 
gold  or  filver  coin,  and  not  in  imaginary  money.  As  to 
the  fubjecT:  of  taxation,  it  has  been  the  opinion  of  many 
intelligent  men  that  there  will  be  no  taxes  laid  immediate? 
ly,  or  if  any,  that  they  will  be  very  inconfiderable.  There 
will  be  rto  occafion  for  it,  as  proper  regulations  will  raife 
very  large  funis  of  money.  We  know  that  Congrefs  will 
have  fufficient  power  to  make  fuch  regulations.  The  mo- 
ment that  the  Conftitution  is  eftabliftied,  Congrefs  will 
have  credit  with  foreign  nations.  Our  fituation  being 
known  they  can  borrow  any  fum.  It  will  be  better  for 
them  to  raife  any  money  they  want  at  prefent  by  borrow- 
ing than  by  taxation.  It  is  well  known  that  in  this  coun- 
try gold  and  filver  vanifh  when  paper  money  is  made. 
When  wre  adopt,  if  ever,  gold  and  filver  will  again  appear 
in  circulation.  People  will  let  their  hard  money  go,  ber 
caufe  they  know  that  paper  money  cannot  repay  it.  After 
the  war  we  had  more  money  in  gold  and  filver  in  circular 
tion,  than  we  have  nominal  paper  money  now.  Suppofe 
Congrefs  wifhed  to  raife  a  million  of  money  more  than  the 
|mpofts :  Suppofe  they  borrow  it.  They  can  eafily  borrow 
|t  in  Europe  at  four  per  cent.     The  intereft  of  that  fum 

will 


(      215      ) 

will  be  but  40,000!.  So  that  the  people  inftead  of  having 
the  whole  i,ooo,oool.  to  pay,  will  have  but  40,0001.  to 
pay,  which  will  hardly  be  felt.  The  proportion  of  40,0001. 
for  this  ftate,  would  be  a  trifle.  In  feven  years  time  the 
people  would  be  able,  by  only  being  obliged  to  pay  the  in- 
terelt  annually,  to  fave  money,  and  pay  the  whole  principal 
perhaps  afterwards  without  much  difficulty.  Gongrefs 
will  not  lay  a  firtgle  tax  when  it  is  not  to  the  advantage 
of  the  people  at  large.  The  weftern  lands  will  alfo  be  a 
confiderable  fund.  The  fale  of  them  will  aid  the  revenue 
greatly,  and  we  have  reafon  to  believe  the  import  will  be 
productive. 

Mr.  J.  M^Dowall—Mx.  Chaimian,  Inftead  of  reasons 
and  authorities  to  convince  me,  aflertions  are  made.  Many 
refpeclable  gentlemen  are  fatisfied  that  the  taxes  will  be 
higher.  By  what  authority  does  the  gentleman  fay  that 
the  impoft  will  be  productive,  when  our  trade  is  come  to 
nothing  ?  Sir,  borrowing  money  is  detrimental  and  ruin- 
ous to  nations.  The  intereft  is  loft  money.  We  have  been 
6bliged  to  borrow  money  to  pay  intereft !  We  have  no 
way  of  paying  additional  and  extraordinary  fums.  The 
people  cannot  ftand  them.  I  mould  be  extremely  forry  to' 
live  under  a  government  which  the  people  could  not  un- 
derftand,  and  which  it  would  require  the  greateft  abilities 
to  underftand.  It  ought  to  be  plain  and  eafy  to  the  mean- 
eft  capacity.  What  would  be  the  confequence  of  ambi- 
guity ?  It  may  raife  animofity  and  revolutions,  and  involve 
fcs  in  bloodmed. — Jt  becomes  us  to  be  extremely  cautious. 

Mr.  Maclalne — Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  afk  the  gentle- 
man what  is  the  ftate  of  our  trade  ?  I  do  not  pretend  to  a 
very  great  knowledge  in  trade,  but  I  know  fomething  of 
it.  If  our  trade  be  in  a  low  fituation,  it  muft  be  the  ef- 
fect of  our  prefent  weak  government.  I  really  believe 
that  Congref?  will  be  able  to  raife  almoft  what  fums  they 
Jsleafe  by  the  impoft.  I  know  it  will,  though  the  gentle- 
man may  call  it  affertiori.  I  am  not  unacquainted  with 
the  territory  or  refources  of  this  country.  The  fefources,* 
tinder  proper  regulations,  are  very  great.  In  the  courfe 
of  a  few  years  we  can  raife  money  without  borrowing  3 
fingle  (hilling.  It  is  not  difgraceful  to  borrow  money. 
The  richeft  nations  have  recurred  to  loans  on  fome  emer- 
gencies.   I  believe,  as  much  as  I  do  in  my  e^iftence,  that 

Congrsfc 


Congrefs  will  have  It  in  their  power  to  borrow  money  if 
our  government  be  fuch  as  people  can  depend  upon.  They 
have  been  able  to  borrow  now  under  the  prefent  feeble 
fyftem :  If  fo,  can  there  be  any  doubt  of  their  being  able 
to  do  it  under  a  refpedlable  government  ? 

Mr.  M' Do  wall  replied,  that  our  trade  was  on  a  con- 
temptible footing— That  it  was  come  almoft  to  nothing — 
and  lower  in  North-Carolina  than  any  where — That  there- 
fore little  could  be  expected  from  the  impoft. 

Mr.  J.  Galloway — Mr.  Chairman,  I  fhould  make  no 
objection  to  this  claufe  were  the  powers  granted  by  the 
Conftitution  fufficiently  defined  :  For  I  am  clearly  of  opi- 
nion that  it  is  absolutely  necefTary  for  every  government, 
and  efpecially  for  a  general  government,  that  its  laws 
fhould  be  the  fupreme  law  of  the  land.  But  I  hope  the 
gentlemen  of  the  committee  will  advert  to  the  10th  fec- 
tion  of  the  firft  article.  This  is  a  negative  which  the  Con- 
ftitution of  our  own  flare  does  not  impofe  upon  us.  I 
wifh  the  committee  to  attend  to  that  part  of  it  which  pro- 
vides that  no  flate  fhall  pafs  any  law  which  will  impair  the 
obligation  of  contracts.  Our  public  Securities  are  at  a  low 
ebb,  and  have  been  fo  for  many  years.  We  well  know 
that  this  country  has  taken  thofe  fecurities  as  fpetie.  This 
hangs  over  our  heads  as  a  contract.  There  is  a  million  and 
a  half  in  circulation  at  lead.  That  claufe  of  the  Confti- 
tution may  compel  us  to  make  good  the  nominal  value 
of  thefe  fecurities.  I  trufl;  this  country  never  will  leave 
it  to  the  hands  of  the  general  government  to  redeem  the 
fecurities  which  they  have  already  given.  Should  this 
be  the  cafe,  the  confequence  will  be,  that  they  will  be  pur- 
chafed  by  fpeculators,  when  the  citizens  will  part  with 
them  perhaps  for  a  very  trifling  confideration.  Thofe  fpe- 
culators will  look  at  the  Conftitution,  and  fee  that  they 
will  be  paid  in  gold  and  filver.  They  wijl  buy  them  at 
a  half  crown  in  the  pound,  and  get  the  full  nominal  value 
for  them  in  gold  and  filver.  I  therefore  wifh  the  commit- 
tee to  confider  whether  North- Carolina  can  redeem  thofe 
fecurities  in«the  manner  mod  agreeable  to  her  citizens,  and 
juftifiable  to  the  world,  if  this  Conftitution  be  adopted. 

Mr.  Davie — Mr.  Chairman,  I  believe  neither*he  tenth 
fe&ion  cited  by  the  gentleman,  nor  any  other  part  of  the 
Conftitution  has  vetted  the  general  government  with  pow« 
:  ""  ~"    '     '  er 


CI*  to  interfere  with  the  public  fecurities  of  any  ftare.  I 
will  venture  to  fay,  that  the  laft  thing  which  the  general 
government  will  attempt  to  do,  will  be  this.  They  have 
nothing  to  do  with  it.  The  claufe  refers  merely  to  con- 
tracts between  individuals.  That  fe&ion  is  the  befl  in  the 
Conftitution..  It  is  founded  on  the  ftrongeft  principles  o£ 
juftice.  It  is  a  fecTion  in  fhort,  which  I  thought  would 
have  endeared  the  Conftitution  to  this  country.  When 
the  worthy  gentleman  comes  to  confider,  he  will  find  that 
the  general  government  cannot  poffibly  interfere  with  fuch 
fecurities.  How  can  it  ?  It  has  no  negative  claufe  to  that 
effect:.  Where  is  there  a  negative  claufe,  operating  nega- 
tively on  the  ftates  themfelves  ?  It  cannot  operate  retro- 
fpectively,  for  this  would  be  repugnant  to  its  own  exprefs 
provifions.  It  will  be  left  to  ourfehes  to  redeem  them  as 
we  pleafe.  We  wifhed  we  could  put  it  on  the  fhoulders  o£ 
Congrefs,  but  could  not.  Securities  may  be  higher,  but 
never  lefs.  I  conceive,  Sir,  that  this  is  a  very  plain  cafe* 
and  that  it  mull  appear  perfectly  clear  to  the  committee,, 
that  the  gentleman's  alarms  are  groundlefs* 

The  committee  now  rofe,  Mr.  Ryefident  refumed  th& 
chair,  and  Mr.  Kenan  reported,  that  the  committee  had, 
according  to  order,  again  had  the  faid  propofed  Conftitu- 
tion under  their  confideration,  but  not  having  had  time  to> 
go  through  the  fame,  had  directed  him  to  move  for  leaver 
to  fit  again  to-morrow. 

Refohed,  That  this  Convention  will  again  to-morrow* 
refolve  itfelf  into  a  committee  of  the  whole  Convention^ 
on  the  faid  propofed  Conftitution. 

The  Convention  then  adjourned  until  to-morrow  mora* 
ing  nine  o'clock. 


WEDNESDAY,    July  30,   1788. 

The  Convention  met  according  to  adjournment,  ancl 
then  refolved  into  a  committee  of  the  whole  Convention, 
to  take  into  further  confideration  the  faid  propofed  Confti* 
tution. — Mr.  Kenan  in  the  chair. 

The  laft  claufe  of  the  fixth  article  read. 

Mr.  Henry  Abbot,  after  a  ihort  exordium  which  was  riot 
cUftinctly  heard,  proceeded  thus — Some  are  afraid,  Mr* 
Chairman,  that  (hould  the  Conftitution  be  received,  they 

E  e  would 


(  Itl  ) 

fc/ould  be  deprived  of  the  privilege  of  worfhipping  <3od 
-according  to  their  consciences ;  which  would  be  taking 
from  them  a  benefit  they  enjoy  under  the  prefent  Conftitu- 
tlon.  They  wifh  to  know  if  their  religious  and  civil  liber- 
ties be  fecured  under  this  fyftem,  or  whether  the  general 
government  may  not  make  laws  infringing  their  religious 
liberties.  The  worthy  member  from  Edenton  mentioned 
fundry  political  reafons  why  treaties  mould  be  the  fupreme 
law  of  the  land.  It  is  feared  by  fome  people,  that  by  the 
power  of  making  treaties,  they  might  make  a  treaty  en- 
gaging with  foreign  powers  to  adopt  the  Roman  catholic 
religion  in  the  United  States,  which  would  prevent  the 
people  from  worfhipping  God  according  to  their  own  con- 
fciences.  The  worthy  member  from  Halifax  has  in  fome 
rneafure  fatisfied  my  mind  on  this  fubject.  But  others  may 
be  diffatisfied.  Many  wifh  to  know  what  religion  fhall  be 
eftablifhed.  I  believe  a  majority  of  the  community  are 
Prefby  terians.  I  am  for  my  part  againft  any  exclufi  ve  efta- 
bliftiment,  but  if  there  were  any,  I  would  prefer  the  Epif- 
copaL  The  exclufion  of  religious  tefts  is  by  many  thought 
dangerous  and  impolitic.  They  fuppofe  that  if  there  be 
no  religious  teft  required,  Pagans,  Deifts  and  Mahometans' 
might  obtain  offices  among  us,  and  that  the  Senate  and 
Reprefentatives  might  ail  be  Pagans.  Every  perfon  em- 
ployed by  the  general  and  date  governments  is  to  take  an 
oath  to  fupport  the  former.  Some  are  defirous  to  know' 
how,  and  by  whom  they  are  to  fvvear,  fince  no  religious 
teds  are  required' — whether  they  are  to  fwear  by  Jupiter,' 
Juno,  Minerva,  Proferpine  or  Pluto.  We  ought  to  be 
ftripici'ou's  of  our  liberties.  We  have  felt  the  effects  of  op- 
preffive  meafures,  and  know  the  happy  confequences  of 
being  jealous  of  our  rights*  I  would  be  glad  fome  gentle- 
man would  endeavour  to  obviate  thefe  objections,  in  order 
to  fatisfy  the  religious  part  of  the  fociety.  Could  I  be 
convinced  that  the  objections  were  well  founded,  I  would 
then  declare  my  opinion  againft  the  Conftitution.  [Mr. 
Abbot  added  fevcral  other  obfervations,  but  fpoke  too  low' 
to  be  heard.] 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  Nothing  is  more  defireable 
than  to  remove  the  fcruples  of  any  gentleman  on  this  in- 
ierefting  fubject :  Thofe  concerning  feli'gion  are  entitled' 
to.  particular  refpect.    I  did  &ot  expect  any  objection  to 

tbift 


(  m  ) 

this  particular  regulation,  which  in  my  opinion,  is  calcuv 
Jate<i  to  prevent  evils  of  the  moil  pernicious  confequences 
to  fociety,  E\lery  perfon  in  the  leaft  converfant  in  .the  hif- 
tory  of  mankind,  knows  what  dreadful  mifchiefs  have  been 
committed  by  religious  perfecutions.  Under  the  colour 
of  religious  tells  the  utmoft  cruelties  have  been  exercifed. 
Thofe  in  power  have  generally  considered  all  wifdom  cen- 
tered in  themfelves,  that  they  alone  had  a  right  to  ditlatq  / 
to  the  reft  of  mankind,  and  that  all  oppofition  to  their  te- 
nets was  profane  and  impious.  The  confequence  @f  this 
intolerant  fpirit  has  been,  that  each  church  has  in  turn  fet 
itfelf  up  againft  every  other,  and  perfecutions  and  wars  of 
the  mod  implacable  and  bloody  nature  have  taken  place  in 
every  part  of  the  world.  America  has  fet  an  example  to 
mankind  to  think  more  modeftly  and  reafonably ;  that  a  mari 
maybe  of  different  religious  ferftiments  from  cur  own, 
without  being  a  bad  member  of  fociety.  The  principles 
of  toleration,  to  the  honour  of  this  age,  are  doing  away 
thofe  errors  and  prejudices  which  have  fo  long  prevailed 
even  in  the  moil  intolerant  countries.  In  the  Roman  ca-^ 
tholic  countries,  principles  of  moderation  are  adopted, 
which  would  have  been  fpurned  at  a  century  or  two  ago. 
I  mould  be  forry  to  find,  when  examples  of  toleration  ar« 
fet  even  by  arbitrary  governments,  that  this  country,  fo 
imprefTed  with  the  higheft  fenfe  of  liberty,  mould  adopt 
principles  on  this  fubjetl:,  that  were  narrow  and  illiberal. 
I  confider  the  claufe  under  consideration  as  one  of  tht 
ftrongeft  proofs  that  could  be  adduced,  that  it  was  the  in- 
tention of  thofe  who  formed  this  fyft&m,  to  eftablifti  a  ge- 
neral religious  liberty  in  America.  Were  we  to  judg* 
from  the  examples  of  religious  tells  in  other  countries,  we 
Should  be  perfuaded  that  they  do  not  anfwer  the  purpofc 
for  which  they  are  intended.  What  is  the  confequencfc 
of  fuch  in  England  ?  In  that  country  no  man  can  be  i 
Member  in  the  Houfe  of  Commons,  or  hold  any  office 
under  the  Crown,  without  taking  the  facrament  according 
to  the  rites  of  the  church.  This  in  the  firft  inftance  muft 
degrade  and  profane  a  rite,  which  never  ought  to  be  taken 
but  from  aiincere  principle  of  devotion.  To  a  man  of 
bafe  principles,  it  is  made  a  mere  inftrument  of  civil  policy. 
The  intention  was  to  exclude  all  perfons  from  offices,  but 
the  member's  of  the  church  of  England.     Yet  it  is  noto* 

rious^ 


(      220      ) 

rious,  -that  Diflenters  qualify  themfclves  for  offices  in  this 
manner,,  though  they  never  conform  to  the  church  on  any  o- 
ther  oocafion  j  and  men  of  no  religion  at  all,  have  no  fcruple 
to  make  ufe  of  this  qualification.  It  never  was  known  that 
a  man  who  had  no  principles  of  religion,  hefitated  to  per- 
form any  rite  when  it  was  convenient  for  his  private  inte- 
rest. No  teft  can  bind  fuch  a  one.  I  am  therefore  clear- 
ly of  opinion,  that  fuch  a  discrimination  would  neither  be 
effectual  for  its  own  purpofes,  nor  if  it  could,  ought  it  by 
any  means  to  be  made.  Upon  the  principles  I  have  ftated, 
I  confers  the  reftriclion  on  the  po&er  of  Congrefs  in  this 
particular  has  my  hearty  approbation.  They  certainly  have 
no  authority  to  interfere  in  the  eftabiifhment  of  any  reli- 
gion whatsoever,  and  I  am  aitonilhed  that  any  gentleman 
ftiould  conceive  they  have.  Is  there  any  power  given  to 
Congrefs  in  matters  of; religion  ?  Can  they  pafs  a  fingle 
a£t  to  impair  our  religious  liberties  ?  If  they  could,  it 
would  be  a  juft  caufe  of  alarm.  If  they  could,  Sir,  no 
man  would  have  more  horror  againft  it  than  myfelf.  Hap- 
pily no  feci  here  is  Superior  to  another.  As  long 'as  this 
is  the  cafe,  we  {hail  be  free  from  thofe  perfecutions  and 
distractions  with  which  other  countries  have  been  torn, 
if  any  future  Congrefs  mould  pafs  an  act  concerning  the 
religion  of  the  country,  it  would  be  an  act  which  they  are 
not  authorifed  to  pafs  by  the  Constitution,  and  which  the 
people  would  not  obey.  Every  one  would  afk,  "  Who 
<(  authorifed  the  government  to  pafs  fuch  an  act  ?  It  is  not 
*f  warranted  by  the  Constitution,  and  is  a  barefaced  ufur- 
*«  pation."  The  power  to  make  treaties  can  never  be  fup- 
pofed  to  include  a  right  to  eftablifh  a  foreign  religion  among 
ourfelves,  though  it  might  authorife  a  toleration  of  others. 
But  it  is  objected,  that  the  people  of  America  may  perhaps 
chufe  Representatives  who  have  no  religion  at  all,  and  that 
Pagans  and  Mahometans  may  be  admitted  into  offices.  But 
how  is  it  poffible  to  exclude  any  Set  of  men,  without  tak* 
Ing  away  that  principle  of  religious  freedom  which  we 
ourfelves  fo  warmly  centend  for  ?  This  is  the  foundation 
on  which  perfecution  has  been  raifed  in  every  part  of  the 
world.  The  people  in  power  were  always  in  the  right, 
and  every  body  elfe  wrong.  If  you  admit  the  leaft  diffe- 
rence, the  door  to  perfecution  is  opened.  Nor  would  it 
#nfwer  the  purpofe,  for  ihs  worft  part  of  the  excluded  Sects 

woivLi 


(      221      ) 

would  comply  with  the  teft,  and  the.beft  men  only  beJcept 
out  of  our  counfels.  But  it  is  never  to  be  fuppofed  that 
the  people  of  America  will  truft  their  deareft  xiglitjs  to  per-  - 
fons  who  have  no  religion  at  ail,  or  a  religion  materially 
different  from  their  own.  It  would  be  happy  for  mankind 
if  religion  was  permitted  to  take  its  own  courfe,  and  main-? 
tain  itfelf  by  the  excellence  of  its'  own  do&rines.  The 
divine  author  of  our  religion  never  wiihed  for  its  fupport 
by  worldly  authority.  Has  he  not  faid,  that  the  gates 
of  hell  Jhall  not  prevail  againjl  it  ?  It  made  much  greater 
progrefs  for  itfelf,  than  when  Supported  by  the  greate-ft 
authority  upon  earth. 

It  has  been  alked  by  that  refpe&able  gentleman  [Mr, 
Abbot]  what  is  the  meaning  of  that  part,  where  it  is  faid, 
that  the  United  States  (hall  guarantee  to  every  ftate  in  the 
union  a  republican  form  of  government,  and  why  a  guaran- 
tee of  religious  freedom  was  not  included.  The  meaning  of 
the  guarantee  provided  was  this — There  being  thirteen 
governments  confederated,  upon  a  republican  principle, 
it  was  effential  to  the  exiftence  and  harmony  of  the  con- 
federacy that  each  mould  be  a  republican  government,  and 
that  no  ftate  fiiould  have  a  right  to  eftablifh  an  ariftocracy 
or  monarchy.  That  claufe  was  therefore  inferted  to  pre- 
vent any  ftate  from  eftablifhing  any  government  but  are- 
publican  one.  Every  one  muft  be  convinced  of  the  mik 
chief  that  would  enfue,  if  any  ftate  had  a  right  to  change 
its  government  to  a  monarchy.  If  a  monarchy  was  efta- 
folifhed  in  any  one  ftate,  it  would  endeavour  to  fubvert  the 
freedom  of  the  others,  and  would  probably  by  degrees 
fucceed  in  it.  This  muft  ftrike  the  mind  of  every  perfoa 
here  who  recollects  the  hiftory  of  Greece  when  (he  had 
confederated  governments.  The  King  of  Macedon  by  his 
arts  and  intrigues  got  himfelf  admitted  a  member  of  the 
Amphyctionic  council,  which  was  the  fuperintending  go-. 
«xrernment  of  the  Grecian  republics,  and  in  a  fhort  time  h» 
became  mafter  of  them  all.  It  is  then  neceflary  that  the 
members  of  a  confederacy  mould  havefimilar  governments. 
But  confidently  with  this  reftritlion  the  ftates  may  make 
what  change  in  their  own  governments  they  think  proper. 
Had  Congrefs  undertaken  to  guarantee  religious  freedom, 
or  any  particular  fpecies  of  it,  they  would  then  have  had 
a  pretence  to  interfere  in  a  fubjecl  they  have  nothing  tc* 


(      122      )  | 

,^o  with.  Each  (late,  fo  far  as  the  claufe  in  queftion  does 
pot  interfere,  mud  be  left  to  the  operation  of  its  own 
principles. 

There  is  a  degree  of  jealoufy  which  it  is  inipoffible  to  fa- 
iisfy.  Jealoufy  in  a  free  government  ought  to  be  refpe&ed  t 
But  it  may  be  carried  to  too  great  an  extent.  It  is  im- 
pra£Hcable  to  guard  againft  ail  pojjtble  danger  of  people's 
chufing  their  officers  indifcreetly.  If  they  have  a  right  to 
chufe,  they  may  make  a  bad  choice,  I  met  by  accident 
with  a  pamphlet  this  morning,  in  which  the  author  ftates 
as  a  very  ferious  danger,  that  the  Pope  of  Rome  might  be 
elected  President.  I  confefs  this  never  (truck  me  before, 
and  if  the  author  had  read  all  the  qualifications  of  a  Prefi- 
dent,  perhaps  his  fears  might  have  been  quieted.  -No  man 
but  a  native,  and  who  has  refided  fourteen  years  in  Ame- 
rica, can  be  chofen  Prefident*  I  know  not  all  the  qualir 
fications  for  a  Pope,  but  I  believe  he  muft  be  taken  from 
the  college  of  Cardinals,  and  probably  there  are  many  pre- 
vious fteps  neceiTary  before  he  arrives  at  this  dignity.  A 
native  of  America  muft  have  very  Angular  good  fortune, 
who  after  rending  fourteen  years  in  his  own  country, 
{liould  go  to  Europe,  enter  into  Romiili  orders,  obtain  the 
promotion  of  Cardinal,  afterwards  that  of  Pope,  and  at 
length  be  fo  much  in  the  confidence  of  his  own  country, 
as  to  be  elected  Prefident.  It  would  be  ftill  more  extra- 
ordinary if  he  fnould  give  up  his  Popedom  for  our  Prefi- 
dency.  Sir,  it  is  inipoffible  to  treat  fuch  idle  fears  with 
mny  degree  of  gravity.  Why  is  it  not  objected,  that  there 
is  no.provifion  in  the  Conftitution  againft  electing  one  of 
the  Kings  of  Europe  Prefident  ?  It  would  be  a  claufe  equal- 
ly rational  and  judicious. 

I  hope  that  1  have  in  fome  degree  fatisfied  the  doubts' of 
the  gentleman.  This  article  is  calculated  to  fecure  uni- 
yerfal  religious  liberty,  by  putting  all  fe£ts  on  a  level,  the 
only  way  to  prevent  perfecution.  I  thought  nobody 
would  have  objected  to  this  claufe,  which  deferves  in 
my  opinion  the  higheft  approbation.  This  country  has 
already  had  the  honour  of  fetting  an  example  cf  civil  free- 
dom, and  I  truft  it  will  likewife  have  the  honour  of  teach- 
ing the  reft  of  the  world  the  way  to  religious  freedom  alfo. 
pod  grant  both  may  be  perpetuated  to  the  end  of  time. 

{&rt  Abbot,  alter  expreffing  his  obligations  for  the  ex- 
planation ■ 


(   iff  ) 

frfanaiion  which  had  been  given,  obferved  thnt  no  anf#£f 
had  been  given  to  the  queftion  he  put  concerning  the  fornt 
of  an  oath. 

Mr.  Iredell— Mr.  Chairman,  I  be,*  pardon  for  having  o-' 
mitted  to  take  notice  of  that  part  which  the  worthy  gentle- 
man has  mentioned.  It  was  by  no  means  from  defign,  but 
from  its  having  efcap'ed  my  memory,  as  I  have  not  the  con- 
veniency  of  taking  note?.  I  (hall  now  fatisfy  him  in  thac 
particular  in  the  beft  manner  in  ray  power. 

According  to  the  modern  definition  of  an'  oath,  it  is 
considered  a  "  folemn  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Being  for 
"  the  truth  of  what  is  faid,  by  a  perfon  who  believes  in' 
is  the  exiftence  of  a  Supreme  Being,  and  in  a  future  ftaie 
"  of  rewards  and  punifhments,  according  to  that  form 
<c  which  will  bind  his  conference  mod."  It  was  long  held, 
that  no  oath  could  be  adminiftered  but  upon  the  New  Tef- 
tatnent,  except  to  a'  Jew*  who  was  allowed  to  fwear  upon 
the  old.  According  to  this  notion,  none  but  Jews  and 
Chriftians  could  take  an  oath,  and  Heathens  were  altoge- 
ther excluded.  At  length,  by  the  operation  of  princi- 
ples of  toleration,  thefe  narrow  notions  were  done  away. 
Men  at  length  considered,  that  there  were  many  virtuous* 
men  in  the  world  who  had  not  had  an  opportunity  of  be- 
ing inftrucled  either  in  the  Old  or  New  Teftament,  who 
yet  very  firicersry  believed  in  a  Supreme  Being,  and  in  a: 
future  ftate  of  rewards  and  puniihments^  It  is  well  known, 
that  many  nations  entertain  this  belief  who  do  not  believe 
either  in  the  Jewifh  or  Chriltian  religion.  Indeed  thers, 
are  few  people  fo  grofsly  ignorant  or  barbarous  as  to  have^ 
no  religion  at  all.  And  if  none  but  Chriitians  or  Jews 
could  be  examined  uporf  oath;  many  innocent  perfons 
might  fuffer  for  want  of  the  teftimony  of  others.  In  re- 
gard to  the  form  of  an  oath,  that  ought  to  be  governed 
by  the  religion  of  the  perfon  taking  it.  I  remember  to 
have  read  an  inftance  which  happened  in  England,  I  be- 
lieve in  the  time  of  Charles  the  fecond  :  A  man  wha  was 
a  material  witnefs  in  a  caufe,  refufed  to  iwear  upon  the 
book,  and  was  admitted  to  fwear  with  his  uplifted  hand. 
The  jury  had  a  difficulty  in  crediting  him,  but  the  Chief 
Juftice  told  them,  he  had,  in  his  opinion,  taken  ^is  ftrong 
arf  oath  as  any  of  the  other  witnefTes,  though  had  he  been 
..III  |we^r  JumfeH>  he  Iho^ldhayc  kififccj  the  .book.    A. very 


(      224      ) 

remarkable  inftance  alfo  happened  in  England  about  forty 
years  ago,  of  a  perfon  who  was  admitted  to  take  an  oath 
according  to  the  rights  of  his  own  country,  though  he 
was  an  Heathen.  He  was  an  Eaft-Indian,  who  had  a 
great  fuit  in  Chancery,  and  his  anfwer  upon  oath  to  a  bill 
filed  againft  him,  was  absolutely  neceflary.  Not  believing 
either  in  the  Old  or  New  Teftament,  he  could  not  be 
fworn  in  the  accuftomed  manner,  but  was  fworn  according 
to  the  form  of  the  Gentoo  religion,  which  he  profefled, 
by  touching  the  foot  of  a  Prieft.  It  appeared,  that  ac- 
cording to  the  tenets  of  this  religion,  its  members  believed 
in  a  Supreme  Being,  and  in  a  future  ftate  of  rewards  and 
punifhments.  It  was  accordingly  held  by  the  Judges, 
upon  great  eonfideration,  that  the  oath  ought  to  be  re- 
ceived ;  they  confidering  that  it  was  probable  thofe  of  that 
religion  were  equally  bound  in  conference  by  an  oath  ac- 
cording to  their  form  of  fwearing,  as  they  themfelves 
were  by  one  of  theirs*,  and  that  it  would  be  a  reproach  to 
the  juftice  of  the  country,  if  a  man,  merely  becaufe  he 
•was  of  a  different  religion  from  their  own,  mould  be  de- 
nied redrefs  of  an  injury  he  had  fuftained.  Ever  fince  this* 
great  cafe,  it  has  been  univerfally  confidered,  that  in  ad- 
miniftering  an  oath,  it  is  only  necefFafy  to  enquire  if  the 
perfon  who  is  to  take  it,  believes  in  a  Supreme  Being,  and 
in  a  future  ftate  of  rewards  and  punifhments.  If  he  does, 
the  oath  is  to  be  adminiftered  according  to  that  form 
which  it  is  fuppofed  will  bind  his  confeience  mod.  It  is, 
however,  neceffary  that  fuch  a  belief  fhould  be  entertained, 
becaufe  otherwife  there  would  be  nothing  to  bind  his  con- 
feience that  could  be  relied  on,  fince  there  are  many  cafes 
where  the  terror  of  punifhment  in  this  world  for  perjury, 
could  not  be  dreaded.  I  have  thus  endeavoured  to  fatisfy, 
the  committee.  We  may,  I  think,  very  fafely  leave  re- 
ligion to  itfelf ;  and  as  to  the*  form  of  the  oath,  I  think 
this  may  well  he  trufted  to  the  general  government,  to  be 
applied  on  the  principles  I  have  mentioned. 

Governor  Johnjlon  expreiTed  great  aftonimment  that  the 
people  were  alarmed  on  the  fubject  of  religion.  This,  he 
faid,  muft  have  arifen  from  the  great  pains  which  had  been 
taken  to  prejudice  mens  minds  againft  the  Conftitution. 
He  begged  leave  to  add  the  following  few  obfervations  to 
what  had  been  fo  ably  faid  by  the  gentleman  laft  up. 


1  read  the  Constitution  over  and  over,  but  could  not  fc& 
one  caufe  of  apprehenfion  or  jealoufy  on  this  fubjecf. 
When  I  heard  there  were  apprehenfions  that  the  Pope  of 
Rome  could  be  the  Prefident  of  the  United  States,  I  wa» 
greatly  ailonifhed.  It  might  as  well  be  faid  that  the  King 
of  England  or  France,  or  the  Grand  Turk  could  be  chofen 
fo  that  office.  It  would  have  been  as  good  an  argument. 
It  appears  to  me  that  it  would  have  been  dangerous,  if 
Gongrefs  could  intermeddle  with  the  fubjecT;  of  religion. 
True  religion  is,  derived  from  a  much  higher  fource  than 
human  laws.  When  any  attempt  is  made  by  any  govern- 
ment to  reftrain  mens  confidences,  no  good  consequence 
can  poffibly  follow.  It  is  apprehended  that  Jews,  Maho-< 
metans,  Pagans,  &c.  may  be  elected  to  high  offices  undetf 
the  government  of  the  United  States.  Thofe  who  are; 
Mahometans,  or  any  others,  who  are  not  profeffors  oi 
the  Chriftian  religion,  can  never  be  elected  to  the  office  of 
Prefident  or  other  high  office  but  in  one  of  two  cafes. 
Firft,  if  the  people  of  America  lay  afide  the  Chriftian  re- 
ligion altogether,  it  may  happen.  Should  this  unfortu- 
nately take  place,  the  people  will  chufe  fuch  men  as  thinfo 
as  they  do  tbemfelves.  Another  cafe  is,  if  any  perfonS? 
of  fuch  a  description,  mould,  notwithftanding  their  re* 
ligion,  acquire  the  confidence  and  efteem  of  the  peopl® 
of  America  by  their  good  conduct  and  practice  of  virtue* 
they  may  be  chofen.  I  leave  it  to  gentlemens  candour  ta 
judge  what  probability  there  is  of  the  people's  chufing  men? 
of  different  fentiments  from  themfelves. 

But  great  apprehenfions  have  been  raifed  as  to  the  influ- 
ence of  the  eaftern  ftates.  When  you  attend  to  circum» 
ftances,  this  will  have  no  weight.  I  know  but  two  o£ 
three  itates  where  there  is  the  leaft  chance  of  eftabiifliing 
any  particular  religion.  The  people  of  Maflachufetts  andvj 
Connecticut  are  moftly  Prefbyterians.  In  every  other; 
ftate,  the  people  are  divided  into  a  great  number  of  fee~rs» 
In  Rhode-Iffand  the  tenets  of  the  Baptifts  I  believe  pre- 
vail. In  New- York  they  are  divided  very  much :  the  mod 
numerous  are  the  Episcopalians  and  the  Baptifts.  In  New*' 
Jerfey  they  are  as  much  divided  as  we  are.  In  Pennfyl* 
vania,  if  any  fe£fc  prevails  more  than  another  it  is  that  of 
the  Quakers.  In  Maryland  the  Epifcopalians  are  moft  nu- 
merous, though  there  are  other  fe&s.     In  Virginia  ther* 


(     t$6    ) 

arc  many  fe£b  ;  you  all  know  what  their  ^religious  fentk 
ments  are.  So  in  all  the  fouthern  dates  they  differ  ;  as 
alfo  in  New-Hampffiire.  I  hope  therefore  that  gentlemen 
will  fee  there  is  no  caufe  of  fear  that  any  one  religion  (hall 
be  exclufively  edabliftied. 

Mr.  Caldwell  thought  that  fome  danger  might  arife. 
He  imagined  it  might  be  objected  to  in  a  political  as  well 
as  in  a  religious  view.  In  the  nrd  place,  he  faid  there  was 
an  invitation  for  Jews,  and  Pagans  of  every  kind,  to  come 
among  us.  At  fome  future  period,  faid  he,  this  might 
endanger  the  charader  of  the  United  States.  Moreover, 
even  thofe  who  do  not  regard  religion,  acknowledge  that 
the  Chridian  religion  is  bed  calculated  of  all  religions  to 
make  good  members  of  fociety,  on  account  of  its  morali- 
ty. I  think  then,  added  he,  that  in  a  political  view,  thofe 
gentlemen  who  formed  this  Conftitution,  mould  not  have 
given  this  invitation  to  Jews  and  Heathens.  All  thofe 
who  have  any  religion  are  againd  the  emigration  of  thofe 
people  from  the  eadern  hemifphere. 

Mr.  Spenser  was  an  advocate  for  fecuring  every  unalien- 
able right,  and  that  of  worfliipping  God  according  to  the 
didates  of  confcienee  in  particular.  He  therefore  thought 
that  no  one  particular  religion  mould  be  eftablimed.  Re- 
ligious teds,  faid  he,  have  been  the  foundation  of  perfe- 
ctions in  all  countries.  Perfons  who  are  confcientious 
will  not  take  the  oath  required  by  religious  tefts,  and  will 
therefore  be  excluded  from  offices,  though  equally  capa- 
ble of  difcharging  them  as  any  member  of  the  fociety.  It 
is  feared,  continued  he,  that  perfons  of  bad  principles, 
Deids,  Atheifts,  &c.  may  come  into  this  country,  and 
there  is  nothing  to  redrain  them  from  being  eligible  to  of- 
fices. He  afked  if  it  was  reafonable  to  fuppofe  that  the 
people  would  chufe  men  without  regarding  their  charac- 
ters. Mr.  Spencer  then  continued  thus — Gentlemen  urge 
that  the  want  of  a  ted  admits  the  mod  vicious  characters 
to  offices.  I  defire  to  know  what  ted  could  bind  them. 
If  they  were  of  fuch  principles,  it  would  not  keep  them 
from  enjoying  thofe  offices.  On  the  other  hand,  it  would 
exclude  from  offices  confcientious  and  truly  religious  peo- 
ple, though  equally  capable  as  others.  Confcientious  per- 
fons would  not  take  fuch  an  oath,  and  would  be  therefore 
excluded.  This  would  be  a  great  gaufe  of  objeaion  to  a 
—       i  religious 


(      227      ) 

religions  tctl.  But  in  this  cafe  as  there  is  not  a  religion* 
teft  required,  it  leaves  religion  on  the  folid  foundation  of 
its  own  inherent  validity,  without  any  connexion  with 
temporal  authority,  and  no  kind  of  oppreflion  can  take 
place.  I  confefs  it  ftrikes  me  fo.  I  am  forry  to  differ 
from  the  worthy  gentleman.  I  cannot  objedt  to  this  part 
of  the  Conftitution.  I  wifti  every  other  part  was  as  good 
and  proper, 

•  Governor  Johnjlm  approved  of  the  worthy  member's 
candour.  He  admitted  a  poffibility  of  Jews,  Pagans,  &c, 
emigrating  to  the  United  States  ;  yct^  he  fait},  they  could 
not  be  in  proportion  to  the  emigrations  of  Chriftians  who 
ihould  come  from  other  countries  %  that  in  all  probability 
the  children  even  of  fuch  people  would  be  Chriftians  $ 
and  that  this,  with  the  rapid  population  of  the  United 
States,  their  zeal  for  religion  ahd  love  of  liberty,  would* 
he  trufted,  add  to  the  progrefs  of  the  Chxiilian  religion 
among  us. 

The  feventh  article  read  without  any  objection  againft  it* 

Governor  Johnjlon,  after  a  fhort  fpeech  which  was  not 
cUftinclly  heard,  made  a  motion  to  the  following  effecl: : 

That  this  committee  having  fully  deliberated  on  the 
Conftitution  propofed  for  the  future  government  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  by  the  Federal  Convention  late~ 
ly'  held  at  Philadelphia,  on  the  17th  day  of  September  laft, 
and  having  taken  into  their  ferious  and  folemn  confidera-- 
tion  the  prefent  critical  fituation  of  America,  which  in*- 
tfkiccs  them  to  be  of  opinion,  that  thoaigh  certain  amend- 
ments to  the  faid  Conftitution  may  be  wilhed  for,  yet  that 
thofe  amendments  mould  be  propofed  fubfequent  to  the 
ratification  on  the  part  of  this  ftate,  and  not  previous 
to  it :  They  therefore  recommend  that  the  Convention  do 
ratify  the  Conftitution,  and  at  the  fame  time  propofe 
amendments,  to  take  place  in  one  of  the  modes  prescribed 
by  the  Conftitution. 

Mr.  Lenoir— Mx,  Chairman,  I  conceive  that  I  fliall  net 
be  out  of  order  to  make  fome  observations  on  this  laft  part 
of  thefyftem,  and  take  fome  retrofpeclive  view  of  fome 
other  parts  of  it.  I  think  it  not  proper  for  our  adoption, 
as  I  confider  that  it  endangers  our  liberties.  When  we 
confider  this  fyftem  collectively,  we  muft  be  furprifed  to 
think,  that  any  fet  of  men  who  were  delegated  to  amend 

thf 


(  **ft  ) 

<|?ie  Confederation,  mould  propofc  to  annihilate  it.  For 
that  and  this  fyftem  are  utterly  different,  and  cannot  exift 
together,  ft  has  been  faid  that  the  fulleft  confidence  mould 
be  put  in  thofe  characters  who  formed  thjs  Conftitution, 
We  will  admit  them  in  private  and  public  transactions  to 
be  good  characters.  But,  Sir,  it  appears  to  me  and  every 
other  tyjember  of  this  committee,  that  they  exceeded  their 
powers.  Thofe  gentlemen  had  no  fort  of  power  to  form 
a  new  Conftitution  altogether,  neither  had  the  citizens  of 
this  country  fuch  an  idea  in  their  view.  I  cannot  under- 
take to  fay  what  principles  actuated  them.  I  muft  con- 
ceive they  were  miftaken  in  their  politics,  and  that  this, 
fyftem  does  not  fecure  the  unalienable  rights  of  freemen. 
It  has  fpme  ariftocratical  and  fome  monarchical  features, 
;ind  perhaps  fome  of  them  intended  the  eftablifhment  of 
pne  of  thefe  governments-  Whatever  might  be  their  in- 
tent,  according  to  my  views,  it  will  lead  to  the  moft  dan- 
gerous ariftocracy  that  ever  was  thought  of.  An  arifto- 
cracy eftablifhed  on  a  constitutional  bottom  ! — I  conceive 
(and  I  believe  moft  of  this  committee  will  likewife)  that 
this  is  fo  dangerous,  that  I  mould  like  as  well  to  have  no 
'Constitution  at  all.     Their  powers  are  almoft  unlimited. 

A  Conftjtution  ought  to  be  underftood  by  every  one, 
The  moft  humble  and  trifling  characters  in  the  country 
have  a  right  to  know,  what  foundation  they  ftand  upon. 
I  confefs  \  dq  not  fee  the  end  of  the  powers  here  pro* 
pofed,  nor  the  reafons  for  granting  them.  The  principal 
end  of  a  Conftitution  is  to  fet  forth  what  muft  be  given 
up  for  the  common  benefit  of  the  community  at  large, 
and  to  fecure  thofe  rights  which  ought  never  to  be  infrin- 
ged. The  propofed  plan  fecures  no  right,  or  if  it  does, 
it  is  in  fo  vague  and  undeterminate  a  manner,  that  we  do 
jiot  underftand  it.  My  conftituents  inftru£ted  me  to  op-> 
pofe  the  adoption  of  this  Conftitution.  The  principal 
reafons  are  as  follow.  The  right  of  reprefentation  is  not* 
fairly  and  explicitly  preferved  to  the  people  j  it  being  eafy 
to  evade  that  privilege  as  provided  in  this  fyftem,  and  the 
terms  of  election  being  too  long,  If  our  General  AfTem- 
fely  be  corrupt,  at  the  end  of  the  year  we  can  make  new 
men  of  them  by  fending  others,  in  their  itead.  It  is  not  fa 
$iere.  If  there  be  any  reafon  to  think  that  human  nature 
I*  corrupt,  and  that  there  is  a  difpofition  in  men  to  afpire 

0 


(      2*p      ) 

to  power,  they  may,  embrace  an  opportunity  during  theif 
long  continuance  in  office,  by  means  of  their  powers,  to 
take  away  the  rights  of  the  people.  The  Senators  are 
chofen  for  fix  years,  and  two-thirds  of  them  with  the  Pre- 
fident  have  mod  extenfive  powers.  They  may  enter  into 
a.  dangerous  combination.  And  they  may  be  continually 
re-eleCted.  The  Prefident  may  be  as  good  a  man  as  any 
in  exiftence,  but  he  is  but  a  man.  He  may  be  corrupt, 
fie  has  an  opportunity  of  forming  plans  dangerous  to  the 
Community  at  large.  J  (hall  not  enter  into  the  minutiae  of 
this  fyftem,  but  I  conceive  that  whatever  may  have  been 
the  intention  of  its  framers,  that  it  leads  to  a  moft  dan- 
gerous ariftocracy.  It  appears  to  me  that  inftead  of  fe* 
curing  the  fovereignty  of  the  dates,  it  is  calculated  to  melt 
them  down  into  one  foljd  empire.  If  the  citizens  of  this 
(late  like  a  confolidated  government,  I  hope  they  will  have, 
virtue  enough  to  fecure  their  rights.  I  am  forry  to  make 
ufe  of  the  exprefjion,  but  it  appears  to  me  to  be  a  fchem« 
to  reduce  this  government  to  an  ariftocracy.  It  guaran*. 
tees  a  republican  form  of  government  to  the  ftates ;  wheii 
all  thefe  powers  are  in  Congrefs  it  will  only  be  a  form.  It 
will  be  paft  recovery  when  Congrefs  has  the  power  of  th« 
purfe  and  the  fword.  The  power  of  the  fword  is  in  ex- 
plicit terms  given  to  it.  The  power  of  dire£t.  taxation 
gives  the  purfe.  They  may  prohibit  the  trial  by  jury, 
which  is  a  moft  {acred  and  valuable  right.  There  is  no- 
thing contained  in  this  Copftitution  to  bar  them  from  it. 
The  Federal  Courts  have  alfo  appellate  cognizance  of  law 
and  fa£t  ;  the  fole  caufe  of  which  is  to  deprive  the  people 
of  that  trial,  which  it  is  optional  in  them  to  grant  or  not. 
We  find  no  provifion  againft  infringement  on  the  right* 
pf  conference.  Ecclefiaftical  courts  may  be  cftabliftied, 
which  will  be  deftru&ive  to  our  citizens.  They  may  make, 
any  eftablilhment  they  think  proper.  They  have  alfo  am 
exclufive  legiflation  in  their  ten  miles  fquare,  to  which 
may  be  added  their  power  over  the  militia,  who  may  be 
carried  thither  and  kept  there  for .  life.  Should  any  one- 
grumble  at  their  acts,  he  would  be  deemed  a  traitor,  an(J 
perhaps  taken  up  and  carried  to  the  exclufive  legiflation, 
and  there  tried  without  a  jury.  We  are  told  there  is  no 
caufe  to  fear.  When  we  confider  the  great  powers  of 
Congrefs,  there  is  great  caufe  of  alarm,     They  can  difarn* 

the 


(     23o     ) 

*he  militia.  If  they  were  armed,  they  would  be  a  refourcc 
againft  great  oppreflions.  The  laws  of  a-  great  empire  are 
difficult  to  be  executed.  If  the  laws  of  the  union  were 
opprelfive  they  could  not  carry  them  into  efFe£t,  if  the 
people  were  pofleiTed  of  proper  means  of  defence. 

It  was  cried  out  that  we  were  in  a  mod  defperate  fitua- 
tion,  and  that  Congrefs  could  not  difcharge  any  of  their 
mod  facred  contracts.  I  believe  it  to  be  the  cafe.  But 
why  give  more  power  than  is  neceffary  ?  The  men  who 
went  to  the  Federal  Convention,  went  for  the  exprefspur- 
poie  of  amending  the  government,  by  giving  it  fuch  addi- 
tional powers  as  were  neceffary.  If  we  mould  accede  to 
this  fyftem,  it  may  be  thought  proper  by  a  few  defigning 
perfons  to  dedroy  it  in  a  future  age  in  the  fame  manner 
that  the  old  fyftem  is  laid  afide.  The  Confederation  was 
binding  on  all  the  ftates.  It  could  not  be  dedroyed  but 
with  the  confent  of  all  the  dates.  There  was  an  exprefs 
article  to  that  purpofe,  The  men  who  were  deputed  to 
the  Convention,  indead  of  amending  the  old,  as  they  were 
folely  empowered  and  directed  to  do,  propofed  a  new  fyf- 
tem. If  the  belt  characters  departed  fo  far  from  their- 
autherity,  what  may  not  be  apprehended  from  others  who 
may  be  agents  in  the  new  government, 

It  is  natural  for  men  to  afpire  to  power.  It  is  the  na- 
ture of  mankind  to  be  tyrannical,  therefore  it  is  neceffary 
for  us  to  fecure  our  rights  and  liberties  as  far  as  we  can. 
But  it  is  alked  why  we  fhould  fufpeft  men  who  are  to  be 
chofen  by  ourfelves,  while  it  is  their  intered  to  act  judly, 
and  while  men  have  felf-intered  at  heart  ?  I  thir/k  the  rea~ 
ions  which  J  have  given  are  fufficient  to  anfwer  that  quef- 
tion.  We  ought  to  confider  the  depravity  of  human  na- 
ture ;  the  predominant  third  of  power  which  is  in  the 
bread  of  every  one ;  the  temptations  our  rulers  may  have, 
and  the  unlimited  confidence  placed  in  them  by  this  fyf- 
tem. Thefe  are  the  foundation  of  my  fears.  They  would 
be  fo  long  in  the  general  government  that  they  would  for- 
get the  grievances  of  the  people  of  the  date. 

But  it  is  faid  we  (hall  be  ruined  if  feparated  from  the 
other  dates,  which  will  be  the  cafe  if  we  do  not  adopt. 
Jf  fo,  I  would  put  lefs  confidence  in  thofe  dates.  The 
#ate$  are  all  bound  together  by  the  Confederation,  and  the 

reft 


(    *3<     ) 

reft  cannot  break  from  us,  without  violating  the  moft  fo- 
lemn  compact.     If  they  break  that,  they  will  this. 

But  it  is  urged  that  we  ought  to  adopt  becaufe  fo  many 
other  ftates  have.     In  thofe  ftates  which  have  patronized; 
and  ratified  it,  many  great  men  have  oppofed  it.     The 
motives  of  thofe  ftates  I  know  not.     It  ig  the  goodnefs  of 
the  Conftitution  we  are  to  examine.     We  are  to  exercife 
our  own  judgments,  and  aft  independently.     And  as  t 
conceive  we  are  not  out  of  the  union,  I  hope  this  Confti- 
tution will  not  be   adopted  till  amendments  are  made. 
Amendments  are  wifhed  for  by  the  other  ftates.     It  was 
urged  here,  that  the  Prefident  fhould  have  power  to  grant 
reprieves  and  pardons.     This  power  is  neceiTary  with  pro- 
per reftriaions.     But  the  Prefident  may  be  at  the  head 
of  a  combination  againft  the  rights  of  the  people,  and 
may  reprieve  or  pardon  the  whole.     It  is  anfwered  to  this 
that  he  cannot  pardon  in  cafes  of  impeachment.     What  is 
the  punifhment  in  fuch  cafes  ?  Only  removal  from  office 
and  future  difqualification.     It  does  not  touch  life  or  pro- 
perty.    He  has  power  to  do  away  punifhment  in  every 
other  cafe.     It  is  too  unlimited  in  my  opinion.     It  may  be 
exercifed  to  the  public  good,  but  may  alfo  be  perverted  to 
a  different  purpofe.     Should  we  get  thofe  who  win  attend 
to  ourintereft,  we  ftiould  be  fafe  under  any  Conftitution,, 
or  without  any.     If  we  fend  men  of  a  different  difpofition 
we  fhall  be  in  danger.     Let  us  give  them  only  fuch  pow- 
ers as  are  neceiTary  for  the  good  of  the  community. 

The  Prefident  has  other  great  powers.  He  has  the  no- 
mination of  all  officers  and  a  qualified  negative  on  the  laws. 
He  may  delay  the  wheels  of  government.  He  may  drive 
the  Senate  to  concur  with  his  propofal.  He  has  other  ex- 
tenfive  powers.  There  is  no  affurance  of  the  liberty  o£ 
the  prefs.  They  may  make  it  treafon  to  write  againft  the 
moft  arbitrary  proceedings.  They  have  power  to  ccntroul 
our  eleftions  as  much  as  they  pleafe.  It  may  be  very  op- 
'  preflive  on  this  ftate,  and  all  the  fouthern  ftates. 

Much  has  been  faid  of  taxation,  and  the  inequality  o£ 
it  on  the  ftates.  But  nothing  has  been  faid  of  the  mode 
of  furniihing  men.  In  what  proportion  are  the  ftates  to 
furnifh  men  >  Is  it  in  proportion  to  the  whites  and  blacks  ? 
I  prefume  it  is.  This  ftate  has  100,000  blacks.  By  this 
Conftitution   co  negroes  are  equal  to  30  whites.     This 

ftate 


(     *3*    ) 

flate  therefore,  befides  the  proportion  fhe  muft  raife  for  ner 
white  people,  mult  furnifh  an  additional  number  for  her 
blacks,  in  proportion  as  30  is  to  50.  Snppofe  there  be  a 
ftate  to  the  northward  that  has  60,000  perfons,  this  (late 
muft  furnifh  as  many  men  for  the  blacks  as  that  whole 
ftate,  exclufive  of  thofe  (he  mull  furnifh  for  her  whites. 
Slaves  inftead  of  (lengthening,  weaken  this  ftate— the 
regulation  will  therefore  greatly  injure  it  and  the  other 
fouthcrn  dates.  There  is  another  claufe  which  I  do  not 
perhaps  well  underftand.  The  power  of  taxation  feems* 
to  me  not  to  extend  to  the  lands  of  the  people  of  the  Uni- 
ted States,  for  the  rule  of  taxation  is,  the  number  of  whites 
and  three-fifths  of  the  blacks.  Should  it  be  the  cafe  that 
they  have  no  power  of  taxing  this  object,  muft  not  direct 
taxation  be  hard  on  the  greater  part  of  this  ftate  ?  I  am  not 
confident  that  it  is  fo,  but  it  appears  to  me  that  they  can 
Jay  taxes  on  this  objecl:.  This  will  opprefs  the  poor  people 
who  have  large  families  of  whites,  and  no  flaves  to  affift 
them  in  cultivating  the  foil,  although  the  taxes  are  to  be 
laid  in"  proportion  of  three-fifths  of  ^the  negroes  and  all 
the  whites.  Another  disadvantage  to  this  ftate  will  arife 
from  it.  This  ftate  has  made  a  contract  with  its  citizens* 
The  public  Securities  and  certificates  I  allude  to.  Thefe 
tnay  be  negotiated  to  men  who  live  in  other  ftates.  Should 
that  be  the  cafe,  thefe  gentlemen  will  have  demands  againft 
this  ftate  on  that  account.  The  Constitution  points  out 
the  mode  of  recovery — it  muft  be  in  the  Federal  Court 
only,  becaufe  controverfies  between  a  ftate  and  the  citi- 
zens of  another  ftate  are  cognizable  only  in  the  Federal 
Courts.  They  cannot  be  paid  but  in  gold  and  filver.  Ac- 
tual fpecie  will  be  recovered  in  that  court.  This  would 
fee  an  intolerable  grievance  without  remedy. 

I  wifh  not  to  be  fo  underftood  as  to  be  fo  averfe  to  this 
fyftem,  as  that  I  fhould  objec\,$©  all  parts  of  it,  or  attempt 
to  reflect  on  the  reputation  of  thofe  gentlemen  who  form* 
cd  it  j  though  it  appears  to  me  that  I  would  not  have  agreed 
to  any  propofal  but  the  amendment  of  the  Confederation. 
If  there  were  any  fecurity  for  the  liberty  of  the  people,  I 
would  for  my  own  part  agree  to  it.  But  in  this  cafe,  as 
millions  yet  unborn  are  concerned,  and  deeply  interefted 
in  our  decifion,  I  would  have  the  moil  pofitive  and  poinC- 
#d  fecurity.    I  {hall  therefore  hope  that  before  this  Houfe 


(    *33     ) 

will  proceed  to  adopt  this  Conftitution,  they  will  propofe 
fuch  amendments  to  it,  as  will  make  it  complete  •,  and 
when  amendments  are  adopted,  perhaps  I  wili  be  as  ready- 
to  accede  to  it  as  any  man.— One  thing  will  make  it  arif- 
tocratical.  Its  powers  are  very  indefinite.  There  was  a 
very  necefiary  claufe  in  the  Confederation,  which  is  omit- 
ted in  this  fyftem.  That  was  a  claufe  declaring  that  every 
power,  &c4  not  given  to  Congrefs,  was  referved  to  the 
ftates.  The  omiffion  of  this  claufe  makes  the  power  fo 
much  greater.  Men  will  naturally  put  the  fulleft  con- 
ftrutlion  on  the  power  given  them.  Therefore  lay  ail  re- 
flraint  on  them,  and  form  a  plan  to  be  underftood  by  every 
gentleman  of  this  committee,  and  every  individual  of  the 
community. 

Mr>  Spaight — Mr.   Chairman,  I  am  one  of  thofe  who 
formed  this  Conftitution.     The  gentleman  fays  we  exceed- 
ed our  powers.     I  deny  the  charge.     We  were  fent  with  a 
full  power  to  amend   the  exifting  fyftem.     This  involved 
every  power  to  make  every  alteration  neceflary  to  melio- 
rate and  render  it  perfect.     It   cannot  be  faid  that  We  ar- 
rogated powers  altogether  inconfiftent  with  the  objecT:  of 
our  delegation.     There  is  a  claufe  which  exprefsly  provides 
for  future  amendments,  and  it  is  ftill  in  your  power.    "Wlia£  , 
the  Convention  has  done  is  a  mere  propofal.    It  was  found 
impoflible  to  improve  the  old  fyftem,  without  changing  its 
very  form.     For  by  that  fyftem  the  three  great  branches 
of  government  are  blended  together.     AH  will  agree  that 
the  conceflion   of  power  to  a  government  fo  conftru£tedj 
is  dangerous.  The  propofing  anf  w  fyftem  to  be  eftabliuSed 
by  the  afTent  and  ratification  of  nine  ftates,  arofe  from  the 
neceflity  of  the  cafe.     It  was  thought  extremely  hard  tha£ 
one  ftate,  or  even  three  or  four  ftates,  ftiould  be  able  to 
prevent  neceflary  alterations.   The  very  refractory  conduct 
of  Rhode-Ifland  in  uniformly  oppofing  every  wife  and  ju- 
dicious meafure,  taught  us  how  impolitic  it  would  be,  to 
put  the  general  welfare  in  the  power  of  a  few  members  of 
the  union.     It  was  therefore  thought  by  the  Convention, 
that  if  fo  great  a  majority  as  nine  ftates  mould  adopt  it, 
it  would  be  right  to  eftablifh  it.     It  was  recommended  by 
Congrefs  to  the  ftate  Legiflatures  to  refer  it  to  the  people 
of  their  different  ftates.      Our  AfTembly  has  confirmee^ 
what  they  have  done,  by  propofing  it  to  the  confideratioi* 

G  g  e£ 


(     234     ) 

of  the  people.  It  was  there  and  not  here  that  the  objec- 
tion fhould  have  been  made.  This  Convention  is  there- 
fore to  confider  the  Conftitution,  and  whether  it  be  pro- 
per for  the  government  of  the  people  of  America  ;  and 
had  it  been  propofed  by  any  one  individual,  under  thefe 
circumftances,  it  would  be^,  right  to  confider  whether  it  be 
good  or  bad.  The  gentleman  has  infinuated,  that  this 
Conftitution,  inftead  of  feeuring  our  liberties,  is  a  feheme 
to  enflave  us.  He  has  produced  no  proof,  but  refts  it  on 
his  bare  affertion— an  affertion  which  I  am  aftonifhed  to 
hear,  after  the  ability  with  which  every  objection  has-been 
fully  and  clearly  refuted  in  the  courfe  of  our  debates.  \ 
am  for  my  part  confcious  of  having  had  nothing  in  view 
but  the  liberty  and  happinefs  of  my  country,  and  I  believe 
every  member  of  that  Convention  was  acluated  by  motives 
equally  fincere  and  patriotic. 

He  fays  that  it  will  tend  to  ariftocracy.  Where  is  the  arif- 
tocratical  part  of  it  ?  It  is  ideal.  I  always  thought  that 
an  ariftocracy  was  that  government  where  the  few  govern- 
ed the  many,  or  where  the  rulers  were  hereditary.  This 
is  a  very  different  government  from  that.  I  never  read  of 
fuch  an  ariftocracy.  The  firft  branch  are  Reprefentative* 
chofen  freely  by  the  people  at  large.  This  muft  be  allow- 
ed upon  all  hands  to  be  democratical.  The  next  is  the  Se- 
nate, chofen  by  the  people  in  a  fecondary  manner  through 
the  medium  of  their  delegates  in  the  Legjftature.  This 
cannot  be  ariftocratical.  They  are  chofen  for  fix  years, 
but  one  third  of  them  go  out  every  fecond  year,  and  are 
refponfible  to  the  ftate  Legislatures.  The  Prefident  is 
elected  for  four  years.  By  whom  ?  By  thofe  who  are  elect- 
ed in  fuch  manner  as  the  ftate  Legislatures  think  proper. 
I  hope  the  gentleman  will  not  pretend  to  call  this  an  arif- 
tocratical feature.  The  privilege  of  reprefentation  is  fecur- 
ed  in  the  moft  pofitive  and  unequivocal  terms,  and  cannot 
be  evaded.  The  gentleman  has  again  brought  on  the  trial 
by  jury.  The  Federal  Convention,  Sir,  had  no  wifh  to 
deftroy  the  trial  by  jury.  It  was  three  or  four  days  before 
them.  There  were  a  variety  of  objections  to  any  one 
mode.  It  was  thought  impoflible  to  fall  upon  any  pne 
mode,  but  what  would  produce  fome  inconveniences.  I 
cannot  now  recollect  all  the  reafons  given,  Moft  of  them 
|ave  been,  amply  detailed  by  other  gentlemen  here.    I 


<    *35    ) 

fhould  fuppofe,  that  if  the  Reprefentatives  of  twelve  ftate^ 
with  many  able  lawyers  among  them,  could  not  form  any 
unexceptionable  mode,  this  Convention  could  hardly  be 
able  to  do  it.  As  to  the  fubjeel:  of  religion,  I  thought 
what  has  been  faid  would  fully  fatisfy  that  gentleman  and 
every  other.  No  power  is  given  to  «*the  general  govern* 
ment  to  interfere  with  it  at  all,.  Any  a&  of  Congrefs  on 
this  fubjeel:  would  be  an  ufurpation.  No  feci  is  preferred 
to  another.  Every  man  has  a  right  to  worfhip  the  Supreme 
Being  in  the  manner  he  thinks  proper.  No  teft  is  required. 
All  men  of  equal  capacity  and  integrity,  are  equally  eligi* 
h\e  to  offices.  „ Temporal  violence  might  make  mankind 
wicked,  but  never  religious.  A  teft  would  enable  the 
prevailing  feci  to  perfecute  the  reft.  I  do  not  fuppofe  an 
Infidel,  or  any  fuch  perfon,  will  ever  be  chofen  to  any  of- 
fice unlefs  the  people  themfelves  be  of  the  fame  opinion*, 
He  fays  that  Congrefs  may  eftablifh  ecclcfiaftical  courts.  I 
do  not  know  what  part  of  the  Conftitution  warrants  that 
aflertion.  It  is  impoffible.  No  fuch  power  is  given  them. 
The  gentleman^adyifes  fuch  amendments  as  would  fatisfy 
fiim,  and  propofes  a  mode  of  amending  before  ratifying, 
If  we  do  not  adopt  firft,  we  are  no  more  a  part  of  the 
tmion  than  any  foreign  power.  It  will  be  alio  throwing 
sway  the  influence  of  our  ftate  to  propofe  amendments  as 
£he  condition  of  our  ratification.  If  we  adopt  firft,  our 
Ileprefentatrves  will  have  a  proportionable  weight  in 
bringing  about  amendments,  which  will  not  be  the  cafe  if 
=we  do  not  adopt.  It  is  adopted  by  tenftates  already.  The 
queftion  then  is,  not  whether  the  Conftitution  be  good, 
but  whether  we  will  or  will  not  confederate  with  the  other 
ftates.  The  gentleman  fuppofes  that  the  liberty  of  the 
prefs  is  not  fecured.  The  Conftitution  does  not  take  it 
away.  It  fays  nothing  of  it,  and  can  do  nothing  to  injure 
it.  But  it  is  fecured  by  the  Conftitution  of  every  ftate  iij 
the  union  in  the  moft  ample  manner. 

He  objects  to  giving  the  government  exclufive  legiflati* 
on  in  a  diftricl-  not  exceeding  ten  miles  fquare,  although 
the  previous  confent  and  ceflion  of  the  ftate  within  which 
it  may  be,  is  required.  Is  it  to  be  fuppofed,  that  the  Re- 
prefentatives of  the  people  will  make  regulations  therein 
dangerous  to  liberty  ?  Is  there  the  leaft  colour  or  pretext 
for  faying,  that  t,he  rnijitia  will  be  carried  and  kept  there 


-  (   *#  J 

for  life  ?  Where  is  there  any  power  o1o  this  ?  The  power 
of  calling  forth  the  militia  is  given  for  the  common  defence, 
and  can  we  fuppofe  that  our  own  Representatives,  chofen 
for  fo  (hort  a  period,  will  dare  to  pervert  a  power,  given  for 
the  general  protection,  to  an  abfolute  oppreffion.  But  the 
gentleman  has  gone  further,  and  fays,  that  any  man  who 
will  complain  of  their  oppreflions,  or  write  agamd  their 
ufurpations,  may  be  deemed  a  traitor, -and  tried  as  fuch  in 
the  ten  miles  fquare,  without  a  jury.  What  an  aftonifh- 
Sng  mifreprefentation  !  Why  did  not  the  gentleman  look 
at  the  Cqnftitutidh,  and  fee  their  powers  ?  Treafon  is  then?, 
defined.  It  fays  exprefsly,  that  treafon  againft  the  United 
States  (hall  coniift  only  in  levying  war  againft  them,  or  in 
adhering  to  their  enemies,  giving  them  aid  and  comfort. 
Complaining  therefore,  or  writing,  cannot  be  treafon. 
[Here  Mr.  Lenoir  rofe,  and  faid  that  he  meant  mifprifion 
of  treafon.]  The  fame  reafons  hold  againfl  that  too.  The 
liberty  of  the  prefs  being  fecured,  creates  an  additional 
fecurity.  Perfons  accufed  cannot  be  tried  without  a  jury  y 
for  the  fame  article  provides,  that  "  the  trial  of  all  crimes 
{hall  be  by  jury."  They  cannot  be  carried  to  the  ten  miles 
fquare ;  for  the  fame  claufe  adds,  «  and  fuch- trial  mail  he 
«  held  in  the  ftate  where  the  faid  crimes  ftiall  have  been 
«c  committed.**  He  has  made  another  objeaion,  that  lane* 
might  not  be  taxed,  and  the  other  taxes  would  fall  heavily 
on  the  poor  people.  Congrefs  has  a  power  to  lay  taxes, 
and  no  article  is  exempted  or  excluded.  The  proportion 
of  each  ftate  may  be  raifed  in  the  mod  convenient  man* 
ner.  The  cenfus  or  enumeration  provided,  is  meant  for 
the  falvation  and  benefit  of  the  fouthern  ftates.  It  was 
mentioned  that  land  ought  to  be  the  only  object  of  taxa- 
tion. As  an  acre  of  land  in  the  northern  flates,  is  worth 
many  acres  in  the  fouthern  ftates,  this  would  have  greatly 
opprefled  the  latter.  It  was  then  judged  that  the  number 
of  people,  as  therein  provided,  was  the  beft  criterion  for 
fixing  the  proportion  of  each  ftate,  3tid  that  proportion  in 
each  ftate  to  be  raifed  in  the  moft  eafy  manner  for  the  peo- 
ple. But  he  has  darted  another  objection,  which  I  never 
heard  before  \  that  Congrefs  may  call  for  men  in  propor- 
tion to  the  number  of  negroes.  The  article  with  refpeel: 
to  requifitions  of  men  is  entirely  done  away.  Men  are  to 
fee  raifed  by  bounty.     Suppofe  it  had  not  been  done  away. 

The 


<     237     ) 

The  eaftern  dates  could  not  impofe  on  us  a  man  for  every 
black.  It  was  not  the  cafe  during  the  war,  nor  ever  could 
be.     But  quotas  of  men  are  entirely  done  away. 

Another  objection  which  he  makes,  is,  that  the  Federal 
Courts  will  fiave  cognisance  of  contradts  between  this 
Hate  and  citizens  of  .another  {late,  and  that  public  fecuri- 
iies,  negociated  by  our  citizens  to  thofe  of  other  ftates 
will  be  recoverable  in  fpecie  in  thofe  courts  againft  this 
ftate.  They  cannot  be  uegociated.  What  do  thtfe  certi- 
ficates fay  ?  Merely  that  the  perfon  therein  named,  {hall 
for  a  particular  fervice,  receive  fo  much  money.  They  are 
not  negotiable.  The  money  mud  be  demanded  for  them 
in  the  name  of  thofe  therein  mentioned.  No  other  per- 
fon has  a  right.  There  can  be  no  danger  therefore  in  this 
refpect.  The  gentlemen  has  made  feveral  other  objections, 
.but  they  have  been  fo  fully  an f were d  and  clearly  refuted 
by  feveral  gentlemen  in  the  courfe  of  the  debates,  that  I 
lhall  pafs  them  by  unnoticed.  I  cannot  however  conclude, 
without  obferving,  that  I  am  amazed  he  mould  call  the 
powers  of  the  general  government  indefinite.  It  is  the 
j£rft  time  I  heard  the  objection.  I  will  venture  to  fay  they 
pre  better  defined  than  the  powers  of  any  government  he 
Hiver  heard  of. 

Mr.  J.  M'DovmII— Mr.  Chairman,  I  was  in  hopes 
-ftliat  amendments  would  have  been  brought  forward  to  the 
fConftitution,  before  the  idea  of  adapting  it  had  been 
thought  of  or  propofed.  From  the  belt  information,  there 
is  a  great  proportion  of  the  people  in  the  adopting  ftates 
>&verfe  to  it  as  it  ftands.  1  collect  my  information  from 
•srefpectabje  authority.  I  icnow  the  necefiity  of  a  federal 
government,  I  therefore  wifh  this  was  one  in  which  our 
-liberties  and  privileges  were  fecured.  For  I  confider  the 
union  as  the  rock  of  our  political  falvation.  I  am  for  the 
flrongeit  federal  government.  A  bill  of  rights  ought  to 
to  have  been  inferted  to  afcertain  out  molt  valuable  ancj. 
^inalienable  rights. 

The  fourth  lection  of  the  firfl  claufe  gives  the  Congreff 
^in  unlimited  power  over  elections.  This  matter  was  not 
cleared  up  to  my  fatisfaction.  They  have  full  power  to 
alter  it  from  one  time  of  the  year  to  another,  fo  as  that 
it  (hall  be  impoflible  for  the  people  to  attend.  They 
J»ay  fix  the  time  in  winter,  and  the  place  at  Edenton, 

ivheij. 


{     *38     ) 

when  the  weather  will  be  fo  bad  that  the  people  cann&fc 
attend.  The  ftate  governments  will  be  mere  boards  of  elec- 
tion. The  claufe  of  elections  gives  the  Congrefs  power 
ever  the  time  and  manner  of  chufing  the  Senate.  I  wifh 
to  know  why  refervation  was  made  of  the  place  and  time 
of  chufing  Senators,  and  not  alfo  of  electing  Reprefenta- 
tives.  It  points  to  the  time  when  the  ftates  fhall  be  all 
confolidated  into  one  empire.  Trial  by  jury  is  not  fecured. 
The  objections  againft  this  want  of  fecurity  have  not  been 
cleared  up  in  a  fatisfa&ory  manner.  It  is  neither  fecured 
in  civil  nor  criminal  cafes.  The  federal  appellate  cogni- 
zance of  law  and  fa£t,  puts  it  in  the  power  of  the  wealthy 
to  recover  unjuftly  of  the  poor  man,  who  is  not  able  to 
attend  at  fuch  extreme  diftance,  and  bear  fuch  enormous 
expence  as  it  muft  produce.  It  ought  to  be  limited  fo  as 
to  prevent  fuch  oppreffions. 

I  fay  the  trial  by  jury  is  not  fufficicntly  fecured  in  crimi- 
nal cafes.  The  very  intention  of  the  trial  by  jury  is,  that 
the  accufed  may  be  tried  by  perfons  who  come  from  the 
vicinage  or  neighbourhood,  who  may  be  acquainted  with 
his  character.  The  fubftance^therefore  of  this  privilege  is 
taken  away-. 

By  the  power  of  taxation  every  article  capable  of  being 
taxed,  may  be  fo  heavily  taxed  that  the  people  cannot  bear* 
the  taxes  neceiTary  to  be  raifed  for  the  fupport  of  their 
itate  governments^  Whatever  law  we  may  make,  may  be 
repealed  by  their  laws.  All  thefe  things,  with  others^ 
tend  to  make  us  one  general  empire.  Such  a  government 
cannot  be  well  regulated.  When  we  are  connected  with 
the  northern  ftates,  who  have  a  majority  in  their  favour, 
Jaws  may  be  made  which  will  anfwer  their  convenience, 
but  will  be  oppreflive  to  the  laft  degree  upon  the  fouthern 
ftates.  They  differ  in  climate,  foil,  cuftoms,  manners,  &c. 
A  large  majority  of  the  people  of  this  country  are  againft 
this  Conftitution,  becaufe  they  think  it  replete  with  dan- 
gerous defecls.  They  ought  to  be  fatisfied  with  it  before 
it  is  adopted,  otherwise  it  cannot  operate  happily.  With- 
out the  affections  of  the  people  it  will  not  have  fufficient 
energy.  To  enforce  its  execution  recourfe  muft  be  had  to 
arms  and  bloodftied.  How  much  better  would  it  be  if  the 
people  were  fatisfied  with  it  ?  From  all  thefe  confiderati- 
ons  I  now  rife  to  oppofe  its  adoption ;  for  I  never  will 
agree  to  a  government  that  fepds  to  the  ,dcftru£Uon  of  the 
liberty  of  the  people,  Jjjjr. 


(     23*     ) 

Mr.  Wilfon  wifhed  that  the  Conftitution  had  excluded  Po* 
pifh  Priefts  from  offices.  As  there  was  no  tell  required, 
and  nothing  to  govern  them  but  honour,  he  faid,  that  when 
their  intereit  clamed  with  their  honour,  the  latter  would 
fly  before  the  former. 

Mr.  Lancafter — Mr.  Chairman,  It  is  of  the  utmoft  im- 
portance to  decide  this  great  queftion  with  candour  and 
deliberation.  Every  part  of  this  Conftitution  has  been 
elucidated.  It  has  been  afterted  by  feveral  worthy  gentle- 
men, that  it  is  the  mod  excellent  Conftitution  that  ever 
was  formed.  I  could  wifh  to  be  of  that  opinion  if  it  were 
fo.  The  powers  veiled  therein  are  very  extenfive.  I  am 
apprehenfive  that  the  power  of  taxation  is  unlimited.  It 
exprefsly  fays,  that  Congrefs  (hall  have  the  power  to  lay 
taxes,  &c.  It  is  obvious  to  me  that  the  power  is  unbound- 
ed, and  I  am  apprehenfive  that  they  may  lay  taxes  too 
heavily  on  our  lands,  in  order  to  render  them  more  pro- 
ductive. The  amount  of  the  taxes  may  be  more  than  our 
lands  will  fell  for.  It  is  obvious  that  the  lands  in  the 
northern  ftates,  which  gentlemen  fuppofe  to  be  more  po- 
pulous than  this  country,  are  more  valuable  and  better  cul- 
tivated than  ours :  'Yet  their  lands  will  be  taxed  no  higher 
than  our  lands.  A  rich  man  there,  from  reports,  does 
not  pofTefs  fo  large  a  body  of  land  as  a  poor  man  to  the 
fouthward.  If  fo,  a  common  poor  man  here,  will  have 
much  more  to  pay  for  poor  land,  than  the  rich  man  there 
for  land  of  the  beft  quality.  This  power,  being  necefla- 
lily  unequal  and  oppreffive,  ought  not  to  be  given  up.  I 
mall  endeavour  to  be  as  concife  as  poffible.  We  find  thafi 
the  ratification  of  nine  ftates  (hall  be  fufficient  for  its  efta- 
bliftiment  between  the  ftates  fo  ratifying  the  fame.  This, 
as  has  been  already  taken. notice  of,  is  a  violation  of  the 
Confederation.  We  find  that  by  that  fyftem,  no  altera- 
tion was  to  take  place,  except  it  was  ratified  by  every  ftatc 
in  the  union.  Now  by  comparing  this  laft  article  of  the 
Conftitution  to  that  part  of  the  Confederation,  we  find  a 
mod  flagrant  violation.  The  articles  of  Confederation 
were  fent  out  with  all  folemnity  on  fo  folemn  an  occafion, 
and  were  to  be  always  bindmg  on  the  ftates ;  but,  to  our 
aftoniftiment,  we  fee  that  nine  ftates  may  do  away  the 
force  of  the  whole.  I  think,  without  exaggeration,  that 
it  will  be  looked  upon  by  foreign  nations,  as  a  ferious  and 
alarming  change*  Hew 


(     *4«     ) 

l£ow  cfo  we  know  that  if  we  propofe  amendments  fney 
Ihail  be  obtained  after  actual  ratification  ?  May  not  thefe 
amendments  be  propofed  with  equal  propriety,  and  more 
fafety,  as  the  condition  of  our  adoption  ?  If  they  violate 
the  thirteenth  article  of  the  Confederation  in  this  manner, 
may  they  not  with  equal  propriety  refufe  to  adopt  amend- 
ments, although  agreed  to  and  wifhed  for  by  two-thirds  of' 
the  dates?  This  violation  of  the  old  fyftem  is  a  precedent- 
for  fuvh  proceedings  as  thefe.  That  would  he  a  violation 
d$ fir uctive  to  our  felicity.  We  are  now  determining  3 
queftion  deeply  affecting  the  happinefs  of  millions  yet  un- 
born. It  is  the  policy  of  freemen  to  guard  their  privileges* 
Let  us  then  as  far  as  we  can  exclude  the  poffibility  of  ty- 
ranny. The  Prefident  is  chofen  for  four  years.  The  Se- 
nators for  fix  years.  Where  is  our  remedy  for  the  moflt 
flagrant  abufes  ?  It  is  thought  that  North-Carolina  is  to 
have  an  opportunity  of  ehufing  one-third  of  their  fenato--* 
rial  Members,  and  all  their  Representatives,  once  in  two- 
years.  This  would  be  the  cafe  as  to  the  Senators,  if  they 
ftould  be  of  the  firft  clafs  :  but  at  any  rate,  it  is  to  be  af- 
ter fix  years.  But  if  they  deviate  from  their  duty,  they 
cannot  be  excluded  and  changed  the  firft  year,  as  the  Mem- 
bers of  Congrefs  can  now  by  the  Confederation.  How 
can  it  be  faid  to  be  fafe  to  truft  fo  much  power  in  the  hands 
of  fuchmen,  who  are  not  refponfible  or  amenable  for  mif- 
conduct  ? 

As  it  has  been  the  policy'  of  every  flate  in  the  union 
to  guard  elections,  we  ought  to  be  more  punctual  in  this* 
cafe.  The  Members  of  Congrefs  now  may  be  recalled. 
But  in  this  Constitution  they  cannot  be  recalled.  The 
continuance  of  the  Prefident  and  Senate  is  too  long» 
It  will  be  objected  by  fome  gentlemen,  that  if  they  are 
good,  why  not  continue  them  ?  But  I  would  afk,  how  are 
we  to  find  out  whether  they  be  good  or  bad  I  The  indivi- 
duals who  aflented  to  any  bad  law  are  not  eafily  discrimi- 
nated from  others.  They  will,  if  individually  enquired ' 
of,  deny  that  they  gave  it  their  approbation ;  and  it  is  ire 
their  power  to  conceal  their  tranfactions  as  long  as  they 
pleafe, 

There  is  alfo  the  Prefident's  conditional  negative  on  the 
laws.     After  a  bill  is  prefented  to  him  and  he  difapproves 
of  it,  it  is  to  be  tent  back  to  that  Houfe  where  it  origin- 
~    '  '  "  ~  "  "  ated. 


ated,  for  their  confi deration.     Let  u$  confider  the  effe&l 
of  this  for  a  few  moments.     Suppofe  it  originates  in  thb 
Senate,  and  paffes  there  by  a  large  majority  :    Suppofe  it 
pafles  in  the  Houfe  of  Reprefentatives  unanimoufly — it 
mull  be  tranfmitted  to  the  Prefident.     If  he  objects,  it  is 
fcnt  back  to  the  Senate  •,  if  two-thirds  do  not  agree  to  ife 
in  the  Senate,  what  is  the  confequence  ?  Does  the  Houfe 
of  Reprefentatives  ever   hear   of    it  afterwards?  No,  it 
drops,  becaufe  it  mud  be  palled  by   two   thirds  of  both 
Houfes,  and  as  only  a  majority  of  the  Senate  agreed  to  it 
it  cannot  become  a  law.   This   is  giving   a   power  to  the 
Prefident  to  over- rule  fifteen  Members  of  the  Senate  and 
every  Member  in  the  Houfe  of  Reprefentatives.     Thefe 
are  my  objections.    I  look  upon  it  to  be  unfafe  to  drag  each 
other  from  the  mod  remote  parts  in  the  ftate,  to  the  Su- 
preme Federal  Court,  which  has  appellate  jurifdiction  o£ 
caufes  arifing  under  the  Conftitution,  and  of  controvert! es 
between  citizens  of  different  flates.     I  grant  that  if  it  be 
a  contract  between  a  citizen  of  Virginia  and  a  citizen  of 
North- Carolina,  the  fuit  muft  be  brought  here;  but  may 
they  not  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court,  which  has  cogni- 
zance of  law  and  fact  ?  They  may  be  carried  to  Philadel- 
phia.    They  ought  to  have  limited  the  fum  on  which  ap- 
peal mould  lie.     They  may  appeal  on  a  fuit  for  only  ten 
pounds.     Such  a  trifling  fum  as  this,  would  be  paid  by  a 
man  who  thought  he  did  not  owe  it,  rather  than  go  fuch; 
a  diftance.     It  would  be  prudence  in  him  fo  to  do.     This 
would  be  very  oppreflive. 

I  doubt  my  own  judgment — experience  has  taught  me  tc* 
be  diffident — but  I  hope  to  be  excufed  and  pui  right  if  I 
be  miftaken. 

The  power  of  raifing  armies  is  alfo  very  exceptionable.' 
I  am  not  well  acquainted  with  the  government  of  other* 
countries,  J>ut  a  man  of  any  information  knows  that  the 
King  of  Great-Britain  cannot  raife  and  fupport  armies-1 
He  may  call  for  and  raife  men,  but  he  has  no  money  to> 
fupport  them.  But  Congrefs  is  to  have  power  to  raife  and 
fupport  armies.  Forty  thoufand  men  from  North-Caroli- 
na could  not  be  refufed  without  violating  the  Conftitution. 
1  wife  amendments  to  thefe  parts.  I  agree  it  is  not  our 
bufinefs  to  enquire  whether  the  continent  be  invaded  or 
Hot.    The  General  Legiilature  ought  to  fuperintend  the 

H  h  riutf 


{     *4*     > 

fare  of  this.  Treaties  are  to  be  the  fupreme  law  of  th£ 
land.  This  has  been  fufriciently  difcufled — it  muft  be 
amended  fome  way  or  the  other.  If  the  ConftitutiOn  be 
adopted,  it  ought  to  be  the  fupreme  law  of  the  land,  and 
a  perpetual  rule  for  the  governors  and  governed.  But  if 
treaties  are  to  be  the  fupreme  law  of  the  land,  it  may  re- 
peal the  laws  of  different  ftates,  and  render  nugatory  our 
bill  of  rights.  As  to  a  religious  teft,  had  the  article  which 
excludes  it,  provided  that  none  (hould  be  required,  but 
what  had  been  required  in  the  ftates  heretofore,  I  would 
not  have  objected  to  it.  It  would  fecure  religion.  Reli- 
gious liberty  ought  to  be  provided  for.  I  acquiefce  with 
the  gentleman  who  fpoke  on  this  point  my  fentiments  bet- 
ter than  I  could  have  done  myfelf.  For  my  patt,  in  re- 
viewing the  qualifications  neceflary  for  a  Prefident,  I  did 
not  fuppofe  that  the  Pope  could  occupy  the  Prcfident's 
chair.  But  let  us  remember  that  we  form  a  government 
for  millions  not  yet  in  exiftence.  I  have  not  the  art  of 
divination.  In  the  courfe  of  four  or  five  hundred  years^ 
I  do  not  know  how  it  will  work.  This  is  mod  certain, 
that  Papifts  may  oecupy  that  chair,  and  Mahometans  may 
take  it.  I  fee  nothing  againft  it.  There  is  a  difqualifica- 
tion  I  believe  in  every  flate  in  the  union — it  ought  to  be 
fo  in  this  fyftem.  It  is  faid  that  all  power  Hot  given 
is  retained.  I  find  they  thought  proper  to  infert  nega- 
tive cl a ufes  in  the  Conflitution,  retraining  the  general 
government  from  the  exercife  of  certain  powers.  Thefe 
were  unneceffary  if  the  doctrine  be  true,  that  every  thing 
not  given  is  retained.  From  the  infertion  of  thefe  we 
may  conclude  the  do£lrine  to  be  fallacious.  Mr.  Lancafter 
then  obferved,  that  he  would  difapprove  of  the  Conflitu- 
tion as  it  then  flood.  His  own  feelings  and  his  duty  to 
his  conftituents  induced  him  to  do  fo.  Some  people,  he 
faid,  thought  a  Delegate  might  a£l  independently  of  the 
people.  He  thought  otherwise,  and  that  every  Delegate 
•was  bound  by  their  inflruclions,  and  if  he  did  any  thing  re- 
pugnant to  their  wifhes  he  betrayed  his  truft.  He  thought 
xiimfelf  bound  by  the  voice  of  the  people,  whatever  other 
gentlemen  might  think,  He  would  cheerfully  agree  to 
adopt  if  he  thought  it  would  be  of  general  utility,  but  as  he 
thought  it  would  have  a  contrary  ertecl:,and  as  he  believed 
a  great  majority  of  the  people  were  againit  it,  he  w«uhi 
•ppofe  \i%  adoption.       *     *  Mr. 


(     143     ) 

Mr.  Willie  Jones  Was  againft  ratifying  in  the  manne* 
propofed.  He  had  attended,  he  faid,  with  great  patience? 
to  the  debates  of  the  fpeakers  on  both  fides  of  the  queftion.. 
One  party  faid  the  Conftitution  was  all  perfection.  The 
other  party  faid  it  wanted  a  great  deal  of  perfeetien.  For 
his  part,  he  thought  fo.  He  treated  the  dangers  which 
were  held  forth  in  cafe  of  non  adoption,  as  merely  ide- 
al and  fanciful.  After  adding  other  remarks,  he  mo- 
ved that  the  previous  queftion  might  be  put,  with  an  in* 
tention,  as  he  faid,  if  that  was  carried,  to  introduce  a  re- 
solution which  he  had  in  his  hand,  and  which  he  was  then 
willing  to  read  if  gentlemen  thought  proper,  ftipulating 
for  certain  amendments  to  be  made  previous  to  the  adop- 
tion  by  this  ftate. 

Governor  John/Ion  begged  gentlemen  to  recollect,  that 
the  propofed  amendments  could  not  be  laid  before  the? 
other  ftrttes  unlefs  we  adopted  and  became  part  of  the  union, 

Mr.  Taylor  wifhed  that  the  previous  queftion  might;  be, 
put  as  it  would  fave  much  time.  He  feared  the  motU 
on  firft  made  was  a  manoeuvre  or  contrivance  to  impofe  a 
Conftitution  on  the  people,  which  a  majority  difaproved  of, 

Mr.  Iredell  wifhed  the  previous  queftion  fhould  be  with-*, 
drawn,  and  that  they  might  debate  the  firft  queition.  The 
great  importance  of  the  fubjecl:,  and  the  refpeciability  of* 
the  gentleman  who  made  the  motion,  claimed  more  defe- 
rence and  attention  than  to  decide  it  in  the  very  moment 
it  was  introduced  by  getting  rid  of  it  by  the  previous  ques- 
tion. A  decifion  was  now  prefented  in  a  new  form  by  a, 
gentleman  of  great  influence  in  the  Houfe,  and  gentle- 
men ought  to  have  time  to  confi.der  before  they  voted  pre- 
cipitately upon  it. 

A  defultory  converfation  now  arofe.  Mr.  J.  Galloway 
winded  the  queftion  to  be  poftponed  till  to-morrow  morn- 
ing. 

Mr.  J.  MKDowall  was  for  immediately  putting  the 
queftion. — Several  gentlemen  expatiated  on  the  evident  ne- 
ceflity  of  amendments. 

Governor  Johnfton  declared,  that  he  difdained  all  ma- 
noeuvres and  contrivance ;  that  an  intention  of  impofing 
an  improper  fyftem  on  the  people,  contrary  to  their  wifh- 
es>  was  unworthy  of  any  man.  He  wifhed  the  motion  ta 
fce  fairly  and  fully  argued  and  inveftigated.     He  obferved 

that 


(     *44     ) 

that  the  very  motion  before  them  propofed  amendments  t* 
be  made.  That  they  were  propofed  as  they  had  been  in 
ether  dates.  He  wi(hed  therefore  that  the  motion  for  th$ 
previous  queftion  fhould  be  withdrawn. 

Mr.  Willie  Jones  could  not  withdraw  his  motion.  Gen- 
tlemens  arguments,  he  faid,  had  been  liftened  to  attentive- 
Sy^  but  he  believed  no  perfon  had  changed  his  opiniafti.  It 
Tvas  unneceifaryj:hen  to  argue  it  again.  His  motion  was 
not  conclufive.  He  only  wimed  to  know  what  ground  they 
itood  on,  whether  they  mould  ratify  it  unconditionally  or 

JlOt. 

Mr.  Spencer  wiftied  to  hear  the  arguments  and  reafons 
for  and  againft  the  motion.  Although  he  was  convinced 
the  Houfe  wanted  amendments,  and  that  all  had  near- 
ly determined  the  queftion  in  their  own  minds,  he  was 
for  hearing  the  queftion  argued,  and  had  no  objection  to 
the  poftponemerit  of  it  till  to-morrow. 

Mr.  Iredell  urged  the  great  importance  of  confederation. 
That  the  confequence  of  the  previous  queftion,  if  carried, 
would  be  an  exclufion  of  this  ftate  out  of  the  union.  He 
contended  that  the  Houfe  had  no  right  to  make  a  conditi- 
onal ratification,  and  if  excluded  from  the  union,  they 
could  not  be  affured  of  an  eafy  admiflion  at  a  future  day, 
though  the  impoffibility  of  exifting  out  of  the  union  muft 
be  obvious  to  every  thinking  man.  The  gentleman  from 
Halifax  had  faid,  that  his  motion  would  not  be  conclufive. 
For  his  part,  he  was  certain  it  would  be  tantamount  to  an 
immediate  decifion.  He  trufted  gentlemen  would  confi- 
«der  the  propriety  of  debating  the  firft  motion  at  large. 

Mr.  Perfon  obferved,  that  the  previous  queftion  would 
produte  no  inconvenience.  The  other  party,  he  faid,  had 
all  the  debating  to  themfelves,  and  would  probably  have  it 
again,  if  they  infilled  on  further  argument.  He  faw  no 
propriety  in  putting  it  off  till  to-morrow,  as  it  was  not 
cuftomary  for  a  committee  to  adjourn  with  two  queftrons 
before  them. 

Mr.  Shepherd  declared,  that  though  he  had  made  up  his 
mind,  and  believed  other  gentlemen  had  done  fo,  yet  he 
had  no  objection  to  giving  gentlemen  an  opportunity  of 
fdifplaying  their  abilities,  and  convincing  the  reft  of  their 
error  if  they  could.  He  was  for  putting  it  off  till  to- 
morrow, 

m 


(    M5    ) 

Mr.  Dank  took  notice  that  the  gentleman  from  Grftle 
yille  had  frequently  ufed  ungenerous  infinuations,and  had 
taken  much  pains  out  of  doors  to  irritate  the  minds  of  hi& 
countrymen  againft  the  Conftitution.  He  callled  upon 
gentlemen  to  act  openly  and  above  board,  adding  that  a, 
contrary  conduct  on  this  occafion,  was  extremely  defpica- 
ble.  He  came  thither,  he  faid,  for  the  common  caufe  of 
his  country,  and  knew  no  party,  but  wjfhed  the  bufinefs 
to  be  conducted  with  candour  and  moderation;.  The  pre- 
vious queftion  he  thought  irregular,  and  that  it  ought  not 
to  be  put  till  the  other  queftion  was  called  for*  That  it 
was  evidently  intended  to  preclude  all  further  debate,  and, 
to  precipitate  the  committee  upon  the  refolution  which  it 
had  been  fuggefted  was  immediately  to  follow,  which  they 
were  not  then  ready  to  enter  upon.  That  he  had  not  ful- 
ly confidered  the  eonfequences of  a  conditional  ratification, 
but  at  prefent  they  appeared  to  him  alarmingly  dangerous* 
and  perhaps  equal  to  thofe  of  an  abfolute  rejection. 

Mr.  Willie  Jonec  obferved,  that  he  had  not  intended  to 
take  the  Houfe  by  furprife  :  That  though  he  had  his  moti- 
on ready,  and  had  heard  of  the  motion  which  was  in- 
tended for  ratification,  he  waited  till  that  motion  mould  be 
made,  and  had  afterwards  waited  for  fome  time,  in  ex- 
pectation that  the  gentleman  from  Halifax,  and  the  gen- 
tleman from  Edenton,  would  both  fpeak  to  it.  He  had  no. 
objection  to  adjourning,  but  his  motion  would  be  ftill  be- 
fore the  Houfe. 

Here  there  was  a  great  cry  for  the  queftion. 

Mr.  Iredell,  [The  cry  for  the  queftion  ftili  continuing^ 
Mr.  Chairman,  I  defire  to  be  heard,  notwithstanding  the  cry 
of  U.  the  queftion,  the  queftion."  Gentlemen  have  no  right; 
to  prevent  any  Member  from  fpeaking  to  it  if  he  thinks  fit 
{The  Houfe  fubfided  into  order.]     Unimportant  as  I  rr/ 
be  myfelf,  my  conftituents  are  as  refpectable  as  thofe 
any  Member  in  the  Houfe.     It  has  indeed,  Sir,  been  my 
misfortune  to  be  under  the  neceffity  of  troubling  the  Houfe 
much  oftener  than  I  wifhed,  owing  to  a  circumftance  which 
J  have  greatly  regretted,  that  fo  few  gentlemen  take  a  {hare 
in  our  debates,  though  many  are  capable  of  doing  fo  with 
propriety.     I  fhould  have  fpoken  to  the  queftion  at  large 
before,  if  I  had  not  fully  depended  on  fome  other  gentle- 
J$an  doing  it,  and  therefore  I  did  not  prepare  myfelf  bj. 


(     *4*    ) 

taking  notes  of  what  was  faid.  However,  I  beg  leave  now 
to  make  a  few  observations.  I  think  this  Constitution  fafe, 
1  have  not  heard  a  fingle  objection  which  in  my  opinion 
{hewed  that  it  was  dangerous-  Some  particular  parts  have 
been  objected  to,  and  amendments  pointed  out.  Though 
I  think  ife  perfectly  fafe,  yet  with  refpecl:  to  any  amend- 
ments which  do  not  deftroy  the  fubftarice  of  the  Confti- 
tution,  but  will  tend  to  give  greater  fatisfaction,  I  fhould 
approve  of  them,  beeaufe  I  {hould  prefer  that  fyftem 
which  would  mod  tend  to  conciliate  all  parties.  On  thefe 
principles  I  am  of  opinion,  that  fome  amendments  (howld 
be  propofed. 

The  general  ground  of  the  objections  feems  to  be,  that 
the  powers  propofed  to  the  general  government,  may  be 
abufed.  If  we  give  no  power  but  fuch  as  may  not  be 
abufed,  we  (hall  give  none4,  for  all  delegated  powers  may 
be  abufed.  There  are  two  extremes  equally  dangerous  to 
liberty.  Thefe  are  tyranny  and  anarchy.  The  medium  be- 
tween thefe  two  is  the  true  government  to  protect  the  peo- 
ple. In  my  opinion,  this  Constitution  is  well  calculated 
to  guard  againft  both  thefe  extremes.  The  poftibility  of 
genera!  abufes  ought  not  to  be  urged,  but  particular  ones 
pointed  oat.  A  gentleman  who  fpoke  fome  time  ago  [Mr. 
Lenoir]  obferved  that  the  government  might  make  it 
treafon  to  write  againft  the  moft  arbitrary  proceedings. 
He  corrected  himfelf  afterwards,  by  faying  he  meant 
tnifprijion  of  treafon.  But  in  the  correction  he  committed 
as  great  a  miftake  as  he  did  at  firft.  Where  is  the  power 
given  to  them  to  do  this  ?  They  have  power  to  define  and 
punim  piracies  and  felonies  committed  on  the  high  feas, 
mnd  offences  againft  the  law  of  nations.  They  have  no 
tower  to  define  any  other  crime  whatever.  This  will 
W  how  apt  gentlemen  are  to  commit  miftakes.  I  am 
convinced  on  the  part  of  the  worthy  Member,  it  was  not 
de%ned,  but  arofe  merely  from  inattention. 

Mr.  Lenoir  arofe  and  declared,  that  he  meant  that  thofe 
punifhments  might  be  inflicted  by  them  within  the  ten 
miles  fquare,  where  they  would  have  exclufive  powers 
pf  legislation. 

Mr.  Iredell  continued — They  are  to  have  exclufive  pow- 
er of  legiflation ;  but  how  ?  Wherever  they  may  have  this 
diftrjcl,  they  mult  pofiefs  it  from  the  authority  of  the 

itete 


(    *47    5 

ftate  within  which  it  lies :  And  that  ftate  may  ftipulate  thfc 
conditions  of  the  cefiion.     Will  not  fuch  ftate  take  car© 
of  the  liberties  of  its  own  people.     What  would  be  the 
coniequence  if  the  feat  of  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  with  all  the  archives  of  America,  was  in  the  power 
of  any  one  particular  ftate  ?  Would  not  this  be  moft  un- 
fafe  and  humiliating  ?  Do  we  not  all  remember  that  in  the 
year  1783^  a  band  of  foldiers  went  and  infulted  Congrefs  ? 
The  fovereignty  of  the  United  States  was  treated  with  in- 
dignity.    They  applied  for  protection  to  the  ftate  they  re- 
fided  in,  but  could  obtain  none.     It  is  to  be  hoped  fuch  a 
difgraceful  fcene  will  never  happen  again,  but  that  for  the 
future  the  national  government  will  be  able  to  protect  it- 
felf.     The  powers  of  the  government  are  particularly  enu- 
merated and  defined:  they  can  claim  no  others  but  fuch. 
as  are  fo  enumerated.     In  my  opinion  they  are  excluded 
as  much  from  the  exercife  of  any  other  authority  as  they 
could  be  by  the  ftrongeft  negative  claufe  that  could  be 
framed.     A  gentleman  has  alked,  what  would  be  the  con- 
fequence  if  they  had  the  power  of  the  purfe  and  fword  ? 
I  afk,  in  what  government  under  Heaven  are  thefe  not  giv- 
en up  to  fome  authority  or  other  ?  There  is  a  neceffity  o£ 
giving  "both  the  purfe  and  the  fword  to  every  government  * 
or  elfe  it  cannot  protect  the  people.     But  have  we  not  fuf- 
ficient  fecurity  that  thofe  powers  (hall  notbeabufed  ?  The 
immediate  power  of  the  purfe  is  in  the  immediate  Repre- 
fentatives  of  the  people,  chofen  every  two  years,  who  can 
lay  no  tax  on  their  conftituents  but  what  they  ars  fubjecfc 
to  at  the  fame  time  themfelves.     The  power  of  taxation 
muft  be  veiled  fomewhere.  Do  the  committee  wifh  it  to  b*> 
as  it  has  been  ?  Then  they  muft  fuffer  the  evils  which  they 
have  done.     Requifitions  will  be  of  no  avail.     No  money 
Will  be  collected  but  by  means  of  military  force.     Under 
the  new  government  taxes  will  probably  be  much  lighter 
than  they  can  be  under  our  prefent  one.     The  impoft  will 
afford  vaft  advantages,  and  greatly  relieve  the  people  from 
direct  taxation.     In  time  of  peace  it  is  fuppofed  by  ma-* 
iiy  the  impofts  may  be  alone  fufficient :  But  in  time  of 
war,  it  cannot  be  expected  they  will.     Our  expences  would 
be  much  greater,  and  our  ports  might  be   blocked  up  by 
the  enemy's  fleet.     Think  then  of  the  advantage  of  a  na« 
iional  government  jJSfieffeil  of  energy  and  credit.     Could 

government 


(     24«    ) 

government  borrow  money  to  any  advantage  without  the 
power  of  taxation  ?  If  they  could  fecure  funds,  and  want- 
ed immediately  for  inllance  ioo,©ooL  thsy  might  borrow 
this  fum,  and  immediately  raife  only  money  to  pay  the  in- 
tereft  of  it.     If  they  could  not,  the  100,000 1.  muft  be 
anftantly  raifed  however  diftreffing  to  the  people,  or  our 
country  perhaps  over-run  by  the  enemy.     Do  not  gentle- 
men fee  an  immenfe  difference  between  the  two  cafes  ?  It 
is  faid  that  there  ought  to  be  jealoufy  in  mankind.     I  ad- 
mit it  as  far  as  is  confiftent  with  prudence.     But  unlimited 
jealoufy  is  very  pernicious.     We  muft  be  contented  if  pow- 
ers be  as  well  guarded  as  the  nature  of  them  will  permit; 
In  regard  to  amending  before  of  after  adoption,  the  diffe- 
rence is  very  great.     I  beg  leave  to  ftate  my  idea  of  that 
difference.     I  mentioned  one  day  before,  the  adoption  by 
ten  flares.     When  I  did  fo,  it  was  not  to  influence  any  per* 
fon  with  refpeel:  to  the  merits  of  the  Conftitution,  but  as 
a  reafon  for  coolnefs  and  deliberation.     In  my  opinion, 
when  fo  great  a  majority  of  the  American  people  have 
adopted  it,  it  is  a  ftrong  evidence  in  itg  favour  :  For  it  is 
not  probable  that  ten  dates  would  have,  agreed  to  a  bad 
Conftitution.     If  we  do  not  adopt,  we  are   no  longer  in 
the  union  with  the   other  flates.     We  ought  to  confider 
ferioufly  before  we  determine  our  connection  with  Jthenn 
The  fafety  and  happinefs  of  this  ft.atc  depend  upon  it. 
Without  that  union  what  would  have  been  our  condition' 
iiow?  A  finking  iriftance  will  point  out  this  very  clearly:  At 
the  beginning  of  the  late  war  with  Great-Britain,  the  Par- 
liament thought  proper  to  flop  all  commercial  intercourfe 
with  die  American  provinces.     They  paffed  a  general  pro- 
hibitory a£t,  from  which  New- York  and  North-Carolina 
were  at  firft  excepted.     Why  were  they  excepted  ?  They 
Iiad  been  as  active  in  oppofition  as  the  other  ftates ;  but 
this  was  an  expedient  to  divide  the  northern  from  the 
middle  ftates,  and  to  break  the  heart  of  the   fouthern. 
Had  New- York  and  North-Carolina  been  weak  enough  to 
fall  into  this  fnare,  we  probably  mould  not  now  have  been 
an  independent  people.     [Mr.  Per/on  called  to  order,  and 
intimated  that  the  gentleman  meant  to  refletl:  on  the  op-* 
pofers  of  the  Conftitution,  as  if  they  were  friendly  to  the 
Britiih  intereft.     Mr.  Iredell  warmly  refented  the  interrup- 
tion, declaring  he  was  perfectly  in  order,  that  it  was  di£- 

orderfy 


(     *49    ) 

orderly  to  interrupt  him,  and  in  refpecl:  to  Mr.  Pfrfortb  ia- 
finuation  as  to  his  intention,  he  declared  in  the  mod  fo- 
lemn  manner  he  had  no  fuch,  being  weil  aflured  the  op- 
pofers  of  the  Condituti'on  were  equally  friendly  to  the  in- 
dependence of  America,  as  its  fupporters..  He  then  pro- 
ceeded.] I  fay,  they  endeavoured  to  divide  us.  North- 
Carolina  and  New-York  had  too  much  fenfe  to  be  taken 
in  by  their. artifices  Union  enabled  us  then  to  defeat  all 
their  endeavours  :  tTnion  will  enable  us  to  defeat  all  the 
machinations  of  our  enemies  hereafter.  The  friends  of 
their  country  mud  lament  our  prefent  unhappy  divifions. 
Mod  free  countries  have  loft  their  liberties,  by  means  of 
diflentions, among  themfelves.  They  united  in  war  and 
danger:  When  peace  and  apparent  fecurity  came,  they 
fplit  into  factions  and  parties,  and  thereby  became  a  prey 
to  foreign  iavaders.  4  This  fhews  the  neceflity  of  union* 
In  urging, the  danger  of  difunipn  fo  drongly,  I  beg  leave 
again  to  fay,  that  I  mean  not  to  reflecl:  on  any. gentleman 
Miatfoever*  as  if  his  wifjies  were  directed  to.  fo  wicked  a 
purpofe.  I  am  fure  fifch  an  infinuation  as, the  gentleman 
from  Granville  fuppofed  I  intended,  would"  be  utterly  un- 
j.uft,  as  I  know  fom'e  of  the  warm  eft  oppofers  of  Great- 
Britain,  are  now  among  the  warmed  opponents  of  the  pro- 
pofed  Conditution.;  Such  afuggettion  never  Entered  into 
my  head,  and  I  can  fay  with  truth,-  that  warmly  as  I  arVi 
attached  to  this  Constitution,  and  though  I  am  convinced 
that  the  falvaticn  of  our  country  depends  upon  the  adop- 
tion of  it,  I  would  not  procure  it  fuocefs  by.  one  unworthy 
action  or  one  ungenerous  word.  A  gentleman  has  faiA 
ifhat  we  ought  to  determine  in  the  fame  manner  as  if  no' 
date  had  adopted  the  Conditution.  The  general  princi- 
ple is  right,  but  we  ought  toconfider  ,our  peculiar  fituati- 
«*n'.  We  cannot  exift  by  ourfelves.  If  we  imitate  the  ex- 
amples of  fome  refpe&able  dates  that  have  propofecl 
amendments  fubfequent  to  their  ratification,  we  (hall  add 
our  weight  to  have  thefe  amendments  carried,  as  our  Re-* 
prefentatives  wiil  be  in  Congrefs  to  enforce  them.  Gen* 
tlemen  entertain  a  jealoufy  of  the.eadern  dates.  To  with- 
draw ourfelves  from  the  fouthern  dates,  will  be  «n~ 
creafing  the  northern  influence.  The  lofs  of  one.  date 
may  be  attended  with  particular  prejudice.  It  will  be  a 
good  while' before  amendments  of  any  kind  can  take  pla<*<?, 

t  i  antf 


(   *8*   ) 

and  in  the  mean  time  if  we  do  not  adopt  we  mall  nave'  rid 
fhare  or  agency  in  their  trarifi£Uons,  though  we  may  be  ul- 
timately bound  by  thera.  The  firft  feflion  of  Congrefs  will 
probably  be  the  moll  important  of  any  for  many  years.  A 
general  code  of  laws  will  then  be  eftabliflied  in  execution 
of  every  power  contained  in  the  Conftitution.  If  we  ra- 
tify arid  propofe  amendments,  our  Reprefentatives  will  be 
there  to  ad  in  this  important  bufinefs.  If  we  do  not  our 
intereft  rriay  fuffer,  nor  will  the  fyftem  be  afterwards 
altered  merely  to  accommodate  our  wifhes.  Bcfides  that* 
one  Houfe  mdy  prevent  a  meafure  from  taking  place,  but 
both  muft  concur  in  repealing  it.  I  therefore  think  an 
adoption  propofing  fubfequent  amendments,  far  fafer  and 
more  defireable  than  the  other  rribde.  Nor  do  I  doubt  that 
every  amendment,  not  of  a  local  nature,  nor  injuring  ef- 
feritially  the  material  powers  of  the  Conftitution,  but  prin- 
cipally calculated  to  guard  againft  mifconftru&ion,  the  real 
liberties  ©f  the  people*  will  be  readily  obtained. 

The  previous  queftion,  after  fome  defultory  converfati* 
on,  was  now  put.  For  it  183.  Againft  it  84.^  Majority 
in  favour  of  the  motion  99. 

Mr.  Prefiderit  now  refumed  thQ  chair,  and  Mr.  Kenan 
reported,  that  the  committee  had  come  to  fome  reiolutions 
on  the  fubjedT:  referred  to  their  confideration,  but  not  hav* 
ing  time  to  reduce  them  to  form,  defired  leave  to  fit  again. 

Refolvedy  That  the  committee  have  leave  to  fit  again  to* 
morrow.  » 

The  Convention  then  adjourned  until  to-morrow  morn- 
ing nine  o'clock. 


THURSDAY,   July   3t,    1788. 

The  Convention  met  according  to  adjournment,  and  re* 
folved  itfelf,  according  to, the  order  of  the  day,  into  a  com* 
mittee  of  the  whole  Convention. — Mr.  Kenan  in  the  chair,. 

Governor  Johijlon — Mr.  Chairman,  It  appears  to  me, 
that  if  the  motion  made  yefterday  by  the  gentleman  from 
Halifax,  be  adopted,  it  will  not  anfwer  the  intention  of  the 
people.  It  determines  nothing  with  refpeft  to  the  Confti- 
tution. We  were  fent  here  to  determine  upon  it.  [Here 
his  Excellency  read  the  refolution  of  the  AfTembty  under 
trhich  the  Convention  met.}  If  we  do  got  decide  upoo 
*  the 


(   m   \ 

fhe  Conftitution,  we  fhall  have  nothing  to  report  to  Con.- 
grefs.  We  (hall  be  entirely  out  of  the  union,  and  (land 
by  ourfelves.  I  wifti  gentlemen  would  paufe  a  moment 
before  they  decide  fo,  awful  a  queftion.  To  whom  are  we 
to  refer  thefe  amendments  which  are  to  be  propofed  as  the 
condition  of  our  adoption  I  The  prefent  Congrefs  have 
nothing  to  do  with  them.  Their  authority  extends  only 
to  introduce  the  new  government,  not  to  receive  any  pro- 
pofition  of  amendments.  Shall -we  prefent  them  to  the 
new  Congrefs  ?  In,  what  manner  can  that  be  done  ?  We 
(hall  have  no  Reprefentatives  to  introduce  them.  We  may 
indeed  appoint  AmpafTadors  to  the  United  States  of  Amei 
"rica  to  reprefent  what  fcruples  North-Carolina  has  in  re- 
gard to  their  Conftitution.  I  know  no  other  way.  A 
number  of  ftates  have  propofed  amendments  to  the  Con- 
ftitution, and  ratified  in  the  mean  time.  .  Thefe  will  have 
great  weight  and  influence  in  Congrefs,  and  may  prevail 
in  getting  material  amendments  propofed.  We  (hall  Ixave 
no  (hare  in  voting  upon  any  of  thefe  amendments,  for  in 
my  humble  opinion,  we  (hall  be  entirely  out  of  the  union, 
smd  can  be  confidered  only  as  a  fareign^poweF.  '  It  is  true 
the  United  States  may  admit  us  hereafter.  But  they  may 
admit  us  on  terms  unequal  and  difadvantageous  to  us.  In 
the  meantime  many  of  their  laws,  by  which  we  (hall  be 
hereafter- bound,  may  be  particularly  injurious  to  the  in- 
terefts  of  this  ftate,  as  we  {ball  have  no  {hare  in  their  for- 
mation. Gentlemen  fay,  they  will  not  be  influenced  by 
what  others  have  done.  I  mud  confefs  that  the  examples 
pf  great  and  good  men,  and  wife  ftates,  has  great  weight 
with  me.  \t  is  faid  there  is  a  probability  that  New- York 
will  not  adopt  this  Conftitution.  Perhaps  fhe  may  not. — - 
But  it  is  generally  fuppofed,  that  the  principal  reafon  of 
her  oppofing  it,  arifes  from  a  feln*  fh  motive.  She  has  it 
now  in  her  power  to  tax  indirectly  two  contiguous  ftates. 
Connecticut  and  New-Jerfey  contribute  to  pay  a  great  part 
of  the  taxes  of  that  ftate,  by  confuming,  large  quantities 
pf  goods,  the  duties  of  which  are  now  levied  for  the  bene- 
fit of  New- York  only.  A  fimilar  policy  may  induce  the 
United  States  to  lay  reftri&ions  on  us  if  we  are  out  of 
the  union.  Thefe  confiderations  ought  to  have  great 
weight  with  us.  We  can  derive  very  little  affiftance  from 
any  thing  N[ew-York  will  do  on  our  behalf.    Her  views 

are 


(      =52      ) 

are  diametrically  oppofite  to  curs.  That  ftate  wan.ts  all 
hex  impofts  for  her  own  exclufive  fupport.  It  is  our  in- 
tereft  that  all  imports  mould  go  into  the  general  treafury. 
Should  Congrefs  receive  our  cbmmiifioners,  it  will  be  a 
confiderable  time  before  this  bufinefs  will  be  decided  om 
It  will  be  fome  time  after  Congrefs  meets,  before  a  Con- 
vention is  appointed,  and  fome  time  will  elapfe  before  the 
Convention  meets.  '  What  they  will  do  will  be  tranfmit- 
ted  to  each  of  the  ftates,  arid  then  a  Convention  or  the 
Legiflature  in  each  ftate  will  have  to  ratify  it  ultimately.—; 
This  will  probably  take  up  eighteen  months  or  two  years. 
In  the  mean  time  the  national  government  i^  going  on. — ■ 
Congrefs  will  appoint  all  the  great  officers,  and  will  pro- 
ceed to  make  laws  and  form  regulations  for' the  future  go- 
vernment of  the  United  States.  This  ftate  during  all  that 
time  will  have  no  fhare  in  their  proceedings  or  any  nega- 
tive on  any  bufinefs  before  them.  '  Another  inconvenience 
which  will  arife,  is  this-— we  (hall  be  deprived  of  the  benefit 
of  the  impoft,which  under  the  hew  government  is  an  addi- 
tional fund ;  all  the  dates  having  a  common  right  to  it.— 
By  being  in  the  union  we  fhould  have  a  right  to  our  pro- 
portionate fhare  of  all  duties  and  impofts"  collected  in  all 
the  ftates.  But  by  adopting  this  refolution,  we  fhall  Iofc 
the  benefit  of  this  ;  which  is  an  objecY  worthy  of  attenti- 
on. Upon  the  whole  I  can  fee  no  pofiible  good  that  will 
xefult  to  this  ftate  from  following  the  refolution  before  m. 
I  have  not  the  vanity  to  think  that  any  reafons  I  offer  will 
have  any  weight.  But  I  came  from  a  refpe&able  county 
to  give  my  reafons1  for  or  again  ft  the  Conftitution.  They 
expect  them  from  me,  and  to  fupprefs  them  would  be  a 
violation  of  my  duty.' 

Mr.  Willie  Jones— Nix.  Chairman,  The  gentleman  laft 
tip  has  mentioned  the  refolution  of  Congrefs  now  lying 
before  us,  and  the  act  of  AlTembly  under  which  we  met 
here,  which  fays  that  we  mould  deliberate  and  determine 
on  the  Conftitution.  What  is  to  be  inferred  from  that  ? 
Are  we  to  ratify  it  at  all  events  ?  Have  we  not  an  equal 
right  to  reject  ?  We  do  determine  by  neither  rejecting  nor 
adopting.  It  is  objected  we  (hall  be  out  of  the  union.  So 
I  wifh  to  be.  We  are  left  at  liberty  to  come  in  at  any 
time.  It  is  faid  we  (hall  fuffer  a  great  lofs,  for  want  of  a 
lhare  of  the  impoft.     I  have  no  doubt  we  fhall  have  it 

v/he$ 


(*S3     ) 

$Aien  we  come  in,  as  much  as  if  we  adopted  now.  I  have 
a  refolution  in  my  pocket,  which  I  intend  to  introduce  if 
this  refolution  is  carried,  recommending  it  to  the  Legtfla- 
iture  to  lay  an  impoit  for  the  ufe  of  Congrefs  on  goods  im- 
ported into  this  (late,  fimilar  to  that  which  maybe  laid  by 
Congrefs  on  goods '  imported  into  the  adopting  ftates. 
This  fhcws  the  committee  what  is  my  intention,  and  on 
•what  footing  we  are  to  be.  This  being  the  cafe,  I  will 
forfeit  my  life  that  we  fhall  come  in  for  a  {hare.  It  is 
faid  that  all  the  offices  of  Congrefs  will  be  filled,  and  we 
Shall  have  no  mare  in  appointing  the  officers.  This  is  an 
objection  of  very  little  importance.  Gentlemen  need  not 
be  in  fuch  hafte.  If  left  eighteen  months  or  two  years 
without  offices  it  is  no  great  caufe  of  alarm.  The  gentle- 
man further  faid,  that  we  could  fend  no  Reprefentatives, 
but  muft  fend  Ambaftadors  to  Congrefs  as  a  foreign  power. 
I  affert  the  contrary,  and  that  whenever  a  Convention  of  the 
ftates  is  called,  North-Carolina  will  be  called  upon  like  the 
reft.  I  do  not  know  what  thefe  gentlemen  would  defire. 
i  am  very  fenfible  that  there  is  a  great  majority  againft  the 
Conftitution.  If  we  take  the  queftion  as  they  propofe,  they 
know  it  would  be  rejected,  and  bring  on  us  all  the  dread- 
jful  confequences  which  they  feelingly  foretell,  but  which 
can  never  in  the  leaft  alarm  me.  I  have  endeavoured  to 
jail  in  with  their  opinions,  but  could  not.  We  have  a 
light  in  plain  terms  to  re f ufe  it,  if  we  think  proper.  I 
iiave  in  my  proportion  adopted  word  for  word  the  Virgi- 
nia amendments,  with  one  or  two  additional  ones.  We 
run  no  rifk  of  being  excluded  from  the  union  when  we 
think  proper  to  come  in.  Virginia  our  next  neighbour 
will  not  oppofe  our  admiffion.  We  have  a  common  caufe 
with  her.  She  wifhes  the  fame  alterations.  We  are  of 
the  greateft  importance  to  her.  She  wilr  have  great  weight 
in  Congrefs,  and  there  is  no  doubt  but  (he  will  do  every 
thing  (he  can  to  bring  us  into  the  union.  South  Caroli- 
na and  Georgia  are  deeply  interefted  in  our  being  admit- 
ted. The  creek  nation  would  overturn  thefe  two  ftates 
without  our  aid.  They  cannot  exift  without  North-Caro- 
lina. There  is  no  doubt  we  fhall  obtain  our  amendments 
and  come  into  the  union  when  we  pleafe.  Maffachufetts, 
Hew-Hampfhire  and  other  ftates  have  propofed  amend- 
ments.   New-York  will  do  fo  alfo  if  fhe  ratifies.     There 

will 


S  (     *54    ) 

will  be  a  majority  of  the  ftates,  and  the  moft  refpe&abl*^ 
important  and  extenfive  ftates  alfo,  defirous  of  amend- 
ments, and  favourable  to  our  admiflion.  As  great  names, 
have  been  mentioned,  I  beg  beave  to  mention  the  autho- 
rity of  Mr.  Jefferfon,  whofe  great  abilities  and  refpecla-. 
bUity  are  well  known.  "When  the  Convention  fat  in 
Richmond,  in  Virginia,  Mr.  Madifon  received  a  letter 
from  him.  In  that  letter  he  faid  he  wiihed  nine  ftates 
would  adopt  it  •,  not  becaufe  it  deferveo1  ratification,  but, 
to  preferve  the  union.  But  he  wifhed  that  the  other  four 
ftates  would  reject  it,  that  there  might  be  a  certainty  of 
obtaining  amendments.  Congrefs  may  go  on  and  take  no 
notice  of  our  amendments.  But  |  am  confident  they  will 
do  nothing  of  importance  till  a  Convention  be  called.  If 
I  recollect  rightly,  the  Conftitution  may  be  ratified  either 
by  Conventions  or  the  Legiflatures  of  the  ftates.  In  ei- 
ther cafe  it  may  take  up  about  eighteen  months.  For  my 
own  part,  I  would  rather  be  eighteen  years  out  of  the. 
union  than  adopt  it  in  its  prefent  defective  form. 

Governor  Johnjlon  —Mr.  Chairman,  I  with  to  clear  my- 
felf  from  the  imputation  of  the  gentleman  laft  up.  If  any, 
part  of  my  conduct  warrants  his  afperfion,  if  ever  I  hunt-? 
ed  after  offices  or  fought  public  favours  to  promote  private 
intereft — let  the  inftances  be  pointed  out.  If  I  know  my- 
felf — I  never  did.  It  is  eafy  for  any  man  to  throw  out  illi- 
beral and  ungenerous  infinuations.  I  have  no  view  to  offi- 
ces under  this  Conftitution.  My  views  are  much  humbler. 
When  I  fpoke  of  Congrefs  eftablifhing  offices,  I  meant  great 
offices,  the  eftablifhment  of  which  might  affect  the  intereft; 
of  the  ftates  \  and  I  added  that  they  would  proceed  to  make 
laws,  deeply  affecting  us,  without  any  influence  of  our  own. 
As  to  the  appointment  of  the  officers,  it  is  of  no  import- 
ance to  me  who  i§  an  officer,  if  he  be  a  good  man. 

Mr.  Jones  replied,  that  in  every  publication  one  might 
fee  ill  motives  affigned  to  the  oppofers  of  the  Conftitution, 
One  reafon  affigned  for  their  oppofition,  was,  that  they 
feared  the  lojfs  of  their  influence,  and  diminution  of  their 
importance.  He  faid  that  it  was  fair  its  oppofers  ihould 
be  permitted  to  retort,  and  affign  a  reafon  equally  felfi(hf 
for  the  conduct  of  its  friends,.  Expectation  to  office* 
might  influence  them,  as  well  as  the  lofs  of  office  and  in- 
fluence might  bias  the  others.    He  intended  no  allufioa 


(    *55    ) 

to  that  gentleman,  for  whom  he  declared  he  had  the  highcft 
tefpe&. 

Mr.  Spetteer  rdfe  in  fupport  of  the  motion  of  the  gen- 
tleman from  Halifax.  He  premifed,  that  he  wifhed  no 
refolution  to  be  carried  without  the  utmofl  deliberation 
and  candour.  He  thought  the  pfbpofition  was  couched 
5n  fuch  modeft  terms  as  could  not  poflibly  give  offence  to 
the.other  dates.  That  the  amendments  it  propofed  were 
to  be  laid  before  Congrefs,  and  would  probably  be  ad- 
mitted, as  they  were  fimilar  to  thofe  which  were  wifhed 
for  and  propofed  by  feveral  of  the  adopting  ftates.  He 
always  thought  it  more  proper  and  agreeable  to  prudence 
to  propofe  amendments  previous  rather  than  fubfequent 
to  ratification.  He  faid  that  if  two  or  more  perfons  en- 
tered into  a  co-partnerfhip,  and  employed  a  fcrivener  to 
draw  up  the  articles  of  co-partnerfhip  in  a  particular  form, 
and  on  reading  them,  they  found  them  to  be  erroneous* 
it  would  be  thought  very  ftrange  if  any  of  them  fhould 
fay,  «  Sign  it  firft,  and  we  fhall  have  it  altered  hereafter.** 
jf  it  fhould  be  figned  before  alteration,  it  would  be  con- 
(idered  as  an  a£t  of  indifcretion.  As  therefore,  it  was  z 
principle  of  prudence  in  matters  of  private  property,  not 
to  alien  t  to  any  obligation  till  its  errors  were  removed,  he 
thought  the  principle  infinitely  more  necefTary  to  be  at- 
tended to  in  a  matter  which  concerned  fuch  a  number  of 
people,  and  fo  many  millions  yet  unborn.  Gentlemen 
laid  they  fhould  be  out  of  the  union.  He  obferved,  that 
they  were  before  confederated  with  the  other  ftates  by  a 
folemn  compact,  which  was  not  to  be  diflblved  without 
the  confent  of  every  ftate  in  the  union.  North-Carolina 
had  not  afTented  to  its  diflblution.  If  it  was  diffolved  it 
Was  not  their  faults,  but  that  of  the  adopting  ftates.  It 
Was  a  maxim  of  law  that  the  fame  folemnities  were  ne- 
cefTary to  deftroy  which  were  necefTary  to  create  a  deed 
or  contract.  He  was  of  opinion,  that  if  they  fhould  be 
out  of  the  union  by  propofing  previous  amendments,  they 
were  as  much  fo  now.  If  the  adoption  by  nine  ftates  en* 
abled  them  to  exclude  the  other  four  ftates,  he  thought 
North-Carolina  might  then  be  confidered  as  excluded* 
But  he  did  not  think  that  do&rine  well  founded.  On  the 
contrary,  he  thought  each  ftate  might  come  into  the  union 
|rhen  &e  thought  proper.    He  confefied  it  gave  him  fome 

concern 


c  *5<s  y 

Concern,  but  he  looked  on  the  fhort  exclufion  of  eighteei? 
months,  if  it  might  be  called  exclufion,  as  infinitely  lefs 
dangerous  than  an  unconditional  adoption.  He  expected 
the  amendments  would  be  adopted,  and  when  they  were, 
this  ftate  was  ready  to  embrace  it.  No  great  inconveni- 
ence could  refult  from  this.  Mr.  Spencer  made  fomc 
other  remarks,  but  fpoke  too  low  to  be  heard. 

Mr.  Iredell — Mr.  Chairman,  In  my  opinion  this  is  a  ve- 
ry awful  moment.  On  a  right  decifion  of  this  queftiorf 
may  poflibly  depend  the  peace  and  happinefs  of  our  coun- 
try for  ages.  Whatever  be  the  decifion  of  the  Houfe  on' 
this  fubje£t,  it  ought  to  be  well  weighed  before  it  is  given. 
We  ought  to  view  our  fituation  in  all  its;  cOnfequenc- 
cs,  and  determine  with  the  utmoft  Caution  arid  deli- 
beration. It  has  been  fuggefted,  not  only  out  of  doors, 
but  during  the  courfe  of  the  debates,  that  if  we  are 
out  of  the  union,  it  will  be  the  fault  of  other  ftates 
and  not  ours.  It  is  true,  that  by  the  Articles  of  the  Con- 
federation, the  confent  of  each  ftate  was  neceflary  to 
any  alteration.  It  is  alfo  true,  that  the  confent  of  nine 
ftates  renders  this  Conftitution  binding  on  them.  The  un- 
happy confequences  of  that  unfortunate  article  in  this  Con- 
federation, produced  the  necefiity  of  this  article  in  the 
Conftitution.  Every  body  knows,  that  through  the  pecu- 
liar obftinacy  of  Rhode-Iiland  many  great  advantages  were 
loft.  Notwithstanding  her  Weaknefs,  (he  uniformly  op- 
pofed  every  regulation  for  the  benefit  and  honour  of  the 
union  at  large.  The  other  ftates  were  then  driven  to  the 
necefiity  of  providing  for  their  own  fecurity  and  welfare,' 
■without  waiting  for  the  confent  of  that  little  ftate.  The 
Deputies  from  twelve  ftates  unanimoufly  Concurred  iri 
opinion,  that  the  happinefs  of  all  America  ought  not  to 
be  facrificed  to  the  caprice  and  obftinacy  of  fo  inconfide- 
lable  a  part.  It  will  often  happen  in  the  courfe  of  human 
affairs,  that  the  policy  which  is  proper  on  common  occafi- 
ons  fails ;  and  that  laws  which  do  very  well  in  the  regular 
adminiftration  of  a  government,  cannot  ftand  when  every 
thing  is  going  into  confufion.  In  fuch  a  cafe,  the  fafety 
of  the  community  muft  fuperfede  every  other  confideratiorf, 
.  and  every  fubfifting  regulation  which  interferes  with  that 
muft  be  departed  from  rather  than  that  th«  people  (hould 
be  ruined.    The  Convention  therefore,  with  a  degree  9! 

manlinefa 


ffiahlinef*  which  I  admire,  difpenfed  with  an  tinanimoud 
confent  for  the  rirefent  change,  and  at  the  fame  time  pro- 
vided a  permanent  remedy  for  this  evil,  not  barely  by  diC- 
jperifirig  with  the  confent  of  one  member  in  future  altera- 
tions, biit  by  making  the  confent  of  nine  fuflicient  for  the 
whole  if"  the  reft  did  not  agree,  confidcring  that  the  con- 
fent of  fo  large  a  number  ought  in  reafon  to  govern  the 
whole,  and  the  proportion  was  taken  from  the  old  Confe- 
deration, which  iri  the  rnoft  important  cafes  rfquired  the 
confent  of  nine,  arid  in  every  thing  except  the  alteration 
bf  the  Conftittition,  made  that  number  fufficierit.  It  has 
been  objected,  that  the  adoption  of  this  government  would 
be  improper,  becaufe  it  would  interfere  with  the  oath  of 
allegiance  to  the  ftate.  No  oath  of  allegiance  requires  us 
to  facrifice  the  fafety  bf  our  country.  When  the  Britifh 
government  attempted  to  eftablifh  a  tyranny  in  America, 
the  people  did  not  think  their  oath  of  allegiance  bound 
them  to  fubmit  to  it.  I  had  takeri  that  oath  feveral  times 
myfelfj  but  had  no  fcruple  td  oppofe  their  tyrannical  mea- 
fures.  The  great  principle  is,  The  fafety  of  the  /people  is  the 
fuprenie  laid.  Government  was  originally  inttituted  for 
their  welfare,  and  whatever  may  be  its  form,-  this  ought  to 
be  its  object.  This  is  the  fundamental  principle  on  which 
our  government  is  founded.  In  other  countries  they  fup- 
pofe  the  exiftence  of  an  original  compact,  and  infer,  that 
If  the  fovereign  violates  his  part  bf  it,  the  people  have  at 
right  to  refift.  If  he  does  not,  the  government  muft  re- 
main unchanged  unlefs  tke  fovcreigri  confents  to  an  alte- 
ration. In  America,  our  governments  have  been  clearly 
treated  by  the  people  themfelves.  The  fame  authority 
that  created  can  deftroy,  and  the  people  may  undoubtedly 
change  the  government,  not  becaufe  it  is  ill  exercifed,  but 
becaufe  they  conceive  another  form  will  be  more  conducive 
io  their  welfare.  I  have  ftated  the  reafons  for  departing 
from  the  rigid  article  in  the  Confederation  requiring  art 
unanimous  confent.  We  were  compelled  to  do  this  or  fee 
our  country  ruined.  In  the  manner  of  the  difpenfatiort 
the  Convention  however  appear  to  have  acted  with  great 
prudence,  ia  copying  the  example  of  the  Confederation 
in  all  other  particulars  of  the  greateft  moment,  by  autho- 
rifmg  nine  ftate*  to  bind  the  whole.  It  is  fuggefted  indeed, 
that  though  tea  dates  have  adopted  this  new  Constitution, 


(    *s«    ) 

ict  as  they  had  no  right  to  diffolve  the  old  articles  of  doit* 
iederatioii,  thefe  ft  111  fubfift,  and  the  old  union  remains* 
of  which  we  are  a  part.  The  truth  of  that  fuggeftiori 
may  well  be  doubted  on  this  ground.  When  the  princi- 
ples of  a  Conftitution  are  violated,  the  Conftitution  it- 
feif  is  diftblved,  or  may  be  diflblved  at  the  pleafure  of  the 
parties  to  it.  Now,  according  to  the  articles  of  Confede- 
ration, Congrefs  had  authority  to  demand  money  in  a  cer- 
tain proportion  From  the  refpe£Uve  ftates  to  anfwer  the 
Exigencies  of  the  union.  Whatever  requifttiohs  they  made 
for  that  purpofe,  were  conftitiitionally  binding  on  the  ftates. 
The  ftates  had  no  discretion  except  as  to  the  mode  of  raif- 
5ng  the  money.  Perhaps  every  Hate  has  committed  re- 
pealed violations  of  the  demands  of  Congrefs.  I  do  not 
believe  it  was  from  any  difhonourable  intention  in  many  pf 
the  ftates ;  but  whatever  was  the  caufe,  the  facl  is,  fuch 
violations  were  committed.  The  confequence  is,  that  up- 
on the  principle  I  have  mentioned  (and  in  which  1  believe 
til  writers  agree)  the  articles  of  Confederation  are  no 
longer  binding.  It  is  alledged,  that  by  making  the  confent 
of  nine  fufticient  to  form  a  government  for  themfelves,  the 
£rft  nine  may  exclude  the  other  four.  This  is  a  very  ex- 
traordinary allegation^  When  the  new  Conftitution  was 
propofed,  it  was  propofed  to  the  thirteen  ftates  in  the 
union.  It  was  defired,  that  all  mould  agree  if  poflible, 
but  if  that  could  not  be  obtained,  they  took  care  that  nine 
ftates  might  at  leaft  fave  themfelves  froni  deftrtf&ion. 
ISach  undoubtedly  had  a  right  on  the  firft  proposition,  be- 
caufe  it  was  propofed  to  them  allt  The  only  doubt  can  he, 
whethef  they  had  a  right  afterwards.  In  my  opinion* 
when  any  ftate  has  once  rejected  the  Conftitution,  it  can- 
not claim  to  come  in  afterwards  as  a  matter  of  right.  If 
it  does  not  in  plain  terms  reject,  but  refufes  to  accede  for 
the  prefent,  I  think  the  other  ftates  may  regard  this  as  an 
abfolute  rejection,  and  refufe  to  admit  us  afterwards  hut 
at  their  pleafure  and  on  what  terms  they  pleafe.  Gentle- 
men wifn  for  amendments.  On  this  fubjeci;,  though  we 
may  differ  as  to  the  neceflity  Of  amendments,  1  believe 
none  will  deny  the  propriety  of  propofing  fome,  if  only 
for  the  purpofe  of  giving  more  general  fatisfa&ion.  The 
queftion  therUs,  whether  it  is  moft  prudent  for  us  to  come 
into  the  union  immediately  and  propofe  amendments  (as  has 

been 


(     *$9    ) 

$>.£en  done,  In,  the  other  Qiates)  or  to,  propofe  amendment*, 
and  be  out  of  the  union  till  all  thefe  be  agreed  to  by  the 
Other,  ftates.  The  confequences  of  either  refolution  I  beg 
leave  to  date.  By  adopting  we  fha,ll  be  in.  the  union  with 
our  fifter  itatesj,  which  is  the  only  foundation  of  our  prof« 
perity  and  fafcty,  We  fhall  avoid  the.danger.  of  a  fepara- 
tion,  a  danger  of  which  the.  latent  effects  are  unknown. 
$p  far  am  I  convinced  of  the  neceflity  of  the  union,  that 
I  would  give  up  many  things  againft  my  own  opinion  to. 
obtain  it.  If  we  facrifice  it,  by  ajeje£tion  of  the  Confti- 
tution,  or,  a  refufal  to,  adopt  (which  amounts,  I,  think,  npar^ 
l,y  to  the  fame  thing)  the  very  circumdance  of  difunioa 
may  occafion  animohty  between  us  and  the  inhabitants  of 
the  other  ftates,  which  may  be  a  means  of  fevering  us  for- 
ever. We  fhall  lofe  the  benefit  which  njuft  accrue  to  the 
other  dates  from  the  new  government.  Their  trade  wilL 
flourifh:  Goods  will  fell  cheap:  Their  commodities  will 
rife  in  value,  and  their  didrefies  occafioned  by  the  war  will 
gradually  be  removed.  Qurs,  for  want  of  thefe  advanta- 
ges, will  continue.  Another,  very  material  confequenca 
will  refult  from.it:  We  fhall  lofe  our  fhare  of  the  impofta 
^n  all  the  dates,  which  under  this  Conftitution  are  to  go  in-, 
to  the  federal  treafury.  It  is  the  particular  local  intereft 
of  this  date  to  adopt  on  this  account,  more  perhaps  than, 
that  of.  any  other  member,  of  the  union.  At  prefent 
sill  thefe  impofts  go  into  the  refpeclive  treafury  of  each 
date,  anid  we  well  know  our.own  are  of  little  confequence 
compared  to  thofe  of  the  other  dates  in  general.  The 
gentleman  from  Halifax  [Mr.  Jones']  has  offered  an  expe- 
dient to  prevent,  the  lofs  of  our  fhare  of  the  impod.  In 
my  opinion  that  expedient  will  not  anfv/er  the  pwrpofe. 
The  amount  of  duties  on.  poods  imported  into  tjiis  date  it 
very  little,  and  if  thefe  resolutions  are  agreed  to  it  will  ba 
lefs.  I.  afk.  any  gentleman,  whether  the  United  Si:atei 
would  receive  from;  the  duties  of  this  date  fo  much  as 
would  be  our,  proportion,  under  the  Conftitution,  of  the 
duties  on  goods,  imported  in  all  the  dates.  Our  duties 
would  be  no  manner  of  compenfation.  for  fuch  proportion. 
What  would  be  the  lajigvjage  of-  Congrefs  on  our  holding 
forth  fuch  an  offer?  "  1/  you. are  willing  to  enjoy  the  be- 
«c  nefits  of  the  un:on,  you.  mud  be  fubje£i  to  all  the  law$ 
«,l  of  it.    We  wili  make  no  partial  agreement  with  vou  » 

this 


(     2<5o     ) 

This  would  probably  be  their  language.     I  have  no  doubt 
;dl  America  would  wifh  North-Carolina  to  be  a  member  of 
fhe  union.     It  is  of  importance  to  tfyem.     But  we  ought 
to  confider  whether  ten  dates  can  do  longer  without  one, 
or  one  without  ten  ?     On  a  competition^  which  will  give 
Way  ,?  The  adopting  ftates  will  fay,  "  Other  dates  had  ob- 
f  je&ions  as  well  as*  you,  but  rather  than   feparate  they 
€i  agreed  to  come  into  the  union,  truding  to  the  judice 
"  of  the  other  dates  for  the  adoption  of  proper  amend- 
(t  ments  afterwards.     One  mod  refpe&able  date,  Virgi- 
*<  nia,  has  purfuedthis  meafure,  though  apparently  averfe 
f  to  the  fydem  as  it  now  dands.     But  you  have  laid  down 
"  the  condition  on  which  alone  you  will  come  into  the 
*c  union.     We  mud  accede  to  your  particular  propofitions, 
*<  or  be  difunited   from  you  altogether.     Is   it   fit  that 
c<  North-Carolina  (hall  dictate  to  the  whole  union  I  We 
f c  may  be  convinced  by  your  reafon,  but  our  conduct  will 
f  *  certainly  not  be  altered  by  your  refidance-"    I  beg  leave 
Jo  fay,  if   Virginia  thought  it  right  to  adopt  and  propofe 
amendments,  under  the  circumdances  of  the  Conditution 
at  that  time,  furely  it  is  much  more  fo  for  us  in  our  prer 
fent   fituation.     That  date,  as  was  judly  obferved,  is  a 
mod  powerful  and  refpeftable  one.     Had  (he  held  out,  i*; 
would  have  been  a  fubjeel  of  mod  ferious  alarm.     But  ihe 
thought  the  rifk  of  lofing  the  uniqn  altogether  too  dange- 
rous to  be  incurred.     She  did  not  then  know  of  the  rati- 
fication by  New-Hampftiire.     Jf  fhe  thought  it  necefTary 
to  adopt,  when  only  e^ght  dates  had  ratified,  is  it  not 
much  more  neceflary  for  us  after  the  ratification  by  ten  I 
I  do  not  fay  that  we  ought  fervilely  to  imitate  any  example, 
TBut  I  may  fay,  that  the  examples  of  wife  men,  and  intel- 
ligent nations,  are  worthy  of  refpecl ;  and  that  in  general 
we  may  be  much  fafer  in  following  than  in  departing  from 
them.     In  my  opinion,  as  many  of  the  amendments  pror 
pofcH,  are  fimilar  to  amendments  recommended  not  only 
by  Virginia,  but  by  other  dates,  there  is  a  great  probabili- 
ty of  their  being  obtained.     All  the  amendments  propofed 
undoubtedly  will  not  be,  nor  I  think  ought  to  be,  but  fuch 
as  tend  to  fecure  more  effectually  the  liberties  of  the  peo- 
ple, ajzainft  an  abufe  of  the  powers  granted,  in  all  human 
probability,  will  •,  for  in  fuch  amendments  all  the  dates  are 
equally  intereftcd.    The  ptofcbility  of  fuch  amendments. 

being 


(  m  ) 

feeing  obtained  is  extremely  great,  for  though  three  ftates 
ratified  the  Conftitution  unanimoufly,  there  has  been  a 
confideratye  oppofition  in  the  other  dates.    In  New-Hamp- 
ftiire  the  majority  was  fmall.     In  Maflachufetts  there  was 
a  ftrong  oppofition.     In  Connecticut  the  oppofition  was 
aboutv  one  third  j  fo  it  was  in  Pennfylvania.     In  Maryland 
the  minority  was  fmalj,  but  very  refpeclable.     In  Virgi- 
nia they  had  little  more  than  a  bare  majority.     There  was 
a  powerful  minority  in  South-Carolina.     Can  any  man 
pretend  to  fay,  that  thus  circumftanced,  the  ftates  would 
difapprove  of  amendments  calculated  to  give  fatisfactjon  to 
the  people  at  large  ?  There  is  a  very  great  probability,  if 
not  an  abfolute  certainty,  that  amendments  will  be  obtain- 
ed.    The  intereft  of  North-Carolina  would  add  greatly  to 
'  the  fcale  in  their  favour.  If  we  do  not  accede  we  may  injure 
the  ftates  who  wifti  for  amendments,  by  withdrawing  our- 
felves  from  their  afliftance.     "We  are  not  at  any  event  in 
a  condition  to  ftand  alone.     God  forbid  we  mould  be  a 
moment  feparated  from  our  fifter  ftates.     If  we  are,  wc 
ftiali  be  in  great  danger  of  a  feparation  forever.  I  truft  eve- 
ry gentleman  will  paufe  before  he  contributes  to  fo  awful 
an  event.     "We  have  been  happy  in  our  connexion  with  the 
other  ftates.    Our  freedom,  independence,  every  thing  dear 
to  us,  has  been  derived  from  that  union  we  are  now  going 
raftily  to  difiblve.     Jf  we  are  to  be  feparated ;  let  every 
gentleman  well  weigh  the  ground  he  Hands  on  before  he 
votes  for  the  feparation.     Let  him  not  have  to  reproach 
himfelf  hereafter  that  he  vofed  without  due  confideration, 
for  a  meafure  that  proved  the  deftruction  of  his  country. 
Mr.  Iredell  then  obferved,  that  there  were  infinuations 
thrown  out  againft  thofe  who  favoured  the  Conftftution — 
that  they  had  a  view  of  getting  offices  and  emoluments. 
He  faid,  he1,  hoped  no  man  thought  him  fo  wicked,  as  to 
facrifice  the  intereft  of  his  country  to  private  views.     He 
declared  in  the  moft  folemn  manner,  the  infinuation  was 
unjuft  and  ill-founded  as  to  himfelf.     He  believed  it  was 
fo  with  refpe®  to  the  reft.     The  intereft  and  happinefs  of 
his  country  fplely  governed  him  on  that  occafion.     He 
could  appeal  to  fome  Members  in  the  Houfe,  and  particu- 
larly to  thofe  who  knew  him  in  the  lower  part  of  the  coun- 
try, that  his  difpofition  had  never  been  pecuniary,  and  that 
he  had  never  afpired  Jo  offices.    At  the  beginning  of  the 

revolution, 


(      *«*      ) 

^evolution,  he  faid,  he  held  one  of  the  bed  offices  in  the. 
ftate  under  the  crown— an  office  on  which  he  dependent 
for  his  fupport.  His  relations  were  in  Great- Britain  \  yefcv 
though  thus  circufrnftanced,  fo  far  was  he  from  being  in- 
fluenced by  pecuniary  motives,  or  emoluments  of  office, 
that  as  foon  as  his  fixation,  would  admit  of  it,  he  did  not 
hefitate  a  moment  to  join  $ie  oppofijion  to  Qrea^-Britain, 
nor  would  the  richeft  office  in  America  have  tempted  him, 
to  adhere  in  that  unjuft  caufe  to  the  I^nti/h  government.  He. 
apologifed  for  taking  up  the  time  of  the  committee,  but 
he  obferved  |hat  reflections  of  that  Ifind  were  confidered, 
as  having  applied,  unlefs  {hey  w^re  taken  notice  of.  He- 
attributed  rio  unworthy  motives  to  any  gentleman  in  the. 
Houfe.  He  believed  rnoft  of  them  wifhed  to  purfue.  the 
intereft  of  thejr  country  according  to  their  own  ideas  of; 
it.     He  hoped  other  gentlemen  would  be  equally  liberal. 

Mr.  Willie  Jonei  obferved,  that  he  affigned  unworthy, 
motives  to  no  o,ne.  He  thought  a  gentleman  had  infinua- 
ted,  that  the  oppofition  all  acted  ifrom  bafp  motives.  He. 
was  well  aflured  that  their  motives  were  as  good  as  thofe. 
of  the  other  party,  and  he  thought  he  had  a  right  to  re-, 
tort  by  ihewing  that  felfifti  views  might  influence  as  well, 
on  one  fide  as  the  other.  I^e  intended  however  no  partir, 
cular  reflections  on  thofe  two  gentlemen,  who  had  appli- 
ed the  obfervatitm  to  themfelves,  fpr  whom  he  faid  he  ha4 
the  higheft  refpeel,  and  was  forry  l>e  had  made  the  obser- 
vation as  it  hac^  given  them  pain.  But  if  they  were  con- 
scious that  the  pbfervation  did  not  apply  to  them,  they 
ought  not  to  be  offended  at  it.  He  then  explained  the 
nature  of  the  refolutions  he  propofed ;  and  the  plair^ 
jqueftion  was,  whether  they  fhould  adopt  them  or  not.—. 
He  was  not  afraid  that  North-Carolina  would,  not  be  ad* 
mitted  at  any  time  hereafter.  Maryland,  he  obferved, 
had  not  confederated  for  many  years  with  the,  other  dates  'A 
yet  (he  was  confidered,  in  the  mean  time  as  a  member  of 
the  union,  was  allowed  as  fuch  to  fend  her  proportion  of 
men  and  money,  and  was  at  length  admitte4  into  the  con- 
federacy in  1781.  This  he  faid  (hewed  how  the  adopting 
ftates  would  acl  on  the  prefent  occafion.  North-Carolina 
might  come  into,  the  union  wfien  (lie  pjeafed. 

Governor  Johnjlon  made  fome  observations  as  to  the  par? 
ticular  cafe  of  Maryland,  but  in  too  low  a  voice  to  be  difr 
$in&ly  heard.  JVfr, 


(    at$3    > 

Mr.  Blood-worth  obferved,  that  the  firft  Convention 
Which  met  to  confult  on  the  necefiary  alterations  of  the 
Confederation,  fo  as  to  make  it  efficient,  and  put  the  com* 
merce  of  the  United  States  on  a  better  footing,  not  con- 
Ming  of  a  fufficient  number  from  the  different  ftates* 
fo  as  to  authorize  them  to  proceed,  returned  without  ef- 
fecting any  thing  j  but  propofed  that  another  Convention 
mould  be  called,  to  have  more  extenfive  powers,  to  alter 
and  amend  the  Confederation.  This  proportion  of  that 
Convention  was  warmly  oppofed  in  Congrefs.—Mr.  King, 
from  Mafiachufetts,  infifttd  on  the  impropriety  of  the 
meafure,  and  that  the  exifthig  fyftem  ought  to  ftand  as  it 
was.,  His  arguments,  he  faid,  were,  that  it  might  deftroy 
the  Confederation  to  propofe  alterations;  that  the  unani- 
mous confent  of  all  the  ftates  was  neceflary  to  introduce 
thofe  alterations,  which  could  not  poflibly  be  obtained ; 
and  that  it  would  therefore  be  in  vain  to  attempt  it.  He 
wondered  how  gentlemen  came  to  entertain  different  opi- 
nions now.  He  declared  he  had  liftencd  with  attention, 
to  the  arguments  of  the  gentlemen  on  the  other  fide,  and 
had  endeavoured  to  remove  every  kind  of  bias  from  his 
mind, yet  he  had  heard  nothing  of  fufficient  weight  to  induce 
him  to  alter  his  opinion.  He  was  forry  that  there  was  any 
divifion  on  that  important  occafion,  and  wiflied  they  could 
all  go  hand  in  hand. 

As  to  the  difadvantages  of  a  temporary  exclufion  from! 
the  union,  he  thought  them  trifling.  He  afked  if  a  few 
political  advantages  could  be  put  in  competition  with  our 
liberties.  Gentlemen  faid  that  amendments  would  pro- 
bably be  obtained.  He  thought  their  arguments  and  rea* 
fons  were  not  fo  fure  a  method  to  obtain  them  as  with- 
holding their  confent  would  be.  He  could  not  conceive 
that  the  adopting  ftates  would  take  any  meafures  to  keep 
this  ftate  out  of  the  union.  If  a  right  view  were  taken 
of  the  fubjeft,  he  faid  they  could  not  be  blamed  in  flaying 
out  of  the  union  till  amendments  were  obtained.  The 
compact  betwen  the  ftates  was  violated  by  the  other  ftates 
and  not  by  North- Carolina.  Would  the  violating  party 
blame  the  upright  party  ?  This  determination  would  cor- 
refpond  with  the  opinion  of  the  gentleman  who  had  writ- 
ten from  France  on  the  fubjecl.  He  would  lay  ftrefs  on 
no  man's  opinion,  but  the  opinion  of  that  gentleman  wa» 
very  refpt ftable*  Mr, 


(  m  ) 

Mr.  Davie — Mr.  Chairman,  It  is  faid  that  there  is  si 
fcreat  majority  againft  the  Conftitution  and  in  faveur  of 
the  gentleman's  propofitidn.  The  objc&  of  a  majority,1 
I  fuppofe,  is  to  purfue  the  mod  probable  method  of  ob- 
taining amendments.  The  honourable  gentleman  from 
Halifax  has  faid  this  is  the  moft  eligible  method  of  obtain- 
ing them.  My  opinion  is  the  very  reverfe  j  let  us  weigh 
the  probability  of  both  modes  propofed,  and  determine  with 
Candour  which  is  the  fafeft  arid  furcft  method  of  obtaining 
the  wiihed  for  alterations.  The  honourable  gentleman 
from  Anfon,  has  faid  that  our  conduct  in  adhering  tothefe 
refolutions,  would  be  modeft.  What  is  his  idea  or  defini- 
tion of  modefty  ?  The  term  muft  be  very  equivocal  \  fo 
far  from  being  modeft,  it  appears  to  me  to  be  no  lefs  than 
an  arrogant  dictatorial  propofal  of  a  Conftitutiofr,  to  the 
United  States  of  America.  We  (hall  be  no  part  of  that 
confederacy,  and  yet  attempt  to  dictate  to  one  of  the  mod 
powerful  confederacies  in  the  world.  It  is  alfo  faid  to  be 
inoft  agreeable  to  prudence ;  if  our  real  object  be  amend- 
ments, every  man  muft  agree  that  the  moft  likely  means 
Of  them  are  the  moft  prudent.  Four  of  the  moft  fefpecl> 
able  ftates  have  adopted  the  Conftitution,  and  recommended 
amendments,  New- York  (if  fhe  refufes  to  adopf)  Rhode- 
Ifland,  and  North- Carolina,  will  be  the  only  ftates  out  of 
the  union.  But  if  thefe  three  were  added,  they  would 
compofe  a  majority  in  favour  of  amendments,  and  might 
by  various  means,  compel  the  other  ftates  into  the  meafure. 
It  muft  be  granted  that  there  is  ho  way  of  obtaining  a- 
mendments  but  the  mode  prefciibed  in  the  Conftitution  % 
two  thirds  of  the  Legiflatures  of  the  ftates  in  the  confede* 
racy,  may  require  Congrefs  to  call  a  Convention  to  propofe 
amendments,  or  the  fame  proportion  of  both  Houies  may 
propofe  them.  It  will  then  be  of  no  confequence  that  we 
Hand  out  and  propofe  amendments ;  without  adoption  we 
are  not  a  member  of  the  confederacy,  and  pofleffing  no 
federal  rights,  can  neither  make  any  pf  opofition  nor  require 
Congrefs  to  call  a  Convention.  Is  it  not  clear*  however 
ftrange  it  may  be,  that  we  are  with-holding  our  weight 
from  thofe  ftates  who  are  of  our  Own  opinion,  and  by  » 
$erverfe  obftiaacy  obftru&ing  the  very  meafure  we  wi(fr 
to  promote.  If  two  thirds  of  both  Houfes  arc  nccefiary 
to  fend  forwatd  amendments  to  the  ftates,  would  it  not  be 

prudent 


(    j«S    ) 

prudent  wc  that  (hould  be  there  and  add  our  vote  to  the  num* 
ber  of  thofe  ftates  who  are  of  the  fame  fentiment  ?  The  ho- 
nourable Member  from  Anfon  has  likened  this  bufinefs  to 
a  copartnerfhip,  comparing  fmall  things  to  great.  The 
eomparifon  is  only  juft  in  one  refpecT: — the  dictatorial  pro- 
fcofal  of  North*Carplina  to  the  American  confederacy,  is  like 
a  beggarly  bankrupt  addre fling  an  opulent  company  of  mer- 
chants, and  arrogantly  telling  them,  "  I  wifh  to  be  in  copart- 
nerfhip with  you,  but  «5  the  terms  muft  be  fuch  as  Ipleafe" 
"What  has  North-Carolina  to  put  into  the  flock  with  the  o- 
ther  ftates  ?  Have  we  not  felt  our  poverty  ?  What  was  the 
language  of  Congreis  on  their  laft  requifition,  on  this  (late  ? 
Surety  gentlemen  .muft  remember  the  painful  terms  in  which 
our  delinquency  was  treated.  That  gentleman  has  alfo  faid* 
".  that  we  mail  ftill  be  a  part  of  the  union,  and  if  we  b$ 
€l  feparated  it  is,  not  our  fault."  This  is  an  obvious 
fo.lecifm...  It  is  our  own  faulty  Sir,,  and  the  direcl  confe- 
rence of  tne  means  we  are  now  purfuing.  Nprth-Caro- 
'lina.ftands  foremoft  in  point  of  delinquency,  and  has  re- 
peatedly violated  the  Confederation.  The  conduct  of  this; 
ftate  .has  been  among  the  principal  caufes  which  produce^ 
this  revolution  in  our  federal  government.  The  honoura- 
ble gentleman  has  alfo  added,  that  it  was  a  rule  in  law, 
*'  that  the  fame  folemnities  were  neceiTary  to  annul  which 
«  were  necefiary  to  create  or  cftablifh  a  compacl,  and  that 
**  as  thirteen  ftates,  created,  fq  thirteen  ftates  muft  concut 
*«  in  the  diffolutipn  of  the  Confederation."  This  may  be 
talking  like  a  lawyer  or  a  judge,  but  it  is  very  unlike  a  po- 
litician ;  a  majority  is  the  rule  of  republican  decifiqns.  It 
was  the  voice  of  a  majority  of  the  people  of  America  that 
gave  that  fy;ftem  validity,  and  the  fame  authority  can  and 
will  annul  it  at  anytime.  Every  man  of  common  fen fe, 
tnowi,  that  political  power  is  political  right.  Lawyers  ma  jr. 
cavil  and  quibble  about  the  neceflity  of  unanimity,  but  the 
true  principle  is  otherwife.  In  every  republican  commu- 
nity the  majority  binds  the  minority,  and  whether  confe- 
derated or  feparated  the  principle  will  equally  apply.  We 
have  a  right  to  come  into  the  union,  until  we  exercif*  the 
right  of  deciding  on  the  queftion  referred  to  us.  Adop- 
tion places  us  in  the  union-r-reje&ion  extinguishes  the 
right,  forever.  The  fcheme  propofed  by  thefe  gentlemen 
will  certainly  be  cohered  as  an.  abfolutt  rejection;  it  may 
fcr  amufe 


(     i&6    ) 

amufe  the  people  and  anfwer  a  purpofe  here,  but  wilt  Hot 
anfwer  any  purpofe  there.  The  honourable  gentlemaii 
from  Halifax  affirm,  "  we  may  come  in  when  we  pleafe." 
The  gentleman  from  New-Hanover,  on  the  fame  fule  of 
the  queftion,  endeavoured  to  alarm  and  frighten  us  about 
the  dangerous  influence  of  the  eaftern  ftates  *,  if  he  de- 
ferves  say  credit,  can  we  expect  they  will  let  us  into  the 
union,  until  they  have  accomplifhed  their  particular  views, 
and  then  but  on  the  moft  difadvantageous  terms?  Com- 
mercial regulations  will  be  one  of  the  great  objects  of  the 
rirft  fefiion  of  Congrefs,  in  which  our  interefts  will  be 
totally  negle&ed.  Every  man  muft  be  convinced  of  the 
Importance  of  the  firft  acls  and  regulations  \  as  they  will 
probably  give  a  tone  to  the  policy  of  ages  yet  to  come,  and 
this  fcheme  will  add  greatly  to  the  influence  of  the  eaftern 
ftates,  aiid  proportion  ably  diminifh  the  power  and  inte- 
refts of  the  fouthern  ftates. 

The  gentleman  fays  he  has  a  project  in  his  pocket,  which 
he  rifks  his  life  will  induce  the  other  ftates  to  give  us  a 
fhare  of  the  general  impoft.  1  am  fully  fatisfied,  Sir,  this 
project  will  not  anfwer  the  purpofe,  and  the  forfeiture  of 
his  life  will  be  no  compenfation  for  irretrievable  public  lofs. 
Every  man  who  knows  the  refources  of  our  commerce,  and 
©ur  fituation,  will  be  clearly  convinced  that  the  project  canr 
not  fucceed — the  whole  produce  of  our  duties,both  by  land 
and  water  is  very  trifling.  For  feveral  years  paft  it  has 
not  exceeded  10,000  1.  of  our  own  paper  money.  It  will 
not  be  more,  probably  lefs,  if  we  are  out  of  the  union. 
The  whole  proportion  of  this  ftate  of  the  public  debts,  ex- 
cept this  mere  pittance,  muft  be  railed  from  the  people 
by  direct  and  immediate  taxation.  But  the  fact  is,  Sir, 
it  cannot  be  raifed,  becaufe  it  cannot  be  paid;  and  with- 
out fharing  in  the  general  impoft  we  fhall  never  difcharge 
our  quota  of  the  federal  debt.  What  docs  he  offer  the 
©ther  ftates?  The  poor  pittance  I  have  mentioned.  Can 
we  fuppofe  Congrefs  fo  loft  to  every  fenfe  of  duty,  intereft 
and  juftice  ? — Would  their  conftituents  permit  them  to  put 
their  hands  into  their  pockets  to  pay  our  debts  ?  We  have 
no  equivalent  to  give  them  for  it.  As  feveral  powerful 
ftates  have  propofed  amendments,  they  will  no  doubt  b« 
Supported  with  zeal  and  perfevcrance,  fo  that  it  is  not  pro- 
vable that  the  objeft  of  amendments  will  be  loft.  Wt 
....  r  ....  maj 


(      2«7      ) 

may  ftruggle  on  for  a  few  years  and  render  ourfeTves 
wretched  and  contemptible,  but  we  mud  at  laft  come  into 
the  union  on  their  terms  however  humiliating  they  may  be. 
The  project  on  the  table  is  little  better  than  an  abfoiute 
rejection,  and  is  neither  rational  or  politic  as  it  cannot 
promote  the  end  propofed. 

Mr.  Lock,  in  reply  to  Mr.  Davit,  expreffed  fome  appre- 
fienfions  that  the  Gonltitution,  if  adopted  as  it  then  flood, 
would  render  the  people  poor  and  miserable.  He  thought 
-k-^wolild  be  very  produ&ive  of  expences.  The  advantage* 
of  the  ftnpoft  he  considered  as  of  little  confequ.ence,  as  he 
thought  all  the  money  raifed  that  way,  and  more,  would 
be  fwept  away  by  courtly  parade — the  emoluments  of  the 
Prefident,,  and  other  members  of  the  government,  the 
Supreme  Court,  &c.  Thefe  expences  would  double  the 
impod  in,  his  opinion.  They  would  render  the  dates  bank- 
rapt.  The  impofts,  he  imagined,  would  be  inconiiderable. 
The  people  of  America  began  to  import  lefs  foreign  frip- 
pery. Every  wife  planter  was  fond  of  home  manufac- 
ture. The  northern  dates-  manufactured  confiderably, 
and  he  'thought  manufactures  would*  encrenfe  daily.  K«5 
thought  a  previous  ratification  dangerous.  The  word  that 
could  happen  would  be,  that  we  IhouJd'  be  thrown  out 
of  the  union.  He  would  rather  that  fliould  be  the  cafe, 
than  embrace  a  tyrannical  goverment,  and  give  away 
our  rights  and  privileges.  He  was  therefore  determin- 
ed to,  vote  for  the  nefolutions  of  the  genjlenaan  from  Har 
lifax. 

Mr*  Spencer  obferved^  that  if  the  conduct  of  North- Ca^ 
rolina  would  be  immoded  and  dictatorial,  in  propofing 
amendments,  and  if  it  was  propofing  a  conditution  to  the 
other  dates,  he  was  fure  the  other  dates  who  hacf^ropofed 
the  fame  amendments,  were  equally  guilty  of  immodedy 
and  dictating  a  conditution  to  the  other  date?.  The  only 
difference  being*  that  this  date  does  not  adopt  previoufly. 
The  gentleman  had  objections  to  his  legal  maxims,  and* 
faid  they  were  not  politic  He  would  be  extremely  forry, 
he  faid,  if  the  maxims  of  juftice  mould  not  take  place  in 
politics*  Were  this  to  be  the  cafe,  there  could  be  no  faith 
put  in  any  compact.  He  thought  the  comparifon  of  the 
date  to  a  beggar  was  a  degradation  of  it,  and  infided  on 
the  propriety  of  his  own  comparifon ;  which  he  thought 

obvious. 


obvious  to  any  one.  He  acknowledged  that  an  exclufion 
from  the  union  would  be  a  mod  unhappy  circumdahce] 
fcut  he  had  no  idea  that  it  would  be  the  cafe.  As  this  mod* 
of  proceeding  would  haden  the  amendments,  he  could 
not  but  Vote  for  it.' 

Mr.  Jones  defined  the  word  modejly  by  contrafting  it 
with  its  antagonid  impudence.  The  gentleman  found  fault 
with  the  dbfervation,  that  this  was  the  mod  decent  and 
bed  way  of  obtaining  amendments.  If  gentlemen  would 
propofe  a  more  eligible  method,  he  would  confeht  to  that. 
He "faid  the  gentleman  had  reviled  the  date  by  his  compa- 
rison, and  mud  have  hurt  the  feelings  of  every  gentleman 
|n  the  Houfe.  He  had  no  apprehenfions  that  the  other 
ftates  would  refufe  to  admit  them  into  the  union,  when 
they  thought  proper  to  come  in.  It  was  their  intered 
to  admit  them.  He  afked  if  a  beggar  would  refufe  a  boon 
though  it  were  but  a  (hilling,  or  if  twelve  men  ftruggling 
under  a  heavy  load  would  refufe  the  aflidance  of  a  thir- 
teenth man  ?  '■  ■  :  ,«  -..  - .  >< 
;    A  defultory  converfation  now  took  place. 

Mr.  Davie  hoped  they  would  not  take  up  the  whole  col- 
lectively, but  that  the  propofed  amendments  would  be' con- 
fidered  one  by  one.  Some  other  gentlemen  exprefled  the* 
fame  defire. 

Many  other  gentlemen  thought  the  refolution  very  pro- 
per as  it  dood.        ; 

The  quedion  being  put,  the  refolution  was  agreed  to  by 
a  great  majority  of  the  committee.  " 

It  was  then  refolved  that  the  committee  ftiould  rife, 
Mr.  Prefident  refumed  the  chair,  and  Mr.  Kenan  re- 
ported from  the  commjttee  of  the  whole  Convention,  that 
the  committee  had  again  had  the  Cohditution  propofed 
for  the  future  government  of  the  United  States  undet 
confederation,  and  had  come  to  "a  retolution  thereupon; 
Which 'he  read  in  his  place,  and  afterward*  delivered  in  at 
the  Clerk's  table. 

1  Ordered,  That  the  faid  report  lie  on  the  table  until  to- 
morrow morning  nine  o'clock :  To  which  time  the  Houfe 
adjourned. 

FRIDAY, 


(  ***  } 

FRIDAY,   August  i,  1788. 
The  Convention  met  according  to  adjournment. 

Mr.  Iredell— Mr.  Prefident,  I  believe,  Sir,  all  debate  it 
now  at  ah  end.  It  is  ufelefs  to  contend  any  longer  againft 
a  majority  that  is  irrefiftible.  We  fubmit,  with  the  de- 
ference that  becomes  us,  to  the  decifibn  of  the  majority  j 
but  my  friends  and  myfelf  are  anxious  that  fomething  may 
appear  on  the  journal  to  (hew  our  fentimcnts  on  the  fub- 
je£t.  I  have  therefore  a  refolution  in  my  hand  to  offer, 
hot  with  a  view  of  creating  any  debate,  (for  I  know  it 
Will  be  inftantly  rejected)  but  merely  that  it  may  be  enter* 
ed  6n  the 'journaV'with  the  yeas  and  nays  taken  upon  it, 
jn  order  that  our  coriftituents  and  the  world  may  know 
What  our  opinions  really  were  on  this  important  occafion. 
We  prefer  this  to  the  exceptionable  mode  of  a  proteft, 
which  might  increafe  the  fpirit  of  party,  and  raife  ani- 
inofity  among  the  people  of  this"  country,  which  is  an  event 
we  wifti  to  prevent,  if  poflible.  I  therefore,  Sir,  have 
the  honour  of  moving, 

!  «< That* the  confideration  of  the  report  of  the  committee 
<«  be  poftooned,  in  order  to  take  up  the  consideration  of 
<<  the  following  refolution.'* 

Mr.  Iredell,  then  read  the  refolution  in  his  place,  and 
afterwards  delivered  it  in  at  the  Qlerk's  table,  arid  his  mo- 
tion was  feconded  by  Mr.  John  Skinner. 
!  Mr.  Jofeph  M'Dpivall  and  feveral  other  gentlemen,  mod 
ftro'ngly  objeclied  againft  the  propriety  of  this  motion. 
They  thought  it  improper,  unprecedented,  and  a  great 
#ontempft  of  the  voice  of  the  majority. 

Mr.  Iredell  replied  that  he  thought  it  perfectly  regular, 
and  by  no  means  a  contempt  of  the  majority.  The  fole 
intention  of  it  was,  to  (hew  the  opinion  of  the  minority, 
which' could  not,  in  any  other  manner,  be  fo  properly 
done.  They  wifhed  to  juftify  themfelves  to  their  confti- 
tuents,  and  the  people  at  large  would  judge  between  the 
merit  of  the  two  propofitions.  They  wilhed  aifo  to  avoid, 
if  poflible,  the  difagreeable  alternative  of  a  proteft.  This 
being  the  firft  time  he  ever  had  the  honour  of  being  a 
Member  of  a  reprefentative  body,  he  did  not  folely  con- 
fide in  his  own  judgment  as  to  the  proper  manner  of  bring- 
ing his  refolution  forward,  but  had  confulted  a  very  re- 
fpe&able  arid  experienced  Member  of  that  Houfe,  who 
?■        '      '••"      r  -     >     ,  -  »        ••     -   •  had 


(     270     ) 

had  recommended  this  method  to  him  ;  and  he  well  knew 
it  was  conformable  to  a  frequent  practice  in  Congrefs,  as 
he  had  obferved  by  their  journals.  Each  Member  had  an 
equal  right  to  make  a  motion,  and  if  feconded,  a  vote 
ought  to  be  taktn  upon  it,  and  he  trufted  the  majority 
would  not  be  fo  arbitrary  as  to  prevent  them  from  taking 
this  method  to  deliver  their  fentinients  to  the  world. 

He  was  fupported  by  Mr.  Machine  and  Mr.  Spaight. 

Mr.  Willie  Jottes,  and  Mr.  Spencer  infifted  on  its  being 
irregular^-and  faid  they  might  proteft.  Mr*  Jones  faid, 
there  never  was  an  example  of  the  kind  before  *,  that  fuch 
a  practice  did  not  prevail  in  Congrefs  when  he  was  a  Mem- 
ber of  it,  and  he  well  knew  no  fuch  practice  had' ever  pre- 
vailed in  the  AiTembly. 

Mr.  Davie  faid,  he  wasforry  that  gentlemen  mould  not 
deal  fairly  and  liberally  with  one  another.  He  declared  it 
was  perfe&ly  Parliamentary,  and  the  u<ual  practice  ia 
Congrefs.  They  were  in  poffeflion  of  the  motion,  and 
could  not  get  rid  of  it  without  taking  a  vote  upon  it.  It 
was  in  the  nature  of  a  previous  queftion.  He  declared 
that  nothing  hurt  bis,  feelings  fo  much  as  the  blind  tyranny 
of  a  dead  majority. 

After  a  warm  difc^flion  of  this  point  by  fcveral  gentle- 
men on  both  fides  of  the  Houfe,  it  was  at  length  intimate 
cd  to  Mr.  Iredell,  by  Mr.  Spaight t  acrofs  the  houfe,  that 
JMr.  Lenoir  and  fome  other  gentlemen  of  the  majority, 
wilhed  he  would  withdraw  his  motion  for  the  prefent,  on 
purpofe  that  the  refolution  of  the  committee  might  be  firft 
entered  on  the  journal,  which  had  not  heen  done  *,  and  af« 
terwards  his  motion  might  be  renewed.  Mr.  Iredell  de- 
clared he  would  readily  agree  to  this,  if  the  gentleman 
who  had  feconded  him  would,  defiring  the  Houfe  to  re- 
member that  he  only  withdrew  his  motion  for  that  reafon, 
and  hoped  he  mould  have  leave  to  introduce  it  afterwards* 
Which  feemed  to  be  underftood.  He  accordingly*  with 
the  confent  of  Mr.  Skinner,  withdrew  his,  motion.  And 
the  refolution  of  the  committee  of  the  whole  Houfe  waft 
then  read,  and  ordered  to  be  entered  on  the  journal.  The 
refolution  was  accordingly  read  and  entered  as  follows,  viz.. 

Refolded,  That  a  Declaration  of  Rights.,  aflfertingand  fecuring  from 
encroachment  the  great  principles  of  civil  and  religious  liberty,  and  the 
unalienable  rights  of  the  people,  together  with  amendments  to  the  moft 
ambiguous  and  exceptionable  parts  of  the  faid  Conftitution  of  govern* 

meat* 


(    *P    ) 

tteftrj  ought  to  be  laid  before  Congrefs,  and  the  Convention  of  fhe 
ftates  that  Shall  or  may  be  called  for  the  purpofe  of  amending  the  faid 
Conftitution,  for  their  confideration,  previous  to  the  ratification  of  the 
Constitution  aforcfaid  on  the  part  of  theflate  of  North-Carolina. 

DECLARATION     OF     RIGHTS. 

lft.  That  there  are  certain  natural  rights,  of  which  men,  when  they 
form  a  focial  compact,  cannot  deprive  or  diveft  their  pofterity,  among 
*hich  are  the  enjoyment  of  life  and  liberty,  with  the  means  of  acquir- 
ing, poflefiing  and  prottcling  property,  and  purfuing  and  obtaining 
happineft  and  fafety. 

ad.  That  all  power  is  naturally  vetted  in,  and  consequently  derived 
from  the  people  j  that  magistrates  therefore  are  theii  truftecs  and  agents, 
and  at  all  times  amenable  to  them. 

3d.  That  government  ought  to  be  instituted  for  the  common  benefit, 
protection  and  fecurity  of  the  people}  and  that  the  doclrine  of  non- 
refiftance  againft  arbitrary  power  and  oppreffion  is  abfurd,  flavifh,  and 
deftru&ive  to  the  good  and  happinefs  of  mankind. 

4th.  That  no  man  or  fet  of  men  are  entitled  to  exclufiveor  feparate 
public  emoluments  or  privileges  from  the  community,  but  in  confide - 
ration  of  public  fervices;  which  not  being  descendible,  neither  ought 
the  offices*  of  magistrate,  legiilator  or  judge,  or  any  other  public  office 
to  be  hereditary. 

5th.  That  the  legislative,  executive  and  judiciary  powers  of  govern- 
I  went  fhould  be  feparate  and  diftinct,  and  that  the  members  of  the  two  firft 
may  be  retrained  from  oppreffion,  by  feeling  and  participating  the  pub- 
lic burthens,  they  fhould  at  fixed  periods  be  reduced  to  a  private  Stati- 
on, return  into  the  raafs  of  the  people,  and  the  vacancies  be  Supplied 
by  certain  and  tegular  elections  ;  in  which  all  or  any  part  of  the  for- 
mer members  to  he  eligible  or  ineligible,  as  the  rules  of  the  conftitution 
of  government  and  the  laws  fhall  direft. 

6th.  That  elections  of  representatives  in  the  legislature  ought  to  be 
free  and  frequent,  and  all  men  having  Sufficient  evidence  of  permanent 
common'intei eft  with,  and  attachment  to  the  community,  ought  to  have 
the  right  of  fuffrage  j  and  no  aid,  charge,  tax  or  fee  can  be  fet,  rated  or 
levied  upon  the  people  without  their  own  confent,  or  that  of  their  re- 
presentatives (6  defied ;  nor  can  they  be  bound  by  any  law  to  which 
they  have  not  in  like  manner  aflented  for  the  public  good. 

7th.  That  all  power  of  fufpending  laws,  or  the  execution  of  laws,  hy 
any  authority,  without  the  confent  of  the  representatives  of  tho  people  in 
the  legiflature,  is  injurious  to  their  rights  and  ought  nottobeexercifed. 

8th.  That  in  all  capital  and  criminal  profecutions,  a  man  hath  aright 
to  demand  the  caufe  and  nature  of  his  accufation,  to  be  confronted  with, 
tho  accufers  and  witnefTes,  to  call  for  evidence,  and  be  allowed  counfel  in 
his  favour,  and  to  a  fair  and  Speedy  trial  by  an  impartial  jury  of  his  vici- 
nage, without  whofe  unanimous  confent  he  cannot  be  found  guilty 
(except  in  the  government  of  the  land  and  naval  forces)  nor  can  he  be. 
•ompeHed  to  give  evidence  againft  himfelf. 

^  jth.  That  no  freeman  ought  to  be  taken,  imprifoned,  ordifTeifed  of 
bis  freehold,  liberties,  privileges  or  franchises,  or  outlawed  or  exiled, 
•r  in  any  manner  d*ftroyed  or  deprived  of  his  life,  liberty  or  proper* 
fy,  but  by  the  law  ef  the  Ian4* 

?oth. 


(    a;*     ) 

.  10th.  Thit  every  freeman  reftrained  of  his  liberty;  is  entitled  to  a 
remedy  to  enquire  into  the  lavvfulnefs  thereof,  and  to  remove,  the  fame 
if  unlawful  j  and  that  fuch  remedy  ought  not  to  be  denied  nor  delayed. 

iith.  That  in  controverfies  refpecting  property,  and  in  fuits  between 
snan  and  man,  the  ancient  trial  by  jury  is  one  of  tbegreateft  fecurities 
to  the  rights  of  the  people,  anc|  ought  to  remain  facred,  and  inviolable. 

12th.  That  every  freeman  ought  to  find  a  certain  remedy  by  recourfe. 
to  the  la>#s  for  all  injuries  and.  wrongs  he  may  receive  in  his  perfon, 
property  or  character  j  heought  to  obtain  right  and  juftice  freely  with- 
out fale,  completely  and  withqut  denial,,  promptly  and  without  delay,, 
and  that  all  eftablimments  or  regulations  contravening  thefe  rights,  are 
oppreffive  and  unjuftJ  ..-.<•, 

1 3th.  That  exceflive  bail  ought  not  to  be  required,  nor  exceflive  fines 
impofed,  nor  cruel  and  unufual  punifliments  inflicted. 

14th.  That  every  freeman  has  a  right  to  be  fecure  from  all  unrea- 
fonable  fearches  and.feizures  of  his  perfon,  his  papers  and  property ; 
all  warrants  therefore  to  fearch  fufpected  places,  or  to  apprehend  any; 
fufpected  perfon  without  fpecially  naming  or  .defcribing  the  place  or 
jperfon,  are  dangerous  and  ought  not  to  be  granted.  . 

15th.  That  the  people  have  a.  right  peaceably  tp  alTemble  together  to. 
confult  for  the  common  good,  or  to  inftruft  their  representatives  j  and 
that  every  freeman  has  a  right  to  petition  or  apply  to  the  legiftature  for 
redrefs  of  grievances,*  1 

1 6th.  That  the  people  have  a  right  to  freedom  of  fpeech,and  of 
•writing  and  pubiifhing  their  fentiments  ;  that  the  freedom  of  the  prefs 
Is  one  of  the  greateft  bulwarks  of  liberty,  and  ought  not  to  be  violated. 

17th.  That  the  people  have  a  right  to  keep  and  bear  arms  ;  that  a  well  1 
regulated  militia,  compofed  of  the  body  of  the  people,  trained  to  arms, 
is  the, proper,  natural  and  fafe  defence  of  a  free  (tare.  That  (landing, 
armies  in  time  of  peace,  are  dangerous  to  liberty,  and, therefore  ought 
to  be  avoided,  as  far  as  the  circumftances  and  protection  of  the  commu- 
»ity.wiil  admit ,  and  that  in  all  cafes,  the  military  (hould  be  under 
irict  fubordination  to,  and  governed  by,  the  .civil  power. 

18th.  That  no  foldier  in  time  of  peace  ought  to  be  quartered  in  any. 
fioufe  without  the  confent  of  the  owner,  and  in   time  of  war  in  fuch 
manner  only  as  the  laws  direct.. 

X9th.  That  any  perfon  religioully  fcrupulous  of  bearing  arms  ought 
to  be  exempted,  upon  payment  of  an  equivalent  to  employ  another  to 
bear  arms  in  his  ftead. 

aoth.  That  religion,  or  the  duty  which  we  owe  to  our  Creator,  and 
the  manner  of  difcharging  it,  can  be  directed  only  .by  reafon  and  con- 
viction, not  by  force  or  violence,  and  therefore  all  men  have  an  equal, 
natural  and  unalienable  right  to  the  free  exercife  of  religion,  according 
to  the  dictates  of  confeience  j  and  that  no  particular  religious  feet  or  fo- 
eiety  ought  to  be  favoured  or  eftabliihed  by  law  in, preference  toothers* 


'       JMEND  MEN?  S  to  the  CONSTITUTION.     , 

I.  That  each  (tare  in  the  union  (hall  refpectively  retain  every  power, 
jurifdiction  and  right,  which  is  not  by  this  conftitution  delegated  t» 
the  Congreft  of  the  Unittd  States,  or  to  the  department*  of  the  fede> 
ral  government,  II. 


(    *7J    )' 

* v       Y  '  •  - . 

,  II.  That  there  fhall  be  one  reprefentative  for  every  30,000^  according 
to  the  enumeration  or  cenfus  mentioned  in  the  constitution,  until  fhe 
whole  number  of  reprefentatives  amounts  to  two  hundred  ;  after  which 
that  number  fhall  be  continued  or  encreafed  as  Congrefs  fhall  direct, 
upon  the  principles  fixed  in  the  constitution,  by  apportioning  the  re- 
prefentatives of  each  ftate  to  fome  greater  number  of  people,  from!  time 
to  time,  as  population  encreafes. 

III.  When  Congrefs  (li all  lay  direct  taxes  or  excifes,  they  fhall  imme- 
diately inform  the  executive  power  of  each  ftate,  of  the  quota  of  fuch! 
ftate,  according  to  the  cenfus  herein  directed,  which;  is  propofed  to  be 
thereby  faifed  :  And  if  the  legislature  of  any  ftate  fh'all  pafs  a  )aw,whichi 
fhall  be  effectual  for  raifing  fuch  quota  at  the  time  required  by  Congrefs^ 
the  taxes  and  excifes  laid  by  Congrefs  (hall  not  be  collected  in  fuch  ftate*. 

IV.  That  the  members  of  taftfift^te  .and;  noufe  of  reprefentatives 
(hall  be  ineligible  to,  and  incafmble  of,  holding  any  civi.l  office  under 
the  authority  of  the  United  States,  during  the  time  for  which  they  fhall 
refpectively  be  elected. 

V.  That  the  journals  of  the  proceedings  of  the  fenate  and  houfe  of 
reprefentatives  fhall  be  publifhed  at  leaft  once  in  every  year,  except  fuel* 
parts  thereof  relating  to  treaties,  alliances,  or  military  operations,  as  in 
their  judgment  require  fecreCy. 

VI.  That  a  regular  ftatemcnt  and  account  of  receipts  and  expendi- 
tures of  all  public  monies  fhall  be  publifhed  at  leaft  once  in  every  year.. 

VII.  That  ho  commercial  treaty  fhall  be  ratified  without  the  concur- 
rence of  two-thirds  of  the  whole  number  of  the  members  of  tile  fenate  5 
And  no  treaty,  ceding,  contracting,  reftraining  or  fufperiding  the  terri- 
torial rights  or  claims  of, the  United'  States,  or  any  of  them,  or  their,  cr 
any  of  their  rights,  or  claims  to  fifhing  in  the  American  feas,  or  navi- 
gating the  American  rivers,  fhall  be  made,  but  in  cafes  of  the  mod  ur- 
gent and  extreme  neeeffity  j  nor  fhall  any  fuch  treaty  be  ratified  with- 
out the  concurrence  of  three-fourths-of  the  whole  number  of  the  mem- 
bers of  both  houfes  refpectively. 

VIII.  That  no  navigation  law,  or  law  regulating  commerce,  fhalt 
be  paffed  without  the  confent'  of  two-thirds  of  the  members  prefent  in 
both  houfes. 

IX.  That  no  (landing  army  or  regular  troops  fhall  be  raifed  or  kept 
tip  in  lime  of  peace,  without  the  confent  of  two-thirds  of  the  members 
prefent  in  both  houfes. 

X.  Tf'hat  no  foldier  fhall  be  enlifted  for  any  longer  term  than  four 
years,  except  in  time  of  war,  and  then  for  no  longer  terra  than  the 
continuance  of  the  war. 

XI.  That  each  ftate  refpectively  fhall  have  the  power  to  provide  for 
organizing,  arming  and  difciplining  its  own  militia  whehfoever  Congrefs 
fhall  omit  or  neglect  to  provide  for  the  fame.  That  the  militia  fhall  noe 
be  fubject  to  martial  law,  exeeptjwhen  in  actual  fervice  in  time  of  war;, 
iyivafion  or  rebellion  :  And  when  not  in  the  actual  fervice  of  the  United 
States,  fhall  be  fubject  only  to  fuch  fines,' penalties  and  punifhmentsaa 
Jhall  be  directed  of  inflicted  by  the  laws  of  its  own  ftate. 

XII.  That  Congrefs  fhall  not  declare  any  ftate  to  be  in  rebellion. 
Without  the  confent  of  at  leaft  two-thirds  of  all  the  members  prefent 
©f  both  houfes. 

XII t.  That  the  exclufive  power  of  legiflation  given  to  Congrefs  or?* 
M  n*  the- 


I     -74     ) 

Mie  federal  tewn  and  its  adjacent  difttia,  and  other  places  purchafecti 
•r  to  be  purchaied  by  Congrefs  of  any  of  the  Kates,  (hall  extend  onlf 
*°™  r£f "lat,ons  as  'efpea  the  police  and  good  government  thereof. 

XIV.  1  hat  no  perion  (hall  be  capable  of  being  preiident  of  theUnited 
States  for  more  than  eight  years  in  any  term  of  hxteen  years. 

XV.  That  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  mall  be  vefted  1ft 
•one  fupreme  court,  and  in  fuch  courts  of  admiralty  as  Congrefs  may  from 
time  to  tunc  ordain  and  eftablim  in  any  of  the  different  rtates.  The  judici- 
al power  /hall  extend  to  all  cafes  in  law  and  equity,  arifing  under  treaties 
made,  or  winch  Thai]  behiSdc  Under  the  authority  of  thellnited  States* 
to  all  cafes  affecting  ambafladors,  other  "foreign  miniffers  and  confuU 
to  all  caies  of  admiralty,  and  maritime  jurifdiaion  ;  to  controverfies  to 
which  the Umted  States  mall  be  a  party  j  to  controverfies  between  two 
or  more  (fates,  and  between  partiesjiriming  lands  under  the  grants  of 
different  ftates  j  hi  all  cafes  affeainMbafladors,  other  foreign  mini  Iters 
and  confuls,  a*d  thofe  in  which  a  Tate  (hall  be  a  party :  the  fupreme 
court  (hall  have  original  jurifdiaion  in  all  other  caTe's  before  mentioned  • 
the  fupreme  court  (hall  have  appellate  jurifliaioh'  as  to  matters  of  lav* 
only,  except  in  cafes  of  equity,  and  of  admiralty  and  maritime  jurifdiai- 
on, in  which  the  fupreme  court  (hall  have  appellate  jurifdiaion  both  as  to 
la*  and  faa  with  fuch  exceptions  and  under  fuch  regulations  as  the 
Congrefs  mail  make  :  But  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  (hall 
extend  to  no  C^Ct  where  theScaufe  of  aaion  fliall  have  o.  iginated  before 
the  ratification  of  this  cbnftitution,  except  in  difputes  between  ftates 
about  their  territory  $  difputes  between  perfons  claiming  lands  under  th« 

gr  ™\ ^ • nt  ftat'S'  a,"d  fuits  for  debts  Jue  t0  the  U^ted  States. 

XVI.  That  in  criminal  profecutions,  no  man  (hall  be  regained  in 
theexerc.feof  the  ufual  and  accultomed  right  of  challenging  or  ex- 
cepting to  the  jury.  & 

XV I  h  That  Congrefs  (hall  not  alter,  modify,  or  interfere  in  the 
times,  places,  or  manner  of  holding  eieclidhs  for  fcnators  and  reprefen- 
tatives, or  either  of  them  except  when  the  legislature  of  any  Mate  (hall 
»egle6   refufe or  be  d.fabled  by  invafion  or  rebel  lion,  to  prefcribe  the  fame. 

XVIII.  That  thofe  claufes  which  declare  that  Congrefs  (hall  not  ex- 
crc.fe  certain  powers,  be  not  interpreted  in  any  manner  whatfoever  t* 
..xtend  the  powers  of  Congrefs  ;  but  that  they  be  conftrued  either  as 
making  exceptions  to  the  fpecified  powers  where  this  mall  be  the  cafe  or 
xrtherwife,  as  inferted  merely  for  greater  caution. 

XIX.  That  the  laws  afcertaining  the  corapenfatlon  of  Tehators  and 
representatives,  for  their  fervices,  be  poftponed  in  their  operation  until 
after  the  eleaion  of  reprefentatives  immediately  fucceeding  the  pafcW 
the™f>  $zt  «cepted  which  (hall  firft  be  pafled  on  lhe*<ubjea 

XX.  That  fome  tribunal,  other  than  the  fenate,  be  provided  for  try- 
ing impeachments  of  fenators.  " 

XXL  That  the  falary  of  a  judge  Thall  not  be  encreafed  or  diminift- 
ed  during  his  continuance  in  office,  otherwife  than  by  general  regulati- 
ons of  falary,  which  may  take  place  on  a  revifion  of  the  fubjea  at  (rat- 
ed periods  o  not  left  than  feven  years,  to  commence  from  the  time  fuch 
falanes  (hall  be  firft  afcertained  by  Congrefs. 

fiJP?/'  ,That  S0ngref8  erto  nocomPany  of  merchants  with  exclu* 
live  advantages  of  commerce. 

^XIII,  That  no  treaties  which  (hall  bcdinaiy  oppofed  to  the  exifK 

In, 


0    27$     >' 

fftg  laws  of  the  United  States  in  Congrefs  affembled  (hall  be  valid*  \m?. 
tU  fuch  laws  fliall.be  repealed,  or  made  conformable  to  fuch  treaty  ;  no* 
fhall  any  treaty  be  valid  which  is  contradictory  to  the  ccnitituiion  of 
the  United  States. 

XXl  V.  That  the  latter  part  of  the  5th  paragraph  of  the  9th  feclion  of 
the  rirft  article  be  altered  to' read  thus— 'Nor  ftiall  veflels  bound  to  a  par* 
ticular  (late  fye  obliged  to  enter  or  pay  duties  in  any  other;  nor  when. 
bound  from  any  one  of  the  ltates  be  obliged  to  clear  in  another. 

XXV.  That  Congrefs  Jhall  not  dire&ly  or  indirectly,  either  by  them- 
felves  or  through  the  judiciary,  interfere  with  any  one  of  the  ltates  in  th« 
redemption  of  paper  money  already  emitted  and  now  in  circulation,  or  m 
liquidating  and,difchargirig  the  public  fecuritiesof.any  oneof  the  ltates, 
but  each  and  every  ftate  fhail  have  the  ex.clufive  right  of,  making  fuclv, 
laws  and  regulations  for  the  above  puipofes  as  they  mail  think  proper. 

XXVI.  That  Con  greis  mall,  not  introduce  foreign  troops  into  the 
United  States  without  the  confent  of  two-thirds,  of  the  members  pre- 
ient  of  both.houfes. 

Mr.  Spencer  then, moved, that  the  rep.prt  of;  the  commit- 
tee be  concurred  with,  and  was,feconded  by  Mr.  Jofeph, 

Mr.  Ire  fall moved^  "  That  the  consideration  of  that. 
«5  motion  be  poftponed,  in  order  to  take  into  confiderati- 
|tf  on  the  following  refolutipn." 

(Which  refolution  was  the  fame  he  introduced  before, 
and  which  he  afterwards,  in  fubftance,  moved  by  way  of; 
amendment^) 

This  gave  rife  to.a  very  warm,  altercation  on  both  (ides* 
during  wnich  the  Houfe  was  in  great  confufion.  Many 
gentlemen,  in  tfie  majority  (particularly  Mr.  Willie  Jones) 
itrongly  contended,  againft  the.  propriety  of  the  motion. 
Several;  gentlemen  in  the  minority  refented  in  ftrong 
terms  the  arbitrary  attempt  of  the  majority  (as  they  termed 
it)  to  fupprefs  thetr  fentiments ;  and  Mr*  Spaighty  in,parti- 
ticular,  took  notice,  with  great  indignation,  o£  the  motion 
ma?le.  to, concur  with  the  committee,  when  the  gentleman 
from  Edenton  appeared*  in  fomc  meafure  to  have  had  the 
faith  of  the  Houfe,  that  he  fhould  have  an  opportunity  to 
renew  his  motiont  which  he  had  withdrawn  at  the  requeft 
of  fome  of  the  majority*  themfelves,  Mr.  Whitmill  Hill 
fpoke  with  great  warmth,  and  declared  that  in  his  opinion, 
if  the  majority  perfevered  in  their  tyrannical  attempt,  the 
minority  fhoiild  fecede. 

Mr.  Willie  Jones,  ilill  contended  that  the  motion  was  al- 
together irregular  and  improper,  and  made  a  motion  cal- 
culated to  (hew  that  fuch  a  motion,  made  and  feconded  un-; 
der  the  circumftances  in  which  it  had  been  introduced^ 
Vfis  not  en^titiedc  to  be  entered  oa  the  journal.    His  motion 


(     276     ) 

being  feconded,  was  carried  by  a  great  majority.  Thp 
yeas  and  nays  were  moved  for,  and  were  taking,  when  Mr. 
Iredell  arofe,  and  faid,  he  was  fenfible  of  the  irregularity 
fie  was  guilty  of,  and  b°ped  he  mould  be  excufed  for  it^ 
J)ut  it  arofe  from  his  defire  of  faving  the  Houfe  trouble. 
That  Mr.  Jones  (he  begged  pardonfor  naming'him)  had  pror 
pofed  an  expedient  to  riim,  with  which  he  fhould  be  per- 
|e£Uy  fatisfied,  if  the  Houfe  approved  of  it,  as  it  was  in- 
different to  jiim  what  was  the  mode,  if  his  objeel:  in  fub- 
itance  was  obtained.  The  method  propofed  was,  that  the 
motion  for  concurrence  mould  be  Withdrawn,  and  his  re- 
solution fhould  be  moved  by  way  of  amendment.  If  the 
Houfe  therefore  approved  of  this  method,  and  the  gentle- 
men who  had  moved  and  feconded  the  motion  would  agree 
to  withdraw  it,  he  hoped  it  would  be  deemed  unneceflary 
to  proceed  with  the  yeas  and  nays. 

Mr.  Nathan  B^ryan  faid,  the  gentleman  treated  the  ma- 
jority with  contempt.  Mr.  Iredell  declared  he  had  no  fuch, 
intention,  but  as  the  yeas  and  nays  were  taken  on  a  diffe- 
rence between  both  fides  of  the  Houfe,  which  he  hoped 
might  be  accommodated,  he  thought  he  might  be  excufe4 
for  the  liberty  he  had  taken. 

Mr.  Spencer  and  Mr.  M'Pqwall,  after  fome  observations 
riot  diftin&Iy  heard,  accordingly  withdrew  their  motion  ; 
and  it  was  agreed  that  the  yeas  and  nays  fhoujd  not  be  tak- 
en, nor  the  motion  which  occafioned  them  entered  or*  the 
journal.     Mr.  Iredelh  then  moved  as  follows,  viz. 

That  the  report  of  the  committee  be  amended,  by  ftrik? 
ing  out  all  the  words  of  the-faid  report  except  the  two 
firft,  viz.  <f  Refohed,  That,"  and  that  the  following  words 
be  inferted  in  their  room,  viz. 

This  convention  having  fully  deliberated  on  the  conftitution  propof- 
ed for  the  future  government  of  the  United  States  of  America  by  the 
federal  convention;,  lately  held  at  Philadelphia,  on  tjjie  17th  day  of  Sep- 
tember lait,  and  having  taken  into  their  ferious  and  folemn  conliderati- 
on  the  prefent  critical  fituation  of  America,  which  induces  them  to  be 
of  opinion,  that  though  certain  amendments  to  the  faid  conftitution 
may  be  wifhed  for,  yet  that  thofe  amendments  (Hould  be  propofed  fubfe* 
<juent  to  the  ratification  on  the  part  of  this  ftate,  and  not  previous  to  it : 
They  do  therefore,  on  behalf  of  the  ftate  of  North-Caroljna,  and  the 
good  people  thereof,  and  by  virtue  of  the  authority  to  them  delegated, 
ratify  the  laid  conftitution  on  the  part  of  this  ftate  :  And  they  do  at  the 
fame  time  recommend,  that  as  early  as  poflible,  the  following  amend- 
ments to  the  faid  conftitution  may  be  propofed  for  the  confideration  and 
adoption  of  the  feveral  ftates  in  the  union,  in  one  of  the  modes  prescrib- 
ed by  the  fifth  article  thireof. 
"  AMENDMENTS. 


(  m  y 

AMENDMENTS. 

I.  Each  ftate  in  the,  union  A>ail  refpe&ively  retain  every  power,  ju- 
rifdiction  and  right,  which  is  not  by  this  Conftitution  delegated  to  the 
jCongrefs  of  the  United  States,  or  to  the  departments  of  the  general  go- 
vernment j  rjor  /hall  the  faid  Congrefs,  or  any  department  of  the  faid  go- 
vernment, exercife  any  act  of  authority  over  any  individual  in  any  of  the 
faid  ftatcs,  bijt  fuch  as  can  be juftified  under  fome  power,  particularly 
given  in  this  conftitution  j  but  the  faid  conftitution  fliali  be  confidered  at 
ail  times  a  ibjemn  inftrument  defining  the  extent  of  their  authority,  and 
the  limits  of  which  they  cannot  rightfully  in  any  inftance  exceed. 

II.  There  (hall  be  one  reprefentative  for  every  thirty  thoufand,  accord- 
ing to  the  enumeration  or  cenfus,  mentioned  in  the  conftitution,  until 
th«  whole  number  of  representatives  ^mounts  to  two  hundred }  after 
which  that  number  (hall  be  continued  or  encreafed  as  Congrefs  (hall  di- 
rect, upon  the  principles  fixed  in  the  conftitution,  by  apportioning  the 
representatives  qf  each  Itate  to  fome  greater  number  of  people,  from 
time  to  time,  as  population  encreafes, 

III.  Each  ftate  refpectively  mall  have  the  power  to  provide  for  or- 
ganising, arming  and  difciplining  its  own  mU^tia,  whenfoever  Congrefs 
fyall  omit  or  neglect  to  provide  for  the  fame.  The  militia  (hall  not  be 
fubject  to  martial  law,  except  when  in  a&ual  fervice  in  tjme°f  wa*">  inva- 
sion or  rebellipn  j  and  when  they  are  not  in  the.  actual  fervice  of  the  - 
Uniffed  States,  they  (hall  he  fubject  only  to  fuch  fines,  penalties  andpu- 
liifhments  as  (hall  be  directed  or  inflicted  by  the  laws  of  its  own  ftate. 

IV.  The  Congrefs  (h,all  not  alter,  modify*  or  interfere  in  the  times, 
places,  or  manner  of  holding  elections  for  fenators  and  reprefeatatives, 
or  either  of  them,  except  when  the  legiflature  of  any  ftate  (hall  neglect, 
refufe   or  be  difabled  by  invafion,  or  rebellion,*,  to  prefcribe  the  fame. 

V.  The  laws  afcertaining  the  compenfation  of  fenators  and  reprefen- 
tatives  for  their  fervices,  (hall  bepoftponed  in  their  operation,  until  af- 
ter the  election  of  representatives  immediately  facceeding  the  paffinj* 
thereof.;  that  excepted,  which  (hall  firft  be  parted  on  the  fubject. 

$vT.  Inftead  of  the  following  words  in  the  oth  fection  of  the  ift  ar- 
ticle, viz,.  "  Nor  (hall  veflels  bound  to  or  from  one  ftate,  be  obliged  to 
enter,  clear  or  pay  duties  in  another  :"  [The  meaning  of  which  is  by 
many  deemed  not  fu ffickntW  explici t :  ]  It  is  propofed  that  the  follow* 
ing  mail  be  fubftituted :  "No  veflel  bound  to  onfe  ftate  (hall  be  oblig- 
ed to  enter  or  pay  duties  to  which  fuch  veflel  may  be  liable  at  any 
port  of  entry,  in  any  other  ft&te  than  that  to  which  fuch  veflel  is  bound  s- 
Nor  (hail  anyveflel  bound  from  one  ftate,  be  obliged  to  clear  or  pay  du- 
ties to  which  fuch  veflel  may  be  liable  at  any  port  of  clearance,  in  any 
other  ftate  than  that  from  which  fuch  veflel  is  bound." 

lie  was  fecondecLby  Mr.  John  Skinner, 

The  queftion  was  then  put,  "  Will  the  Convention  adopt 
that  amendment  or  not  ?"  And  it  was  negatived :  Where- 
upon Mr.  Iredell  moved  that  the  yeas  and  nays  mould  be 
taken,  and  he  wa,s  feconded  by  Mr.  Steele,  They  were 
accordingly  taken,  and  were  as  follow : 

YEAS— His  Excellency  Samuel  Johnfton,  Efq.  Prefident,  MeflTrs. 
lames  Iredell,  Archibald  Machine,  Nathan  Kcais,  Iohn  G.  Blount, 
Thomas  Aldeifon,  John  Johnfton,  Andrew  Oliver,  <5oodwin  Ellifton, 

Charles 


(     *7*     I 

#harles  M'Dowall,  Richard  D.  Spaight,  Willianj  I.  Dawfon,  lames 
IPorterfield,  William  Barry  Grove,    George  Elliott,  Wallis  Styron, 
William   Shepperd,  Carteret,  lames   Philips,  Iohn   Humphries,  Mi- 
chael Payne,  Charles  J ohnfon,  Stephen   Cabarrus,  Edmund  Biount, 
Chowan,  Henry  Abbot,  Iiaac  Gregory,  Peter  Dauge,  Charles  Grandy, 
Enoch  Sawyer,  George  Lucas,  Iohn  Willis,  Iohn  Cade,  EJias  Barnes, 
Neil  Brown,  Iame§  Winchefter,  William  Stokes,  Thomas  Stewart, 
Jofiah  Collins^  Thomas  Hines,  Nathaniel  Jones,  Iohn   Steele,    Wil- 
liam R.  Davie,  Jofeph  Reddick,  lames   Gregory,  Thomas    Hunter, 
Gates,  Thomas  Wynsi  Abraham  Jones,  Iohn  Eborne,  lames  Jafper, 
Caleb  Foreman,    Seth   Hovey,  Iohn    Sloan,   Iohn   Moore,  William 
Maclaine,  Nathan  Mayo',  William   S.la4e,  William  M'Kenate,  Ro- 
bert Irwin,  John  Lane,  Thomas  Reading,  Edward  Everagain,  Enoch 
Relfe,  Devotion  Davis,  William   Skinner,  jofhua  Skinner,  Thomas 
Hervey,  Iohn  Skinner,  SamnelJiarrel,  JofepH  Leech,  Wm.  Bridges, 
William  Burden,    Edmund  Blount,    *Tyrrek  Simeon  Spruil,    David 
Tanner,  Whitmill  Hill,  Benjamin   Smith,  Iohn    Sitgreaves,  Natha- 
niel Allen,  Thomas   Owen,  George   Wyns,  David,  Perkins,  Jofeph, 
Jperebee,  William  Ferebee,  William  Baker, and  Abner ;  Neate.— 84. 
NAY§-—MeiTrs.  Willie    Jones,    Samuel   Spencer,   Lewis  Lanier, 
Thomas  Wade,  Daniel  Gould,  lames  Bonner,    Alexius'   M.  Fofter^ 
Lewis  Dupree^  X"011138  Brown,  lames   Greenlee,  Joleph  M'Dowall,' 
Robert  Miller,  Benjamin  Williams,  Richard  Nixon,  Thomas  AJfm- 
ftrong,  Alexander  M'Allifter,  Robert  Dkkins,  George  Roberts,  Iohn- 
Womack,  Ambrpfe  Ramfey,  lames   Anderfon,  Jos,   Stewart^  WiU" 
liam  Veftal,  Thomas   Evans,  Thomas  Hardlman,  Robert  Weakley, 
William  Donnelfon,  William  Dobins,  Robert  Diggs,  Bythel   Bell," 
Elifha  Rattle,  William  Fort,  Etheld.  Gray,  William  Lancafter,  Tho-1 
mas  Sherrod,  ^chn   Norwood,  Sterling  Dupree,    Robert   Williams, 
Richard  Moye,    Arthur  Forbes,  David  Caldwell,  William  Goudy, 
Daniel   Gillefpie,  Iohn   Anderfon,  Iohn  Hamilton,  Thomas  Perfon,' 
Jofeph  Taylor,  Thornton  Yancey,  Howell  Lewis,  jun.  E*  Mitchell, 
George  Moore,  George  Ledbetter,  William  Porter,  Zebedee  Wood, 
Edmund  Waddeil,  Xames   Galloway,  Iohn  Regan,  Jofeph  Winftonj" 
James  Gains,    Charles  M'Annelly,    Abfalom   Boftick,  Iohn   Scott,' 
Iohn  Dunkin,  David  90c^>  Curtis  Ivev^^e^is^  Holmes,   Richard' 
Clinton,  Hardy  Holmes,  Robert  Alifpn,  lames  Stewart,  Iohn  Tip- 
ton, Iohn  Macon,  Thomas  Chriftmaijj,   Henry  Montfort,  William 
Taylor,  Iamea   Hanl^y,  Britain  Saupdert,  William  Lenoir,  Richard^ 
Allen,  Iohn  Brown,  jof.  Herndon,  lames  Fletcher,  Lemuel  Burkit, 
William  Little,  Thomas  Kang,  Nathan  Bryan,  Iohn  Hf  %y*n,  Ed- 
ward Whitty,  Robert  Alexander,  lames  Johnfon,  Iohn   Cox,  Iohn 
Carrsl,    Corn.   Doud,   Thomas  Tyfon,  WilUam  Martin,    Thomas 
Hunter,  Martin,  Iohn  Graham,  William  fopfc"»  William   Kindal, 
Thomas  UlTery,    Thomas  Butler,    Iehn  BemrWd,  lames  Vaughan, 
Robert  Peebles,  lames  Vinfon,  William  S.   Marnes,  Howell  Ellin,' 
Redman  Bunn,  Iohn  Bonds,  David  Pridgen,  Daniel  Yates,  Thomas' 
Johnfton,  Iohn  Spicer,  A.Tatom,  Alexander  Mebane,  William  Me- 
bane,    William  M'Cauley,    William.    Shepperd,    Orange,    Jonathan 
JLinley,  Wyatt  Hawkins,    lames  Payne,  Iohn   Graves,  Iohn  Blair, 
Jofeph  Tipton,   William   Bethel),    Abraham   Phillips,    Iohn  May* 
Charles  Galloway,  lames  Bofwell,  Iohn  M'Alliftcr,  David  Looney, ' 
v  John 


(     279     ) 

Iohn  Sharpe,  Jofeph  Gaitier,  Iohn  A.  Campbell,  Iohn  PugH  Wil- 
liams, William  Marshall,  Charles  Robertfon,  lames  Gillefpie,  Charles 
Ward,  William  Randal,  Frederick  Hargel,  Richard  M'Kinnie, 
Iohn  Cains,  Jacob  Leonard,  Thomas  Carfon,  Richard  Singleton, 
lames  Whitfide,  Caleb  Phifer,  Zachias  Wilfon,  Jofeph  Douglas, 
T  homas  Dougan,  lames  Kenan,  Iohn  Jones,  Egbert  Hay  ^ood,  Wil- 
liam Wootten,  Iohn  Branch,  Henry  Hill,  Andrew  Bafs,  Jofeph 
Boon,  William  Farmer,  John  Bryan,  Edward  Williams,  Francis  Oli- 
ver, Matthew  Brooks,  Griffith  Rutherford,  George  H.  Barringer, 
Timothy  Bloodworth,  Everet  Pearce,  Afahel  Rawlins,  lames  Wrl- 
Ton,,  lames  Roddy,  Samuel  Cain,  Benj.  Covington,  Jofeph  M'Dowall 
jun.  Durham  Hall,  lames  Bloodworth,  Joel  Lane,  lames  Hinton, 
Thomas  Devane,  lames  Brandon,  William  Dickfon,  Burwell  Moor- 
ing, Matthew  Lock,  and  Stokely  Donelfon.— 184. 

Ordered,  That  the  further  coafideration  of  the  report  of 
the  committee  of  the  whole  Convention  be  poftponed  un- 
til to-morrow. 

After  proceeding  on  another  bufinefs  which  had  been 
afligned  them,  (fixing  on  a  feat  of  government)  the  Con- 
vention adjourned  till  to-morrow  morning  fix  o'clock. 


SATURDAY,     August   2,   1788. 
The  Convention  met  according  to  adjournment. 
The  report  of  the  committee  of  the  whole  Convention, 
Recording  to  order,  was  taken  up  and  read  in  the  fame 
words  as  on  yefterday ;  when  it  was  moved  by  Mr.  Perfont 
and  feconded  by  Mr.  Maeon,  that  the  Convention  do  con- 
cur therewith,  which  was  objected  to  by  Mr,  A,  Machine. 
The  queftion  being  put,  "  Will  the  Convention  concur, 
with  the  report  of  the  committee  of  the  whole  Convention 
or  not  V*  It  was  carried,  in  the  affirmative.     Whereupon 
Mr.  Davie  moved  for  the  yeas  and  yeas,  and  was  feconded 
by  Mr. ;  Cabarrus.     They  were  accordingly  taken :  And 
thofe  who  voted  yefterday  againft  the  amendment,  voted 
for  concurring  with  the  report  of  the  committee — thofe 
who  voted  in  favour  of  the  amendment  now  voted  againft 
a  concurrence  with  tta report.     [See  their  names  page  278.  J 
On  motion  by  MWWillie  Jones,  and  feconded  by  Mr. 
James  Galloway,  the  following  refolution  was  adopted  by 
a  large  majority,  viz. 

Whereas  this  Convention  has  thought  proper  neither 
to  ratify  nor  reject  the  Conftitution  propofed  for  the  go* 
vernment  of  the  United  States  ;  and  as  Congrefswill  pro- 
ceed to  aft  under  the  faid  Conftitution,  ten  ftates  having 

ratified 


ratified   the  fame,  and  probably   lay  ah   impoft  on  g$S&$ 
imported  into  the  faid  ratifying  ftate6 : 

Refblved,  That  it  be  recommended  to  the  Legiflature  of 
this  ftate,  that  whenever  Gongrefs  (hall  pafs  a  law  for 
collecting  an  impoft  in  the  ftates  aforefaid,  this  ftate 
enact  a  law  for  collecting  a  ftmilar  impoft  on  goods  im- 
ported into  this  ftate,  and  appropriate  the  money  arifing 
therefrom,  to  the  ufe  of  Congrefs. 

.i  On  a  motion  made  by  Mr.  Wlllk  Jones,  and  fecorided 
l)y  Mr.  James  Galloway, 

Refohed  unnnimoujly,  That  it  be  recommended  to  the 
General  Afiem.bly  to  take  effe&tfal  meafures  for  the  re- 
demption of  the  paper  currency,  as  fpeedily  as  may  be, 
confiftent  with  the  fituation  and  circumftances  of  the  peo- 
ple of  this  ftate. 

On  a  motion  made  by  Mr.  Willie  Jones y  and  fecondecf 
by  Mr.  Jarnes  Galloway,  . 

Refohed  unanimoujly,  That  the  Honourable  the  Prefix 
dent  be  requefted  to  tranfmit  to  Congrefs,  and  to  the  Ex- 
ecutive of  New-Hampftiire,  Maffachufetrs,  Connecticut/ 
Jfchode-Ifland,  New- York,  New-Jcrfey,  Pennfylvania,  De- 
laware, Maryland,  Virginia,  SoUth-Carolina,  and  Georgia, 
a  copy  of  the  fefblution  of  the  committee  of  the  whol? 
Convention  oh  the  fubjecl:  of  the  Confutation  propofec| 
for  the  government  of  the  united  States,  concurred  witlr 
by  this  Convention,  together  with  a  copy  of  this  refolu- 
tions  on  the  fubjeel:  of  impoft  and  paper  money. 

The  Convention  afterwards  proceeded  to  the  bufinefs  of 
fixing  the  feat  of  government,  and  on  Monday,  Auguft  4, 
adjourned  Ji fie  die*  | 

8^  'the  per/on  ivho  took  the  debates,  having  %ad  a  very  inconvenient 
feat  in  the  gallery  and  hawing  been  frequently  mtilcjled  by  the  wife  made . 
in  the  gallery  and  below,  is  afraid  that  there  may  be  fame  inaccuracies  and 
omijjions  in  them.  But  he  can  truly  affure  the  gentlemen  vohofpohe  in  Con- 
vention in  particular,  and  the  public  in  general,  that  he  paid  thefiricleji 
mndmofl  inviolable  regard  tojujiice  and  impartiality ,  nor  <was  he  a&uatcd 
by  any  other  motive  whatjbever. 


<t 


. 


